Intra-party Dissent Research Articles

A Two-Headed Creature: Bicameralism in African Autocracies

Since the 1990s, seventeen African states have added a second chamber to their legislatures. This sudden trend is puzzling for two reasons. First, bicameral legislatures have decreased by 33 percent worldwide. Second, although upper houses often aim to improve democratic representation, descriptive statistics suggest these institutional changes were not due to democratic or representative pressures. The changes occurred primarily in hybrid regimes. What explains this resurgence of bicameral legislatures in Africa? I argue that incumbents introduce a second chamber when the opposition has sufficient power in the lower chamber to contain the executive branch. I adopt a mixed-methods approach combining statistical analysis and two case studies of Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. I find that African incumbents have created a second chamber to (1) weaken the legislature as a whole and the opposition in particular and (2) manage intra-party dissent.

Communicating the Rift: Voter Perceptions of Intraparty Dissent in Parliaments

Communicating the Rift: Voter Perceptions of Intraparty Dissent in Parliaments

Politicians unleashed? Political communication on Twitter and in parliament in Western Europe

AbstractTwitter is a prominent communication tool for politicians with two potential uses: as a “substitute” channel to circumvent constraints from other political arenas, or as an “amplifier” that reinforces party messages. Using a novel dataset containing tweets and parliamentary speeches by members of parliament (MPs) in seven countries, we estimate politicians’ positions and intra-party dissent on European integration. We find that MPs’ sentiment about Europe on Twitter is a valid measure of their party's position, while also uncovering intra-party disagreements. Our results suggest that most MPs amplify the partisan message, but MPs who participate less in parliamentary debate tend to have larger differences with their party on Twitter. Social media thus can free politicians from their party's grip.

Intra-party dissent over Brexit in the British Conservative Party

This article seeks to map the evolution of intra-party dissent over Brexit in the parliamentary Conservative Party between July 2016 and January 2020. It shows that dissent was primarily due to the relentless intra-party disputes over the fact that the Conservative Government failed to deliver Brexit during Theresa May’s premiership. Brexit could not have been settled if Boris Johnson had not managed to reunite the party through the 2019 general election. This article gauges the intensity of intra-party dissent by drawing on three representative indicators, including the number of Conservative MPs quitting the party, the number of ministerial resignations and parliamentary voting records of the Conservative MPs over Brexit. Three dominant factional groups, namely hard Brexiteers, soft Brexiteers and Bremainers, competed to shape the government’s handling of Brexit. They diverged over issues of sovereignty, economic implication of Brexit, and the UK–EU future relationship. The research also finds that the hard Brexiteers and the Bremainers appeared less compromising over Brexit, while the soft Brexiteers with a pragmatic mindset were relatively flexible and ready for concessions.

Explaining the reform of the Europarties’ selection procedures for Spitzenkandidaten

ABSTRACT This article examines how Europarties selected lead candidates (Spitzenkandidaten) for the 2019 European Parliament elections, and investigates why these parties changed or did not change their procedural processes compared with the 2014 election. As external and internal factors incentivized Europarties to democratize their selections, the main hypothesis expects more inclusive procedures in 2019. The empirical analysis examines seven parties – EPP, PES, ALDE, EGP, PEL, ACRE and EFA – based on sixteen interviews with high-ranking party officials, internal party documents, and party websites. By leveraging analytical frameworks for the analysis of national parties we first provide a detailed account of these Europarties’ selection procedures and subsequently present crucial factors explaining reforms (or lack thereof). The results show that mainly intra-party dissent hampered large democratic reforms. Our findings contribute to scholarly understanding of intra-party decision-making in Europarties, and have important consequences for the role of Europarties in future democratizing efforts of the EU.

Political partisanship versus turnout in Italy’s 2016 referendum

Italy’s 2016 referendum represents an opportunity to discuss the main hypotheses posited by current literature as to the determinants of referendums. The issue-voting of this constitutional referendum was too technical to arouse great passions in the voters. This provided room for second-order determinants, and the referendum campaign became a competition between Government and Opposition. In such a scenario, political partisanship is expected to play a significant role in the voter’s choice. This paper intends to test the impact of partisanship on the vote, versus that of further possible determinants: intra-party dissent, the voters’ dissatisfaction with the government, as well as the referendum turnout. Particular attention has been paid to the latter, also because the impact of turnout on referendums is understudied. Correlations and linear regression models, based on data of all the Italian provinces, revealed that, apart from partisanship, other second-order features impacted on the referendum outcome: in particular, it emerged that, where the turnout had been higher, the “No” share was lower. However, the turnout was intertwined with other determinants, first of all, partisanship. To disentangle the turnout from its correlates, a lagged instrument, namely the turnout of the previous referendum held in 2006, was introduced. The Two-Stage Least Squares model proved the instrument to be a robust predictor of the 2016 referendum vote. The result of a mediation model further supported these findings, which suggest that the turnout—as an expression of civic commitment—is not independent of the voters’ decision.

The politics of parliamentary procedure: An analysis of Queen’s Speech debates in the House of Commons

In the UK Parliament, the State Opening and accompanying Queen’s Speech enable governments to set out their legislative plans and delineate their policy choices at the start of each parliamentary session. This article explores the procedural politics of the Queen’s Speech debates, and analyses atypical cases to demonstrate the institutional, constitutional and political utility of the process. It examines the defeated King’s Speech of 1924; the backbench dissent of the 1946 King’s Speech; the volatile Labour Queen’s Speeches of the 1970s; and finally the free vote on a government backbench amendment to the 2013 Queen’s Speech. In demonstrating the political use of parliamentary procedure, it maps a number of different modes of procedural utility for Queen’s Speech debates: to facilitate government; to frame policy debates; to contest policy choices; and to articulate both inter- and intra-party dissent. The article argues that, as a consequence of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011, Queen’s Speech debate procedures may become an increasingly important mechanism through which normally marginalised actors pursue their political goals.

Intra-Party Dissent as a Constraint in Policy Competition: Mapping and Analysing the Positioning of Political Parties in the German Refugee Debate from August to November 2015

The large influx of refugees into Germany in late 2015 gave rise to a period of intensified party competition over a single issue: refugees. This paper examines German parties’ reactions to this issue suddenly becoming highly important and voter preferences shifting to a more restrictive stance. It does so by analysing the parties’ positions on the issue from August to November 2015 based on statements from more than 1000 quality newspaper articles. The analysis shows that there was no uniform shift in line with the change in public opinion but a pattern of polarisation. Moreover, converging party position changes sparked intra-party criticism that was in turn followed by divergence – a pattern observable for the Green Party as well as for the Christian Democrats. Altogether, these findings suggest that policy motives, which induce intra-party dissent, impede parties opportunistically trying to follow shifts in public opinion in the short term.

Cross-cutting issues, intraparty dissent and party strategy: The issue of European integration in the House of Commons

When do legislative opposition parties use wedge issues to attack the government? In this article, I focus on the issue of European integration and its impact on party strategy in the 1992–1997 British House of Commons. Utilizing both voting and rhetorical data, the analysis reveals that both government and opposition were split on the issue, and thus the opposition was not able to use it. This, I argue, stems from the complexity of the issue, i.e. the fact that it combines redistributive cleavages with pre- and post-material ones, which cannot be suppressed by party leaders. The results demonstrate the importance of taking into consideration both the government’s and the opposition’s cohesion in modeling party strategies. Further, the combination of voting and rhetorical data adds to our understanding of the dimensionality and structure of partisan ideologies in Europe. We have won more elections than any party in Britain because we are the most united and the most determined party in Britain. Over the same period Labour has been the most divided and the most undisciplined party. That is why they have lost, and lost, and lost, and lost again. Sir Norman Fowler, Conservative Party Chairman, 1992 Party Conference.

How salient is Europe? An analysis of European election manifestos, 1979–2004

What determines how ‘European’ a party’s manifesto is? This article examines the salience of European issues in national parties’ Euromanifestos during the 1979–2004 period. I argue that domestic politics, including voter, party, and party system factors, influence the European content of a party’s Euromanifesto. Using data from the Euromanifestos Project for 14 member states, I find that the differential emphasis on European issues in the national party system, intra-party dissent on European integration, voter ambivalence on membership of the European Union, and party type all influence the salience of European issues in a party’s manifesto. These findings have important implications for understanding both how parties use manifestos to manipulate the political agenda and the dimensions of contestation in elections to the European Parliament.

Where There is Discord, Can They Bring Harmony? Managing Intra-Party Dissent on European Integration in the Conservative Party

Research Highlights and Abstract The Conservative Party became more united around a soft Eurosceptic position in opposition, but internal divisions are evident on the scale and pace of change to the UK's relationship with the EU. Conservative Party leaders have employed a range of methods to manage intra-party dissent on European integration: intervention in candidate selection, patronage, discipline, policy compromises, permitting low-cost dissent, referendum pledges and reducing issue salience. Dissent on European integration tends to be higher when the Conservatives are in office because governing parties cannot individually control the EU agenda, must take difficult decisions and may have to sacrifice their preferred positions to broker compromises. Eurosceptic dissent has increased because Conservative policy has been diluted in coalition and the crisis in the Eurozone has raised the salience of the EU issue, but Eurosceptic rebels are not a cohesive group and this limits their influence. Divisions on European integration were prominent in the Conservative Party in the 1990s, but abated in opposition. In this period, the party became more cohesive in terms of attitudes on Europe as it embraced soft Euroscepticism. However, differences over the desired scale and pace of changes to Britain's relationship with the European Union saw dissent increase as the party entered coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. This article examines the effectiveness of various approaches to management of dissent on Europe utilised by the party leadership: intervention in candidate selection; patronage and discipline; permitting limited dissent; policy compromise and deferred decisions; pledging referendums; and agenda setting and issue salience. It shows that intra-party divisions on European integration are particularly difficult to manage and suggests that dissent on the issue may often be higher in governing parties than those in opposition.

Containing the sleeping giant in EU referendums? A comparison of the strategies of confinement of EU issues of the RPR (1992) and the PS (2005)

This article deals with the ways parties depoliticise European matters in EU referendums. Through the two cases of the RPR in the Maastricht Treaty referendum and the PS in the ECT referendum, it investigates how mainstream parties contain the ‘sleeping giant’, how they manage intra-party dissent over EU matters. It reflects on the specific strategies they use to confine the effects of the European cleavage on their party organisations. It relies on a comparative case study analysis based on newspaper archives to reassess the distinct political contexts and the evolving positions of party leaderships over time. Three main findings are outlined. First, it shows that the ‘Europeanisation’ of the discourses of mainstream parties has remained highly strategic, superficial and fluctuating over time. Second, while the politicisation of EU matters has sometimes occurred, Eurosceptic pressures have been actively absorbed by mainstream parties through a whole range of strategies of compartmentalisation. Finally, it illustrates that depoliticisation has constituted a core element in the ways mainstream parties have used EU issues in domestic political competition.

Dropping the unitary actor assumption: The impact of intra-party delegation on coalition governance

What happens to cabinet governance if parties do not act as ‘unitary actors’? In this paper, I examine the consequences of intra-party dissent for coalition governments in parliamentary systems. Drawing on the principal–agent literature, I develop a model in which party agents, namely cabinet ministers and legislators rather than parties as collective actors, decide on specific policies. The individuals’ amount of loyalty determines the degree of party unity. I use simulation techniques to analyze the power of an agenda-setting minister in a two-party coalition conditional on the level of party unity. The results suggest that the minister’s agenda-setting power diminishes if parliamentarians and cabinet members aim at implementing their personal policy preferences. However, the party not in charge of the respective portfolio may benefit from disunity within its own ranks. This counter-intuitive result raises doubts about the widespread view that internal unity strengthens the bargaining power of political parties.

Mixed Messages

Mass opposition to Europe may stem from mainstream as well as formally Euroskeptic parties. Large parties in the member states of the European Union (EU) tend to combine support for Europe with a high level of intra-party dissent over the issue. Thus, these parties provide heterogeneous yet potentially influential signals about European integration to their supporters. In this paper, we examine the effect of intra-party dissent on the opinion of party supporters. Our estimation of this relationship explicitly addresses the issues of endogeneity, omitted variables, and measurement problems endemic to the empirical study of elite effects on mass opinion. Specifically, we use variation in the centralization of candidate selection rules as an instrumental variable for intra-party dissent. We find substantial evidence that intra-party dissent does indeed increase variation in support for integration among party supporters. With common levels of intra-party dissent, even pro-EU parties can cause a substantial portion of their supporters to adopt anti-EU opinions.

Who’s Cueing Whom?

The 2005 French and Dutch referendum campaigns were characterized by an alleged disconnect between pro-European political elites and Eurosceptic masses. Past evidence regarding elite-mass linkages in the context of European integration has been conflicting. Whereas some scholars argue that political elites respond to the changing preferences of their electorates, others suggest that party elites cue the mass public through a process of information and persuasion. We contend that these conflicting results stem from the reciprocal nature of elite-mass linkages and estimate a series of dynamic simultaneous equations models to account for this reverse causation. Using Euro-barometer and expert survey data from 1984-2002, we find evidence of a dual-process model, whereby party elites both respond to and shape the views of their supporters. We also find that the strength of these results is contingent on several factors, including the type of electoral system, intra-party dissent and voter characteristics.

The Changing Face of the British House of Commons in the 1970s

Until 1970, one party normally had a governing majority in the House of Commons, high voting cohesion existed in both major parliamentary parties, and Governments were rarely defeated in the House. In the decade of the 1970s, governing majorities declined in size and then disappeared, intra-party dissent rose markedly, and Government defeats in the division lobbies occurred frequently. These changes called into question the previously held assumptions that party discipline in the House of Commons resulted from the MPs' fears of precipitating a general election, from the power of the whips, from the expectation of party loyalty among the constituency parties, and from the Government's superior sources of information on matters of policy. A new self-reliance among MPs is likely to sustain and reinforce the movement for parliamentary reform.

Democracy or Socialism? A Case Study ofVorwärtsin the 1890s

Interpreters who would make Karl Marx a democrat argue that a correctly informed socialist agitation can combine with economic conditions to create majority support for a proletarian revolution and a communist society. When the agitators themselves disagree about socialist theory, however, a dilemma is created. Should party leaders pose as guardians of orthodoxy and muzzle intraparty dissent, to the obvious detriment of democracy, or should they tolerate criticism of socialist dogma, and thereby perhaps weaken the chance for a successful revolution? Before Lenin imposed his answer to these questions upon the communist movement, the world's first mass-based and avowedly Marxist party, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), grappled inconclusively with this intraparty dilemma of democratic socialism.