Interstate Compact Research Articles

Counseling and the Interstate Compact: Navigating Ethical Practice Across State Lines

Counseling and the Interstate Compact: Navigating Ethical Practice Across State Lines

Why is it taking so long to move down the road?: Creating a regional border agreement in the DMV as an alternative for the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children

AbstractThe Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) is an agreement between all 50 states and the District of Columbia governing the process of placing a foster child out of state. Notorious for its long wait times and system backlog, the ICPC presents a host of problems for children attempting to move mere minutes across state lines to be with a relative or kin placement instead of state foster care. In an effort to make this process smoother, 18 different “border agreements” have been adopted by several neighboring states across the U.S. Such border agreements give temporary placement licenses to relatives and kin while the ICPC process is ongoing. While this is a good start towards a solution, the ICPC could be further streamlined if border agreements were used more widely, especially in regional contexts. This article considers the possibility of such a regional agreement between the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Northern Virginia (known as the “DMV”). By comparing and contrasting two existing border agreements in these three jurisdictions, a regional DMV border agreement can be created implementing the best terms of both agreements.

Clashes Involving National Popular Vote, Hare (“RCV”), Maine, Alaska

ABSTRACTApparently unnoticed by its advocates, a prominent effort to improve the troubled US presidential-election system—the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—is on a collision course with another effort at electoral change—“ranked-choice voting” (RCV, known previously by less ambiguous names). The NPVIC is a clever device intended, without constitutional amendment, to elect as president the nationwide popular-vote winner (i.e., the plurality-vote winner) rather than the electoral-vote winner. Election results in 2000, 2016, and 2020 enhanced its support. However, the (constitutional) ability of even one state to replace its plurality voting with another voting system causes the popular-vote total posited for the NPVIC to be undefined, thereby rendering the NPVIC unusable. Maine and Alaska recently switched from plurality voting to RCV for presidential elections. Consequently, tangled results and turmoil could occur with the NPVIC. To improve presidential elections, replacing plurality voting with other systems appears to be more sensible than pursuing the NPVIC.

Across State Lines: Interstate Compact (DOJ)

Federal Grants & ContractsVolume 45, Issue 2 p. 6-6 Grants Alerts Across State Lines: Interstate Compact (DOJ) First published: 14 December 2020 https://doi.org/10.1002/fgc.31463Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume45, Issue217 December 2020Pages 6-6 RelatedInformation

The Electors Clause and the Governor's Veto

This Essay examines whether the United States Constitution allows a governor to veto a state legislature’s bill governing presidential elections. The Constitution does not support this seemingly intuitive proposition directly, and on its face appears to vest control over presidential elections solely in the hands of state legislatures: while Article II of the Constitution explicitly provides for the “Legislature” of each state to control the “manner” in which electors are chosen, it makes no mention of state governors. This vagary in the Constitution’s text takes on particular import in light of political polarization over election administration in recent years. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has prompted numerous states to make emergency modifications to their election systems, including delaying elections or attempting to cancel marginally competitive presidential primaries. Commentators have even expressed fear that a state legislature may eventually attempt to exercise its plenary authority to determine how presidential electors are appointed under Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution to choose electors without holding a popular vote. This Essay answers these concerns by arguing that a state governor can veto state legislatures’ bills governing presidential elections on the same terms as any other legislation. Although the Constitution may not explicitly provide for a state governor’s role, the Supreme Court’s precedents and longstanding practice strongly suggest that a state governor has the same powers over bills governing presidential elections as over other state legislation. This conclusion has further implications for other potential conflicts between state legislatures and governors over presidential elections, including rules for absentee balloting, awarding electors by congressional district, using ranked-choice voting, or entering the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact.

Designing an Interstate Compact for a Pandemic Testing Board

Analysts have recently focused their attention on two pathways for the United States to reopen prior to the development of a vaccine for COVID-19. The first is to accept a series of rolling openings and closings: reopening as infection rates decrease, then reclosing as they rise again due to increased interac- tions. This approach is generally thought to be enormously costly economically and socially, as people will be kept in their homes and commerce restrained for considerable amounts of time. The second approach is to massively ramp up the production of testing, either through a universal testing regime (which would require capacity to test all 300+ million Americans every week or two) or a system of testing, tracing, and supported isolation (which would require testing 5 million Americans a day, plus tracing those who were in contact with the infected and isolating them). The testing pathway would enable the United States to reopen without having to close repeatedly and it would, as a result, save billions of dollars. The problem is that we do not have the number of tests necessary to pursue a testing pathway to reopening. Scaling up testing presents a variety of challenges -- including supply of the underlying materials within the supply chain; coordination problems that link supply to demand; and personnel and plans for how to deploy millions of tests per day. One solution to these challenges, which the Harvard Roadmap for Pandemic Resilience has outlined, is to establish a single coordinating body—a Pandemic Testing Board—to be tasked with ensuring the necessary supply of tests, deploying those tests, and facilitating a tracing program. There are two ways to design this body. It could be a federal government institution, part of the Executive Branch. Or it could be built through an interstate compact, with federal appropriations but not federal administration. This paper offers a blueprint for how to design a pandemic testing board via an interstate compact.

An Interstate Compact to End the Economic Development Subsidy Arms Race

Targeted economic development subsidies do not work as advertised. In fact, the balance of economic theory and empirical evidence suggests that they are more likely to undermine development than to enhance it. Yet policymakers face strong incentives to continue to offer subsidies. Because subsidies are economically costly but politically valuable, they create a situation similar to a prisoner’s dilemma. An interstate compact offers a solution by changing the political payoffs. Importantly, interstate compacts enable policymakers to credibly commit to ending what many already see as a race to the bottom. Ending the mutually destructive subsidy war would allow state and local governments to repurpose up to $95 billion annually to tax relief and other projects with better payoffs.

The Myth of National Popular Vote Presidential Elections and the Reality of Elector Unit Rule Voting

The Myth of National Popular Vote Presidential Elections and the Reality of Elector Unit Rule Voting discusses in unprecedented depth if the proposed National Popular Vote Interstate Compact can provide for popular election of a President of the United States whether or not the winner of the popular vote also wins the Electoral College. It concludes that NPV cannot accomplish its purported purpose. The article also discusses a recent article proposing each state’s electors to vote in accordance with the popular vote proportions in their respective states instead of, as the case now, unanimously, by the unit rule. It concludes that this change would be impractical and unwise. The revision also contains a new critical section on a recent article asserting that the Electoral College is more than an echo of slavery and a new conclusory section. This article is current as of February 13, 2020. It reflects the 10th Circuit's decision in Baca v. Colorado Secretary of State and the Supreme Court’s grant of review in that case and the conflicting Washington State Supreme Court case, Matter of Guerra.

ASHA Sets 2020 Advocacy Priorities Targeting Workload, Reimbursement, and More

You have accessThe ASHA LeaderASHA News1 Mar 2020ASHA Sets 2020 Advocacy Priorities Targeting Workload, Reimbursement, and More Jeffrey P. ReganMA Jeffrey P. Regan Google Scholar More articles by this author , MA https://doi.org/10.1044/leader.AN10.25032020.65 SectionsAboutPDF ToolsAdd to favorites ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In In this era of unprecedented polarization and uncertainty, it is more important than ever that lawmakers and policymakers across the country understand the value of audiologists and speech-language pathologists. Despite the political cacophony, ASHA has hit the ground running this year, building on last year’s successes and aggressively advocating on behalf of the professions in several key priority areas. ASHA’s 2020 Public Policy Agenda guides our advocacy efforts. This member-driven and member-written resource—approved by the Board of Directors—sets ASHA’s top public policy priorities in schools, health care, early intervention, and professional practice. In schools, ASHA is advancing new legislative language to promote manageable workload, reduce excessive caseload, and streamline documentation burdens for our school-based members. We are also fighting for fair and equitable wages, as well as increased access to and funding for the services we provide. In health care, ASHA continues to advance several initiatives that would protect and expand comprehensive coverage of and payment for services provided in a variety of health care settings. We are also working to ensure fair productivity and documentation standards, and that emerging health care delivery systems and new payment models include our services. It is essential to preserve licensure and certification requirements for the professions, protect the professions’ defined scopes of practice, mitigate workforce shortages, and support a robust, diverse graduate and undergraduate student population. ASHA is working to expand state adoption of the new Audiology and Speech-Language Pathology Interstate Compact, and to advance congressional initiatives that would diversify the student population in graduate audiology and speech-language pathology programs. ASHA also recognizes a commitment to the 40 million Americans who have a communication disorder. We are working on several initiatives designed to benefit the patients, clients, and students our members serve. This diverse objective includes supporting the preservation of Medicaid eligibility and benefits, ensuring that families have objective information with which to make informed decisions about treatment and care, and promoting devices and technologies that are safe for consumers. The 2020 Public Policy Agenda recognizes the pivotal role that ASHA members play as advocates for the professions, and highlights resources for members who want to stay informed and get involved, including the 60-Second Advocacy Update, ASHA Take Action, and ASHA-PAC. Author Notes Jeffrey P. Regan, MA, is ASHA director of government affairs and public policy. [email protected] Advertising Disclaimer | Advertise With Us Advertising Disclaimer | Advertise With Us Additional Resources FiguresSourcesRelatedDetails Volume 25Issue 2March 2020 Get Permissions Add to your Mendeley library History Published in print: Feb 28, 2020 Metrics Downloaded 314 times Topicsasha-topicsleader_do_tagleader-topicsasha-article-typesCopyright & Permissions© 2020 American Speech-Language-Hearing AssociationLoading ...

The Myth of the Bipartisan National Popular Vote Plan

Abstract Advocates of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) promise that it can deliver plurality electoral rule (“first past the post”) for presidential elections, at the national level, without amending the Constitution or abolishing the Electoral College. They also contend that the plan has seen bipartisan support and will pass on the strength of such cross-party attraction. In fact, the NPVIC remains a polarizing scheme, strongly appealing to most Democrats and strongly repellant to most Republicans. In turn, it is extremely unlikely that sufficiently many states will join the Compact for it to reach the next stage of legal testing.

A Quiet Coup: Balkanizing the U.S. by Eliminating the Electoral College

There are calls for US presidential elections to be changed. The existing Electoral College system, a method that has been in effect in every presidential election since the 1804 approval of the Twelfth Amendment to the US Constitution, is seen by those seeking change as an unjust way for selecting US presidents. Many Democrats remain enraged by the fact that Hillary Clinton received more votes than Donald Trump in 2016 but was not elected president due to the Electoral College’s state-by-state electoral system. A movement is taking place in some state legislatures to adopt a system called the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact [the Compact]. This is a key part of a strategy drafted in 2006 and not yet operative but gaining state signatories. At this point in May 2019 all the current 15 state signatories to the Compact represent states with Democratic-controlled legislatures. The District of Columbia has also voted to join the Compact, bringing the total count to 16. The Investors Business Daily published an analysis of the worst run and best run states from a fiscal perspective. The worst run states included Illinois, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island. Each of these states is a signatory to the national popular vote Compact. The best run states included South Dakota, Tennessee, Nebraska, Florida, Utah, Alaska, Oklahoma, Wyoming, New Hampshire, and Montana. With the exception of New Hampshire they are all “Red” states. None is a signatory to the Compact. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is an attempt at a “quiet coup” seeking permanent voting control of the office of the US Presidency. As such it offers a perfect recipe for the balkanization of America, contradicting the wisdom of those such as James Madison, one of our Founding Fathers who played a critical role in the formation of our Constitution. Madison recognized the inevitable factionalism of competing interests and diverse cultures in America. The Compact seeks to effectively amend the US Constitution de facto while pretending otherwise. The advocates launched a strategy through the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact knowing they could not gain the required approval of three-fourths of US states to create a national vote simple majority or plurality amendment to the US Constitution in place of the Twelfth Amendment’s Electoral College system.

Three Bizarre Presidential-Election Scenarios: The Perils of Simplism

The 1968, 2000, and (future) 2024 U.S. presidential elections provide settings for deliberately provocative, offbeat scenarios that might have happened or could happen. Throughout, the Electoral College and plurality voting both receive blame. Scenario 1 exposes a quirk previously unnoticed: Under (albeit special) conditions, certain 1968 Humphrey voters could have made Humphrey rather than Nixon the election victor had they voted strategically for Wallace instead of Humphrey. In Scenario 2, overlooked nonidentifiability of undervotes would have plagued the 2000 Florida recount had the U.S. Supreme Court not halted it, thus raising questions about the foresightfulness of almost everyone involved; but, in addition, Gore missed an opportunity that, through use of proper statistical sampling, could have propelled him to victory. In Scenario 3, National Popular Vote Interstate Compact supporters fail to foresee that even one state, by changing its method for presidential voting, can wreck this innovative and widely promoted compact.

Editorial Note

Editorial Note

Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the formation of either a Regional Popular Vote Interstate compact or a National Popular Vote Interstate compact on the functioning of a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College. The two versions of interstate compacts that are considered here differ in only one respect: in one case, the interstate compact allocates its electoral votes to the regional popular winner, while in the other case it allocates the votes to the national popular winner. They both differ from the ongoing National Popular Vote Interstate Compact as it is assumed that the agreement is effective as soon as the members sign it. Decisiveness and welfare analyses are conducted with a simplified symmetric theoretical version of the Electoral College wherein malapportionment problems are absent. The three most popular probabilistic models are considered and the study is conducted either from the self-interest perspective of the initiators of the interstate compact or from a general interest perspective. The analysis combines analytical arguments and simulations.

Collective Action and the Evolution of Intergovernmental Cooperation

Voluntary cooperation among governments holds tremendous promise for solving policy problems with regional and national scope. In this article, we apply insights from the theory of institutional collective action to understand the evolution of cooperative governmental institutions. We address the question: What makes a government decide to exit an existing cooperative arrangement and join a new one with a stronger central authority? Our empirical analyses examine state choices about whether to participate in the new Interstate Compact for Juveniles or remain in an existing compact that serves the same purpose. The findings shed light on how governments make trade‐offs between their desire to maintain their autonomy and the need to overcome the transactions costs, coordination problems, and free‐rider problems associated with cooperative governance in order to achieve policy gains.

Competing loyalties in electoral reform: An analysis of the U.S. electoral college

A central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that parties, when in power and motivated by partisan interest, seek desired outcomes via the strategic adoption of electoral rules. Such a focus, however, omits a key point: electoral rules also distribute power among geographic units. If, within a party, the partisan and geographic interests of some members conflict, then the canonical relationship between partisanship and rule choice may be conditional. The U.S. electoral college provides an opportunity to test for such intra-party variation, because it advantages some states over others and thus makes salient geographic allegiances. Using an original dataset on one reform proposal—the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—I find evidence of competing loyalties. Although NPVIC advances furthest when Democrats control state lawmaking, a state's status as a swing—but not as an overrepresented—state weakens the relationship to the point where even Democrats are unlikely to aid NPVIC.

Group to Develop Interstate Compact for Audiologists, SLPs

Group to Develop Interstate Compact for Audiologists, SLPs

A Calamitous Compact

ABSTRACTThe National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (joined so far by ten states and DC) would replace the current presidential-election system, based on the electoral college and the winner-take-all rule, with nationwide plurality rule, and it would do so by changes in state law, not a Constitutional amendment. The mischief that would create (especially procedural instability, noncompliant electors, nation-wide recounts, vote manipulation, and narrowed support), the compact’s questionable Constitutionality, the weakness of its defense, and the availability of less calamitous alternatives are reasons enough to reject it.

Electoral Vote Allocation and Pennsylvania

The Pennsylvania General Assembly has introduced bills to reform the allocation of electoral votes in presidential elections. These reforms include changing from a winner-take-all (unit) system of allocating electoral votes to inclusion in the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact and adopting the congressional district method of allocating electoral votes. This paper argues that while there are substantial problems with the current method by which Pennsylvania (and most other states) allocate its electoral votes, the potential problems associated with reform proposals would not improve the fairness of the current system, the efficacy of citizens’ votes, nor the importance of the state of Pennsylvania in presidential elections.

Newest AMA Section Council Member Brings Focus on LGBT Health

At the June 2015 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, the GLMA will be sponsoring a resolution to end the exclusion of transgender individuals from service in the military.