Interrogative Model Of Inquiry Research Articles

J. Hintikka’s Interrogative Model of Inquiry and Prospects for Its Application in the Study of Artificial Intelligence

The article outlines the prospects of using J. Hintikka’s interrogative epistemology for modelling cognitive operations carried out by a cognizing agent to create a machine capable of full cognition. It was established that modeling is divided into two objectives: modeling the cognitive operations and modeling the strategic reasoning. Interrogative epistemology presents a solution to the first objective. It relies on a game-theoretic formal apparatus that allows one to correctly describe all types of possible moves within the framework of a particular cognitive game. The second objective cannot be accomplished in a general epistemological theory framework since strategic considerations about the organization of research and even the concept of knowledge inevitably depend on the broader context of an agent’s practical activity. Therefore, interrogative epistemology does not claim a universal and complete description of the process of cognition, focusing on other tasks: primarily on identifying hidden premises that cognitive agents use in their reasoning. For the same reason, interrogative epistemology deems the possibility of the existence of a cognizing machine as formally unsubstantiated and questionable. However, arguments are given in favor of the fact that interrogative epistemology serves as an acceptable conceptual framework for clarifying the nature of the difficulties that arise with attempts to accomplish the second objective and improving the quality of philosophical discourse in the field of artificial intelligence research. The author substantiates this position by arguing that the ability to cognize presupposes the ability to perform all the essential functions that are usually called mental.

Strategies of inquiry

This paper examines critically the reconstruction of the ‘Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction’ proposed jointly by M.B. Hintikka (1939–1987) and J. Hintikka (1929–2016) in the 1980s, and its successor, the interrogative model of inquiry (imi) developed by J. Hintikka and his collaborators in the 1990s. The Hintikkas’ model explicitly used game theory in order to formalize a naturalistic approach to inquiry, but the imi abandoned both the game-theoretic formalism, and the naturalistic approach. It is argued that the latter better supports the claim that the imi provides a ‘logic of discovery’, and safeguards its empirical adequacy. Technical changes necessary to this interpretation are presented, and examples are discussed, both formal and informal, that are better analyzed when these changes are in place. The informal examples are borrowed from Conan Doyle’s The Case of Silver Blaze, a favorite of M.B. and J. Hintikka.

The interrogative model of inquiry meets dynamic epistemic logics

The Interrogative Model of Inquiry (IMI) and Dynamic Epistemic Logics (DELs) are two central paradigms in formal epistemology. This paper is motivated by the observation of a significant complementarity between them: on the one hand, the IMI provides a framework for investigating inquiry represented as an idealized game between an Inquirer and Nature, along with an account of the interaction between questions and inferences in information-seeking processes, but is lacking a formulation in the multi-agent case; on the other hand, DELs model various operations of information change in multi-agent systems, but the field is lacking a proper integration of question and inference dynamics, along with an application to the investigation of inquiry processes. The goal of this paper is to integrate the two paradigms in such a way as to combine their respective insights. To this end, we develop a formal system called DEL\(_\mathrm{IMI }\) which aims to represent the interaction between question and inference dynamics in inquiry—as described by the IMI—in a multi-agent setting, and this in such a way as to enable an investigation of inquiry games with multi-agent dimensions. The DEL\(_\mathrm{IMI }\) system is designed to represent the possible moves of such inquiry games through three types of epistemic actions: agents addressing questions to Nature, agents addressing questions to other agents, agents drawing logical inferences. We then show how the resulting framework can be used to formally define multi-agent inquiry games. We conclude by evaluating the interest of the DEL\(_\mathrm{IMI }\) system for the IMI and DELs paradigms.

Introduction: The Second Nordic HPS&ST Symposium

The symposium concentrated on questions of how to promote better science teaching and better scientific literacy in all levels of education by having lessons informed by the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. In particular, the symposium attempted to discuss and find ways to implement these aspects of knowledge and knowledge formation in teacher-education programs. The collection of papers in this volume, discuss a diversity of topics, but with the common core how philosophy and history of science can be used for the benefits of science teaching. The uses and advantages of such a view are today acknowledged not only in the field of education, but also in the field of cognitively oriented views of learning. The article Questioning and Experimentation by Arto Mutanen makes an interesting and new contact between Jaakko Hintikka’s philosophy and education. This opening is new and with many potential applications in field of science education. In the core of the article is Hintikka’s interrogative model of inquiry, with its explicit and well-formed logic of questioning and answering. This model is then used to analyze the learning process. The insights contained in this work show in very illuminating way, how philosophy of science can act as a source of innovation in teaching. The contributions, Consolidating Pre-service Physics Teachers’ Subject Matter Knowledge Using Didactical Reconstructions by Terhi Mantyla and Maija Nousiainen, and How to Use Historical Approach to Teach Nature of Science in Chemistry Education by Simo Tolvanen, Jan Jansson Veli-Matti Vesterinen and Maija Aksela, come from the research groups of Faculty of Science, Helsinki University, and both describe those innovations and practical renovations which have been done in teacher education inspired by history and philosophy in science. The article by Mantyla and Nousiainen describes approaches used in physics teacher education, and based on certain didactical reconstruction used to emphasize the epistemological aspects of science. The authors discuss

Questioning and Experimentation

The paper is a philosophical analysis of experimentation. The philosophical framework of the analysis is the interrogative model of inquiry developed by Hintikka. The basis of the model is explicit and well-formed logic of questions and answers. The framework allows us to formulate a flexible logic of experimentation. In particular, the formulated model can be interpreted realistically. Moreover, the model demonstrates an explicit logic of knowledge acquisition. So, the natural extension of the model is to apply it to an analysis of the learning process.

EXPLANATORINESS: CAUSE VERSUS CRAIG

In "Toward a Theory of the Process of Explanation", Ilpo Halonen and Jaakko Hintikka (2003) present two interlocking theses, one positive, one negative. Their positive thesis is that philosophical inquiries into the nature of explanation should begin with a theory that explicates the logical form of the process of explaining, [ms. 4] Given that explanations are the product of such processes, a theory of explanation will emerge as a con sequence of the theory of explaining. Their negative thesis is that the nature and importance of what they call the "covering law model" of explanations has been dramatically misunderstood. By analyzing the logical form of the process of explanation, Halonen and Hintikka endeavor to show that covering laws should be viewed not as premises, but rather as 'summaries' of explanatory arguments. The core of Halonen and Hintikka's positive thesis is a theory of the process of explaining which the authors dub the "interrogative nomological" model. Since the interrogative-nomological model is essen tially a special case of Hintikka's interrogative model of inquiry, [ms. 4] the explanatory process overall is viewed as an interrogative "argument", aimed at finding an answer to the question why E?, where E is the ex planandum. Such argument begins with a (possibly informal) background theory T, then proceeds with the explainer posing "questions" to nature (experiments) and nature yielding "answers" (results of experiments). At least a part of this process is aimed at establishing some suitable initial conditions / such that the explanandum can be logically derived from T and /. Accordingly, while explaining does contain a deductive element, it is not a purely deductive enterprise, [ms. 44] Halonen and Hintikka emphasize that the explanandum (and, presum ably, the explanans) can have any logical form whatsoever, [ms. 27] What is critical in explanations is the behavior of non-logical constants, [ms. 27] The constants in the explanandum fall into two mutually exclusive, but not necessarily exhaustive, classes: the critical and the queried constants. The critical ones are, so to speak, the values of the parameters that specify

The Interrogative Model of Inquiry and Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning

The purpose of the study was to examine how the Interrogative Modelof Inquiry (I-Model), developed by Jaakko Hintikka and Matti Sintonenfor the purposes of epistemology and philosophy of science, could be applied to analyze elementary schoolstudents' process of inquiry in computer-supported learning. We review the basic assumptions of I-Model,report results of empirical investigation of the model in the context of computer-supportedcollaborative learning, and discuss pedagogical implications of the model. The results of the studyfurnished evidence that elementary school students were able to transform initially vagueexplanation-seeking question to a series of more specific subordinate questions while pursuing theirknowledge-seeking inquiry. The evidence presented indicates that, in an appropriate environment, it is entirelypossible for young students, with computer-supportfor collaborative learning, to engage in sophisticatedknowledge seeking analogous to scientific inquiry. We argue that the interrogative approach to inquiry canproductively be applied for conceptualizing inquiry in the context of computer-supported learning.

Interrogative Reasoning and Discovery: a New Perspective on Kepler’s Inquiry.

In recent years, serious study of scientific discovery has begun to flourish again. Although the discussion has cleared up some issues, the field still is in need of a new kind of systematic approach. Such an approach should locate and justify the epistemic role of discovery within a larger theory of scientific practice, and its basic claims should receive support from historical and contemporary reports of actual scientific practice. Few proposals have even tried to realize these desiderata. Historical case studies do not usually address the systematic goals, while systematic studies are too abstract and idealized to accommodate the details of historical studies. Thus, models which attempt to mediate between these poles are needed. In this paper, I shall introduce a model which accords fairly well with the desiderata. Its conceptual core is the interrogative model of inquiry (I-Model, for short) which laakko Hintikka and his associates have been developing in recent years. I shall argue that the 1model offers a promising theory of scientific inquiry, and, in particular, that it can bring light to the structure of reasoning employed by working scientists. The main argument for this goes as follows. The model is founded on a precise logical theory. As a logical model of knowledge acquisition it can offer us something that the historical case studies of scientific discoveries have not offered: a logic of scientific discovery. On the other hand, I-model's account of the discovery process is less idealized than in previous systematic models of discovery. It thus captures more details of historical episodes. Consequently, the I-model forms a kind of synthesis between historical case studies and previous accounts of