International Monetary Fund Lending Research Articles

Conditionality in extreme circumstances: the IMF and emergency financing during the COVID-19 pandemic

The article highlights the shift in lending policy towards instruments without ex post conditionality by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) amid the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The objectives of the article are two-fold: Firstly, it aims to clearly indicate the shift of IMF lending policy towards instruments without conditionality in 2020; secondly, it complements the existing academic literature on changes in conditionality by testing three factors that contribute to the shift. It is concluded that similarly to the global financial crisis in 2008, more discretion was given to IMF staff to rapidly respond to the crisis and that the IMF staff increased the Fund’s power position in the global financial safety net through expanded lending. A novelty around the COVID-19 crisis is the change in the normative debate around conditionality, which intensified in the years before the pandemic, suggesting that a more permanent change in IMF conditionality policy is taking shape. Keywords: Conditionality, COVID-19, Emergency Financing, International Monetary Fund.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND IMF: EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF EXTENDED FUND FACILITY (EFF) ON THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a global financial organization that offers financial support to nations with economic difficulties. There are serious worries about the efficacy of IMF Program conditionality on debtor countries due to the IMF's growing influence through the Extended Fund Facility Program and their performances in developing countries. The conditionality of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Program is examined in this research in relation to Pakistan's economic governance. Due to its long-term reliance on IMF resources, Pakistan presents an intriguing case study. The influence of IMF conditionality on Pakistan's economy's governance structure and key economic indicators is examined in this study using a broad framework of qualitative elements. The study's findings demonstrate that there is consistently uncertainty in the governance structure and the execution of policy decisions in IMF lending schemes. Due to this deterioration, the country was unable to meet its macroeconomic objectives, such as reducing poverty and controlling inflation, Future perspectives on the research findings recommend that Pakistan's economic policy makers concentrate on their other sources of economic strength rather than solely relying on the IMF Program.

Doing more with less: The catalytic function of IMF lending and the role of program size

Financial assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is supposed to unlock other financing, acting as a catalyst for private capital flows. The empirical evidence of the presence of such a catalytic effect has, however, been mixed. This paper shows that a possible explanation for the rather inconclusive empirical evidence to date is the neglect of the size of an IMF program. Applying a novel identification strategy to account for endogenous selection into (large) adjustment programs, and using a comprehensive data set spanning the years 1990-2018, we show that the catalytic effect of IMF financial assistance is weakened – and potentially reversed – if the size of a program exceeds a certain level. We argue that large IMF financial assistance coupled with the IMF’s preferred creditor status can lead to a crowding-out of private investors by increasing their loss in the event of default. Our findings add to the debate on the optimal size of Fund-supported programs and can also inform the broader policy discussions on the adequacy of IMF resources.

An effective pandemic treaty requires accountability

An effective pandemic treaty requires accountability

IMF conditionality, export structure and economic complexity:The ineffectiveness of structural adjustment programs

The conditionality requirements of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been a source of intense debate since the early 1980s. These conditions, which are attached to IMF lending programs, cover a variety of issues from fiscal and monetary reform to economic liberalization and institutional change. In this paper we empirically examined the effects of IMF programs and conditionality requirements on structural transformation through changes in the technology-and-skill intensity and overall economic complexity of exports. Our empirical methodology accounted for policy and conditionality heterogeneity across country and time and accounts for the endogeneity of IMF programs and conditions. The empirical results suggest that IMF programs and conditionality requirements along a spectrum of policy areas had no robust or significant effect on export structure, economic complexity or export diversification. Overall, we found no evidence of any positive effects of IMF programs or IMF conditionality requirements on the technology-and-skill intensity of exports.

Who Is Credible? Government Popularity and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Lending

In this paper, I explain variations in international investors’ reactions to International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs. Investors react favorably if a borrowing government is credibly committed to implementing essential IMF conditionality. Instead of engaging complex information processing about economic reform, however, investors rely on a heuristic device to assess the borrower’s domestic political conditions. I argue that a borrowing government’s popularity is an important cue for investors to assess the prospect of an IMF program. Investors associate higher government popularity with better implementation of the program and react more favorably to more popular borrowers. Using annual data from up to 52 emerging market economies from 1998 to 2017, I find robust statistical evidence supporting these claims: an IMF program alone does not restore investor confidence. Rather, an IMF program carried out by a strong government does. My findings have important implications for the study of global financial governance and credible commitment.

Understanding the consequences of IMF surcharges: the need for reform

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides a global public good when it lends emergency balance-of-payments support to countries that otherwise could not access such financing at comparable terms. No country borrows from the IMF lightly, and only does so as a last resort in the face of an economic crisis. In exchange for IMF lending, governments surrender some sovereignty, self-determination of their economic policies, and implicitly admit that the government, on its own, could not manage the travails through which it is going. A lesser-known but also costly trade-off is that the IMF imposes significant surcharges – akin to the penalty rates imposed by banks – on countries with large borrowings from the IMF that are not paid back within a relatively short time. Indeed, IMF surcharges are pro-cyclical financial penalties imposed on countries precisely at a time when they can least afford them. This brief note examines the economic implications of the surcharges from a global distributive perspective. In so doing, the authors stress the need to eliminate excessive surcharges in the COVID-19 era and call for a more fundamental reform of IMF financing.

Partisan Technocrats: How Leaders Matter in International Organizations

AbstractInternational organizations make policy decisions that affect the lives of people around the world. We argue that these decisions depend, in part, on the political ideology of the organization's chief executive. In this study, we investigate the influence of the leader of one of the most powerful international organizations: the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We find that when the Managing Director is politically left of center, the IMF requires less labor market liberalization from borrowing countries in exchange for a loan. We also find evidence suggesting that the Managing Director's influence on labor-related loan conditions is independent of the Fund's most powerful members, including the United States. While Managing Directors rarely engage in overtly political behavior, they appear to act as “partisan technocrats” whose ideology influences international financial rescues and specifically the conditions attached to countries’ loans, which shape the distributive consequences of IMF lending.

Doing More with Less: The Catalytic Function of IMF Lending and the Role of Program Size

Financial assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is supposed to unlock other financing, acting as a catalyst for private capital flows. The empirical evidence of the presence of such a catalytic effect has, however, been mixed. This paper shows that a possible explanation for the rather inconclusive empirical evidence to date is the neglect of the size of an IMF program. Applying a novel identification strategy to account for endogenous selection into (large) adjustment programs, and using a comprehensive data set spanning the years 1990-2018, we show that the catalytic effect of IMF financial assistance is weakened - and potentially reversed - if the size of a program exceeds a certain level. We argue that large IMF financial assistance coupled with the IMF's preferred creditor status can lead to a crowding-out of private investors by increasing their loss in the event of default. Our findings add to the debate on the optimal size of Fund-supported programs and can also inform the broader policy discussions on the adequacy of IMF resources.

The Catalytic Effect of IMF Lending: Evidence from Sectoral FDI Data

ABSTRACT Our study contributes to the search for the elusive catalytic effect of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending on inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Recent scholarship has found that the catalytic effect is conditional on political regime and program stringency. We contribute to this literature by developing and testing a theory which describes how the catalytic effect also varies by economic sector. This is a departure from existing studies, which have tended to focus on aggregate FDI flows after crises. Our findings corroborate previous research, which finds that in general IMF lending has a substantial and negative effect on FDI. However, we find that the negative effect is concentrated in sectors that are highly dependent on external capital and have low sunk costs in the host country. Our findings are robust to several alternative explanations common in IMF literature, namely the importance of IMF program design and the ability of governments to make credible commitments to reform. Substantively, our findings suggest that investors are more likely to use IMF lending as an escape hatch in countries where FDI is dependent on external capital and has low sunk costs.

ABOUT SPELLS AND RECIDIVISM OF THE TRANSITION ECONOMIES’ PARTICIPATION IN IMF PROGRAMS

Based on the review of the modern world economic literature, there were revealed polar approaches of researchers to estimation of the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in world economic processes in whole and its influence on the economic development of separate countries. There were analyzed institutional changes in IMF architecture and management system that favored its transparency, efficiency and increase of trust to the activity of the Fund from the world society. Based on the dynamic approach to the analysis of credit cooperation of countries-recipients with IMF, there were revealed factors that caused differences in duration of series of IMF lending programs (spell) for transition economies and ones that determine recidivism of their credit relations with the Fund. Among other ones, the determining role is played by the technical assistance of the Fund that favored institutional establishment of unstable economic systems, search for consensus between IMF staff members and governments of countries about formation of the policy of conditionality and effectiveness of its realization. The article presents chronologization and analytic estimation of main stages of cooperation between Ukraine and IMF, estimates the net transfers of financial resources of the Fund, elucidates conditions of the incomplete drawn of granted credit resources by Ukraine, causes of finishing credit cooperation and transition to technical one at different stages. At the end there was made a conclusion that main efforts must be directed on constructing native economic system a self-sufficient macroeconomic pattern of the development of the native economic system.

International demands for austerity: Examining the impact of the IMF on the public sector

What effects do International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans have on borrowing countries? Even after decades of research, no consensus exists. We offer a straightforward explanation for the seemingly mixed effects of IMF loans. We argue that different loans have different effects because of the varied conditions attached to IMF financing. To demonstrate this point, we investigate IMF loans with and without conditions that require public sector reforms in exchange for financing. We find that the addition of a public sector reform condition to a country’s IMF program significantly reduces government spending on the public sector wage bill. This evidence suggest that conditions are a key mechanism linking IMF lending to policy outcomes. Although IMF loans with public sector conditions prompt cuts to the wage bill in the short-term, these cuts do not persist in the longer-term. Borrowers backslide on internationally mandated spending cuts in response to domestic political pressures.

Do the International Monetary Fund Lending Programs Create Moral Hazard?

Using International Monetary Fund lending data from 2005 through 2015, we find evidence that the IMF General Resources Account credit creates moral hazard that is concentrated in European and EU-member countries. Our results hold for the periods of time just prior to and after the financial crisis. In contrast, we find moral hazard associated with the IMF Poverty Reduction Growth Trust creates moral hazard only prior to the financial crisis and we attribute this change to the 2010 modifications to the trust.

IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014

ABSTRACTIn recent years, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has re-emerged as a central actor in global economic governance. Its rhetoric and policies suggest that the organization has radically changed the ways in which it offers financial assistance to countries in economic trouble. We revisit two long-standing controversies: Has the policy content of IMF programmes evolved to allow for more policy space? Do these programmes now allow for the protection of labour and social policies? We collected relevant archival material on the IMF's lending operations and identified all policy conditionality in IMF loan agreements between 1985 and 2014, extracting 55,465 individual conditions across 131 countries in total. We find little evidence of a fundamental transformation of IMF conditionality. The organization's post-2008 programmes reincorporated many of the mandated reforms that the organization claims to no longer advocate and the number of conditions has been increasing. We also find that policies introduced to ameliorate the social consequences of IMF macroeconomic advice have been inadequately incorporated into programme design. Drawing on this evidence, we argue that multiple layers of rhetoric and ceremonial reforms have been designed to obscure the actual practice of adjustment programmes, revealing an escalating commitment to hypocrisy.

IMF lending arrangements in emerging and developing countries – participation and prediction

The literature on determinants of International Monetary Fund (IMF) interventions in emerging and developing countries shows that the IMF’s decisions are determined by political and economic causes. This article empirically investigates economic factors, showing that a country’s probability to sign an IMF arrangement can be predicted by looking at a core group of macroeconomic variables. Using discriminant analysis we develop a score function that allows us to predict a country’s future participation in IMF programmes. The study covers 153 emerging and developing countries, over more than 30 years (1980–2011) and 654 agreements, for both non-concessional and concessional loans. The proposed tools are simple, consistent and relevant and they can be used both to monitor an IMF country and its economic development in real time and to forecast future demand for IMF aid.

International Monetary Fund Lending Effectiveness: Case of Albania

The main aim of the paper is to analyze the effectiveness of IMF funds that Albania receives, and are they good sources to stimulate economic development, reduction of poverty, increase health and help environmental issues. In many countries IMF programs appear to be ineffective and also in Albania somehow, funds did not achieve to be the main source of development. But, it is not only IMF that makes the programs ineffective because very important factor in realization are official people working in corresponding countries, external shocks, policy changes and compatibility of programs with country public policies. DOI: 10.5901/ajis.2015.v4n3s1p205

IMF Lending and Banking Crises

This paper looks at the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs on banking crises in a large sample of developing countries, over the period 1970–2010. The endogeneity of the IMF intervention is addressed by adopting an instrumental variable strategy and a propensity score matching estimator. Controlling for the standard determinants of banking crises, the results indicate that countries participating in IMF-supported lending programs are significantly less likely to experience a future banking crisis than nonborrowing countries. The paper also provides evidence suggesting that compliance with conditionality and loan size matter, corroborating the importance of IMF-supported reform and liquidity provision for banking sector stability.

Mixed Signals: IMF Lending and Capital Markets

The effect of new International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending announcements on capital markets depends on the lender’s political motivations. There are conditions under which lending reduces the risk of a deepening crisis and the risk premium demanded by market actors. Yet the political interests that make lenders willing to lend may weaken the credibility of commitments to reform, and the act of accepting an agreement reveals unfavorable information about the state of the borrower’s economy. The net ‘catalytic’ effect on the price of private borrowing depends on whether these effects dominate the beneficial effects of the liquidity the loan provides. Decomposing the contradictory effects of crisis lending provides an explanation for the discrepant empirical findings in the literature about market reactions. This study tests the implications of the theory by examining how sovereign bond yields are affected by IMF program announcements, loan size, the scope of conditions attached to loans and measures of the geopolitical interests of the United States, a key IMF principal.

The political economy of participation in IMF programs: a disaggregated empirical analysis

What factors determine whether or not countries have programs with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? The existing literature suggests that a number of economic and political variables are important, but there is disagreement about their relative significance. Moreover, the fit of general participation models is not particularly good. An increasingly popular view in the recent literature is that the pattern of IMF lending is politically driven and that it reflects the interests of the Fund’s leading shareholders; the US is seen as exerting a powerful influence. Using both quantitative and qualitative techniques, and based on an informal analytical framework, we examine in detail the factors that may be at work. We cover the period from 1984 to 2008. We discover considerable variation across the nature of programs (concessional and non-concessional), income levels, geographic regions, and time periods. The degree of observed variation means that it is unsafe to use one general participation model as the basis for evaluating the effects of IMF programs. It also means that the design of policy needs to reflect the nuances that the data reveal.

IMF Lending and Banking Crises

This paper looks at the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs on banking crises in a large sample of developing countries, over the period 1970-2010. The endogeneity of the IMF intervention is addressed by adopting an instrumental variable strategy and a propensity score matching estimator. Controlling for the standard determinants of banking crises, our results indicate that countries participating in IMF-supported lending programs are significantly less likely to experience a future banking crisis than nonborrowing countries. We also provide evidence suggesting that compliance with conditionality and loan size matter.