International Climate Negotiations Research Articles

Facing the Policy Challenges of Climate Change: Assessing China's Strategy and Actions in International Environmental Crisis Communication

Climate change represents an unparalleled global challenge that necessitates urgent, unified responses to mitigate its far-reaching impacts. As a leading contributor to global emissions and a key stakeholder in international climate negotiations, China's policy maneuvers, and diplomatic engagements are crucial for spearheading global efforts towards sustainable development. However, the image China presents in global climate change governance does not fully meet its expectations, which is largely due to Chinas strategic deviation in public communication. This study aims to dissect the complexities of China's strategic approach, evaluating its effectiveness, contributions, and encountered challenges within the international climate change dialogue. By focusing on China's capacity to facilitate collaborative global actions and its endeavors in promoting sustainable policies, this research emphasizes the indispensability of adept communication and robust international cooperation in combating the environmental crises of this era.

The European Union Climate Diplomacy: Evolving Practices in a Changing Geopolitical Context

Summary The European Union (EU) has systematically promoted global climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. Since the 1990s, despite varying success in international climate negotiations, it has sought to take a leadership role in global climate politics. Internal consolidation of environmental and climate policies has enhanced EU policy coherence and strengthened its ability to influence international efforts to mitigate climate change. Globally, however, the picture is marred by geopolitical competition, rendering the context of global climate politics less propitious for the EU’s climate leadership. This article examines how the EU’s climate diplomacy is adapting to an increasingly complex international context. It finds that while the EU climate action is still premised on the deep-seated beliefs of the EU’s ambitious approach to climate, the practices of EU climate diplomacy have adapted to a changing geopolitical context. This evolution is traced through a set of key diplomatic practices: narration, co-ordination, outreach and mainstreaming.

What network roles affect the decline of the embodied carbon emission reduction pressure in China's manufacturing sector foreign trade?

China's manufacturing sector faces pressure to reduce its carbon emissions embodied in foreign trade, yet the influence of the sector's structural and path characteristics on reducing embodied carbon emission (ECE) remains unclear. We developed a research framework to analyze the trade-embodied carbon transfer networks of China's 11 manufacturing industries with 48 economies from 2000 to 2019, identifying the key carbon transfer-in industries and paths. By integrating network characteristics, we assessed the ECE reduction pressure on key manufacturing industries and identified factors hindering its decline. ECE in China's manufacturing foreign trade increased by 273.1% from 2000 to 2019, with the ECE in exports to developing countries since 2012 (255.58 Mt) surpassing exports to developed countries (228.31 Mt). China's medium-low and medium-high technology manufacturing are key carbon transfer-in industries, observed large decreases in the importance of the carbon transfer-in paths from Europe, the United States, Japan, and South Korea, versus notable increases from the Row Asia and Pacific region. Metal manufacturing, non-metallic mineral manufacturing, and chemical manufacturing were the top three industries facing ECE reduction pressure. The network structure indicators obstruct the ECE reduction pressure in metal manufacturing, whereas the network path indicators obstruct the pressure in the other key manufacturing industries. To alleviate the ECE reduction pressure within China's manufacturing foreign trade, China's manufacturing sector should enhance trade cooperation with Asia–Pacific countries. The study's insights offer valuable references for China's formulation of domestic manufacturing emission reduction policies and its participation in international climate negotiations.

Pension funds and fossil fuel phase-out: historical developments and limitations of pension climate strategies

Despite the decades of international climate negotiations and several landmark agreements, global efforts to date to restrict fossil fuel production in line with climate targets have been unsuccessful. As national and international policies continue to fall short of phasing out fossil fuels, increasing attention has been paid to non-state actors, like pension funds, as a potential source of more ambitious climate action. As major asset owners, large shareholders in fossil fuel companies, and historically activist investors, pension funds are theoretically well-placed to contribute to phasing out fossil fuels. Despite growing recognition of this potential role for pension funds and other major investors in climate change mitigation, there has been little attention to pension funds’ historical record on climate change, or to how their climate strategies have developed and changed over time. This paper examines how the climate strategies of the largest US and European pension funds have evolved in relation to key developments in international climate agreements and the extent to which these strategies contribute to restricting fossil fuel supply. Through an analysis of the annual, governance, and sustainability reports of 6 pension funds from 1997 to 2022, we examine the strategies pension funds have adopted to address both climate change and fossil fuels. Pension funds have demonstrated responsiveness to the signals of international climate agreements, adopting a range of strategies with respect to climate change (amongst others, integrating ESG principles, increasing their sustainable investments, and setting net zero goals). Their explicit attention to fossil fuels and contribution to supply-side interventions take the form of systematic shareholder engagement, (selective) divestment, and lobbying policymakers. While pension fund climate action is growing , the ambition of their strategies is not aligned with a rapid fossil fuel phaseout; their efforts are often focussed on improving disclosure and transparency and demonstrate complacency with minimal improvements from fossil fuel companies. If pension funds are to significantly contribute to phasing out fossil fuels, redefining pension fund responsibilities and the traditional shareholder role will likely be required.

‘Never right to make comparisons’? Holocaust memory, climate crisis, and the debate over appropriate discourse

ABSTRACT This article considers the relationship between the Holocaust and the increased threat of mass violence due to climate change. Extreme weather events, resource deprivation, and population movements are likely to cause societal stresses which make genocide more probable, but the link between this and memory of the Holocaust has proven contentious. Starting with Archbishop Justin Welby’s apology for invoking the Holocaust during international climate negotiations in 2021, this article considers the history and causes of such controversy, arguing that there are selected ways in which it is reasonable and useful to bring Holocaust memory into dialogue with the climate crisis. .

A Minimal Capabilities-Based Account of Loss and Damage

ABSTRACT The topic of loss and damage has generated contentious debates in international policymaking and climate negotiations. Up until now, political agreements have been possible because of the use of ambiguous language in defining loss and damage. However, with the agreement of creating a specific fund for loss and damage reached in the last COP27, the need to define loss and damage becomes more pressing. This definition will not only determine to whom the funds will flow, but also what kind of measures will be funded. This paper contributes to clarifying these two issues. First, it proposes what should count, minimally, as loss and damage by specifying a minimal account of loss and damage based on the capabilities approach. This minimal account develops and justifies an ex-post perspective on loss and damage that is coherent with the UNFCCC discourse. Moreover, it proposes to differentiate between economic damage, non-economic losses, and non-economic damage. Second, it proposes a variety of reparative measures (material and symbolic) that should be implemented in response to different forms of loss and damage.

Who believes in green growth? Strategic framing and technology leadership in the UNFCCC negotiations

ABSTRACT Policymakers and governments increasingly frame climate protection in terms of green growth, arguing that continued economic growth and climate protection are complementary and mutually beneficial. With such framing, governments hope to overcome the global common goods problem associated with climate change and to enable higher ambition on climate action within and across states. Yet, no empirical evidence to date has been provided on how widespread the support for green growth is in international climate politics. This paper, therefore, investigates which countries employ green growth framings at UNFCCC negotiations, and whether this relates to domestic factors, in particular economic structure, level of development and climate impacts. We conduct panel-data analysis on green growth positions derived from hand-coding a unique dataset of High-level Segment statements at the Convention of the Parties (COPs) from 2010 to 2019 for 151 countries. The results reveal that, to date, green growth proponents are those countries with the most advanced national clean energy technology (CET) capacities – as measured by the Green Complexity Index. The findings highlight that green growth is not promoted by all countries at international climate negotiations. Key policy insights: In international climate negotiations, climate protection is increasingly framed as a green growth opportunity to motivate global ambition. Clean Energy Technology (CET) leading countries are more likely to use green growth framings than other less-technologically advanced peers and those with high exposure to climate risks. Mechanisms to support green growth pathways for all countries should be scaled up, including technology transfer and finance to foster local capacities and human capital. Given that green growth framings are not universally endorsed, further emphasis should be placed on additional co-benefits of climate action beyond economic growth, such as food and energy security, adaptation and resilience-building.

Transformational learning and engagement on climate action for students attending a climate negotiation

When Greta Thunberg addressed world leaders at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s 24th Conference of Parties (COP24), it highlighted how young people including Indigenous youth are seeking to influence international climate change negotiations. However, young people face barriers to effectively engaging in the COP processes with few opportunities to learn about the structure and practices for COP Observers. In this paper, we describe and evaluate a structured learning experience developed to support students conducting research related to climate change and their engagement with international climate negotiations. Before attending the COP24, students were given in-person and online training about the UNFCCC, its processes, and major issues under negotiation. They also developed and presented their work during a COP side event. Through pre- and post-surveys and in-depth interviews, we asked students about their expectations and degree of engagement and agency at the COP and more broadly on climate action. Students reported that the academic scaffolding before and during the COP provided most of the students with tools for navigating the complexities of the COP. For all of the students, learning through engagement with the COP24 process supported greater self-efficacy and literacy in relation to climate change action.

Preferences for climate change policies: the role of co-benefits

ABSTRACT Policies mitigating climate change provide a global public good but are also likely to imply local co-benefits where implemented. This may affect citizens’ preferences for what policy to implement as well as where to implement it. This aspect remains understudied despite its relevance for international climate negotiations, national policies, and the development of voluntary carbon credit markets. The results of a discrete choice experiment show that citizens in five countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) have quite similar mean willingness to pay for carbon emission reductions and agree on the ranking of policies targeting different sectors. Specifically, policies targeting renewable energy use, are preferred over policies targeting industrial energy efficiency or carbon sequestration and biomass production in forests. Applying follow-up questions shows that concerns over co-benefits, notably air pollution, is linked to preferences for implementation in the home country. In the absence of co-benefits, citizens are indifferent or prefer policies implemented in other countries. Key policy highlights Citizens in five European countries share preferences for climate change mitigation policies, though significant intra-national heterogeneity in preferences exist Policies targeting increased use of renewables are preferred over policies targeting improved energy efficiency in the industry. Citizens express preferences for policies implemented in their own country. This is associated with their perception of co-benefits. In particular, consideration of reduced air pollution as a side effect of investing in renewable energy and in energy efficiency in the industry are important determinants of preferences for national implementation of policies. Preferences for national co-benefits may both enhance policy acceptance and reduce willingness to support policies implemented in other countries. The latter aspect may reduce cost-effectiveness across countries but ease effort-sharing negotiations.

Applicability of leadership modes outside the negotiation framework: insights from China

Drawing insights from a qualitative content analysis of China’s national climate reports between 2016 and 2019, this article examines the extent to which classical leadership typologies introduced by Oran Young, Arild Underdal, and Raino Malnes in the early 1990s have explanatory power outside of international climate negotiation frameworks. Mode by mode, we assess the strengths and weaknesses of four classical leadership modes—directional, ideational, instrumental, and structural—to grasp the manifestation of international climate leadership in a domestic context. While the analysis points out some substantial weaknesses in classical leadership modes, it indicates that China has taken consistent efforts to offer climate leadership in a domestic context. Given the huge gap between the leadership literature and the planetary reality; however, the article concludes that the key shortcoming of the leadership literature is that it tends to focus exclusively on the negotiation phase of international climate politics. Therefore, prospective studies on climate leadership have to pay more attention to the locus of leadership.

Climate-Smart Forestry: Promise and risks for forests, society, and climate

Climate change is presenting a global challenge to society and ecosystems. This is changing long-standing methods to determine the values of forests to include their role in climate mitigation and adaptation, alongside traditional forest products and services. Forests have become increasingly important in climate change dialogues, beyond international climate negotiations, because of their framing as a Natural Climate Solution (NCS) or Nature-Based Solution (NBS). In turn, the term “Climate-Smart Forestry” (CSF) has recently entered the vernacular in myriad disciplines and decision-making circles espousing the linkage between forests and climate. This new emphasis on climate change in forestry has a wide range of interpretations and applications. This review finds that CSF remains loosely defined and inconsistently applied. Adding further confusion, it remains unclear how existing guidance on sustainable forest management (SFM) is relevant or might be enhanced to include CSF principles, including those that strive for demonstrable carbon benefits in terms of sequestration and storage. To contribute to a useful and shared understanding of CSF, this paper (1) assesses current definitions and framing of CSF, (2) explores CSF gaps and potential risks, (3) presents a new definition of CSF to expand and clarify CSF, and (4) explores sources of CSF evidence.

Environmentally Sound Technologies for Climate Change Mitigation in BRICS Countries: A Comparative Policy and Legal Perspective

Adoption of Environmentally Sound Technologies (ESTs), those have the potential for significantly improved environmental performance relative to other technologies is one of the effective steps for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). BRICS countries are emerging economies and play an active role in contributing to GHG emissions and climate change. Therefore, adoption of ESTs in these countries play a crucial role in mitigating climate change. The role of BRICS nations at international climate negotiations are utmost important as it may determine the fate of climate change globally. In this context this paper analyses and discusses the national laws and plans in BRICS countries pertinent to ESTs which are mainly in consonance to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1992. The legal provisions for development, dissemination, and technology transfer commitments concerning ESTs internationally and within BRICS countries are studied and analysed to understand the current position and future directions toward climate change mitigation.

GCC Countries Strategic Options in a Global Transition to Zero-Net Emissions.

Using a multi-level perspective approach combined with top-down macroeconomic models, we analyze the situation of the GCC countries in the perspective of a global transition to zero-net emissions before the end of the century. Based on these analyses, we propose strategic and political options for these oil and gas exporting countries. We show that it would be unwise for GCC member states to adopt an obstructionist strategy in international climate negotiations. On the contrary, these countries could be proactive in developing international emissions trading market and exploiting negative emissions obtained from CO2direct reduction technologies, in particular direct air capture with CO2sequestration, and thus contribute to a global net-zero-emissions regime in which clean fossil fuels are still used.

Corporate concessions: Opportunity or liability for climate advocacy groups?

When social movements achieve some success in meeting goals, elite opponents may see compromise and collaboration with movement organizations as a desirable option. The consequences for advocacy organizations of elite concessions are contested. Some highlight the political opportunities created by elite support, such as increased access to financial resources, political processes, and new audiences. Others identify potential liabilities, including demobilization, bureaucratization, and the co-optation of advocacy frames. Herein is presented a framework for analyzing the pathways through which realignments among elite opponents influence social movement struggles, using the first fifteen years of the international climate negotiations as a historical case. After years of pressure from environmental advocacy organizations, some global oil corporations shifted their climate policy stance from obstruction to collaboration. These realignments in turn affected the activities, framing strategies, policy access, and cross-group relations of climate advocacy groups, benefiting some to the detriment of others.

International and domestic leadership for fulfilling carbon neutrality in emerging economies: comparative evidence from China and India

The socioeconomic impacts of potential climate policies are unevenly distributed across the globe, and different countries take different leading positions in fulfilling carbon neutrality. We select two top-emitting emerging economies, China and India, as our case studies. Considering structural, entrepreneurial, ideational, and exemplary leadership based on the leadership theory, we analyze the two countries’ international and domestic positions in climate change mitigation after each became active climate action taker (i.e. during 2008–2021). We further rely on interest-based and norm-based approaches to explore the driving factors of their leading positions. We conclude that although China is generally more inclined to take the leading position, China and India currently both exert substantive leadership, especially prevalent in recent international climate negotiation rounds. China and India’s consistency of international and domestic leadership evolves via different paths. China initially focused more on international rather than domestic leadership positions (symbolic leader), while India initially took the opposite approach (pioneer). An alignment between international and domestic leadership is found in both countries in more recent years, making both countries substantive leaders. Compared with the interest-based approach, the norm-based approach has greater explanatory power for the two countries’ leading position.

Multilevel intergroup conflict at the core of climate (in)justice: Psychological challenges and ways forward

AbstractAlthough developed countries have been historically responsible for causing climate change, developing countries are more vulnerable to its current and future effects and being asked to commit to levels of climate action that exceed their responsibilities and capabilities. Climate change exacerbates existing social inequities by disproportionately impacting certain groups (including women, racial minorities, and the poor) more than others. Powerful institutions such as the government and the academy have a responsibility to alter this course and advance climate justice but are themselves marred by inequities. Given these disparities, the question of how the burden of climate change mitigation should be justly distributed amongst stakeholders is of paramount importance to international and domestic climate negotiations. Insights from the social identity and group processes literatures explain how experiences of inequity along geographical and sociodemographic dimensions generate identities and groups. As group members, people are sensitive to threats to the ingroup, experience collective emotions on behalf of the group, and differentially apply morality to in‐ versus outgroups. Members are also incentivized to protect and further their group's interests relative to outgroups. Social psychology offers some promising avenues of research for potential solutions to mitigate the multilevel intergroup conflict posing as a barrier to climate justice. Climate governance recommendations to policymakers and negotiators include incentivizing integrative solutions and fully considering the justice implications of climate policy. Climate scholars are encouraged to pursue interdisciplinary collaborations, improve diversity within the academy and in research samples, and prioritize climate adaptation in developing contexts.This article is categorized under: Climate, History, Society, Culture > Disciplinary Perspectives Climate, Nature, and Ethics > Climate Change and Global Justice

30 Years of International Climate Negotiations: Are They Still our Best Hope?

30 years of international climate talks have not prevented the globe from heating up more than 1 degree Celsius over post-industrial times, nor have they kept the year 2022 from breaking new temperature and extreme weather records around the world. Although the international process has been indispensable for building the foundation to move out of the carbon age, it is now time to shift attention away from the acrimonious climate talks and treat them as a sideshow, rather than the solution to the problem. An analysis of 30 years of international climate negotiations shows that multilateral climate diplomacy years ago stopped driving countries’ action. National political opportunity structures, normative shifts, economic factors, and external events are what shape countries’ climate policies largely independent of international climate negotiations.

Climate-Induced Migration: The Need for a Reparative Legal Regime+

We are already witnessing climate-induced migration and thus must prepare to address the next decades of even more human mobility as a consequence of the climate disruption crisis. Fifty years after the Stockholm Conference, international environmental law still needs solutions to protect those persons most vulnerable to environmental harm. This paper seeks to focus on the concept of reparative justice as the theme and attitude of legal solutions, so as to refocus legal tools to provide relief to those persons who are displaced and dispossessed because of the climate disruption crisis. In this paper, we present possibilities for a reparative climate justice regime that could help to break the current cycle of harm and denial in which states are currently embroiled within international climate negotiations. This focus considers how careful solutions such as credit within the financial mechanisms under the Paris Agreement, in a spirit of trust and solidarity, could contribute to legal solutions to climate migration problems. The paper first iterates the scope and history of climate-induced migration in international law and then presents the case for reparations as a strong legal response to climate-induced migration, before finally exploring the legal avenues within international climate law wherein reparative justice and financing could potentially operate.

The Climate Justice Community: Theoretical Radicals and Practical Pragmatists?

ABSTRACT The objective of this paper is to promote a better understanding of the link between normative climate justice claims—originating in Political Theory and Philosophy—and concrete social practices of the climate justice movement active at the international climate negotiations. We argue that the climate justice movement can be understood as a community of practice. Empirically, we zoom into this community of practice and comparatively analyse three case studies on human rights networks, faith-based groups and gender justice advocates. Methodologically, our analysis is based on a review of primary and secondary documents, participatory observations and expert interviews at the climate negotiations in Warsaw (2013), Bonn (2014), and Paris (2015) and via skype/phone (2013–2016). Our analysis reveals that each network within the community of practice—even those with more radical objectives—minimise the demands formulated at the outset in order to successfully cooperate with state negotiators.

Carbon inequality in China: Novel drivers and policy driven scenario analysis

Even though carbon inequality (CI) affects international climate negotiations and regional carbon emission reduction policies, a majority of countries ignore the individual sub-national-level CI and its important drivers (e.g., efficiency, technological change, investment, and industrialization). Thus, there is an urgent need to develop relevant carbon emission reduction policies that can incorporate the effects of these drivers. In this study, we investigated the drivers of CI in China at individual provincial and national levels during 2005–2019, using a newly developed individual Gini decomposition approach and a proposed within-between production-theoretical decomposition-based Theil index; notably, the traditional Theil index approach has not significantly changed for decades, and our study is the first to modify the approach. Our results revealed that the national CI presented a general downward trend from 2005 to 2019, wherein the individual between-group and within-group subcomponents portrayed nearly linear relationships in the west region. Notably, income disparity and energy intensity disparity were the two largest positive drivers, while the between-industrial investment-output share disparity and the investment scale disparity were the most important negative drivers of CI.