Internal Realism Research Articles

Pragmatic realism: towards a reconciliation of enactivism and realism

AbstractThis paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,13(3), 461–475, 2014), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and argue that whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards ‘internal realism’, he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress – the claim that multiple subjects inhabit the same world. We explore Peirce’s pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi’s manipulation-based enactivist realism to a richer, inquiry-based enactivist realism. We explore how this realism’s pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism.

Paradigms and the Principle of Internalism: An Analysis of the Concept of Rational Acceptability

The article is devoted to the consideration of the relationship of T. Kuhn (and his followers) with representatives of the school of internal realism. Theses of the article: Kuhn’s teaching does not contain an unambiguous understanding of the basis on which ideas within the paradigm are acceptable to a scientist; post-Kuhn discussions in the field of epistemology of scientific knowledge acquire not historical, but “human” character; they are conducted around the concept of “rational acceptability”; theoretical positions as epistemological anarchism, similarly, internalism can equally be deduced from Kuhn’s teaching; the essentialist program of internal realists is excessively focused on criticizing the relativistic consequences of the doctrine of the paradigm; the revealed contradictions of Kuhn’s relativistic and internalist receptions prompt rejection of both these receptions. It is shown that Kuhn’s theory initially disposes to its transformation into a more consistent one in two ways: either due to radical antirealism, or due to an internalist approach, when its own epistemology is built within the framework of the paradigm with a mandatory definition of what is considered real and objective. Rational acceptability regulates the “value” aspect, i.e. preference for a certain theoretical model. Conclusions of the study: in internalism, the idea of the intersubjective nature of scientific knowledge is not lost; rational acceptability in internalism plays a restraining role in relation to the individual wills of scientists, acting as a collective form of intentionality that precedes any private scientific research with epistemological prerequisites; the criterion of rational acceptability is conservative, since it allows us to restrain the tendency of any language to lock itself in its own context; rational acceptability in internalism successfully balances between dogmatism and skepticism; the realistic and rational nature of the concept of “acceptability” allows us to reject the relativistic thesis about the closeness of science within a particular paradigm and assume that there is always “not-paradigmatic” component, rooted in the philosophical understanding of science.

Did Putnam Really Abandon Internal Realism in the 1990s?

This paper aims to challenge the idea claimed by Putnam in his Dewey Lectures that internal realism presupposed sense data theory so that it would have been unable to account for the fundamental intuition of common sense realism that perception gives us cognitive access to reality. Rather, I argue that Putnam’s writings from the period of internal realism indicate that it (internal realism) already presupposed a form of direct realism of the kind he puts forth in the Dewey lectures. I support my thesis with a demonstration of the implication of direct realism in the refutation of the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis that occurs in the first chapter of Reason, Truth and History, as well as with various passages from the philosopher’s writings of the time when he defended internal realism. I also argue, contrary to what the philosopher seems to assert in his Dewey Lectures, that his model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism does not involve sense data theory. After noting the very strong resemblance between the theses of his common sense realism of the 1990s and those of his internal realism of the 1980s, I hypothesize that Putnam pretended to renounce internal realism in order to allow himself to rephrase his original position so as to avoid being misinterpreted as a form of idealism or fact constructivism, as was the case with his initial statement.

Putnam’s Alethic Pluralism and the Fact-Value Dichotomy

Hilary Putnam spent much of his career criticizing the fact/value dichotomy, and this became apparent already during the phase when he defended internal realism. He later changed his epistemological and metaphysical view by endorsing natural realism, with the consequence of embracing alethic pluralism, the idea that truth works differently in various discourse domains. Despite these changes of mind in epistemology and in theory of truth, Putnam went on criticizing the fact/value dichotomy. However, alethic pluralism entails drawing distinctions among discourse domains, especially between factual and nonfactual domains, and these distinctions are in tension with the rejection of the fact/value dichotomy, as this would in principle hinder factual domains as genuine. This issue raises, prima facie, some doubts about the effective compatibility of these views.

Putnam’s no Miracles Argument

In this paper I investigate Hilary Putnam’s conception of scientific realism by examining the so-called “no miracles argument.” According to a widespread reconstruction of his thought, Putnam has been moving from scientific realism, through internal realism to natural realism of common sense. Nonetheless, I show that, in fact, the American philosopher has always been a scientific realist. This notion needs however to be made clearer, because Putnam tends to move constantly on the razor’s edge between metaphysical realism and anti-realism. I argue that Putnam’s mature conception of scientific realism can be thought of as “open realism,” insofar as it is the result of the combination of the acceptable intuitions of metaphysical realism, with conceptual relativity, natural realism and pragmatism.

Edgar Wind on Experiment and Metaphysics

AbstractThe paper presents a detailed interpretation of Edgar Wind’sExperiment and Metaphysics(1934), a unique work on the philosophy of physics which broke with the Neo-Kantian tradition under the influence of American pragmatism. Taking up Cassirer’s interpretation of physics, Wind develops a holistic theory of the experiment and a constructivist account of empirical facts. Based on the concept of embodiment which plays a key role in Wind’s later writings on art history, he argues, however, that the outcomes of measurements are contingent. He then proposes an anti-Kantian conception of a metaphysics of nature. For him, nature is an unknown totality which manifests itself in discrepancies between theories and experiment, and hence the theory formation of physics can increasingly approximate the structure of nature. It is shown that this view is ambiguous between a transcendental, metaphysical realism in Kant’s sense and an internal realism in Putnam’s sense. Wind’s central claim is that twentieth century physics offers new options for resolving Kant’s cosmological antinomies. In particular, he connected quantum indeterminism with the possibility of human freedom, a connection that Cassirer sharply opposed.

Научный реализм в истории античной философии

The article is devoted to the consideration of the possibility of applying the methodological principles of scientific realism in the history of ancient philosophy. The author shows that in its strong version, scientific realism is not an appropriate basis for historical research, since it involves minimizing the number of interpretations of philosophical material of the past. Another serious drawback of applying strong versions of scientific realism in the history of philosophy is their focus on the correspondent theory of truth. This theory does not fit the historian of philosophy, since she aims not only at creating a realistic picture of the past, but also at incorporating the philosophical ideas of the past into the modern context, therefore a coherent theory of truth is more likely to meet her objectives. After a brief review of the weak versions of realism (H. Putnam’s “internal realism”, S. Blackburn’s “quasi-realism” and “sensibility theory”), the author concludes that these kinds of realism are more suitable for the history of philosophy in general and for the history of ancient philosophy in particular. As a result, the author concludes that the historian of philosophy must take into account the objectivity and independence of the philosophical ideas of the past, and inevitably be guided by his own conceptual and terminological facilities in order to incorporate the ideas of the past into the modern philosophical context.

Hillary Putnam's Internal Realism as a Pragmatically Justified Conception

Hillary Putnam's Internal Realism as a Pragmatically Justified Conception

퍼트남(H. Putnam)의 내재적 실재론이 과학 교육과정에 갖는 함의

퍼트남(H. Putnam)의 내재적 실재론이 과학 교육과정에 갖는 함의

Some Aspects of the Arcane Nature of Quantum Mechanical Theory and Distinctive Forms of Realism Arising Out of It

The paper, in Part 1, is devoted to discussing the underlying logic and algebra of the classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, their syntax and semantics, the reasons for their differences and the diagrammatic representations of the two. This part of the paper also demonstrates that there are several puzzling characters of microphysical phenomena by alluding to the relevant details of the double-slit experiment. These counterintuitive results of the experiment make it difficult to explain the empirical success and realist commitments of quantum mechanics. The second part, Part 2, of the paper is concerned with the question as to how conceptual schemes of scientists interact with the world such that the problem of new meaning and reference of the microphysical terms could be determined. The paper refrains from having a general discussion on Realism and do not venture into a comprehensive survey and critique of all known varieties of realistic interpretations. It selects only a few forms of realism (based on the reasons given) in investigating microphysical phenomena forming part of QM. These selected forms of realism explain how does conceptual scheme/terms in scientific theory hookup to the objects and their relations in the world based on the model-theoretic character of the scientific theory and causal rigidified descriptivism of scientific terms (vide Putnam) as well as scientist’s interaction with the world, say, in the “instrumental context of laboratory” (vide Heelan) such that the problem of meaning and reference could be resolved. The paper claims that convergence of the two views may result in a particular form of realism, the Hermeneuticized Internal Realism, appropriate for the science of microphysical phenomena.

El programa de Putnam en la discusión realismo/antirrealismo. Del realismo interno al realismo pragmático.

El trabajo se aboca al problema del realismo, como uno de los focos en los que convergen cuestiones semánticas, ontológicas y epistémicas. El análisis parte del realismo interno de Putnam, señalando sus dificultades y el tránsito al realismo pragmático o natural. Este tránsito implica la revisión de la noción epistémica de verdad y de las instancias de justificación, y consiguientemente de las relaciones que se establecen entre la actividad perceptiva y las prácticas lingüísticas.

Collingwood, Idealism, Realism, and the Possibility of Historical Knowledge

Abstract Collingwood argued that most theories of knowledge in English, up to his time, had been based on perception and scientific thinking; thus, if true, they made history impossible. So how is historical knowledge possible? Collingwood argued that only an idealistic philosophy can account for the possibility of historical knowledge. Consequently he integrated with his idealist theory of history a forceful and damaging critique of the “naive realism” of his day. In this paper I defend Collingwood’s idealist answer to this question, demonstrating how he hoped to broaden the scope of English epistemology through his anti-realist philosophy of history. I also analyze a recently theorized and purportedly more sophisticated form of historical realism which has been theorized by Chris Lorenz. Lorenz borrows Putnam’s notion of internal realism to argue for a historical realism which can account for knowledge of the real past. I argue that internal realism fails as historical realism. Collingwood’s idealism is a better response to relativism as well as naive realism than is internal realism. I conclude that Collingwood’s answer to the question of historical knowledge – which as I show, is Kantian in character – demanded of him, and perhaps demands of us today, a break with the dominant philosophies of perception, truth, and logic.

Being and Describing: An Entity Realist Appraisal of Internal Realism

Hilary Putnam’s later works capture a dissent from the idea that descriptions (linguistic representations) ‘map’ an ontology of the mind-independent world. He argues that descriptions ‘project’ an ontology onto the world. However, it is evident from his arguments that he is not against endorsing existential claims about the world. He agrees that the world and entities exist. But, when we attempt to know ‘what exists,’ we use language and consequently compromise the ‘real’ as it is in itself. One can see, in a certain sense, an entity realist thrust in Putnamian internal realism. That is, he acknowledges the causal component in the act arriving at existential claims. Surprisingly, at the same time, he is doubtful whether the ‘known’ is indeed real as it is in itself. I argue that Putnam’s mid-career works on internal realism incorporate a realism about entities (and the world) and an antirealism about theoretical descriptions. The first two parts of the paper provide the landscape of the debate over realism by starting with two unavoidable tenets of standard scientific realism. The subsequent parts provide a direction of thought, to an entity realist reading of internal realism.

Linguagem e realidade: para uma teoria do significado segundo Hilary Putnam

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n2p281In his work The meaning of meaning and Representation and Reality H. Putnam refutes the Aristotelian theory of language by defending his theory of an internal realism. The meaning (mental representation) of a word does not determine the reference of a word as in the conception of Aristotle. Language is a collective act of the human society and not an individual one. Scientific groups of experts can determine the meaning of a word by knowing the corresponding scientific standards and models. The determination of the meaning requires a public division of working to which trust and confidence belong. Furthermore without a benevolent interpretation and understanding, language and dialog of the linguistic community are not possible.

Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity

ABSTRACT:This essay describes three commitments that have become central to the author's philosophical outlook, namely, to liberal naturalism, to metaphysical realism, and to the epistemic and ontological objectivity of normative judgments.Liberal naturalismis contrasted with familiar scientistic versions of naturalism and their project of forcing explanations in every field into models derived from one or another particular science. The form ofmetaphysical realismthat the author endorses rejects every form of verificationism, including the author's one-time ‘internal realism’, and insists that our claims about the world are true or false and not just epistemically successful or unsuccessful and that the terms they contain typically refer to real entities. ‘Representationalism is no sin’. The central part of the essay is an account oftruthbased on a detailed analysis of Tarski's theory of truth and of the insights we can get from it as well as of the respects in which Tarski is misleading. (This part goes beyond what the author has previously published on the subject.) The account ofthe objectivity of the normativein this essay draws on insights from Dewey as well as Scanlon.

Reply to my critics

<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:WordDocument> <w:View>Normal</w:View> <w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom> <w:HyphenationZone>21</w:HyphenationZone> <w:PunctuationKerning /> <w:ValidateAgainstSchemas /> <w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid> <w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent> <w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText> <w:Compatibility> <w:BreakWrappedTables /> <w:SnapToGridInCell /> <w:WrapTextWithPunct /> <w:UseAsianBreakRules /> <w:DontGrowAutofit /> </w:Compatibility> <w:BrowserLevel>MicrosoftInternetExplorer4</w:BrowserLevel> </w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif]--> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;" lang="EN-GB">In this reply to my critics (Monika Bobako, Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Ewa Domańska, Juliusz Iwanicki, Aviezer Tucker, Hayden White). I am answering several critical arguments that have been formulated concerning my ‘Bordercrossings’. First, I dismantle the critique that I am subscribing to some version of ‘covering law explanation’. Second, I clarify in what – limited - sense I find Lakatos ideas concerning ‘scientific researchprogrammes’ fruitful for philosophy of history. The cognitive and political <em style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Doppelexistenz</em> of theories in the human sciences explains why epistemological analyses always need to be complemented by practical analyses. Third, I defend my ‘double focus’ against the postmodern critique that my ‘internal realism’ is ‘powerblind’, and fourth, against the critique that ‘scientific history’ is ‘beyond politics’. Fifth and last I argue that in criticizing positions it is fruitful also to include the discussions about them in the critical argument.</span></p> <!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" LatentStyleCount="156"> </w:LatentStyles> </xml><![endif]--><!--[if !mso]><object classid="clsid:38481807-CA0E-42D2-BF39-B33AF135CC4D" id=ieooui></object> <mce:style><! st1\:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) } --> <!--[endif] --><!--[if gte mso 10]> <mce:style><! /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Normale Tabelle"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} --> <!--[endif] -->

‘Biologising’ Putnam: saving the realism in internal realism

Putnam's internal realism attempts to overcome both radical subjectivism and metaphysical realism. While he agrees with subjectivists that we understand the world through conceptual schemes, Putnam rejects their ‘anything goes’ relativist conclusions, arguing that states and properties of the external world co-determine our understanding of the world, and that some theories are more rational to accept than others. Theories, in other words, while they can't be expected to correspond ‘absolutely’ to the external world, can nevertheless be objective-for-us. When theorising about rationality, however, Putnam runs into problems, claiming that the criteria of rational acceptability, determining the choice of conceptual schemes, are a set of historically evolving cultural norms. This causes a slide into subjectivism and relativism. In this paper, I argue that the main tenet of internal realism – the possibility of an objectivity-for-us – can be maintained. Taking a naturalistic approach, I defend the view that both the conceptual tools and the epistemic values making up our conceptual schemes are ultimately grounded in our genetically determined cognitive apparatus. The conceptual schemes mediating our understanding of the world, therefore, are not merely contingent cultural products but, to an important extent, necessary biological products. In this regard, although Putnam explicitly rejects any attempts to naturalise reason, I argue that it is precisely such a naturalistic approach that provides his internal realism with the necessary backing.

Internal Realism and the Reality of God

How do religions refer to reality in their language and symbols, and which reality do they envisage and encounter? on the basis of some examples of an understanding of religion without reference to reality, I first answer the question of what ‘realism’ is. realism has been an opposite concept to nominalism, idealism, empiricism and antirealism. The paper concentrates especially on the most recent formation of realism in opposition to antirealism. In a second section the consequences for philosophy of religion and theology are considered. How the reality, as it is considered in philosophy of religion and in theology, has to be characterised, if and how this reality is relevant for human beings, and what its relation is to everything else, can only be answered and clarified in a presentation in a language that is specific for this reality, the reality of God.

Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth

AbstractThis entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough.

Towards an Informational Pragmatic Realism

I discuss the design of the method of entropic inference as a general framework for reasoning under conditions of uncertainty. The main contribution of this discussion is to emphasize the pragmatic elements in the derivation. More specifically: (1) Probability theory is designed as the uniquely natural tool for representing states of incomplete information. (2) An epistemic notion of information is defined in terms of its relation to the Bayesian beliefs of ideally rational agents. (3) The method of updating from a prior to a posterior probability distribution is designed through an eliminative induction process that singles out the logarithmic relative entropy as the unique tool for inference. The resulting framework includes as special cases both MaxEnt and Bayes’ rule. It therefore unifies entropic and Bayesian methods into a single general inference scheme. I find that similar pragmatic elements are an integral part of Putnam’s internal realism, of Floridi’s informational structural realism, and also of van Fraasen’s empiricist structuralism. I conclude with the conjecture that their valuable insights can be incorporated into a single coherent doctrine—an informational pragmatic realism.