Internal Control Opinions Research Articles

How Does Artificial Intelligence Shape Audit Firms?

Does artificial intelligence (AI) displace auditors? We exploit the staggered hiring of AI employees at audit office locations across the United States as a proxy for the use of AI at local audit offices. The main findings are as follows. First, relative to audit offices that do not yet hire AI employees, those that do hire AI employees have a 4.3% increase in the number of auditor jobs, particularly among junior and midlevel auditors. Second, using AI is associated with an increased demand for soft skills (e.g., cognitive skills) in auditor jobs. Third, audit offices that use AI have more accurate going concern and internal control opinions. Semistructured interviews of 11 seasoned audit partners confirm that investment in AI is centralized at the national level, but the decision to deploy it often resides at the local audit office level. Notably, none of the partners believe that AI has replaced or will replace human auditors. Overall, our study—comprising both empirical and qualitative data—suggests that using AI does not replace auditors, but rather changes the skills required for these jobs and improves audit quality. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Funding: K. K. F. Law’s research is supported by the Start-Up Grant from Nanyang Technological University and the Ministry of Education (MOE), Singapore, under its Academic Research Fund Tier 1 [Grant RG128/20]. M. Shen’s research is supported by the Start-Up Grant from the National University of Singapore [Grant A-0003914-00-00] and the MOE under its Academic Research Fund Tier 1 [Grant A-8000098-00-00]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.04040 .

An Examination of the Terminal Year in an Auditor-Client Relationship

SYNOPSIS We examine the cost and consequences of switching auditors. Specifically, we consider several client costs (audit fees, going-concern opinions, and internal control opinions) in the last year of an audit engagement (“terminal year”). We find that outgoing auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees, issue more going-concern opinions, and issue more adverse internal control opinions during the terminal years of their audits. These findings suggest that outgoing auditors gain greater bargaining power, are more likely to charge for additional hours of audit work, and are less likely to yield to client pressures. Overall, our results suggest that companies face real economic costs from the outgoing auditor in addition to the start-up costs of the incoming auditor. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: G31; G32; G33; M21.

Internal control opinion shopping: Does initial audit fee discounting matter?

Both regulators and researchers are concerned that the lowballing of initial year audit fees may impair auditor independence (U.S. Senate 1977, 2002; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 1978; Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], 2000; Huang et al. 2015). Using a full sample of 1373 U.S. firm-year observations for which the client’s predecessor auditor reports an adverse SOX Section 404 internal control opinion, we find that in the following year a successor auditor who lowballs audit fees is more likely to issue a clean internal control opinion. The results hold when the predecessor auditors are dismissed, but not when the predecessors resign. We also find that firms are no more likely to succeed in opinion shopping when the proportion of audit committee financial experts is high. In addition, we find internal control opinion shopping occurs with initial fee discounting only in competitive audit markets and the period of a few years following the adoption of SOX (since 2007).

Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and Auditors’ Litigation Risk

SUMMARY We investigate whether the concern of shareholder litigation motivates auditors to disclose internal control weaknesses. We document that issuing adverse internal control opinions reduces the likelihood of auditors being named with their clients as defendants in shareholder lawsuits. This finding suggests that auditors can reduce their legal liability arising from failed financial statement audits by increasing the quality of internal control audits. Consistent with this expectation, we find that auditors are more likely to issue such opinions in a timely manner for clients with higher ex ante litigation risk. Overall, our evidence suggests that the threat of litigation provides an incentive rather than a disincentive for auditors to issue adverse internal control opinions for clients with higher litigation risk. Data Availability: The data are available from public sources indicated in the paper. JEL Classifications: M42; K41.

The two sides of corporate social responsibility and the quality of internal control audit opinions

Although corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities provide a strong signal of management integrity, the involvement of the client in irresponsible CSR should alert the auditor to the risk of material misstatement. Framing management integrity assessments by relying on responsible CSR activities can lead to auditors' unintended alignment with their clients' preferred outcomes. Motivated by the increasing frequency of clean internal control opinions (ICOPs) regarding clients that subsequently misstate, we explore whether auditors' overreliance on responsible CSR influences the quality of ICOPs. We find that clients' CSR involvement is associated with fewer adverse ICOPs, but this CSR effect is asymmetric because it is only explained by responsible CSR activities and not by irresponsible CSR activities. Importantly, the ‘good side of CSR’ is associated with fewer adverse opinions being issued to misstated clients. Additional analyses show that only irresponsible CSR activities increase the risk of financial misstatements. Our findings provide support for the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's warning that certain conditions inherent in the audit environment, such as the assessment of management integrity, can lead to auditors unconsciously favouring confirming evidence (represented by responsible CSR activities) instead of relying on disconfirming evidence (represented by irresponsible CSR activities) that could raise issues about management's integrity and ethical commitment.

Partner-Level internal control opinion shopping and its economic consequences: Evidence from “SOX 404” in an emerging market

This study examines whether firms engage in internal control opinion shopping (ICOS) at audit partner level and its economic consequences. Based on the Chinese setting where the identities of audit partners are publicly disclosed and the requirements for internal control reporting are akin to SOX 404, we do find that firms successfully engage in ICOS at partner level. Furthermore, partner-level ICOS is associated with lower earnings quality and more tunneling activities. However, it seems that investors are not able to perceive the ICOS behavior, as evidenced by the indistinguishable market reactions to earnings announcements between ICOS firms and their counterparts. Moreover, successful partner-level ICOS firms do not remedy their internal control weaknesses in a timely manner and are more likely to receive sanctions from regulators. Further analyses suggest that firms engaged in partner-level ICOS are more likely to be charged with higher audit fees and firms whose CEOs are about to retire in the near future are more likely to conduct ICOS. This study fills the gap in the literature by investigating the outcomes of and market reactions to opinion shopping in the context of internal controls.

How Do Audit Firms Treat Partners Who Issue Adverse Internal Control Opinions?

How Do Audit Firms Treat Partners Who Issue Adverse Internal Control Opinions?

Don't Make Me Look Bad: How the Audit Market Penalizes Auditors for Doing Their Job

ABSTRACTWe examine the reputational impact of an audit office issuing adverse internal control opinions (adverse ICOs). While prior research has examined how clients that receive an adverse ICO respond, we focus on clients that did not receive an adverse ICO. We find that audit offices that issue more adverse ICOs experience lower growth and that this effect is stronger when the adverse ICO is associated with a more visible client or refers to an entity-level control weakness. Finally, we find that clients are less likely to select auditors that have a history of issuing adverse ICOs, and auditors are able to recoup some of their lost growth when they issue fewer adverse ICOs. Our results indicate that the market for audit services penalizes auditors for disclosing information critical of management, which undermines the value of direct-to-investor auditor communications and provides insight into potential longer-term implications of the expanded auditor's report.

The Effects of the Internal Control Opinion and Use of Audit Data Analytics on Perceptions of Audit Quality, Assurance, and Auditor Negligence

SUMMARYAudit data analytics (ADAs) allow auditors to analyze the entire population of transactions that has measurable benefits for audit quality. However, auditors caution that the level of assurance on the financial statements is not incrementally increased. We examine whether the testing methodology and the type of ICFR opinion issued affect jurors' perceptions of auditor negligence. We predict and find that when auditors issue an unqualified ICFR opinion, jurors make higher negligence assessments when auditors employ statistical sampling than when they employ ADAs. Further, when auditors issue an adverse ICFR opinion, jurors attribute less blame to auditors and more blame to the investor for an audit failure. Additionally, jurors perceive the use of ADAs as an indicator of higher audit quality and are less likely to find auditors negligent. However, jurors do not perceive a difference in the level of assurance provided when auditors use ADAs versus sampling testing methods.

Investor Sentiment and Audit Opinion Shopping

SUMMARY The purpose of this study is to examine whether investor sentiment influences clients' propensity to engage in audit opinion shopping. Using the opinion shopping framework of Lennox (2000), we document that internal control opinion shopping is more prevalent when investor sentiment is high. This effect is concentrated among firms with low institutional ownership. We also find that clients are more likely to undertake downward switches (i.e., Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditor) when sentiment is high. Additional tests reveal that clients who engage in opinion shopping during high sentiment periods have a higher risk of material restatements and higher audit fees. As well, the market-penalty associated with opinion shopping is reduced when sentiment is high. Overall, the results suggest that firms' opinion shopping behavior during high sentiment periods is more prevalent and opportunistic. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.

Auditor Responses to Shareholder Activism

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we investigate how auditors respond to shareholder activism against their clients. Our study is important because activism may be viewed by auditors as a source of increased engagement risk, thereby impacting audit outcomes. The potential relationship between shareholder activism and audit outcomes leads us to predict that activism targets will pay higher audit fees and also will be more likely to receive adverse internal control opinions (ICOs) and first‐time going concern opinions (GCOs). Our results, which support all three predictions, suggest that the public scrutiny associated with activism campaigns heightens auditors' concerns about reputational damage and litigation risk. Consistent with this notion, we find that activism targets are more likely to experience accounting‐related lawsuits. We also find that the increased likelihood of adverse ICOs documented in our baseline tests reflects higher‐quality reporting rather than increased auditor conservatism. Overall, our findings suggest that activism campaigns spur auditor diligence while also increasing the possibility of negative outcomes that may not be fully anticipated by activist investors.

Do Audit Firms Care about Media Coverage? An Investigation of Audit Firm Response to News Coverage

We examine how auditors respond to news coverage of their firm and evaluate the extent to which national news outlets function as a watchdog over audit firms. We find that when media coverage includes issues specific to audit conduct (i.e., restatements, adverse internal control opinions, or fraud), audit firms respond by increasing audit attention (increased fees, reporting delay, and late filings). We find this effect is amplified among clients with issues similar to those discussed in the media. Additionally, audit firms respond to high levels of audit related news at peer firms, suggesting firms try to preemptively manage their reputation even when not under direct media scrutiny. Finally, we find no evidence that firms increase attention following non-negative audit related news coverage. Collectively, our evidence suggests that the news media functions as an effective informal oversight mechanism of audit firms by driving increased auditor attention and improved audit quality.

The Moderating Role of an Auditor Independence Clarification on the Relationship Between an Internal Control Opinion and Loan Officers’ Risk Assessments and Decisions

This study examines whether an auditor independence clarification affects loan officers’ lending risk assessments and lending decisions when it is integrated into an auditor’s report as PCAOB has required since 2017. An experiment study is conducted with 98 nationwide commercial bank loan officers. The results indicate that an auditor independence clarification moderates the relationship between an internal control opinion and loan officers’ lending risk assessments and decisions. The findings provide empirical evidence to confirm the informative value of an auditor independence clarification and support PCAOB’s expectation to enhance public users’ understanding of the auditor's independence obligations.

Auditor Responses to Shareholder Activism

In this paper, we investigate how auditors respond to shareholder activism against their clients. Our study is important because activism may be viewed by auditors as a source of increased engagement risk, thereby impacting audit outcomes. The potential relationship between shareholder activism and audit outcomes leads us to predict that activism targets will pay higher audit fees and also will be more likely to receive adverse internal control opinions and first‐time going concern opinions. Our results, which support all three predictions, suggest that the public scrutiny associated with activism campaigns heightens auditors’ concerns about reputational damage and litigation risk. Consistent with this notion, we find that activism targets are more likely to experience accounting‐related lawsuits. We also find that the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions documented in our baseline tests reflects higher quality reporting rather than increased auditor conservatism. Overall, our findings suggest that activism campaigns spur auditor diligence while also increasing the possibility of negative outcomes that may not be fully anticipated by activist investors.

The impact of high insider ownership on SOX 404 internal controls

PurposeThis study aims to investigate the effect of high insider ownership on firms’ internal controls over financial reporting. In particular, it examines how high insider ownership affects the likelihood of an adverse Sarbanes–Oxley Act Section (SOX Section 404) opinion and its subsequent remediation.Design/methodology/approachTests of hypotheses use ineffective controls and remediation models. The initial tests in this study use ineffective internal controls over financial reporting probit regression models to investigate how high insider ownership affects the ex-post likelihood of an adverse 404 opinion. Two remediation models – a multinominal probit regression and probit regression model – are used to investigate the effect of high insider ownership on the likelihood of successfully remediating an adverse 404 opinion.FindingsResults show that while the ex-ante likelihood of an adverse SOX Section 404 auditor’s internal control opinion increases with high insider ownership, high insider ownership firms are more likely to remediate ineffective 404 controls. This study rationalizes these diverse findings by asserting that prior to an adverse 404 opinion, entrenched managers avoid internal control financial reporting oversight and monitoring. After an adverse opinion, however, and within the context of an imminent and explicit value reducing 404 opinion, powerful high insider owner managers are motivated to remedy ineffective controls.Originality/valueThis research synthesizes existing streams of literature on insider ownership and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting quality to provide new information on the effects of high insider ownership on firms’ internal controls.

Does Audit Committee Accounting Expertise Help to Promote Audit Quality? Evidence from Auditor Reporting of Internal Control Weaknesses

ABSTRACTIn this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a greater likelihood of adverse internal control audit opinions when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise (measured by the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee). Among all clients, we find a lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal following an adverse internal control audit opinion when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise. In further analyses, we find that this lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal occurs when at least two audit committee members possess accounting expertise. We also find some evidence that CFO influence (but not CEO influence) over the audit committee negates the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions when internal control material weaknesses likely exist, as well as the decreased likelihood of auditor dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. These findings have important implications for regulators and corporate nominating committees interested in promoting audit committee effectiveness.

Comment letters and internal control opinion shopping

ABSTRACTTaking Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2017 as our samples, this paper investigates the supervision effect of comment letters on internal control opinion shopping at audit firm level, branch level and signing partner level respectively. The empirical results show that the pressure from comment letters can significantly decrease the probability of internal control opinion shopping at both audit firm level and signing partner level. This supervision effect is more pronounced when there are internal-control-related questions in comment letters or the firm’s annual auditor is required to give opinions on some questions in comment letters. As for the branch level of audit firms, it is found that the supervision effect of comment letters on internal control opinion shopping is more pronounced in the firms which switch from headquarters to branches. We also find comment letters have spillover effects on firms in the same industry, in the same province or with the same auditors.

Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and Auditors' Litigation Risk

In contrast to research showing that private litigation discourages audit clients from disclosing internal control weaknesses, we find that auditors’ litigation concerns have a countervailing effect. Our empirical results show that adverse internal control opinions reduces the likelihood of auditors being implicated in lawsuits against their clients, which suggests that disclosing internal control weaknesses can protect auditors from litigation. Consistent with the notion that such litigation protection in turn encourages auditors to issue adverse internal control opinions, we find that both new and incumbent auditors are more likely to issue adverse internal control opinions for clients with higher ex ante litigation risk. Moreover, for restating firms that eventually acknowledge the existence of internal control weaknesses, ex ante litigation risk is positively associated with earlier adverse internal control opinions. Overall, our evidence suggests that litigation threat provides an incentive rather than a disincentive for auditors to issue adverse internal control opinions in a timely fashion. As both new and incumbent auditors have such incentives, auditors’ litigation concerns suppress clients’ opportunistic internal control opinion shopping.

Don't Make Me Look Bad: How the Audit Market Penalizes Auditors for Doing Their Job

We examine the reputational impact of an audit office issuing adverse internal control opinions (adverse ICOs). While prior research has examined how clients that receive an adverse ICO respond, we focus on clients that did not receive an adverse ICO. We find that audit offices that issue more adverse ICOs experience lower growth and that this effect is stronger when the adverse ICO is associated with a more visible client or refers to an entity-level control weakness. Finally, we find that clients are less likely to select auditors with a history of issuing adverse ICOs and that auditors are able to recoup some of their lost growth when they issue fewer adverse ICOs. Our results indicate that the market for audit services penalizes auditors for disclosing information critical of management, which undermines the value of direct-to-investor auditor communications and provides insight into potential longer-term implications of the expanded auditor’s report.

The Effects of the Internal Control Opinion and Use of Audit Data Analytics on Perceptions of Audit Quality, Assurance, and Auditor Negligence

Advanced audit data analytics tools allow auditors to analyze the entire population of accessible client transactions. Though this approach has measurable benefits for audit efficiency and effectiveness, auditors caution that it does not incrementally increase the level of assurance expressed relative to the financial statements’ fair presentation. We experimentally examine whether the audit testing methodology (audit data analytics versus traditional sampling) and the type of internal control (ICFR) opinion auditors issue (unqualified versus adverse) affect jurors’ perceptions of auditor negligence after an audit failure. We predict and find that when auditors issue an unqualified ICFR opinion, jurors make higher negligence assessments when auditors employ traditional statistical sampling techniques than when they employ audit data analytics. We also find that when auditors issue an adverse ICFR opinion, jurors attribute less blame to auditors and correspondingly more blame to the investor for an audit failure. Additional analyses reveal that jurors perceived the use of audit data analytics as an indicator of higher audit quality and are less likely to find auditors negligent. However, jurors do not perceive a difference in the level of assurance provided by the audit opinion when auditors use ADAs or traditional sampling testing methods. Our study informs regulators, practitioners, and academics about the contextual effects of the ICFR opinion and the perceived assurance and potential litigation effects of using advanced technological tools in the audit.