The resource allocation and utilization efficiency in multi-airport systems can be significantly enhanced through the implementation of effective management strategies, thereby enhancing transportation efficiency in these critical transportation hubs. This study proposes a decision-making model for governments, airports, and air carriers operating within multi-airport systems, incorporating network structures that encompass both air-rail intermodal connectivity and direct route options. A backward induction method is employed to conduct a comparative analysis of social welfare between group management and localized management strategies for multi-airport systems. The results demonstrate that the group management strategy represents the Nash equilibrium, as it ensures the maximization of social welfare while maintaining alignment with public welfare objectives. Further examination of high-speed rail unit operating costs reveals a potential Prisoner’s Dilemma that the management departments may encounter. When the high-speed rail unit operating costs fall below a critical threshold, total social welfare under the localized management strategy surpasses that of the group management strategy for multi-airport systems. Moreover, higher airline revenue proportions derived from air-rail intermodal services may mitigate the likelihood of encountering a Prisoner’s Dilemma, as the critical value of high-speed rail unit operating cost increases with the increase of airline revenue proportions. These findings provide valuable insights for policymakers and stakeholders in designing effective multi-airport system management strategies, integrating both operational efficiency and social welfare maximization.
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