Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty Research Articles

Контроль над ядерным оружием: конец истории?

The article is addressed to an unprecedented crisis of the system and process of nuclear arms control – including nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation. During a half century history of the practical nuclear disarmament (counting from the 1963 partial nuclear tests ban treaty – PTB) this process has had many ups and downs, but never has it been so deeply deadlocked. Although the two main nuclear treaties are still implemented: the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 2010 and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987, their future is increasingly uncertain and their validity is eroding, just as that of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and other agreements in this crucial sphere. For the first time in the last fifty years the world is facing a real threat of totally loosing control over the most destructive weapons created in the history of mankind. What is the most amazing – this is happening half a century after the end of the Cold War, when the hopes emerged that nuclear disarmament would finally become a realistic proposition. Dramatic events in and around Ukraine are badly exacerbating the crisis of nuclear arms control, but they are not its original cause. The article is analyzing the principal reasons of the present crisis: the transforming post-post Cold War world order; Russia’s position and role in the new international environment; the military-strategic, economic and technological developments, which are leading to disintegration of former conceptual premises and mechanisms of nuclear arms control and which are not adapted to the changing objective realities. In conclusion some general proposals are provided with the aim of saving, adopting and enhancing nuclear arms limitation and non-proliferation.

A Banner Year for Conventional Arms Control? The Arms Trade Treaty and the Small Arms Challenge

THE CONTROL OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS HAS OFTEN SEEMED THE POOR COUSIN of the global efforts to control weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the advent of the atomic era, the focus of arms control and disarmament activity has been overwhelmingly on nuclear weapons and their lesser, if still ugly, stepsisters of biological and chemical weapons. The initial multilateral arms control agreements concerned themselves with limits on the testing of nuclear weapons and, shortly thereafter, with their nonproliferation (e.g., the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968). Bilateral US-Soviet/Russian arms control arrangements also predominantly dealt with the reduction of strategic nuclear forces and restraints on deployments of defenses against (nuclear-tipped) ballistic missiles. Efforts to reduce major conventional weapon systems were also taken up in the 1980s in the context of negotiations between the opposing alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, eventually culminating in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) of 1989. This treaty provided for a massive reduction in the conventional forces that had confronted each other for years in Central Europe and established a new, far more stable security order on the continent. Even the CFE Treaty, however, tended to be overshadowed by other major disarmament agreements concluded in those heady post-Cold War days: the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987), Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (1996), and various US-Russian bilateral strategic nuclear arms accords of the 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty). From one perspective, the focus on WMD and nuclear weapons in particular is understandable. These after all are weapons that have a capacity for apocalyptic destruction. However, given the prevailing taboo on WMD use (not since 1945 for nuclear weapons, and only a handful of incidents involving chemical weapons), the impact on humans is more a grave potential than a painful reality. Conventional arms, including by this term not only the major weapon systems such as tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles but also the portable small arms and light weapons (SALW), are the tools of daily destruction around the world. It is this category of armament that, as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan once described, are the real weapons of mass destruction. (1) These are the weapons that are actually employed in conflicts and that take the greatest toll, not only of combatants, but also of civilians willfully targeted or simply caught in the cross-fire. The year 2013 was marked by two significant achievements in the realm of multilateral conventional arms control. The first was the adoption by the UN General Assembly in April of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first legally binding agreement to establish common standards for the international transfer of conventional weapons, including SALW. The second was the unanimous adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 2117 at its meeting of 26 September addressing the SALW issue as a threat to international peace and security. This is only the second time that the Council has passed a resolution on this theme. There is reason to celebrate both of these achievements but also to subject them to some critical scrutiny as to what these actions by the General Assembly and the Security Council, respectively, actually mean for dealing with the problems raised by conventional weapons. To better judge the significance of the 2013 developments, it is necessary to place them in their historical context. Past UN Action on Conventional Arms The UN came relatively late to addressing the security and humanitarian challenges posed by conventional arms and, especially, SALW. The UN Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1991 to attempt some transparency over international trade in major weapons systems, but it did not include (and still does not) provision for SALW to be included in the same manner as the seven other categories of weaponry. …

Obstacles and Opportunities for a Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty between Russia and the United States

:Tactical nuclear weapons have emerged as an unavoidable issue for future nuclear weapons negotiations between Russia and the United States. This article discusses challenges and opportunities regarding a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. It begins with an overview of precedents from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. These and subsequent experiences show three major obstacles that must be overcome to permit bi-lateral agreement on tactical nuclear weapons: definitional issues over differentiating tactical from strategic nuclear weapons; negotiation challenges including the asymmetries between American and Russian tactical arsenals and non-nuclear capabilities such as ballistic missile defence and conventional prompt global strike; and verification questions over whether and how warhead status can be verified without disclosing sensitive information. This analysis examines whether the International Atomic Energy Agency could have a role in verification to help facilitate agreement. Lastly, this article offers various confidence building measures, emphasizing areas where the two countries could cooperate. While the obstacles are serious, there are opportunities for achieving consensus on some contentious issues.

A proposal for a South Asian intermediate nuclear forces treaty

This article proposes that the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty be applied as a model for a missile‐ban treaty between India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan are developing and deploying missiles whose use could be devastating on the densely populated subcontinent. Moreover, missile limits are more amenable to verification than are agreements to reduce or eliminate warheads of mass destruction. Key problems for a South Asian INF treaty include the status of China, the mechanics of verification, and the potential for using space‐launch vehicles as offensive weapons. Above all, both India and Pakistan must perceive such a missile agreement as enhancing their national security.