Interest In Foreign Affairs Research Articles

Legislative Behavior, Mass Media, and Foreign Policy Making: The Case of Paraguay

Does national media news coverage affect the behavior of legislators when deciding foreign policy matters? This article aims to disentangle the relationship between the media and legislative behavior in foreign policy, using Paraguay as a case study. We analyze the level of public debate on international affairs, measured by the frequency of news in the newspaper ABC Color in the six months before the roll-call votes on the Chamber of Deputies of Paraguay. The literature on Latin American studies finds a lack of parliamentary interest in foreign affairs due to low voter attention to this subject, and therefore a low impact on reelections. We find the relationship between parliamentary polarization and public interest in a bill to be mediated by mass media. After estimating a Tobit model, we observe a significant and positive relationship between the news coverage a law receives and the degree of polarization among parliamentarians. Thus, our empirical evidence contradicts the idea that there is a lack of electoral interest in foreign policy. We confirm this finding through qualitative data gathered from in-depth interviews.

Modern Foreign Correspondents after World War I: The New York Evening Post's David Lawrence and Simeon Strunsky

In the aftermath of World War I and the Peace Conference of 1919, the American public's interest in foreign affairs increased. The Wilson administration's wartime program, the New Diplomacy, contributed to this interest. It called for open diplomacy among statesmen and diplomats in the settlement of international conflicts, and press access to and publicity of their deliberations. The goal was an internationalized public opinion that would aid both concepts. With the prospect of an enlarged role for the United States in foreign affairs, prominent newspaper publishers and editors supported a robust coverage of foreign news, marked by a modern narrative consisting of the facts and an interpretation of their meaning. The New York Evening Post's David Lawrence and Simeon Strunsky promoted the New Diplomacy and explained its ramifications for American foreign policy and press relations.

What Is in the National Interest? Hans Morgenthau's Realist Vision and American Foreign Policy

To answer that question this analysis examines the work of the political realist thinker Hans J. Morgenthau who transformed the study of international relations with his analysis of this question. As this analysis turns to Morgenthau, a founder of the National Committee and the chief theorist of the national interest, to define the complexities of the term, Morgenthau read the writings of the founders of America—the Federalists—for an explication of what has become the most important term in the lexicon of international relations. As relayed in this analysis, Morgenthau distilled three precepts underlying the founders’ conception of America's interest in foreign affairs and nine rules that govern the art of diplomacy. They are identified and explained here in an analysis that shows, among other things, the durability of Morgenthau's thought.

Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo's Foreign Policy Challenges

New Indonesian President Joko Widodo, who prefers to be known by the portmanteau Jokowi, (1) has declared that he will focus on domestic affairs, particularly improving the country's maritime infrastructure and reasserting the authority of the state, as part of broad reform programme. In these areas, he could be transformative president. However, an activist presidency in these areas, even if intended only as domestic effort, will create unintended foreign policy challenges for Indonesia, because its economic and maritime interests are so closely intertwined with those of its neighbours. Moreover, Jokowi's focus on domestic policy will likely see him delegate management of foreign affairs, including responsibility for addressing these challenges, to several key advisers. Where consensus among these advisers does not emerge, Jokowi is unlikely to intervene to settle the debate and to clarify Indonesia's position, as his predecessor, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, often did when confronted with similar challenges. This article first outlines the role that President Yudhoyono played in the conduct of the country's foreign policy in order to illustrate the change in experience and focus that Jokowi represents. Second, it reviews Jokowi's statements on foreign affairs and argues that his views on Indonesia's external relations are almost entirely function of his domestic reform agenda, which emphasizes state strength and maritime affairs. Third, it identifies the key people providing advice to Jokowi on foreign policy, and how they might influence his views. Finally, it explores how this context might affect the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region, highlighting the dilemma of the Indonesian position in the South China Sea. I argue throughout that Jokowi's focus on maritime affairs and questions of state sovereignty could lead to greater tensions with neighbouring states and China; and that his inexperience in foreign affairs could allow these tensions to persist in way they did not under his predecessor, thus diminishing Indonesia's regional leadership role. Yudhoyono's Departure Leaves Void When President Yudhoyono vacated the State Palace in October 2014, he left void in the country's foreign policymaking system. As president, Yudhoyono energetically pursued vision of Indonesia's place in the world as rising power, and of himself as globe-trotting statesman respected and admired by his peers. In his pursuit of this vision, he took great care to cultivate opinion abroad, while minimizing the opportunity for institutional competition over foreign policy among his ministries at home. The presidency was not Yudhoyono's first turn at foreign Throughout his long army career, Yudhoyono demonstrated keen interest in foreign affairs. Early in his presidency, as he strove to position himself as an international statesman and foreign policy intellectual, he adopted and promoted foreign policy vision defined by the country's identity as large Muslim majority democracy. (2) By the start of his second term, he had refined his view of Indonesia's place in the international system as country with a thousand friends and zero enemies and an all directions foreign policy. (3) He sought to improve ties with both the United States and China, but also made show of diplomacy with Iran and North Korea. (4) He pursued warmer relations with neighbouring countries, including Australia, Singapore and Malaysia, resisting demands from the bureaucracy and legislature that he take harder line in various disputes. (5) In implementing his foreign policy agenda, Yudhoyono continued institutional reforms begun by his predecessor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, that consolidated foreign policymaking in the foreign ministry and the State Palace, thereby limiting institutional competition over foreign policy between various ministries. …

The Normalisation of Portuguese-Chinese Relations and Macao’s Handover to Mainland China, 1974–79

Although many people believe that small or medium powers tend to be very concerned with overseas territories, this was not true in the case of Macao. The great power, mainland China, showed very little interest in foreign affairs, because it knew that the outcome of the handover would be in its favour. Nonetheless, from May 1974 to July 1975, both China and Portugal had to demarcate their positions. The Portuguese entered into informal conversations with the Chinese ambassador to France, Zeng Tao, in August 1975, which lasted until January 1978, a total of almost three years. As soon as power in mainland China shifted from the leftists to the moderates, however, the new ambassador in Paris, Han Kehua, made it clear that he wanted things settled in six months. However, in 1978, the Portuguese cabinet had three different prime ministers and three different ministers of foreign affairs. Ultimately, the Portuguese cabinet had to give in to mainland China, on 8 February 1979.

Globalization and people’s interest in foreign affairs

Globalization signifies the increasing interconnectedness among different parts of the world. But few studies have examined whether and how the processes of globalization relate to people’s interests in foreign affairs. This study tackles the question at the individual level. It identifies transnational social connections, willingness to move abroad, foreign language abilities, and perceived impact of globalization as four factors representing people’s connections with and orientations toward the processes of globalization. These four factors are hypothesized as correlates of people’s interest in foreign affairs. Analysis of a comparative survey ( N = 1117) conducted in Hong Kong and Taipei generally supports the hypotheses, but the results also show that social contexts may shape the strengths of the relationships among different factors. The analysis also explores the problematic of causality. The results suggest that some, but not all, aspects of individuals’ connections with globalization can influence interest in foreign affairs.

Connecting the President and the People: Washington's Neutrality, Genet's Challenge, and Hamilton's Fight for Public Support

As the French Revolution intensified with the execution of King Louis XVI in 1793, so did the American public's interest in foreign affairs. Since President George Washington seized the initiative in foreign affairs (rather than Congress, as was expected by many at the time), the executive became the focal point of the developing relationship between the American public and the newly established federal government. The events centered on the Washington administration and the French Minister, Edmond Genet, placed the office of president of the United States squarely at the intersection of foreign affairs and popular politics. By focusing on the political activity that swirled around President George Washington's controversial proclamation of neutrality, this essay examines how Federalists, especially the administration's own Alexander Hamilton, tried to shape the public's understanding of the proclamation. When Washington thrust his administration into the burgeoning foreign crisis, the president put himself and the executive office at the center of the public debate. By looking at newspaper essays, community resolutions, presidential replies, and the Gideon Henfield trial and verdict, this essay argues that the Washington administration experienced the power of public opinion as an advantageous political force as well as an obstacle to its policy of neutrality. Washington's proclamation of neutrality, which injected executive authority into the realm of foreign affairs at a time when the American public was intensely interested in foreign events, contributed to the developing relationship between the American people and the newly established executive office.

A Review of Parliament-Foreign Policy Nexus in South Africa and Namibia

After a review of selected literature on foreign policy and parliament-foreign policy nexus in South Africa, this article examines the nature of ‘Parliamentary diplomacy’, with special focus on Parliamentary Committees on Foreign Affairs [PCFA] in South Africa and Namibia since 2000. By means of descriptive approach and content-analysis of documentary sources and conversational interviews, it further explores the extent of executive-legislative frictions over foreign affairs in both countries and the raison deter for parliamentary interest in foreign affairs, which is located within the orbit of National Interest. It argues that the executive-legislature friction over foreign policies may not be resolved sooner, more so that there are other actors seeking to influence the direction of foreign policy in both countries.

Editor's introduction: Thirty years of <i>Irish Studies in International Affairs</i>

In addition to having a strong focus this year on the concept of the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P), this issue of Irish Studies in International Affairs marks the thirtieth year of publication of the journal?something of a milestone and one that provides an opportunity to look back over the development of the journal itself and the wider study of international affairs in Ireland over that time period. A National Committee for the Study of International Affairs had been established by the Royal Irish Academy in 1977, and the first issue of this journal two years later published a series of papers from seminars and the committee's first annual conference. That issue, edited by Liam de Paor and Patrick Keatinge, had a focus that would not be out of place today?Ireland's relationship with the League of Nations and United Nations, Anglo-Irish relations, Ireland's development policy and the direction of Irish foreign policy. The committee that oversaw the launch of the journal included, in addition to the editors, some people who have retained a connection with the Academy's international affairs committee to the present day?Garret FitzGerald and Noel Dorr?and academics who went on to publish in the journal frequently in the following years. The demand to publish the journal reflected a wider sense that Ireland needed a greater level of academic reflection on foreign affairs. The low level of debate on foreign policy matters was also of concern to members of Dail Eireann at that time. In 1978, a future leader of the Labour party, Ruairi Quinn, speaking in the first debate on foreign affairs after Fianna Fail's overwhelming victory in the 1977 election, called for a public debate on the values that should inform foreign policy. In the course of his speech, Quinn said that 'there appears to be a lack of interest in foreign affairs' and that in the past, even during the period of external affairs minister Frank Aiken's high-profile activity in the United Nations in the late 1950s, the decisions made in relation to Ireland's foreign affairs activities were 'of concern perhaps more to the individuals [involved] and the parties rather than to the public'.1 He argued that this was set to change,

Editor's introduction: Thirty years of "Irish Studies in International Affairs"

Editor's introduction Thirtyyearsof IrishStudies inInternational Affairs John Doyle Centre for International Studies, School of Law and Government, Dublin CityUniversity In addition to having a strong focus this year on the concept of the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P), this issue of Irish Studies in International Affairs marks the thirtieth year of publication of the journal?something of a milestone and one that provides an opportunity to look back over the development of the journal itself and thewider study of international affairs in Ireland over that time period. A National Committee for the Study of International Affairs had been established by theRoyal IrishAcademy in 1977, and thefirst issue of this journal two years later published a series of papers from seminars and the committee's first annual conference. That issue, edited by Liam de Paor and Patrick Keatinge, had a focus that would not be out of place today?Ireland's relationship with theLeague of Nations and United Nations, Anglo-Irish relations, Ireland's development policy and the direction of Irish foreign policy. The committee thatoversaw the launch of the journal included, in addition to the editors, some people who have retained a connection with theAcademy's international affairs committee to the present day?Garret FitzGerald and Noel Dorr?and academics who went on to publish in the journal frequently in the following years. The demand to publish the journal reflected a wider sense that Ireland needed a greater level of academic reflection on foreign affairs. The low level of debate on foreign policy matters was also of concern tomembers of Dail Eireann at that time. In 1978, a future leader of theLabour party,Ruairi Quinn, speaking in thefirst debate on foreign affairs after Fianna Fail's overwhelming victory in the 1977 election, called for a public debate on the values that should inform foreign policy. In the course of his speech, Quinn said that 'there appears to be a lack of interest in foreign affairs' and that in the past, even during the period of external affairsminister Frank Aiken's high-profile activityin the UnitedNations inthelate 1950s, thedecisions made in relation to Ireland's foreign affairs activities were 'of concern perhaps more to the individuals [involved] and the parties rather than to thepublic'.1 He argued that thiswas set to change, by virtue of our entry into and membership of theEEC which includes the present situation where the nine member states are attempting tomove towards common lDdil Debates, vol. 306, cols 465-75,4 May 1978. Author's e-mail: john.doyle@dcu.ie IrishStudies inInternational Affairs, Vol. 20 (2009), 1-5. doi: 10.3318/ISIA.2009.20.1 2 Irish Studies inInternational Affairs policy positions on major issues of foreign affairs, we no longer have to depend purely on our powers of persuasion. We have in a vague and perhaps ill-defined form a power which we never previously had, albeit a negative one, and to that extent foreign affairs is no longer an irrelevant luxury that can be talked out on a Thursday afternoon by people who happen to have an interest in things beyond the seas. It affects us in a very real way...we have a responsibility by virtue of having a say and therefore some power.2 There was at that time no parliamentary forum for consistent discussion on foreign affairs. Academia had been equally slow to formalise the interests of individuals. While therewere individual academics with an interest in international affairs,many of them involved in the launch of the journal, no Irish university offered a specialised degree in international relations at either primary or postgraduate level. Those who gave impetus to the study of international affairs through the journal are due a debt of gratitude, as now, 30 years later, the formal university study of international relations is one of the fastest growing sub-disciplines in the broad social sciences/humanities area in Ireland. Students can now takemodules in international affairs at every Irish university and have the option in a number of colleges of taking a full degree in international relations/studies at BA, MA or PhD level, and in specialisms such as development, international security, peace and conflict studies or EU...

Proximity and Distance

AbstractThis article shows the great interest in foreign affairs and other international influences in three Norwegian newspapers between 1880 and 1930. International coverage has received relatively little interest in Norwegian press history, but should be considered a vital element in creating a national imagery in a young state which gained its independence in 1905. The article shows how proximity and distance are political as well as geographical concepts, contributing to our notions about social dynamics in other societies. The article is based on a pilot study conducted on behalf of the Norwegian Press History project.

‘Thy Will Be Done’: The New Foreign Policy of America's Christian Right

America's evangelical community are usually seen to be little more than cheerleaders for the Bush administration's activist foreign policy. However, there is much going on in this diverse community, which has begun to develop its own ideas about foreign policy, many of which contradict realist and neo-conservative approaches. Tracing the development of the community's interest in foreign affairs, the article focuses on the three most important contemporary issues for America's conservative Protestants (CPs): solidarity with the oppressed; concern over and use of international institutions (and with Europe); and support for Israel. There is a growing coherence among America's (white) CPs, which will be of increasing relevance to America's partners and friends.

Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media Age

Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media Age. By Matthew A. Baum. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. 344p. 19.95 paper.Most research aimed at understanding television's influence on citizens' knowledge and attention to current events has focused on network news. Yet hard news constitutes only a small fraction of TV programming. The television day is filled with shows that come under the rubric of “soft news”—running the gamut from celebrity gossip to late-night comedy, afternoon talk shows, and prime-time magazines. Matthew Baum's book fills an important gap in political communication research. Baum asks what people learn about hard news from soft news programs. He argues that watching soft news programs gets people who would otherwise have little interest in foreign affairs to pay attention to international crises.

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy

The second half of 2001 will be remembered as one of the more eventful and significant periods in recent Australian foreign policy. Two issues - immigration policy and the terrorist attack on the United States - dominated the period under review here. Although Australian interests were, arguably, only indirectly involved in the latter incident, the aftermath of 'September the eleventh', as the attack rapidly became known, overshadowed Australia's federal election and gave foreign and security policy a rare prominence amongst an Australian electorate not usually known for its interest in foreign affairs. The tumultuous events of late 2001 not only threw the conduct and efficacy of John Howard's coalition government's foreign policy into sharp relief, it highlighted a number of issues that are likely to be central to the agendas of foreign policy-makers more generally over the coming decades.

Australia's Foreign Policy after Timor

THE SETTINGIn July 1997, John Howard's conservative government honoured an election promise and issued In the National Interest, Australia's first ever white paper on foreign and trade policies. Election promises, like pie-crusts, are made to be broken, but 1996 was such a turbulent year in Australian politics - an ephemeral populist racist movement, Hansonism, exploited some of the domestic discontents of globalization - and such an error-filled year in foreign policy that there was a strong compulsion on the government to retrieve some ground by setting out its international philosophy.It was a risky move. Howard's record did not suggest a keen interest in foreign affairs. In the tradition of bipartisanship in this area, his party's programme seemed to contain few, if any, convincing differences from its Labor predecessors. Predictions in international affairs are always hazardous. Australia's longest-serving foreign minister, Richard Gardiner (later Lord) Casey, an artist of aphorisms, used to say that 'diplomats, unlike the money market, don't deal in futures.' Technological advances have aided the professionals' preference for making policy on the run, for foreign policy as the art of the skilful fumble. By 1997 the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), in the tenth year of its merger, had survived serious teething problems and severe downsizing largely by giving economic and financial issues precedence over traditional broad politico-security concerns.Mercantilism shaped the white paper. In the words of the foreign affairs minister, Alexander Downer, in an address to the National Press Club in Canberra on 31 March 1999: 'a fifteen year perspective ... identified globalisation and the economic rise of Asia as defining trends.' These themes were not novel. They would have been acceptable to Labor's Prime Minister Paul Keating, who had reined in his roving foreign minister, Gareth Evans, and demanded a focused (or niche) foreign policy giving priority to trade, Indonesia, and Japan (to which the white paper added the United States and China). The validity of the white paper's second focus was widely questioned because it appeared just after the economic crisis broke in Asia. However, in his speech Downer expressed the government view that the crisis was all but over and reaffirmed the white paper: 'we have no reason to change those medium- to long-term trends.'This was surprising because it appeared to misjudge the damage the crisis would do to political, security, and social superstructures and, consequently, to under-estimate change in the hierarchy of challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region - not to mention the inevitable pain still to be suffered, especially by Indonesia where crony capitalism remains largely intact.THE EMERGENCE OF EAST TIMOR IN 1999Downer's introductory observations set the scene for a speech on 'Indonesia, East Timor and Australia: New Challenges, Enduring Interests.' The rest of 1999 has been the story of how the tiny territory of East Timor (area just under 15,000 square kilometres, population perhaps 800,000) turned out to be the catalyst for change in Australia's immediate regional environment and present the greatest challenge for Australian foreign policy.It is not possible in this article, which looks forward, to retrace the history of East Timor, a Portuguese colony from 1524-1975, and of Australia's peripheral involvement in it. Suffice it to say that during the Second World War, it was the locus of a major Australian guerrilla war against Japanese invaders, at whose hands some 40,000 Timorese died, and its tragic history over the last quarter of a century since its incorporation into Indonesia by force has involved fatalities in the range 100,000-200,000. Geography and humanitarianism have put East Timor and the perceived shortcomings of Australian policy under continued scrutiny, and the ensuing controversy has split public and political opinion across parties. …

From butterboxes to wooden shoes: the shift in English popular sentiment from anti-Dutch to anti-French in the 1670s

ABSTRACTWhile Restoration historians have traditionally assumed that there was little public interest in foreign affairs, and that English attitudes towards Europe were determined either by religious or domestic concerns, this essay argues that there was a lively and sophisticated English debate about Europe which turned on the proper identification of the universal monarch rather than religion. In the later 1660s the English political nation was deeply divided in its understanding of European politics. Enthusiastic supporters of the restored monarchy thought that the republican United Provinces sought universal dominion, while the monarchy's radical critics identified absolutist France as an aspirant to universal monarchy. French success in the early phases of the third Anglo-Dutch war, the failure of the French navy to support the English fleet at sea, and the overthrow of the Dutch republican regime in favour of William III, Prince of Orange, convinced the vast majority of the English that France represented the greater threat. Ultimately popular pressure compelled Charles II to abandon the French alliance. In addition, the popular conviction that Louis XIV had succeeded in corrupting the English court resulted in a new-found desire for popular accountability in foreign affairs, and a consequent diminution of the royal prerogative in that sphere.

Individual aggression, national attachment, and the search for peace: Psychological perspectives

The primary question addressed is the role of affect related factors, particularly values, as possible mediators of individual differences in attitudes towards nuclear armament-disarmament issues. One such factor is value placed on children, those individuals who have greater affection for children or who are more supportive of devoting national resources toward meeting children's needs being more supportive of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test moratorium. This relationship was found in a well-educated group of adults with a special interest in foreign affairs as well as in college student populations. A significant and strong relationship between the value placed on war as an instrument of foreign policy and a pronuclear armament stance was also found in each of these two samples. Measures of individual aggression, however, were minimally and inconsistently related to the attitude towards nuclear armament-disarmament and the attitude towards war measures. The possible role of patriotic and nationalistic values was also explored. Patriotism or love of and pride in one's country was shown to be functionally distinct from nationalism or the view that one's country is superior to and should be more powerful than other nations. Patriotism but not nationalism was found to be positively correlated with early paternal sattachment while nationalism but not patriotism, was found to be significantly related to pronuclear armament views. The findings from this series of studies indicate that the analysis of individual differences in nuclear armament-disarmament policy attitudes has heuristic usefulness and may be useful for social policy in this area.

Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders

Do the personal characteristics of political leaders affect their governments' foreign policy behavior? The present study examines the impact of 6 personal characteristics of 45 heads of government on the foreign policy behavior of their nations. These characteristics, each of individual interest, interrelate to form two orientations to foreign affairs, and the influence of these orientations on foreign policy behavior is also explored. The results are reported for all 45 heads of government, as well as for those leaders among the 45 with high or low interest in foreign affairs and with little or much training in foreign affairs.

The Limits of Public Support

Polls reveal that the American public's interest in foreign affairs remains consistently low. In only three of ten to twelve areas of government spending, polled since 1971, did the public feel that the United States was spending too much; of these, foreign aid—both economic and military— was an easy first.

Direction of policy in Palestine, 1936–45

The years preceding World War Two witnessed significant changes in British policy in Palestine. These changes were at one and the same time the cause and effect of a radical re-adjustment of the British policymaking machine (for want of a better name) responsible for Palestine. Until 1936, Britain had administered the Palestine Mandate in the light of a reasonably objective judgement of the respective rights of Zionists and Arabs. To a considerable degree, policy-making had been delegated by Cabinet and Colonial Secretary to the permanent officials in London and to the men on the spot in Palestine. But the Arab Rebellion which began in April, 1936 and continued intermittently until the eve of war, involved the moral sympathy, political support and even the physical intervention of certain of the Arab States. The increasing involvement of the Arab world in Palestinian affairs of necessity led to an increasing and ultimately dominating interest on the part of the Foreign Office. With the security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean at stake policy in Palestine could no longer be left in the hands of officials, whether in London or Jerusalem. London could no longer afford the luxury of considering the problems of Palestine in isolation from the rest of the Middle East. The re-assumption of ministerial and Cabinet control over policy in Palestine was neither swift nor smooth. Ministers relied heavily on the opinions of their permanent staff, especially when they themselves were new and often ephemeral incumbents. Baldwin's leadership in Cabinet was weak, collective responsibility sadly lacking. Baldwin took little interest in foreign affairs, and believed that Ministers should run their own Departments, with himself on hand to settle disputes or give advice. 1 If during 1935-36 the Cabinet dithered for months over its attitude to Italy, it could not be expected to re-assert swift control over a troubled colony. Government machinery for dealing with Arabian and Middle Eastern problems generally still showed a remarkable lack of unified direction. Apart from the traditional, major, but rather obscure divisions between the responsibilities of on the one hand, the Foreign Office and, on the other, of the India Office and the Government of India in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, policy in Iraq (until its official independence in 1932), Transjordan and Palestine was the responsibility of the Colonial Office.2 Defence policy in the Middle East had been placed in the hands of the Air Ministry during Churchill's tenure at the Colonial Office in 1921, but the despatch of troops in considerable numbers to Palestine in 1936 led to an ad hoc assumption of general command by the G.O.C. of the Army. The Admiralty was concerned for its part with the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf Ports as stop-offs on the Imperial route to India and as terminal ports for oil supplies.