Intentional Systems Theory Research Articles

Reasons Things Happen for a Reason: An Integrative Theory of Teleology

Humans default to functions and purposes when asked to explain the existence of mysterious phenomena. Our penchant for teleological reasoning is associated with good outcomes, such as finding meaning in misfortune, but also with bad outcomes, such as dangerous conspiracy theories and misunderstood scientific ideas, both of which pose important social and health problems. Psychological research into the teleological default has long alluded to Daniel Dennett’s intentional-systems theory but has not fully engaged with the three intellectual stances at its core (intentional, design, physical). This article distinguishes the intentional stance from the design stance, which untangles some of the present knots in theories of teleology, accounts for diverse forms of teleology, and enhances predictions of when teleological reasoning is more likely to occur. This article examines the evidence for a teleological default considering Dennett’s intentional-systems theory, proposes a process model, and clarifies current theoretical debates. It argues that people rationally and often thoughtfully use teleological reasoning in relation to both cognitive and social psychological factors. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.

The Comic Stance

AbstractDespite sustained philosophical attention, no theory of humor claims general acceptance. Drawing on the resources provided by intentional systems theory, this article first outlines an approach to investigating humor based on the idea of a comic stance, then sketches the Dismissal Theory of Humor (DTH) that has resulted from pursuing that approach. According to the DTH, humor manifests in cases where the future-directed significance of anticipatory failures is dismissed. Mirth, on this view, is the reward people get for declining to update predictive representational schemata in ways that maximize their future-oriented value. The theory aims to provide a plausible account of the role of humor in human mental and social life, but it also aims to be empirically vulnerable, and to generate testable predictions about how the comic stance may actually be undergirded by cognitive architectures.

Rationality, Religion and Intentional Systems Theory: From Objective Ethnography to the Critical Study of Religious Beliefs

AbstractRationality pervades the study of religion. This essay argues that rationality has three roles in this context. First, it functions as a presupposition in the ethnographic descriptions of religious behaviour; second, it functions as the explanatory principle in ethnography of religion; third, rationality functions as a normative tool in the critical assessments of religion. It is argued that all three roles are rooted in the Dennettian intentional system theory and are thus intricately linked with each other. It is further argued that any ethnographic study of religion that uses the best available scientific methods in the description and explanation of human behaviour, commits itself to the relative optimality of scientific outlook and to the critique of religion in principle.

Intentional Systems Theory, Mental Causation and Empathic Resonance

In the first section of this paper I argue that the main reason why Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory (IST) has been perceived as behaviourist or antirealist is its inability to account for the causal efficacy of the mental. The rest of the paper is devoted to the claim that by emending the theory with a phenomenon called ‘empathic resonance’ (ER), it can account for the various explananda in the mental causation debate. Thus, IST + ER is a much more viable option than IST, even though IST + ER assigns a crucial role to the phenomenology of agency, a role that is incompatible with Dennett’s writings on consciousness.

Cognition, natural selection and the intentional stance

Abstract Daniel Dennett advocates the use of the intentional stance in adaptationist biology and in cognitive ethology. He sees intentional system theory as closely related to decision theory and game theory. In biological decision and game theory models, nature “chooses” the strategy by which the animal chooses a course of action. The design of the animal imposes constraints on the model. For Dennett, by contrast, the description of nature's rationale imposes constraints on the design of the animal. Dennett's oversimplified conception of nature's rationale undermines the usefulness of the intentional stance as a tool in cognitive ethology. Intentional system theory can be made more useful in investigating animal cognition by modifying its application to questions of biological function.

Illusions of Consciousness

Daniel Dennett's theory of mind divides into two parts: a theory of mental content, which is provided by his intentional systems theory, and a theory of consciousness, the latest presentation of which is brought together in an exciting recent work, Consciousness Explained. This book, combined with his 1987 The Intentional Stance, constitutes the third execution of Dennett's overall program, the first two being Content and Consciousness (1969) and Brainstorms (1978). Consciousness Explained is a veritable treasure of fascinating ideas, fresh perspectives and striking illustrations, many of which are sure to be much discussed by philosophers in years to come.

Intentional system theory and experimental psychology

Intentional system theory and experimental psychology

A critique of Dennett

This essay is intended to be a systematic exposition and critique of Daniel Dennett's general views. It is divided into three main sections. In section 1 we raise the question of the nature of a plausible scientific psychology, and suggest that the question of whether folk psychology will serve as an adequate scientific psychology is of special relevance in a discussion of Dennett. We then characterize folk psychology briefly. We suggest that Dennett's views have undergone at least one major change, and proceed to discuss both his earlier and his later views. In section 2 we suggest that Dennett is correctly perceived as an instrumentalist in his earlier works. We think that Dennett later abandons this position because of general worries about instrumentalism and, more importantly, because Dennett became convinced that an instrumentalist conception of folk psychology will not enable us to vindicate the notions of personhood, moral agency, and responsibility. This left Dennett with a dilemma. On the one hand, he does not think that beliefs, etc., will turn out to be genuine scientific posits. On the other hand, he thinks that moral agency would be impossible if we could not treat beliefs, etc. as causally efficacious in some suitable sense. In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls ‘intentional system theory’. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls ‘subpersonal cognitive psychology’, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable. If we are right in our arguments, then Dennett's program to produce a scientifically plausible psychology, one that will turn out to vindicate folk psychology (in some suitable sense), is a failure. It fails in the following important ways: (i) What Dennett sketches — intentional system theory cum subpersonal cognitive psychology — is not a plausible scientific psychology. (ii) As a consequence, Dennett also fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for moral and rational agency.

The Case Against the Case Against Belief

Some of our most prominent philosophical thinkers maintain that scientific advances threaten to show that nothing answers to our common-sense framework of intentional states such as belief, desire, hope, fear, and the rest. Paul Churchland argues that the elimination of what he calls 'folk psychology' is 'richly possible' in light of the 'advancing tide of neuroscience' (Churchland, 1981, p. 90). Stephen Stich, although not as convinced as Churchland, also is pessimistic about the existence of intentional states. Stich asks whether our ordinary belief ascriptions may turn out not to be true and answers this way: 'this is indeed a serious possibility, since ordinary belief ascription makes a pair of empirical assumptions, both of which might turn out to be false... it is too early to say whether folk psychology has a future' (Stich, 1983, p. 242). For Daniel Dennett the conflict between 'our vision of ourselves as responsible, free, rational agents, and our vision of ourselves as complex parts of the physical world of science' (Dennett, 1978, p. x) is potentially so troublesome that he has embraced an explicitly instrumentalistic view of intentional states ('intentional systems theory') in order to preserve intentional ascriptions in the face of whatever science might tell us about ourselves. Worries about the viability of common-sense mental concepts have become a growing theme in recent philosophizing about the cognitive sciences. In his intriguing new book From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Stich, 1983) Stich uses several arguments regarding cognitive psychology to claim that the existence of the common-sense notion of belief is in jeopardy. My strategy in this paper is to grant Stich's claims about psychology and argue that one still need not renounce the existence of belief. I try to show that Stich has portrayed the realist view as more precarious than it really is and that Stich has overestimated the strength of his argument by ignoring certain distinctions important to realism.

Adaptationist theorizing and intentional system theory

Adaptationist theorizing and intentional system theory

Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The “Panglossian paradigm” defended

AbstractEthologists and others studying animal behavior in a “cognitive” spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed toparticular“information-processing models.” Just such an interim descriptive method can be found inintentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable “anecdotal” data - is sketched. The underlying assumptions of this approach can be seen to ally it directly with “adaptationist” theorizing in evolutionary biology, which has recently come under attack from Stephen Gould and Richard Lewontin, who castigate it as the “Panglossian paradigm.” Their arguments, which are strongly analogous to B. F, Skinner's arguments against “mentalism,” point to certain pitfalls that attend the careless exercise of such “Panglossian” thinking (and rival varieties of thinking as well), but do not constitute a fundamental objection to either adaptationist theorizing or its cousin, intentional system theory.