Intentional Objects Research Articles

Focusing on an object or reflexive self-awareness? Mindfulness, phenomenology and the Pāli suttas

ABSTRACT The concept of mindfulness within the contemporary mindfulness movement was the subject of a recent phenomenological critique. The present article confronts that critique in order to develop a phenomenologically viable interpretation of mindfulness that corresponds with how the word sati is used in the Pāli suttas. By clarifying the distinction between intentional objects and intentional acts, it can be shown that mindfulness was not originally conceived of as an exercise in focusing on a meditation object, but as reflexive self-awareness. Consequently, it is wrong to describe mindfulness as ‘bare attention’. Mindfulness was originally a philosophical enterprise, an attitude that can be cultivated only when one is attending to things while remaining aware of the broader context. Furthermore, an ordinary person (puthujjana) cannot cultivate what the Buddha called ‘right mindfulness’ (sammāsati). This is the province of the noble ones who have acquired the right view and are accomplished in virtue.

Ternary Moral Empathy Model from the Perspective of Intersubjective Phenomenology.

The phenomenon of empathy is an intersubjective process of feeling and a particular form of intentionality. Moral empathy refers to a type of empathy that can trigger moral action, with the embodied intersubjectivity laying the foundation for its emergence. This paper attempts to propose a comprehensive theoretical model of moral empathy from the perspective of intersubjective phenomenology, which includes the following. (1) The moral dimension of perceptual empathy: at the subpersonal, unconscious, and perceptual-motor level, embodied empathic practices are essential for the formation of moral consciousness and the emergence of moral empathy. (2) The moral dimension of situational empathy: following the development of shared attention mechanisms, children can direct towards the intentional objects of others through embodied situational cues to perceive the psychological state of others and generate the moral empathy of "ought", leading to dyadic morality that promotes cooperative behavior. (3) The moral dimension of narrative empathy: the narrative practices of moral empathy refer to the processes by which children could perceive and understand the moral situation of characters within an embodied narrative structure, subsequently generate prosocial motives such as empathic concern, and then accept the "objective" moral norms of the group consciousness embedded in the narrative.

Pure Consciousness as the Ground of the Given: Or, Why There is No Perception Without Background Reception

Abstract: The thrust of the present paper is that contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness are in the grip of a distorted perspective on the nature of their subject. They are absorbed in an understanding of consciousness which overemphasizes its role in grasping intentional objects, while undervaluing its functioning as the receptive ground to whom things are given and in whom they are disclosed. I first make the distinction more precise, discerning two complementary modes of consciousness: the accusative mode and the dative mode, respectively. Taking Locke as a primary representative of the disregard for the dative mode, I proceed to show that this negligence leads to a fundamentally incomplete, and therefore ultimately incoherent, picture regarding the nature of consciousness. This is further demonstrated with regard to some contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness: higher-order monitoring theories and self-representational theories. I then move on to enquire, can the dative mode hypothesis receive support from significant trends in contemporary neuroscience? While interesting connections are drawn in relation to affective neuroscience and to spontaneous background activity, I argue that in order to do full justice to the receptive side of consciousness we must ultimately resort to the more radical concept of pure consciousness, developed primarily within Hindu and Buddhist philosophy.

Nightingale of Keats. Documents, archives, and information objects

The paper first analyzes the complexity of the notion of the archival document, in its fundamental definition and its updates prompted by the shift to the digital dimension. It then sets out to consider – from a digital hermeneutic point of view – the notion of ‘document’ from the perspective of the information object and therefore of the intentional object. Finally, the paper discusses the ways in which the archive is a technological enhancement for the interrogability and ‘consultability’ of knowledge.

The Visible and the Invisible: Jean-Luc Marion on the Artistic Phenomenology

Jean-Luc Marion, as a renowned phenomenologist today, transcends painting from the realm of aesthetics and, through a series of fundamental inquiries into painting, images, and issues such as idols and icons, rearticulates phenomenology's overcoming of subjectivity. This article will reflect on Marion's artistic phenomenology, focusing on the visible and the invisible and describing painting, idols, and the most visible from the perspective of givenness. Particularly noteworthy is that painting is no longer seen merely as the intentional object of the viewer; it transcends the ordinary object to become an idol. The idol evokes more gazes while also concealing itself beneath the subject. Contemporary painting rebels against dependence on nature, showcasing more possibilities. From Impressionism to minimalism, artistic creation breaks away from pure visibility, attempting to operate autonomously from intentional subjects and move towards the icon.

Courageous Love: K. C. Bhattacharyya on the Puzzle of Painful Beauty

Abstract In the 1930s, the Bengali philosopher K. C. Bhattacharyya proposed a new theory of rasa, or aesthetic emotion, according to which aesthetic emotions are feelings that have other feelings as their intentional objects. This paper articulates how Bhattacharyya's theory offers a novel solution to the puzzle of how it is both possible and rational to enjoy the kind of negative emotions that are inspired by tragic and sorrowful tales. The new solution is distinct from the conversion and compensation views that dominate the existing literature, and it derives its significance from how it ties aesthetic experience to self-awareness.

Beyond Reading

What does it mean to encounter a literary work of art? When we talk about them, we refer to literary works as characterizable entities. In a genuine encounter with a literary work, instead, our focus shifts to “what it is about”: we bring to mind the intentional objects it invites us to direct our attention to, typically through reading. If what we encounter is a work of art, however, we are invited to do something beyond that even, namely to attune ourselves to disclose something more profound. Through shifting our focus from the individual to the typical and affectively responding to a work’s characteristics, we disclose a qualitative character that presents itself as of general relevance insofar as it characterizes a specific kind of thing potentially experienced in the world. Our focus shifts from individual intentional objects, such as a character’s view of her partner as standing in need of salvation, to the kinds of values and things manifested therein, such as the peculiar kind of ambiguity inhering a specific kind of commitment. To encounter a literary work of art, I conclude, means to follow the invitation to disclose value essentials, and thus to find a specific kind of truth.

Averaging is a convenient fiction of neuroscience

Averaging is a convenient fiction of neuroscience

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND FOR THE FORMATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHY OF THE 19th CENTURY

An early stage in the development of phenomenology, as a matter of fact, is considered, which completes a long, foldable and richly planned process, within the framework of which a new philosophical methodology was formed. Among the concepts of phenomenology, the concept of intentionality is especially distinguished, as it is not only the basic characteristic of all mental acts of a person, but also a rethinking prompting ontology of wisdom. The basic provisions of the phenomenological theory of information are not in themselves an intentional principle, which changes the traditional for that hour the understanding of information as a mental interpretation of speeches. F. Brentano's position forces us to talk about certain ontological levels that are associated with a greater or lesser obviousness of real or mental objects. The general thesis proposed here is that phenomenology is not the creation of a single, even brilliant, thinker, but is a doctrine that completes a rather long, complex and multifaceted process within which a new philosophical position was formed. In this sense, it can be argued that the emergence of the phenomenological method was prepared by the entire development of European philosophy, in each stage of which one can find points of formation of the phenomenological method or points of thematic intersection with phenomenology. In this respect, phenomenology is not just a philosophical «invention», another» «system», but a doctrine that emerged at the intersection of rational and empirical theories of New European philosophy, starting in the nineteenth century. At an early stage of phenomenology's development, an important conceptual basis for building a scientific psychology that wants to consider mental phenomena in any meaningful way is revealed. This basis is contained in the concept of intentionality, which is fundamental to the construction and development of phenomenological discourse. However, it would be a mistake to treat intentional objects as products of the imagination or simple empirical data that psychology usually deals with. In a certain sense, an intentional object is not a psychological phenomenon, but one of the constituent elements of the original ontology, a material, a brick, which consistently makes up any ontological structure. Thus, already at the stage of the formation of the phenomenological doctrine, the contours and priorities of a new philosophy were determined, which positioned itself as a philosophy of consciousness and should be read as a prerequisite for the construction of a fundamental ontology.

Intentionality as Tendency and Intentionality as Consciousness-of

In this paper, I argue that according to Edmund Husserl “tendency” does not designate a specific class of intentional experiences but rather, on par with “consciousness-of,” a universal mode of intentionality essential for any constitution of sense. In doing so, I explicate Husserl’s distinction between intentionality as tendency (Tendenz), which he describes as a striving (Streben), and intentionality as consciousness-of (Bewusstsein-von), which he describes as a presentation (Vorstellung) of an intentional object. Then, I discuss Husserl’s problematic way of relating these two universal modes of intentionality. Although he claims that intentionality as tendency presupposes intentionality as consciousness-of, I argue that the universal validity of this presupposition is put into question by the consideration of drives (Triebe), which Husserl describes as passive tendencies that originally lack any consciousness of the end strived toward, and, hence, do not seem to presuppose any presentation of it. I show that the lack of intentionality as consciousness-of poses two major problems in Husserl’s account, in that it makes drives seemingly unintelligible as (i) strivings and as (ii) motivated experiences. Lastly, to find a possible solution to these problems and better clarify the relation between intentionality as tendency and intentionality as consciousness-of at the level of drives, I explore Edith Stein’s account of drives as aimless strivings governed by experiential causality (Erlebniskausalität), discussing its advantages and potential drawbacks, as well as its compatibility with Husserl’s account.

Triangle(s) of Being: Linguistic (Coserian) and Semiotic (Peircean) Perspectives

Abstract This article envisages a possible tripartite division of (types of) being, in correspondence, one the one hand, to Eugenio Coseriu’s linguistic contents (significatum, designatum, sense) and on the other hand to Charles Sanders Peirce’s ‘participants’ in the process of semiosis (sign, object and interpretant). Being as eidos/ essence, corresponding to idiomatic significata, is responsible for the constitution of stabilities and/ or iterations within the otherwise perpetual flux of cogitata/ phenomena. Being as actual existence or particular, intentional object corresponds to the linguistic designata as they are produced through and by speech in the very linguistic act(s). Finally, being as ecstasis (in the Heideggerian sense of this term) or as sense represents the individual speaker’s ‘stance’ in the world, at the same time ‘opening’ it to interpretation by the others. Also, if on the levels of significata and designata language is simply/ purely logos semantikos, on the level of sense the three possible intents of the speaker (apophantikos, poetikos, pragmatikos) can be put into correspondence to the old/ traditional naming and understanding of temporal ec-stases as past, present and future respectively.

Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism

Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive.

Seekingnormalitàin Alberto Moravia’sIl conformista: Towards an Italian history of the homosexual fascist in postwar memory

This article analyzes the figure of the homosexual fascist, the ‘homo-fascist,’ in postwar cultural memory through the lens of Alberto Moravia's 1951 novel Il conformista ( The Conformist). Il conformista exemplifies the place of the homo-fascist narrative in crafting postwar cultural discourses around fascism, especially in the Italian case. Beginning from a close reading of the text combined with analysis of its historical context, the article deconstructs the narrative's interpretive logic to identify the many politically convenient fictions the homo-fascist offered within the growing project of postwar memory. These fictions, as embodied in the homo-fascist, facilitated the dual condemnation and excusal of fascism as the pathological weakness of the separate few, not the collective many. This analysis illuminates the often-overlooked historical role that narratives of homosexuality have played in the fluid construction of cultural, political, and social memories of fascism and its adherents. Viewing Il conformista within a specifically Italian vein of the narrative distinct from the German, moreover, critically reorients the text within Italy's individual and politically potent relationship to its Fascist past. Understanding the homo-fascist through Il conformista, therefore, enlightens not only the history of the homo-fascist figure, but also the histories of modern Italy, postwar memory culture, and sexual politics.

What is Distinctive of Film Emotions?

Film emotions are genuine emotions whose formation and development is affected by conflictive factors. Whereas their arousal, similar to that of real-life emotions, is disproportionately strengthened by the cinematographic medium, their subsequent course is both weakened and interrupted. Their objects, which I view as members of our personal emotional world (not in terms of their supposed fictionality, as often assumed), are also proper intentional objects of emotions: our fear is about the shark on the screen, our pity about the main character. This view allows also for an explanation of two of film emotions’ neglected features: (a) the viewer's emotional attachment and empathy toward film objects and (b) the long-lasting emotional impact films can have on viewers.

Modeling intentionality in the human brain.

This paper is focusing on a rather neglected issue that concerns both aspects of philosophy and neurobiology in relation to the concept of intentionality. Intentionality is concerned with the 'directedness' or 'aboutness' of mental phenomena towards an object. Despite the fact that in philosophy both concepts of aboutness and directedness are conceptually identical with intentionality, a careful neuroscientific approach can demonstrate that these two phenomena represent two distinct conceptual and neurobiological aspects of intentionality with complementary functions. We described the interaction between a series of intentionality and pathogenetic psychobiological factors, the corresponding brain topography, and the resulting clinical manifestation and psychopathology. A permanent failure of intentionality dominates in psychosis, which includes an inappropriateness of the intentional object or connection, from the outset, or even from the prodromal phase of the disorder. Affective disorders may result from imprecise interoceptive prediction error signals, due to a confused identification of the intentional object. In suicidal patients there is an emotional intentionality failure, characterized by an absence of intentional object or a loss of conscious access to normal intentional objects. We may model an 'intentional system' as a higher order system, with a monitoring and regulatory role attributed to the brain and behavior. Also, we may consider mental disorders as the result of a radical disruption of intentionality, due to an inappropriateness or lack of the intentional object or due to an inappropriate connection in some points of the suggested brain pathways of intentionality.

Fear is Anticipatory: A Buddhist Analysis

This article derives from the Buddhist Nikāya Suttas the idea that fear has an intentional object that is best analysed in anticipatory terms. Something is feared, I argue, if construed as dangerous, where to construe something as dangerous is to anticipate it will cause certain unwanted effects. To help explain what this means, I appeal to the concept of formal objects in the philosophy of emotions and to predictive processing accounts of perception. I demonstrate how this analysis of fear can do exegetical work in the context of the Nikāya Suttas, and respond to philosophical issues concerning the relation between the intentional and anticipatory dimensions of fear; the relevant anticipated effects of feared objects; and whether fearing subjects necessarily know they anticipate unwanted effects. I also draw an analogy to allostatic sensations to engage issues concering how the anticipatory dimension of fear relates to the motivational.

African recognition of dignity as a basis for universal human rights

I present a typically African account of human dignity, which I derive from Ifeanyi Menkiti’s influential strongly normative view of traditional African practices of recognition respect (2004). I explain how this implies a suitable basis for a common good criterion for human rights. I develop this account against (a) the claims of Tshepo Madlingozi (2017) and Vincent Lloyd that the struggle against anti-Black racist domination does not depend on recognition; (b) the claim by David Boucher (2011) that human dignity is a convenient fiction for human rights recognition; and (c) the claims of Kwame Gyekye (2002) and Motsamai Molefe (2020) that Menkiti’s view on human dignity does not provide adequate warrant for the universality of human rights. I draw on Menkiti’s account of recognition respect for human dignity and on arguments for the authority of actual rights recognition by Gerald Gaus (2006) and Rex Martin (2013). In doing so, I present a comprehensive theory of human rights recognition that does not depend on any intrinsic, transcendental human capacity but locates the universality of human rights in the mutually recognised common good, which is implicit in extant African communal normative social practices that are oriented toward the recognition of dignity.

A Case Against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology

ABSTRACT There’s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary, Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh–eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an unfounded illusion. In this paper, I present an analysis of Śrīgupta’s ‘neither-one-nor-many argument’ against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses.

Intentionality in Avicenna: a reconstruction based on his notion of ‘consideration’

ABSTRACT Although Avicenna does not explicitly develop a ‘theory of intentionality', one can reconstruct his account of intentionality through an analysis of his thoughts on the relation between mind, meaning, and thing. We take up this task in this paper through an analysis of Avicenna's theory of the considerations of quiddity. First, we clarify Avicenna's idea of ‘quiddity', and show how it functions as a core of ‘meaning' which remains identical in its different modes of realization. Second, through an examination of the very notion of ‘consideration' (i‘tibār), we distinguish between two aspects of the mind, i.e. mental act and mental existence. This helps us clarify what Avicenna means by the existence of a quiddity in mind and in what sense, if any, it is essential to intentionality. Third, addressing the problem of the relation between ‘mental existence' and ‘external existence’, we show how the mode of existence of a quiddity, including its concrete existence, is posited in and through intentionality. This implies that both being and quiddity are moments of the intentional object, and thus, intentionality, for Avicenna, is a dyadic relation between the intentional act and the intentional object. We conclude by reconstructing the structure of intentionality in Avicenna.

The messy politics of local climate assemblies

In recent years, many local authorities in the UK have run local climate assemblies (LCAs) such as citizens’ assemblies or juries, with the goal of developing citizen-led solutions to the climate crisis. In this essay, we argue that a ‘convenient fiction’ often underpins the way local authority actors explain the rationale for running LCAs. This convenient fiction runs as follows: LCAs are commissioned as a response to the climate threat, and local decision-makers work through LCA recommendations to implement appropriate policies in their locality. We suggest that this narrative smooths over and presents as linear a process that is in fact messy and political. LCAs emerge as a result of political pressure and bargaining. Once LCAs have run their course, the extent to which their recommendations are implemented is dependent on power dynamics and institutional capacities. We argue that it is important to surface the messiness and political tensions that underpin the origins and aftermath of local climate assemblies. This achieves three things. First, it helps manage expectations about the impact LCAs are likely to have on the policy process. Second, it broadens understandings of how LCAs can contribute to change. Third, it provides a complex model that actors can use to understand how they can help deliver climate action through politics. We conclude that LCAs are important — if as yet unproven — new interventions in local climate politics, when assessed against this more complex picture.