Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress Research Articles

“He yells because he cares”: jury perceptions of emotional abuse from a sports coach toward child athletes

In recent years, several instances of coach-perpetrated emotional abuse toward athletes have surfaced, such as in the case of Mike Teti, a U.S. Olympic rowing coach. Emotional abuse in the realm of sports seems to occur in the context of a coach “helping the athlete reach their potential.” However, little to no research exists on how these cases are viewed in the courtroom. In the present study, a 2 (Victim Age: 9-year-old x 17-year-old victim) x 2 (Victim Gender) x 2 (Participant Gender) between-participants design was used to investigate civil court decisions when a male soccer coach was sued by an athlete’s family for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. One hundred seventy-seven participants recruited from Mechanical Turk read a trial summary and answered questions about the trial. Results revealed that male victims received fewer pro-victim judgments (i.e., plaintiff decisions), and this relationship was due to participants perceiving male victims as lower in emotional distress, showing less sympathy for the male victim, and judging the coach as being less to blame. In addition, male participants and previous involvement in sports led to more pro-defendant judgments. Results are discussed in terms of psychological theory and courtroom implications are provided.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) Claim Laws and the Legal Remedies: Examining and Identifying the Theory

The area of tort law known as negligence engages harm caused by failing to act as a form of carelessness probably with extenuating circumstances. Emotional distress is a broad term that can refer to a wide range of symptoms from a variety of mental health disorders. Anyone can experience emotional distress, even if they do not meet the criteria for any psychological disorder. Whether or not a mental health problem is present, emotional distress can be overwhelming effect on daily functioning. The workplace can be a stressful environment, and while some stress may be motivating, too much is often overwhelming. The major causes of emotional distress related to work may include concerns about job security or job performance. Sometimes, circumstances build and combine in unexpected ways to cause distress for relationships with colleagues or managers. A person can experience poor working conditions in any workplace and at all levels of an organization. Among the many possible causes of emotional distress at home are personal or environmental factors, such as: experiencing relationship problems with partners, other family members, or friends. It may include living in a neighborhood that faces inequity and a deprivation of resources.

IS ANONYMITY GONE? DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ANCESTRY TESTING REVEALS OLD SECRETS IN FERTILITY CARE: LEGAL CASE REVIEW

To heighten awareness of potential ethical and legal pitfalls when providing fertility care in the age of direct-to-consumer (DTC) ancestry tests. Legal issues and court cases against fertility clinics due to DTC ancestry testing were queried using the Nexis Uni (legal search engine of state and federal cases) and Google search engines. Local county courts were queried for court documents pertaining to specific cases. The following search terms were used: IVF, fertility, 23andMe, and Ancestry.com. Many DTC ancestry tests utilize microarray chips and look at hundreds of thousands of single nucleotide polymorphisms (snp’s) as a measure of genetic similarity, thus mapping customers to others in their database. Six legal cases were found filed between years 2018-2021. In 2019, a physician brought charges against a University IVF facility for misuse of sperm he had donated when he was a medical student. He donated sperm with the conditions that it would be used by women living outside the state and to father only five children. Through DTC ancestry testing, he later identified 19 individuals were conceived with his donated sperm and several of these individuals live in his community. This resulted in a high-profile case for breach of consent, and he sued the clinic for $5.25 million. The case is still ongoing. Another case resulted after a mother found a relative of her daughter’s sperm donor through a 23andMe DNA test. The mother made unwelcome contact to a relative of the anonymous sperm donor. The sperm bank sent the recipient a “cease-and-desist” letter stating she had violated the terms of their contract by contacting the family of the sperm donor and seized the remaining vials of the sperm she had purchased. The recipient sued the sperm bank, however in January 2020, the judge dismissed the woman’s claims and sided in favor of protecting the anonymity and rights of gamete donors. DTC ancestry testing has also revealed cases where reproductive endocrinologists have acted unethically and used their own sperm to inseminate patients without disclosure and informed consent. A woman brought eight causes of action against her parents’ fertility doctor in 2018 after using Ancestry.com DNA kit and finding out their doctor was her biological father. The charges include medical malpractice, lack of informed consent, fraud, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and violation of Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. The reproductive endocrinologist admitted that he breached the applicable standard of care when he inseminated his patient with his own semen. The trial is anticipated to begin May 17, 2021. With the rapid growth in popularity for DTC, donor anonymity can no longer be reasonably presumed. Individuals who are donor-conceived can more easily identify their biologic oocyte or sperm donors who intended to be anonymous.

Doxing Phenomenon in Indonesia: Amid Waiting for Privacy Settings

The activity of privacy data dissemination in cyber world today often happens to people who allegedly made mistakes and went viral. Internet users often provide the detailed information through the easy access of various information today, as if it does not violate the law and even expected helping the process of identifying the perpetrator. In Fact, this action is close to what we call as doxing, the privacy violation. The research method of this paper is normative juridical with statute approach, case approach, analytical approach, and comparative approach. The data source of this research is secondary data. The specification of this study is analytical descriptive. The results of this study identified several regulations that could be applied on doxing perpetrators, especially the provisions set out in Law No. 19 of 2016, although the provisions do not specifically address doxing. Several concepts to be considered regarding doxing cases are to file a tort claim regarding privacy information, ie, the tort of public disclosure of private facts, or legal recovery for victims by carrying the concept of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim that applies in some states of the United States.

Re-imagining the Dignitary Torts

Abstract In the article, we make three claims. First, we argue that a large number of what are traditionally seen as separate torts are, at their core, all about affronts to the dignity of the victim. These include offensive battery, assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, invasion of privacy, some nuisances, and abuse of process (malicious prosecution). These torts do not involve direct physical harm but, rather, emotional distress from having your dignity attacked. Second, we argue that as these torts have developed inside of their own doctrinal silos, there are important differences among the laws governing them. Third, we argue that these differences are not justified and that it would be better to create a consistent tort approach to dignitary harm: tort recovery should lie for injuries resulting from wrongful conduct that is highly offensive and causes more than minor harm. This, it turns out, is the standard that currently applies in a majority of jurisdictions for privacy invasions. If more widely adopted, this standard would, for example, far more easily allow recovery for nasty verbal sexual (or other) harassment, since intentional infliction of emotional distress currently requires a much stronger showing. At the same time, it would preclude recovery for minor physical touchings that technically now qualify as offensive battery. We think this achieves the balance much better.

To have and to hold: Emotional distress, divorce denial, and the politics of interspousal torts

Abstract While domestic abuse can manifest itself in many forms, one example of abuse within the divorce process is the denial of the religious divorce. In Jewish law, the parties must transact a bill of divorce (known as a get) before they are divorced. If a spouse refuses to cooperate with this process, they limit their former partner’s ability to date and remarry within the community, effectively maintaining coercive control post-divorce. This article will examine whether or not victims of get refusal would be able to recover monetary awards under the tort doctrine of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED). This article will argue that while the facts of get refusal meet the central elements of the tort of IIED, these cases are unlikely to succeed in most states due to the court system’s reluctance to apply IIED to interspousal torts. The reasons behind this hesitation draw on the complex history of domestic abuse and tort law, and historical legal prioritizations of family privacy over abuse victims’ safety. Additionally, I will explore the history of the IIED tort as a vehicle for social change and examine how IIED can still play that role today. Ultimately, I will argue for the necessity of courts’ abandoning lasting vestiges of the marital privacy doctrine and providing redress to victims of this insidious form of domestic abuse.

Retaliation, Humiliation, and Extreme and Outrageous Conduct: IIED in the Workplace

Citing the need to preserve managerial discretion, courts frequently espouse the need to adopt an “especially strict approach” in cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) in the workplace. As a result, it is notoriously difficult for employees to prevail upon IIED claims against their employers. At the same time, a few courts have recognized that one form of employer conduct may merit special treatment when assessing an IIED claim against an employer. According to some courts, the fact that an employer has engaged in retaliatory conduct may be “a critical and prominent” factor in assessing an employer’s behavior. This Article argues that other courts should also recognize retaliatory conduct as a weighty factor when considering whether such conduct meets the threshold of “extreme and outrageous” conduct for purposes of an IIED claim. Drawing upon social science research into the areas of humiliation and retaliation, this Article generally agrees with courts that have concluded that workplace retaliation often has a greater detrimental impact upon the victim than other forms of non-actionable employer conduct and, therefore, should be given special weight in the analysis of the extreme and outrageous nature of employer conduct.

It’s Alright, Ma, It’s Life and Life Only: Are Colleges and Universities Legally Obligated during the Coronavirus Pandemic to Exempt High-Risk Faculty from In-Person Teaching Requirements?

Because there is no law specifically addressing colleges’ and universities’ legal obligations to allow faculty for health reasons to opt for online, rather than in-person, teaching during the coronavirus pandemic, colleges, universities, and their faculties generally seem to be proceeding on the assumption that any such legal obligations are no more than minimal. This Article challenges that widespread assumption and argues that colleges and universities in fact have very substantial legal obligations in this regard. We focus on the group of faculty whom we believe colleges and universities have the clearest legal obligation to protect -- those who, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, appear to be most vulnerable to getting seriously ill or even dying if they contract the coronavirus. In the language of the CDC, our focus is faculty members “at increased risk of severe illness from COVID-19,” which, according to the CDC, means anyone who has reached age 65 or who has one of various “medical conditions,” including cancer, chronic kidney disease, diabetes, hypertension, pregnancy, and more. We argue that four separate legal sources are best understood as requiring colleges and universities to exempt high-risk faculty from any in-person teaching requirement. Two of the four sources are federal statutes that qualify as major statements of national policy – the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The other two sources are important state-law doctrines with strong support in the American Law Institute’s most recent restatement of the law of torts – protection from intentional infliction of physical harm, and protection from intentional infliction of emotional distress. We hope our arguments will provide college and university leaders with a perspective that will prompt them to recognize the great importance of adopting an exemption policy that at a minimum covers high-risk faculty. Perhaps they would adopt such a policy simply to avoid possible legal liability. Ideally, however, they would do so at least in part out of a recognition that a college or university policy at odds with legal sources as weighty as the four discussed speaks very poorly for their institution.

Suing The NRA for Damages

A solution is needed for the gun violence epidemic, where approximately 15,000 innocent persons are shot to death each year. Close analysis reveals that meaningful legislative solutions have failed to move forward. The reason for this failure is the National Rifle Association’s (NRA) stranglehold on federal and state legislators. This Article explores a nonlegislative solution—a tort suit aimed at obtaining compensation for the shooting victims and returning the NRA to its original purpose. It will examine conduct actions by the NRA and consider the NRA’s foundational defenses: failure to engage in any “imminent lawless action,” the First Amendment, the Second Amendment, and proximate cause. It will also consider the five tort causes of action: (1) aiding and abetting, (2) civil conspiracy, (3) strict liability, (4) the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (5) negligence.

Emotional Distress Claims, Dignitary Torts, and the Plaintiff-Friendly Fiction of Reasonable Sensitivity

In 2019, an article in the University of Memphis Law Review considered whether individuals with a highly sensitive temperament are able to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), given the tort’s ‘reasonable person’ standard. The author argued that this standard discriminates against plaintiffs who are more susceptible to emotional harm than average. How has the law of IIED historically accounted for plaintiffs with underlying conditions? Here this question is addressed with respect to diagnosed and undiagnosed psychiatric vulnerabilities, including suspected or confirmed genetic predispositions, in light of continued research interest in the field of psychiatric genetics. Although scientific advances could allow plaintiffs to assert harm in new ways, alternatively shifting the focus of IIED away from the plaintiff’s vulnerabilities and toward the defendant’s conduct could return IIED to its roots as a dignitary tort and better serve the interest of individual corrective justice.

Facebook v. Sullivan: Building Constitutional Law for Online Speech

In the United States, there are now two systems to adjudicate disputes about harmful speech. The first is older and more established: the legal system in which judges apply constitutional law to limit tort claims alleging injuries caused by speech. The second is newer and less familiar: the content-moderation system in which platforms like Facebook implement the rules that govern online speech. These platforms are not bound by the First Amendment. But, as it turns out, they rely on many of the tools used by courts to resolve tensions between regulating harmful speech and preserving free expression—particularly the entangled concepts of “public figures” and “newsworthiness.” This Article offers the first empirical analysis of how judges and content moderators have used these two concepts to shape the boundaries of free speech. It first introduces the legal doctrines developed by the “Old Governors,” exploring how courts have shaped the constitutional concepts of public figures and newsworthiness in the face of tort claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Article then turns to the “New Governors” and examines how Facebook’s content-moderation system channeled elements of the courts’ reasoning for imposing First Amendment limits on tort liability. By exposing the similarities and differences between how the two systems have understood these concepts, this Article offers lessons for both courts and platforms as they confront new challenges posed by online speech. It exposes the pitfalls of using algorithms to identify public figures; explores the diminished utility of setting rules based on voluntary involvement in public debate; and analyzes the dangers of ad hoc and unaccountable newsworthiness determinations. Both courts and platforms must adapt to the new speech ecosystem that companies like Facebook have helped create, particularly the way that viral content has shifted normative intuitions about who deserves harsher rules in disputes about harmful speech, be it in law or content moderation. Finally, the Article concludes by exploring what this comparison reveals about the structural role platforms play in today’s speech ecosystem and how it illuminates new solutions. These platforms act as legislature, executive, judiciary, and press—but without any separation of powers to establish checks and balances. A change to this model is already occurring at one platform: Facebook is creating a new Oversight Board that will hopefully provide due process to users on the platform’s speech decisions and transparency about how content-moderation policy is made, including how concepts related to newsworthiness and public figures are applied.

Healthism in Tort Law

This article draws on the author's recently published book, Healthism: Health Status Discrimination and the Law (with Jessica L. Roberts) (Cambridge University Press 2018), examining tort law doctrine and policy for examples of differential treatment of health status or behaviors. Just as scholars previously have drawn attention to discrimination based on race, sex, age, and other protected categories in tort law, the article urges similar examination of tort law's potential to discriminate against the unhealthy. The article discusses the potential for healthism in the reasonably prudent person standard of care, contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, noneconomic damages caps, impaired driver and physician cases, failure to mitigate, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other tort law rules. It concludes by applying the book's decisional rubric for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible health status differentiation to specific examples from tort law.

Examining the Efficacy of the Common Law Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Bullying in the Context of the Employment Relationship

Examining the Efficacy of the Common Law Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Bullying in the Context of the Employment Relationship

Can university be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress?

Ann Meehan became a curator at the Loyola University of Chicago Art Museum in 2005.

A review of this month's lawsuits and rulings

Intentional infliction of emotional distress: Instructor's conduct not outrageous enough to justify suit Sexual misconduct: Failure to ask for accommodation sinks former student's suit Adult learner: Unreasonable request undermines former student's accommodation suit Athletics: Failure to allege outrageous conduct kills former coach's suit Accommodation: Lack of physical limitations defeats epileptic's disability suit

Wilkinson v Downton After Rhodes and its Future Viability in New Zealand

This article analyses the tort in Wilkinson v Downton, commonly referred to as intentional infliction of emotional distress, in light of the United Kingdom Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes v OPO. After considering the three base elements of the Rhodes Court's newly reformulated tort, and giving a brief introduction to the New Zealand equivalent, the article suggests the law in this area is in need of further clarification and reform. The Rhodes formulation, while useful, does not go far enough in securing a viable future for the tort in light of the developments in negligence and privacy. The article justifies the tort's independence and suggests reforms to its elements in this respect. In particular, it concludes that the conduct element ought to be based on a "reasonable target" test, and the consequence element ought to be modified to allow recovery for damage amounting to severe emotional distress outside the range of ordinary human experience.

Retrospective: compatibility management: customer-to-customer relationships in service environments

Purpose This paper aims to revisit Martin and Pranter’s (1989) Journal of Services Marketing article, “Compatibility Management […]”, and by doing so, heighten service scholars’ and practitioners’ awareness of the historical and ongoing relevance of customer-to-customer (C2C) encounters, the challenges C2C encounters pose and the opportunities for future research. Design/methodology/approach A combination of review and commentary approaches is taken to summarize the 1989 article, the circumstances of its conception, the topic’s intersection with contemporary service topics and to illustrate the multi-faceted nature of C2C encounters and the challenges faced in their management. Findings Investigated in a number of service contexts, C2C encounters continue to be relevant in a multitude of service environments where customers converge. Research limitations/implications Because the evolution of service scholarship and practice is collectively shaped by an infinite number of people, events and sources, the attribution of effects to only one or a few influences is a highly subjective matter of interpretation. Practical implications Because C2C encounters are part of customers’ service experiences and can affect their satisfaction and patronage behaviors, service organizations can benefit by their efforts to influence C2C encounters. Social implications The criteria customers use to react to other customers and the bases used by service organizations/personnel to manage C2C encounters may not always be morally, ethically or legally defensible. For example, the Napa Valley Wine Train incident of 2015 involved allegations of racial discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Originality/value The retrospective analysis contributes to the field’s understanding of the historical development of services marketing and provides fodder for future research.

Think of the Children: Using IIED to Reformulate Disturbing Speech Restrictions

The Colorado State Court of Appeals recently upheld an injunction restricting public displays of aborted fetuses. The court held that the restriction passed strict scrutiny because the state had a compelling interest in protecting children from the psychological harm of “disturbing images” and the injunction was narrowly tailored. This marked the first time an injunction had been upheld on this rationale. This Note critiques that holding and others. It contends that while some federal and state courts have recognized the interest in protecting the psychological wellbeing of children from disturbing speech as compelling, the interest is not supported by precedent. It then argues that courts have formulated the interest with a breadth that is flawed and antithetical to the First Amendment. It concludes by proposing that the state’s interest in protecting children from disturbing speech should be reformulated in the mold of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

First Amendment Constitutionalism

This article develops a contextual model of free speech. Despite extensive work in this area, dating back to the early twentieth century, the three dominant theories of free speech do not adequately describe the full range of expressions protected by the Constitution. The proponents of the first school of thought claim that the purpose of protecting free speech is to further democratic institutions. Those of the second conceive personal autonomy to be the predominant reason why free speech is so carefully guarded by courts and society at large. And those of the third persuasion relate the American people’s high regard for free speech to the advancement of knowledge. While each touches on the ideals of representative democracy, none fully accounts for the intricacies of the First Amendment within the context of overall constitutional structure. Each contains elements of why free speech is so important to our legal culture, but none of these three provides a comprehensive account.The First Amendment is not solely established to protect speech but also the other predicates of representative democracy. Speech empowers individuals to engage in self-realization within a community of equals committed to the general welfare. Any regulations inhibiting, limiting, or restraining it should be narrowly tailored to safeguard the Constitution’s overarching guarantee of liberal equality for the common good. This principle derives from the Preamble to the Constitution’s General Welfare Clause and the Declaration of Independence’s Unalienable Rights Clause. Scholars and courts have too often ignored these two sources of federal power. Yet they provide the groundwork for representative democracy, wherein expressive liberty enables individuals to voice their political opinions, enjoy personal dignity, and attain knowledge and expertise. Free speech is a function of a constitutional system that enables people to pursue happiness for the betterment of the whole polity. After expounding a comprehensive theory of free speech and critiquing its most important alternatives, the article applies this major shift in First Amendment thought to defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and incitement doctrines.

The Prosser Letters: 1919-1948

William Prosser was one of the most accomplished and influential scholars of the twentieth century. He molded the development of tort doctrine, especially in the areas of products liability, privacy, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. In spite of his numerous achievements, there is no full-length biography of Prosser. A major reason no one has written such a volume is the lack of Prosser’s papers. Based on information from a Berkeley Law librarian, it appears Prosser destroyed most of his papers in 1963. Recently, however, prominent academics have both written shorter biographical pieces on Prosser and called for further research on his life.Progress is possible thanks to the serendipitous discovery of a pile of Prosser’s old letters at a garage sale in the Berkeley area. The letters begin when the twenty-one-year-old Prosser is in Europe after fighting in World War I and continue through Prosser’s role as a visiting professor at Harvard Law School in 1948. They provide a first-hand account from Prosser during crucial periods of his life.This essay is based on a review of those letters. It accomplishes three main things. First, it fills in considerable details of Prosser’s life, including the resolution of several contested issues, such as where Prosser spent his childhood and when he matriculated as a 1L at Harvard Law School. Second, the essay provides a first-hand account of Prosser’s pedagogical experience in law school and how that affected his teaching, his struggle with the decision to become an academic, and his candid appraisal of the academy. Third, the essay reveals Prosser’s assessment of his own honesty, which is especially provocative in light of the controversy surrounding his methods for influencing the law.