Intention In Criminal Law Research Articles

Intention in Criminal Law: The Challenge from Non‐Observational Knowledge

AbstractIntention is at the heart of criminal law. If it is not the mens rea requirement found most often in offences, it is still the standard against which other grades of fault tend relatively to be judged. It has generated much controversy, as the crucial question, “Did the defendant intend X?” is resistant to clear answers. This paper argues that intention‐questions are difficult because intention is not the thing law takes it to be: Importantly, contrary to law's assumptions, it is neither a state of mind nor is it connected in an exclusive manner to the reasons for which we act.

فكرة القصد في القانون الجنائي والمدني ووجه العلاقة بينهما

The determination of the criminal intention and the civil un-named intention, their relationship, explaining the concept of both notations, and the importance of intention in criminal law, which in turn determines the legal characterization of the crime, differs from the penalty of the unintended crime. Also determining the unnamed intention in civil law, and explaining that such a concept is not clear since the civil code did not stipulate such a theory despite the magnitude of the consequences that will occur. It is found that the unnamed intention has major importance in civil relations, however, the civil law did not give it importance, nor developed it as a theory, contrary to the criminal law which gave it great importance and the jurisprudence had dealt with it as one of the main theories in criminal law.

Intention in Criminal Law: Time to Change?

Intention in Criminal Law: Time to Change?

In(de)terminable Intentions

Let me begin with a confession. When I see that the latest issue of a law journal contains a reply to an earlier article, I tend to be overcome with a mixture of irritation and fatigue. On the occasions on which I peruse the offending article, the effect is generally similar to that attributed by Emile Zola to a bedtime reading of the Code Civil. Such rejoinders rarely illuminate the basic issues which the original writer tried to address, and all too oiften consist in very detailed points which can only be grasped by a reader assiduous enough to return to the earlier text. When a reply is in turn met by a counter-reply, the reader frequently has the frustrating feeling that she is witness to what is essentially a private debate which has somehow found its way onto the public page. In the light of such a confession, I clearly owe MLR readers some explanation for inflicting a member of this doubly unfavoured species upon them. 1 Jeremy Horder's rejoinder to my article on intention is an unusual member of the genre.2 First, it gives a clear and (generally) fair statement of the portions of my argument with which it is concerned. Secondly, and more importantly, it raises some significant points about criminal law doctrine and scholarship in its own right. Indeed, it does not really constitute a 'reply' to my article, for in relation to the two main theses which I was advancing, Horder is, as far as I can tell, in partial agreement with one and does not address himself substantially to the other. What he does is quite properly to point out that the relevance of intention in criminal law is broader than I explicitly acknowledged. In doing so, however, he in fact considerably expands the terrain over which my arguments can be played out. The purpose of this comment, then, is both to acknowledge (with some modifications) the legitimacy of Horder's assertion of the multiple roles of intention in criminal law, and to show how that recognition fails to support the conclusions which he draws from it in relation to my argument. My aim is not so much to reiterate or defend my arguments (something which in any case would not be possible in the space which the MLR has generously accorded me) as to clarify the points of genuine difference between Horder and myself so as better to allow our readers to judge the relative merits of our positions. As Horder explains, the main purposes of my article were, first, to illuminate the ideological role of conceptions of intention in legitimating criminal legal practices and, second, to argue for a loosening of the boundaries between criminal law and criminal justice studies. I shall return briefly to this second point below, but as it is the first argument on which Horder concentrates, this will be my principal concern. In essence, Horder accuses me of focusing unjustiE1ably on only one of the roles of intention in criminal law that of grounding and shaping attributions of responsibility and judgments of culpability. He argues that intention has at least three other significant roles: constituting wrongs, protecting autonomy

Intention in Criminal Law

Intention is a central concept in our system of criminal liability. And in recent years it has been much discussed, both by lawyers and philosophers. However, there remain disagreements, and some unclarity. My purpose in this paper is to examine, and propose solutions to, the main problems concerning the concept of intention in the criminal law.

Conditional intention

In this article I wish to deal with a problem about the analysis of intention in criminal law. The issue I want to take up has arisen primarily in the context of theft and theft-related offences. However, there is no reason to suppose that it is a problem confined to theft. It could arise in any area of the criminal law which involves intention as constitutive of mens rea.The general problem can be stated very briefly. How is the law to deal with an accused who intended to perform some act which, if performed with simple intention, would be an offence, when he intended to perform that act only if some contingency occurred? The case law on theft demonstrates that, far from being an arcane question, this is a live issue. This is for the simple reason that a great many intentions are intentions of this conditional nature.

Intention in Criminal Law

Intention in Criminal Law