Intelligence Officer Research Articles

Prevalence and risk factors for Achilles tendon rupture in the military population from 2006 to 2015: a retrospective cohort study

IntroductionAchilles tendon rupture (ATR) is a serious musculoskeletal injury that results in substantial functional decline, especially in highly physically demanding occupations such as service in the military. The purpose of...

Narrative misinformation from a credible source can be discredited with counternarrative

Former government intelligence officer David Grusch became a hot new topic in the UFO world when he declared that the government was hiding an alien ship crash retrieval program. Can this media coverage be influential in increasing belief in UFOs? And can a credible critic of Grusch's claims successfully negate the impact of the media coverage on the acceptance of misinformation? A three-condition experiment (N\,=\,287) showed that a counternarrative can successfully negate the influence of his claims on conspiratorial beliefs. We suggest that these results have practical implications for journalists in their coverage of controversial claims.

Commanders Requirements: What Do New Zealand Commanders and their Staffs Expect of Military Intelligence Officers in the 21st Century

Military intelligence supports commanders, operations and planning staffs, and their evolving needs. With few foundations for what is expected of military-intelligence officers in scholarly literature, this article attempts to determine what military-intelligence soldiers, planning officers, operational staff, and commanders expect of military-intelligence officers in the 21st century operating environment. Literature, training doctrine, and public resources provide no data or succinct analysis justifying how New Zealand military-intelligence officers comprehend what their roles required of them. This research surveyed New Zealand Defence Force personnel to determine what they believe is best military-intelligence practice. While commanders’ preferences differ, doctrine indicates military-intelligence officers should train for the most likely situations, and therefore commanders’ most likely expectations.2 This article presents analysis of what is required to be a good military-intelligence officer.

Commanders Requirements: What Do New Zealand Commanders and their Staffs Expect of Military Intelligence Officers in the 21st Century

Military intelligence supports commanders, operations and planning staffs, and their evolving needs. With few foundations for what is expected of military-intelligence officers in scholarly literature, this article attempts to determine what military-intelligence soldiers, planning officers, operational staff, and commanders expect of military-intelligence officers in the 21st century operating environment. Literature, training doctrine, and public resources provide no data or succinct analysis justifying how New Zealand military-intelligence officers comprehend what their roles required of them. This research surveyed New Zealand Defence Force personnel to determine what they believe is best military-intelligence practice. While commanders’ preferences differ, doctrine indicates military-intelligence officers should train for the most likely situations, and therefore commanders’ most likely expectations. This article presents analysis of what is required to be a good military-intelligence officer.

“We Have Successfully Neutralised an Attack”—Historical Case Studies in Terrorism Prevention Through Cooperation

ABSTRACT While there is a large body of literature concerned with understanding terrorist attacks and the reasons for why they could not be prevented, this article looks at it from the opposite side: why could terrorist attacks successfully be prevented and what role did intelligence-sharing play? The article analyses three historical cases in depth based on extensive archival records from 18 intelligence agencies. This article traces how intelligence-sharing worked by highlighting the hands-on experiences of intelligence practitioners. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, the article shows how intelligence officers managed to establish successful and effective counterterrorism cooperation in the early 1970s. Second, through the eyes of intelligence reports the article presents new insights about terrorist tactics and terrorism innovation at the time. This included the use of women in terrorist plots and car sales as cover business for terrorism financing. The article concentrates on a peak moment in European terrorism history: it analyses early 1970s Black September attacks and the efforts of intelligence agencies to counter them.

J. L. Austin: Philosopher and D-Day Intelligence Officer, by M. W. Rowe

<i>J. L. Austin: Philosopher and D-Day Intelligence Officer</i>, by M. W. Rowe

Moral Risk, Moral Injury, and Institutional Responsibility: Ethical Issues in HUMINT

Intelligence is morally unique—means and ends that are typically morally problematic are rendered justifiable by reference to the special purpose that national security intelligence serves. This is particularly the case with human intelligence (HUMINT), where operators and handlers might have to violate normal ethical principles as part of their job. Lying, coercion, and/or exploitation may feature as part of a HUMINT operation. This creates a moral risk, where individuals and institutions are excepted from normal moral constraints. Rather than looking at the immediate moral risks of HUMINT operations, this article looks at the relation between the moral risks encountered as part of HUMINT and moral injury. Moral injury may refer to two complementary phenomena: when a person is exposed to immoral activities and suffers psychologically because of dissonance between those immoral activities and normal moral behaviors, and when a person’s moral character is “numbed” because of them engaging in immoral activities. HUMINT exposes intelligence officers to both kinds of moral injury. There is a moral responsibility of intelligence institutions to be both aware of, and seek to mitigate, moral injury, while operating in a context where such moral risk is at times justifiable.

The Significance of the Prisoner Exchange with Russia

The 1 August 2024 prisoner exchange between Russia and the West shows that, for all his ruthlessness, Russian President Vladimir Putin can act rationally. The negative view is that Putin successfully held hostages for ransom, will have concluded that ‘prisoner diplomacy’ works and will simply instrumentalise it again. But the analogy with mere hostage-taking is flawed insofar as Russia got nothing immediately or directly useful out of the deal. For Putin, it turned on fulfilling what he considers a moral commitment to secure the return of Russian intelligence officers. He was willing to make concessions to achieve a goal that he valued highly. Conversely, through firmness, patience and unity, Western negotiators were able to induce Putin to compromise. An implicit lesson is that the West can support Ukraine more consistently, without undue fear of escalation, and take a firmer, more proactive approach to defining the terms of mutual restraint.

Intelligence Officers Have an Ethical Responsibility to Use Tradecraft

Intelligence officers have an ethical responsibility to choose the most appropriate tools and methods—collectively called “tradecraft”—and this responsibility transcends military or civilian affiliation, rank or seniority, employment status (contractor versus government personnel), intelligence discipline, and intelligence career field. Each intelligence officer has an ethical responsibility to seek a greater and deeper understanding of tradecraft; to apply tradecraft effectively and appropriately; to speak up when tradecraft is being used poorly, or not at all; and to teach and mentor all who ask for help or do not know to ask. This responsibility cannot be outsourced to technology solutions, nor to an ombudsman or a senior manager. In the United States, it cannot be replaced by treating Intelligence Community Directive 203 as a checklist. Nor will it solve all the Intelligence Community’s woes—including politicization—but it offers an important layer of protection against poor intelligence while providing a real mechanism to actualize integrity.

The Great Game and the border issue in the Pamirs in the reports of Ralph Cobbold, 1898‒1899

The 1890s were a time of growing tension in Central Asia, stemming both from the geopolitical confrontation between the Russian and British empires and from the desire of Afghanistan and China to realise their own national interests and use the struggle of the dominant political forces to their own ends. One of the most difficult issues was the border dispute, i.e. fixing the border between Russia and Afghanistan, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other. Britain sought to exploit the differences on this issue to its own advantage, which could well have led to the outbreak of hostilities. The mechanism for identifying weaknesses in Russia’s position in the Pamirs comes out clearly in the 1898‒1899 reports of the British intelligence officer Ralph Cobbold, preserved in the National Archives of India. They characterise the actions of the Russian authorities in the Pamirs, the attitude of the local population to the opposing sides, and potential instruments of local influence that would allow Britain to bring the region under its control. The Russian diplomatic and military administrations were aware of the aspirations of the British Empire and used both the “stick” and the “carrot” to maintain the status quo in the region: in some issues they had to make concessions, in others the Russian side acted rigidly. Such an approach not only kept the Central Asian region in the frames of peaceful development, but also was one of the foundations of the conclusion of the Russian-British pact on the division of spheres of influence in the Middle East and Central Asia in 1907, which put an end to the Great Game and allowed the formation of the Triple Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance.

Artificial Intelligence in Military Medicine.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has garnered significant attention for its pivotal role in the national security and health care sectors. However, its utilization in military medicine remains relatively unexplored despite its immense potential. AI operates through evolving algorithms that process extensive datasets, continuously improving accuracy and emulating human learning processes. Generative AI, a type of machine learning, uses algorithms to generate new content, such as images, text, videos, audio, and computer code. These models employ deep learning to encode simplified representations of training data and generate new work resembling the original without being identical. Although many AI applications in military medicine are theoretical, the U.S. Military has implemented several initiatives, often without widespread awareness among its personnel. This article aims to shed light on two resilience initiatives spearheaded by the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, which is now the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office. These initiatives aim to enhance commanders' dashboards for predicting troop behaviors and develop models to forecast troop suicidality. Additionally, it outlines 5 key AI applications within military medicine, including (1) clinical efficiency and routine decision-making support, (2) triage and clinical care algorithms for large-scale combat operations, (3) patient and resource movements in the medical common operating picture, (4) health monitoring and biosurveillance, and (5) medical product development. Even with its promising potential, AI brings forth inherent risks and limitations that require careful consideration and discussion. The article also advocates for a forward-thinking approach for the U.S. Military to effectively leverage AI in advancing military health and overall operational readiness.

Sending Couriers to Czechoslovakia as Part of Anticommunist Resistance in the First Half of the 1950s

The anticommunist resistance in Czechoslovakia, organized from abroad, was led primarily by groups of experienced Czechoslovak intelligence officers who fled to the West after the coup d'état in February 1948. Financed and organized by the intelligence services of France, Great Britain, and the United States, and in isolated cases by the Czechoslovak exile organizations, these groups sent hundreds of couriers to Czechoslovakia to carry out various intelligence tasks. Recruited mainly from young individuals placed in refugee camps, these people faced a perilous mission. The State Security Service apprehended many of them. Those deemed unsuitable for intelligence use by the communist security apparatus faced years of imprisonment or even execution. A few years after the communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, when it became clear that World War III would not break out, activities of the Western intelligence services that previously sent couriers dramatically changed. Risks when crossing the national border and working in Czechoslovakia became enormous. The state borders with Western countries were heavily guarded. Czechoslovak society was overcome by fear, and it was difficult to find people willing to cooperate with patriots in exile. In the middle of the 1950s, Western intelligence services stopped sending couriers to Czechoslovakia. They began to focus more on the use of legal channels and tried to recruit collaborators from among Czechoslovak citizens who regularly visited Western countries for business or cultural purposes.

Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961-7

This absorbing account of relations between the Soviet Union and the leaders of anticolonial movements fighting to liberate Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau from Portuguese rule in the 1960s and 1970s is in part the fruit of Natalia Telepneva's doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Odd Arne Westad,1 whose own work looms large in the historiography of the Cold War. The book opens like a spy thriller with a Soviet military plane landing in Luanda on the day Agostinho Neto, leader of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), is set to be inaugurated as the first president of independent Angola. On board the An-12 is an intelligence officer by the name of Boris Putilin, 'whose job had been to coordinate arms transfers from the Soviet Union'2 to the MPLA. Putilin is almost shot at by an Angolan solider but is rescued in time to attend the inauguration by the chief of airport security.

Perceptions of built environment professionals on intelligent office buildings: The interplay between technology, design for sustainability and responsiveness

The confluence of technological advances, climate mitigation efforts, and evolving user expectations has significantly transformed how the built environment is conceptualized, designed, and delivered; Intelligent Buildings (IBs) are not an exception. The systematic literature review revealed that there have been limited studies exploring the perspectives of Building Environment (BE) professionals on IBs, along with divergent emerging descriptions of IBs, creating an ambiguity for their practical realization. To address this gap, this study aims to explore the intelligence in office buildings based on professionals’ interpretations and its practical implementation through design features. An exploratory study was carried out by conducting semi-structured interviews with 63 domain professionals, and qualitative content analysis was utilized to identify emerging themes during the interviews. Nine themes were identified for describing Intelligent Office Buildings (IOBs). Professionals' perceptions were found to vary according to their nationality and profession. The original contribution of this study is that by reflecting the perspectives of building environment professionals worldwide through interviews and revisiting the existing debates in the literature, the current IOB design approach is delineated. The core IOB concept evolves around the occupant-oriented approach and the integration of climate-responsive design strategies with a balanced level of technology uniquely serving a well-defined purpose by taking advantage of regional conditions. Research findings have theoretical contributions by unravelling the IOB concept and design features, shedding light on the dual roles of technology and design principles. These findings on guiding principles for the design of IOBs can provide a valuable framework for BE practitioners.

Vyacheslav Trubnikov - Intelligence Officer and Diplomat

Vyacheslav Trubnikov - Intelligence Officer and Diplomat

ПІДГОТОВКА МАЙБУТНІХ ОФІЦЕРІВ РОЗВІДНИКІВ ДО ПРОФЕСІЙНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ В УМОВАХ ЗМІШАНОГО НАВЧАННЯ ЗАСОБАМИ ІНФОРМАЦІЙНО-ОСВІТНЬОГО СЕРЕДОВИЩА

The article analyzes scientific works, the regulatory and legal framework and the content of educational and methodological documentation regarding the organization of professional training of future intelligence officers. Modern approaches related to distance learning and digitalization of professional training of future specialists of the national security and defense sector of Ukraine, as well as the European Union, have been identified. The results of previous studies have been summarized. It has been established that the professional training of future intelligence officers in the conditions of pandemics and full-scale war can be carried out in the format of blended learning using the means of a specially created informational and educational environment. It is substantiated that blended learning of future military intelligence officers consists of the educational activity in two forms: in form of training sessions in specialized classrooms under the direct supervision of the scientific and pedagogical workers and in form of independent work with electronic resources of a specially created information and educational environment. Varieties of blended learning models in the conditions of pandemic and full-scale war are distinguished, namely "rotational model", "flexible model", "person-oriented model" and "enriched virtual environment model". Pedagogical components of information and educational environment tools for blended learning of future intelligence officers have been developed, which include: independent study of new educational material, independent study of material using elements of creativity, independent improvement of theoretical knowledge and practical skills in conditions of quasi-professional activity, and independent in-depth study of material. The introduction of innovative forms, methods and means of obtaining intelligence information into the professional training of future intelligence officers in the format of blended learning by means of the information and educational environment is proposed. The experience of conducting military intelligence acquired by the intelligence units of the armies of NATO member countries and the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the de-occupation of the territories of sovereign Ukraine captured by Russian-terrorist forces is considered as part of the blended learning. Standards of individual and collective training of future intelligence officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and NATO are applied. Key words: future intelligence officers, blended learning, blended learning models, information and educational environment tools, pedagogical components of information and educational environment tools.

Soviet Espionage in Sweden: The Vasilii Sidorenko Case of 1942

This is a study of a Soviet espionage mission in Sweden in 1942 under the aegis of the intelligence officer Vasilii Sidorenko. Aside from trying to reconstruct, on the basis of material filed with the archive of the Swedish Security Police (Säpo), the history of the mission, the article also addresses methodological challenges following from the fact that we must, as Soviet material remains very scarce, approach Sidorenko’s mission indirectly, through material generated by the Swedish police. The article is therefore structured in terms of three separate fields of inquiry—a first that addresses the organization of Sweden’s counterespionage with regard the Sidorenko mission, a second that addresses the organization and institutional context within which Sidorenko operated, and a third that addresses the accounts of five Swedish citizens who were suspected and later sentenced for having assisted Sidorenko to collect military intelligence in Sweden. The article concludes that the suggested framework with three fields of inquiry might be helpful in the study of offensive espionage operations in a more general sense.

A RECENTLY DISCOVERED LETTER FROM CAPTAIN ARTHUR CONOLLY

ABSTRACT This article publishes a recently discovered letter apparently written by the 19th-century British intelligence officer Arthur Conolly. Conolly is best known as the author of the term 'The Great Game' in connection with Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia during the mid-19th century. The letter was written in April 1841 while Conolly stopped on the bank of the Amu Darya River, the northern boundary of Afghanistan en route to Bukhara. He was travelling partly in an attempt to rescue a fellow British officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stoddart, who was detained there. The mission failed and both men were executed in Bukhara the following year. The letter is addressed to the Austrian general August Giacomo Jochmus, who was the commander of the combined forces of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and Austria during the Syrian War of 1839–1841. The letter was discovered by the authors in the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art in Moscow.

Everybody Needs Help Sometimes: Facilitators of Soviet Defectors’ Publications

Soviet intelligence officer defectors arrived in their new countries lacking skills that translated easily into postdefection jobs. To earn money, they often turned to the one asset they had—their stories. To publish their stories, they had to work with a variety of facilitators who connected them with publishing companies and distributed their works. Those helpers can be characterized into four categories: activists/dissidents, academics, journalists, and intelligence practitioners. Helpers were sometimes connected to and supported by a Western government, particularly the United States or United Kingdom, and the resulting work reflected the Cold War ideological competition. However, government sponsorship was not always the case, and some helpers expressed views that extended beyond the receiving government’s policy or that criticized the handling agency. In any case, most defectors could not have published their works without the helpers’ support.

STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL MODEL OF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE FORMATION OF FUTURE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF HMEI

The article updates the problem of the formation of professional competence of future military intelligence officers in the information and educational environment of a higher military educational institution, substantiates the theoretical foundations of professional training of future officers. The need to protect the territorial integrity of our state was analyzed, which determined the importance of the challenges posed to the transformation of military education into the professional training of Ukrainian officers. It is noted that one of the directions of the development of an effective system of military education, with the aim of gaining full membership of Ukraine in NATO, is the modernization of the officer training system, strengthening the integrity of the professional training of military specialists. It has been observed that military-professional education in accordance with the principles of the military doctrine of the state, target instructions of military policy and science, state educational standards, within which the professional training of future military intelligence officers is carried out, is based on the educational-professional program, the modern model of training competent specialists taking into account the methods preparation of NATO member countries. It has been found that the social order of society to ensure the interests of national security and defense of the state for the training of military specialists in higher military educational institutions, in accordance with modern requirements, determines the important problem of forming the professional competence of future military intelligence officers and the development of a structural and functional model of such a process in conditions of the informational and educational environment. It was found that modeling allows to analyze the real content, establish goals, highlight the main components of the structure, essential features, relationships, graphically display the functional specificity and determine the formation of professional competence of future military intelligence officers. A structural-functional model for the formation of professional competence of future military intelligence officers in the information and educational environment of higher military educational institutions has been developed, which contains blocks: conceptual-target (social order, goal, task, conceptual and methodological approaches, principles, functions), procedural- technological (informational and educational environment at higher military educational institutions, organizational and pedagogical conditions, stages, components, methods, forms, means, technologies, educational disciplines), effective (criteria, level indicators, result).