Intelligence Liaison Research Articles

Capturing wartime history to forge postwar intelligence liaison: Telford Taylor’s battle with the US Navy over the future of Anglo-American signals intelligence

ABSTRACT Telford Taylor was not a career military intelligence officer, but his short career in military intelligence during World War Two had an outsized impact on the development of American interservice as well as Anglo-American signals intelligence. Near the end of the war, Taylor put forth a visionary proposal to harness wartime lessons learned against Germany and Japan in order to prepare for postwar collaboration against likely rivals, particularly the Soviets. While his British interlocutors were amenable to such a project, the US Navy was not.

Close yet far? Further understanding Intelligence Liaison over 20 years after 9/11

Close yet far? Further understanding Intelligence Liaison over 20 years after 9/11

Intelligence liaison in practice; service attachés in the Swedish Legation in London 1939-45

ABSTRACT During the Second World War, Britain was regarded by neutral Sweden as an important source of intelligence. Swedish service attachés were posted to London to use their diplomatic and service status to collect and report relevant intelligence to Swedish High Command in Stockholm for assessment and circulation. Their collection techniques in Britain meet Wilhelm Agrell’s definition of intelligence liaison and this paper describes how they were able to deliver significant results under difficult conditions. At times, they had to contend with a hostile and restrictive host country, communication difficulties (in every sense) with Stockholm and unappreciative diplomats and senior officers. Their efforts have gone largely un-noticed in Swedish Second World War historiography, and readers may be surprised to learn of the results that they achieved and the difficulties that they faced.

Deception and Manipulation in an Intelligence Liaison Relationship: U.S.–Pakistani Negotiations and the 1980s Afghan Program

Small-state leaders can profit enormously by collaborating with great powers on clandestine intelligence activities. The United States historically has provided billions of dollars in military and economic aid to intelligence liaison partners that host intelligence collections facilities or support joint covert operations. While many of these relationships are characterized by trust and mutual benefit, others are subject to a constant struggle for control. Unlike the scrutiny paid to overt base negotiations, this clandestine bargaining largely has been overlooked in intelligence and International Relations literature. This review of the negotiations surrounding the U.S.–Pakistani joint covert operations in Afghanistan during the 1980s addresses this void. Declassified documents and memoirs reveal that Pakistani leaders deliberately deceived Washington as to their motives and commitment to the joint Afghan program in order to maximize their negotiating leverage. This case study demonstrates that acquiring accurate information regarding a partner’s intentions is a critical factor in determining power dynamics within an intelligence liaison relationship.

Liberal Internationalism, Offensive Realism and Intelligence Liaison: The Case of the Israeli and South African Intelligence Services

Liberal Internationalism, Offensive Realism and Intelligence Liaison: The Case of the Israeli and South African Intelligence Services

Intelligence cooperation between Poland and Japan during the Second World War

Military cooperation between Poland and Japan, including cooperation of intelligence officers, began after the two countries established diplomatic relations in March 1919 when Japan recognized Poland as an independent state. This cooperation thrived during the 1930s. Tokyo decided that Warsaw can be a valuable strategic point and a Japanese intelligence coordination centre for Europe, which would be oriented towards the East and the West (the USSR and Germany). In exchange for information, the Japanese allocated Polish intelligence liaison officers in their diplomatic posts in Germany, the Baltic states and Scandinavia. The Japanese enabled them to send reports in the Japanese diplomatic mail and issued suitable forged documents. The centre for this cooperation was Riga and Kaunas, later Berlin, Prague, Königsberg and Stockholm.

Long term intelligence sharing: the Five Eyes and the European Union

ABSTRACT Many scholars have pointed to intelligence sharing (also known as intelligence liaison) as one of the most closely guarded secrets within intelligence communities. The Five Eyes intelligence community is one of the biggest and most enduring multi-state intelligence sharing networks in the world. This article compares the European Union and the Five Eyes intelligence communities and identifies potential factors which foster long-standing intelligence relationships. This article argues that the decisions made by the Five Eyes, such as the creation of shared structural complementarities and existing cultural similarities, have created a path dependence between the Five Eyes powers. The same kind of path dependence has not been created when looking at the EU. A common identity has helped forge this path dependence and helped form a strong multi-state, long-term intelligence sharing relationship.

‘Heil England!’ Reggie Sutton-Pratt, British Military Attaché in Stockholm 1939-1945

ABSTRACT During the Second World War, neutral Sweden was regarded by Britain as an important source of intelligence but the activities and contribution of the Stockholm Military Attaché, Reginald Sutton-Pratt to the sourcing, management and communication of British military intelligence have not been previously assessed. Sutton-Pratt was a key figure in Anglo-Swedish ‘intelligence liaison,’ that enabled Britain to estimate the military capability of this neutral in the event of German invasion. Intelligence liaison required competences that facilitated cooperation between senior Swedish and British military officers to a perhaps surprising degree. Additionally, Sutton-Pratt maintained Norwegian sources that provided detailed intelligence about German deployment and activities in the occupied territory. He also sourced intelligence from escaped British POWs for MI9. Sutton-Pratt’s valuable position as an accredited attaché was threatened by his involvement in SIS and SOE operations but he avoided being recalled. In addition to his intelligence roles, he worked assiduously to contribute to the British war effort across a range of activities such as military supplies to Finland during the Winter War and prisoner exchange with the Germans.

Inter- and intra-agency intelligence liaison during ‘the troubles’

ABSTRACT Intelligence is crucial to success in counter-terrorism, and successful intelligence work involves effective liaison between and within all the organisations involved. Scholars rarely address intelligence in counter-terrorism other than through case studies, while studies of intelligence in counter-insurgency and studies of international intelligence liaison emphasise the value of intelligence liaison with little attention to how it works in practice. This article substantially expands existing knowledge and understanding by focusing on intelligence coordination within Northern Ireland in the 1990s. It draws on heretofore unexploited, yet voluminous, original material. It analyses the contribution that computerisation made to inter-agency liaison, the contribution the Northern Ireland Prison Service made to intelligence work, the role played by intra- and inter-agency structures and the valuable work that the right individuals in the right posts can do. This article thereby provides a broader and deeper understanding of the challenges faced by state agencies and how some of these were overcome to facilitate inter- and intra-agency intelligence liaison in Northern Ireland in the 1990s. It therefore contributes to emerging theory that seeks to explain intelligence.

Dangerous Liaison: The 1973 American intelligence failure and the limits of intelligence cooperation

ABSTRACT The article analyzes the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to foresee the Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack on Israel in 6 October 1973. The paper deconstructs the various elements of the American failure and explores the reasons that led to it. The paper shows that at the heart of the flawed American assessment was a paradigm formulated by U.S. intelligence analysts, one that was influenced by Israeli intelligence analysts. With this conclusion, the paper suggests that alongside the numerous advantages of intelligence liaison between states, the practice can also lead them to make grave errors.

The Twilight of the British Empire: British Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948–63, by Chikara Hashimoto

This monograph explores the British Empire and intelligence in the early post-war era by focusing on British policy-makers’ interest in using intelligence to counter communism in the Middle East from 1948 to 1963. Intelligence was vital for counter-subversion with Britain’s loss of reliable Middle East partners. The book includes a foreword with two tributes to author Chikara Hashimoto (1975–2016) by Len Scott and Paul Maddrell, discussing the author’s life and contributions to intelligence studies. They explain that the book breaks new ground by looking at the role of Britain’s security services in the Middle East, a topic usually on the periphery of intelligence studies. Drawn from extensive research in The National Archives, Hashimoto’s book looks at Britain’s ‘secret liaison with Middle Eastern security agencies’ and how the ‘friendly’ countries ‘struggled to reciprocate’ (p. 3). He concludes, ‘As British influence faded during the period between 1948 and 1963, intelligence liaison with Middle Eastern counterparts was a short-term success but a long-term failure’ (p. 3).

Combatting terror in Europe: Euro-Israeli counterterrorism intelligence cooperation in the Club de Berne (1971–1972)

How do intelligence agencies cooperate to counter terrorism and to what extent can it be (ab)used for political purposes? This article focuses on the Club de Berne, an intelligence liaison forum that was founded in 1969 by nine Western European countries and which was also linked to the United States and Israel. This article explores the mechanisms of counterterrorism intelligence-sharing in the early 1970s and examines the motives for cooperation within this framework. On the basis of large-scale recently declassified intelligence records, the article uncovers new aspects in the history of European security cooperation with Israel and the United States, and hopes to lay the groundwork for broader theoretical reflections about counterterrorism intelligence cooperation.

U.S.–Pakistan intelligence liaison in South Asia’s age of terror: a realist analysis

ABSTRACTIn an effort to contextualise the concept of intelligence liaison within the framework of International Relations theories, the paper argues that the genesis of liaison arrangements is driven by necessity and convenience – key tenets of realism. Specifically, the paper investigates U.S.–Pakistan intelligence liaison spanning over a period of three decades, from early 1980s – a time when religious terrorism spread its tentacles in the Indian subcontinent under the aegis of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence and occasionally, indirect support from the Central Intelligence Agency – till the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011. The question that is attempted to answer is: under what conditions do intelligence liaisons sustain? What drives cooperation or confrontation among intelligence services? The case study serves as an illustration of the realpolitik character of intelligence liaisons where interests and practicality-driven actions dominate moral and ethical considerations. Finally, using Randall Shweller’s model of analysis of international alliances, the paper concludes that, more than honouring the purpose of the liaison arrangement, the complex adversarial liaison between the two intelligence agencies served as a medium for each other to balance their interests.

‘We recommend compliance’: bargaining and leverage in Ethiopian–US intelligence cooperation

ABSTRACTDisputes over the costs and benefits of intelligence liaisons between the US and its African allies are routine. The contentious and largely overlooked bargaining processes that stem from these disputes call into question prominent depictions of US–African security partnerships as rigidly hierarchical alliances. Through an assessment of compliance bargaining between Ethiopia and the US over the terms of their intelligence liaison, this article posits that, despite the vast power asymmetry between these allies, Ethiopia routinely dictated and policed the terms of this liaison, while consistently leveraging it as means to acquire political concessions from the US.

International Intelligence Liaison in the Afghan Theatre of War: Strategic Interests and Hierarchical Relations

ABSTRACTInternational intelligence liaison remains an essential tool for international actors in any theatre of war, whether dealing with covert action or information sharing. Strategic interest as a driver for liaison is a subject that has been widely examined over the years, but hierarchies between international actors within the field of intelligence liaison is a subject only a few scholars have touched upon. Within the framework of the Afghan Theatre of War—set during both the Soviet occupation of the country and the current international security mission—this work draws on the knowledge and experiences from academics and professionals in trying to reveal how strong states apply highly structured hierarchies when liaising with in-theatre national intelligence services in order to reach certain strategic objectives. At the same time, the purpose is also to critically examine the false assumption that the same powerful states exercise some kind of monopoly over the interpretation of intelligence liaison agreements with lesser powerful states. Afghanistan serves as an evident and suitable case because of its contemporary relevance but also due to the lack of systematic comparison of intelligence liaison in the region.

Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) Database Perspective: A Case Study

Although the first Regional Intelligence Liaison Office (RILO) was established in 1987 there is no reliable data on the effectiveness of the program. A similar situation exists in the case of the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) database, even though it is the only central depository of Customs seizures worldwide. This paper focuses on the purpose and meaning of these initiatives from an enforcement perspective; these tools have been around for 30 years and so it is timely to consider whether a redefinition and new approach to these intelligence-related initiatives are needed. The paper presents the general background, the outcomes of a survey on the CEN database, and proposals for future improvement.

Turkey’s intelligence diplomacy during the Second World War

ABSTRACTThe Turks avoided becoming ensnared in the devastation of the Second World War and also increased their own technical capabilities by way of an exchange of their partial support for Western military and intelligence activities in the region. However, the Turkish leadership demonstrated repeated doubts and hesitancy about Western aims even when the Axis forces were in its doorstep, fearing a possible Anglo-Soviet agreement regarding Turkey which would ultimately jeopardize the country’s political and territorial integrity. As the host country of the signals intelligence facilities, the Turks did not simply tried to take their share from the intelligence, endeavoured to direct the intelligence liaison in their favour. Particularly Ankara employed intelligence diplomacy as a mechanism to maintain the country’s independence and territorial integrity. There were powerful and arguably compelling reasons for pursuing such intelligence diplomacy.

Western intelligence cooperation on Vietnam during the early Cold War era

ABSTRACTIn the aftermath of the 1954 Geneva Conference, Canada, the UK, the US and other Western allies cooperated in gathering and sharing of human intelligence on and in North Vietnam. The British and Canadian foreign ministries played a key role in these efforts. Focusing mainly on the activities of these two countries, we explore the Vietnam intelligence program and discuss some of its implications on a broader Western, multilateral Humint cooperation. While the focus of this article is on efforts in Indochina in the mid-1950s, the pattern of intelligence cooperation described here continued into early and mid-1960s. Western intelligence liaison is not limited to the Vietnam case, as reflected in the intelligence activities of Western allies in Cuba (the 1960s–1970s), Tehran (1978–1980), Bosnia (the 1990s) and elsewhere.

Developing International Intelligence Liaison Against Islamic State: Approaching “One for All and All for One”?

The summer of 2015 heralded the beginning of “Year Two” of the U.S.-led international coalition's airstrikes against Islamic State (IS)—also known interchangeably as the Islamic State of Iraq and a...

Fighting the Cold War or Post-Colonialism? Britain in the Middle East from 1945 to 1958: Looking Through the Records of the British Security Service

Recent declassified records show that the British Security Service, known as MI5, not only operated in the colonial territories but also in independent foreign territories in the Middle East. This article will show for the first time the activities in these territories of Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME), the regional headquarters of MI5, after the Second World War until its closure in 1958. By examining declassified records, this article will demonstrate that the regional role of MI5 was not to defend British interests against nationalist movements, but was instead quite narrowly focused on Communist movements in the region. It will further argue that the intelligence-collection activities and security measures implemented in these territories were largely limited by the general hostility towards Britain's military presence in the Middle East in the post-war period. This article will also explore the nature of the intelligence liaison between the representatives of MI5 and their Middle Eastern counterparts as well as with the British Secret Intelligence Services (SIS), known as MI6.