Insurgent Threats Research Articles

Violent Extremism: Work Stories of Women Police Officers in a Mobile Force Company in Eastern Philippines

This study delved into the work experiences of women police officers assigned in mobile force companies in the entirety of Samar. Criticized for its underperforming economy due to insurgent threats, this district provided a backdrop for exploring the role of women police officers in counter-insurgency programs. The research employed a phenomenological, qualitative approach to uncover deeper insights.This study used phenomenological research design. Ten (10) women police officers from various areas in Samar, including Allen, Pambujan, Calbayog, Catbalogan, Dolores and Quinapondan were chosen as informants. These officers, with a minimum of two years of experience, were selected from the Samar provincial police records.Interviews were conducted and recorded using a smartphone application, ensuring detailed and accurate transcriptions. Most responses were in English, with a small portion in the local dialect, which was translated for clarity.The study identified nine emergent themes: Community Engagement and Trust, Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Community Resilience and Peacebuilding, Mental Health and Resilience, Gender Dynamics and Cultural Sensitivity, Operational Challenges and Adaptation, Personal Growth, Professional Development and Strategic and Tactical Innovation and Women's Leadership and Empowerment . These themes highlighted the importance of of the role of women police officers between the police and community, acknowledged the risks in implementing counter-insurgency programs, and noted the challenges of funding and aligning with government initiatives. The officers expressed continuous effort and aspiration in their roles, emphasizing the need for recognition in the role of women police officers.

Blowback or overblown? Why civilians under threat support invasive foreign intervention

How do military tactics shape civilian support for foreign intervention? Critics contend that invasive tactics undermine popular support by alienating the civilian population. Counterexamples suggest that civilians will support invasive tactics when foreign counterinsurgents are willing and able to mitigate a proximate threat. I reconcile these divergent findings by arguing that civilian support is a function of threat perception based on three interacting heuristics: social identity, combatant targeting, and territorial control. To evaluate my theory, I enumerate a survey among Iraqi residents in Baghdad during the anti-ISIS campaign. Respondents preferred more invasive tactics when foreign counterinsurgents assisted the most effective local members of the anti-ISIS coalition. Across sectarian divides, however, respondents uniformly opposed the deployment of foreign troops. These findings suggest that in regime-controlled communities, civilians will support counterinsurgents who are invasive enough to mitigate insurgent threats, but not too invasive as to undermine local autonomy.

Facing the Threat of Modern Islamic State Insurgence to Increase National Resilience

The threat of insurgency or modern rebellion of Islamic State in Indonesia is strongly influenced by the Southeast Asian regional environment which has a region with religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity. Ethnic, religious, racial, and intergroup conflicts have caused economic, political, and psychological losses. This article aims to describe and analyze using a variety of approaches applied in Indonesia to face the modern insurgency of the Islamic State using qualitative analysis methods. The technique of collecting data and information is through literature study. There are several jihadi organizations and groups that carry out operations, such as Jamaah Islamiyah, the Indonesian Mujahideen Council, and others. The vitality of radical and extremist groups is able to rise to renew leadership in the organizational network structure based on personal closeness, friendship, and family. National resilience as a dynamic condition of the nation and the conception of national development in achieving the goals and ideals of the nation, which is tough and tenacious and capable of developing national strength in dealing with all kinds and forms of threats, challenges, obstacles, and disturbances both coming from within and from within. outside, which threatens and endangers the integrity, identity and survival of the nation and state, especially the threat of modern Islamic State insurgency. Modern insurgency may never develop sufficient military strength to carry out conventional operations and must therefore rely on terrorism and psychological and political means. Therefore, facing the threat of the Islamic State, the Government of Indonesia must map the transformation of ISIS in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, so that it is faced with proportional efforts and actions such as dealing with domestic insurgency, regional cooperation, and the involvement of extraregional forces within the ASEAN framework.

Police empowerment and police militarisation in times of protracted conflict: Examining public perceptions in southern Somalia

ABSTRACT Residents of Kismayo, Somalia choose to empower local police with greater discretionary authority. Why is this so? Can police militarisation encourage such public views? Relying on a new dataset on community perceptions and qualitative field interviews, this study examines the relationship between perceived police militarisation and police empowerment in a society that has experienced prolonged conflict and currently faces an active insurgent threat. Despite the poor record of police militarisation in western democracies, this study's quantitative findings suggest that the more visible dimensions of police militarisation (material and cultural) are significantly related to greater public support for police empowerment in southern Somalia. Specifically, field interviews reveal that the symbolic appearance of militarisation and the accompanying hierarchical discipline and formalism convey a level of preparedness and professionalism that encourages residents to willingly empower police. Furthermore, results also suggest that clan representation within the force is significantly associated with police empowerment.

Civil War, Institutional Change, and the Criminalization of the State: Evidence from Guatemala

The relationship between war and state formation is a central topic in the social sciences. While scholarship on interstate war posits that conflict triggers extractive processes that build the state, research findings on the effects of intrastate war are more mixed, often suggesting that civil war inhibits extraction and induces state decay. This study, however, posits that the negative relationship between civil war and revenue extraction is not underpinned by institutional destruction but by the wartime introduction of undermining rules that structure behavior in ways that subvert taxation. To illustrate this claim, it traces the evolution of undermining rules within the customs administration at the height of the Guatemalan armed conflict. As the perceived escalation of the insurgent threat created institutional ambiguity, newly empowered political-military elites implemented alternative procedures for capturing customs revenues, which systematically undermined the state’s extractive capacity. Comparing this case with one of reinforcing rules that bolster extraction, I posit that the broad or narrow nature of the rule-making coalition explains divergent paths of wartime institutional development. Overall, this study uncovers the inner workings of the counterinsurgent state and illustrates how civil war dynamics induce processes of institutional change that can have long-term effects on state performance.

English

Borderline as a defence line is central in countering transnational insurgency. Yet, countries in African Sub-region are lackadaisical about redefining inherited colonial borders. Primarily, the study examined the origin of Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)  counterinsurgency (COIN) operational mandate as well as the linkage between border, threat of insurgency and MNJTF COIN operation  in Nigeria's northeastern region. It derived data from secondary sources and method of analysis adopted was content descriptive analysis ; enemy-centric and population-centric COIN theories upheld  this study. Interestingly, study reveals that in 1994, MNJTF was established by Nigeria to deal with insurgent from its northern borders and later expanded to include African neighbours. That in 2015, MNJTF was formally authorized  under a new concept of operation to cover COIN with the mandate to: Create a safe environment in areas affected by Boko Haram activities; prevent expansion of insurgency activities and facilitate overall stabilization programme to fully restore state authority. However, study found four evidences linking the threat of insurgency to the porous/undefined nature of the shared borderland with Niger, Chad and Cameroon: (1) the overlapping pattern in community settlements on the borderland makes it difficult for MNJTF to effectively counter insurgents; (2) it favours illegal arms trafficking;  (3) borderland forested area serves as shelter and factory base of the insurgents; (4) borderland ecological factor strengthens insurgent membership and operation in the terrain. Therefore, paper argues that with the present character of the shared borderland in northeastern Nigeria, countering insurgency would remain challenging. Paper recommends policy guide for effective COIN.   Key words: Arms trafficking, ecological factor, insurgency, counterinsurgency, Nigeria's northeast.  

US-Afghan Talks: Myths and Realities

This article focuses on US-Taliban talks in the context of intra-Afghan talks. The talks provide for the restoration of peace in Afghanistan and withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan after a period of about 19 years. It also provides for the swap of 5,000 Taliban held by the government and 1,000 Afghan in the custody of Taliban. The agreement cannot be put into practice on account of mutual distrust by both the Afghan government and the Taliban. Though there is pressure from the US over the Afghan government for resumption of talks with Taliban yet no fruitful result has been obtained. The government of Afghanistan is not only faced with threat of insurgency from Taliban but also the ISKP or ISIS. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and failure of the US-Taliban talks is testimony to the fact that Realism has failed to shape the politics of the smaller states.

PERSONALIDAD Y UN ENEMIGO INTERNO: ENTENDIENDO LA POPULARIDAD DE ÁLVARO URIBE, 2002-2010

During two terms in office, Alvaro Uribe enjoyed very high approval ratings. This deviates from the typical approval patterns exhibited by most executives in the region and from prior Colombian presidents. In this paper we give elements to understand what explains Uribe’s eight-year honeymoon. Here we argue that Uribe’s popularity was the interplay of three factors: A ruling style that allowed him to build an affective link with citizens. Uribe’s ability to create a rally-around-the-flag atmosphere regarding the internal armed conflict. And a booming economy. Using regression models based on cross-national and survey data results indicate that: Uribe exhibited high approval ratings because he was part of a group of Latin American executives who developed a government style based on an emotional link with people, and that those citizens who saw the internal conflict as the main problem in Colombia and were more exposed to Uribe’s messages about the insurgent threat were more likely to support him.

The Challenges of the Fight Against Insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria

The Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria has been one of the most devastating phenomena in the country claiming thousands of lives and properties worth billions of Naira in the process. All the governmental efforts put in place so far failed to curb the menace as the threat of insurgency continues in some parts of Northeastern Nigeria. This work examined the major challenges that are responsible for the continuation of insurgency despite divergent measures taken by the government to address the problem. The research used both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary source is the in-depth interview conducted with some selected informants who are related with security issues involving security personnel in the Northeast, policy-makers, analysts, some repented insurgents and media men. The secondary source is the use of the existing documents such as books, reports, news and internet sources. The data obtained was discussed and analysed using thematic analytical interpretations to arrive at findings. The research discovered that, the major reasons or challenges that made insurgency defiant of all solutions in Northeastern Nigeria consists of corruption, conspiracy, inappropriate approach, lack of proper intelligence, hostility from the host communities, nature of Nigerian borders, politicisation of security issues, religious dogmatism and lack of cooperation among the security personnel. Therefore, for an effective approach towards addressing the problem of insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria, the paper recommends that a multi-dimensional approach is required such as religious censorship, intelligence, cooperation, prudence and good governance.

Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict: How Governments and Foreign Interveners Respond to Insurgent Threats

We introduce a new data set on the strategies and tactics employed by belligerents in 197 internal armed conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 2013. The Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict (STAC) data set provides scholars with a rich new source of information to facilitate investigations of how regimes and their foreign supporters have responded to insurgent threats and the effects of actors’ force employment choices on a wide variety of intra- and postconflict outcomes. In addition to seventeen novel variables that measure the strategies and tactics employed by governments and intervening states, the STAC data set contains independently coded measures of many variables that overlap with existing data sets—a feature that facilitates the replication of existing studies and robustness checks on the results of new studies. We demonstrate the utility of the STAC data with an analysis of the impact of rebel mobilization on the basis of ethnicity on the propensity of governments to employ forced resettlement, civilian protection, civilian welfare projects, and civilian targeting to counter the insurgent threat.

A typology of insurgent, terrorist and extremist threats in India

ABSTRACTIndia's threat landscape is dotted with various groups fighting for multiple causes. This article attempts to provide an overview of the most prominent groups that operate all over the nation. In this respect, it casts light on the Kashmiri Conflict, the Naxalite Insurgency, the North-East Separatist groups, Islamist threats and the Hindutva extremism. Key aspects of the groups covered here include their origin, membership, facilitating factors and government response among others. This article analyses the Kashmiri, Naxalite and North-East militancy as insurgent groups whereas it analyses the rise and fall of Islamist and Hindu extremism through the lens of identity theories.

Theories, methods and practices – a longitudinal spatial analysis of the (de)securitization of the insurgency threat in Russia

How do securitizing actors go about desecuritizing policy issues that have been securitized across multiple spatially bounded referent objects? Do such desecuritizations develop as a single or manifold process and with what political effect? And critically, how do we methodologically approach the study of such processes? These are pertinent questions that have been left underexamined in the (de)securitization literature. In seeking to fill this gap, this article makes two main points. First, it calls for a greater focus on the study of (de)securitizations that are constructed according to multiple spatially bounded referent objects, and on how these diverging strands of discourse and practice shape the overarching process. Second, it argues for a greater use of longitudinal methods of analysis as a better way to capture the evolutionary dynamics of desecuritization processes, which (re)constitute security policies and agendas. To illustrate these claims, the article considers the empirical case of Russia’s (de)securitization of insurgent threats since 2000 by tracing this process over a longitudinal period and across three spatial-referent objects, namely the local level: Chechnya; the sub-federal level: North Caucasus; and the national level: Russia.

PERANAN PASUKAN CAWANGAN KHAS POLIS DIRAJA MALAYSIA (PDRM) DALAM MENANGANI ANCAMAN KOMUNIS, 1968-1989

Malaysia was one of the countries that faced the security threat of communist insurgency; inflicted by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) since 1948. Although having been defeated by the Malayan Security Forces in 1960, the CPM took their second opportunity by reviving their armed struggle, prompting the Second Malaysia Emergency in 1968 which lasted for almost 40 years. The success of the Malaysian Security Forces in the Second Emergency was based on meticulous implementation of intelligence services by the Royal Malaysian Police Special Branch (SB) Division, known for their high reputation and efficiency in counter-intelligence in the 1970s. This study focuses on the roles and functions of the Special Branch, primarily its intelligence strategies and tactics, which led to the defeat of the CPM in 1989.

Decentralization Reforms in Cambodia

1. Introduction International donors have promoted a variety of decentralization reform programmes that have been implemented in many governments in developing countries around the world. In Cambodia, a decentralization programme was adopted as a core public sector reform. Since the 2002 commune election, decentralization reforms were introduced and largely financed by international donors as part of a broader objective to improve state accountability and deepen democracy in Cambodia (Manor 2008). However, reform has been shaped by conflicts at the national level rather than by demands from local-level actors. Although there have been radical decentralization initiatives in some respects, particularly at the commune level, decentralization reform has not awarded substantial authority and autonomy to local governments to enable them to be as responsive and accountable to local residents to the extent decentralization advocates hoped for. This paper traces the evolution of Cambodia's sub-national authority since the end of the Khmer Rouge period. During the 1980s and before international intervention in Cambodia in the early 1990s, local actors were given substantial power and discretion over services and revenues as a result of constraints at the time. This paper assesses Cambodia's formal decentralization reform and its outcomes for accountability and democracy after new decentralized institutions and elected councils were officially created in 2002 and 2009. The paper then explains the political significance of the reform from the perspective of the government and leaders of the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and the extent to which decentralization fits in with their strategy for legitimacy. Our analysis suggests that the donor-promoted decentralization in Cambodia has been and continues to be designed and implemented in a context where power has been successfully consolidated in the hands of the CPP and its informal patronage network. Decentralization has helped keep the CPP in power. Consequently, it has offered little opportunity for the emergence of empowered and independent local actors capable of challenging the status quo. Nonetheless, the CPP's surprisingly poor performance in the July 2013 national election, when it won twenty-seven fewer seats in the National Assembly than in the 2008 election, has put pressure on the government and the CPP to execute expansive decentralization to local levels so that they can deliver better services and be more accountable to local citizens. 2. History of Decentralization and Centralization Cambodia had experienced decentralization before the official launch of commune decentralization in 2002. Contemporary decentralization in Cambodia can be categorized into two distinct periods. The first was a de facto decentralization immediately after the end of the Khmer Rouge era (1980 onwards) when the country experienced international isolation and economic collapse; and the second period began in 1993, after a new government was formed following the first national election organized by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). (1) 2.1 De Facto Decentralization, 1980s to 1993 Decentralization was implemented by the Cambodian People's Party (formerly Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party) which took control with backing from the Vietnamese government after the end of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979. The Cambodian government faced enormous challenges in rebuilding a country burdened with a shattered economy; a violent and traumatized society; disintegrated state institutions; and isolation from the West. The key aims of the Cambodian leaders were to restore the bureaucracy, to establish the Party's authority from the centre down to the local level, and to manage insurgent threats posed by the remaining Khmer Rouge and their allies operating from safe havens in Thailand. During this period, the state was confronted with a lack of resources needed to pay state officials; the ongoing war with the Khmer Rouge; and the population's distrust of the communist-oriented regime and its Vietnamese advisors. …

The Challenge of Managing Insurgency in Nigeria (2009-2015)

The effort by the government to eradicate insurgency has been slow and costly in terms of public funds spent, lives and properties lost. This has made the citizenry to question the efficacy of the methodology adopted by the government to wipe out the menace. It is against this backdrop that this paper uses the documentary research method to examine the reason why the government is unable to contain the threat of insurgency in Nigeria. In the review, it was discovered that government’s agencies’ opportunistic behavior accounts for the poor performance of the government to wipe outinsurgency in Nigeria. To effectively manage the situation this paper recommends that the government should mitigate the corruptionentrenched in her security agencies,enhance the capabilities of her security agencies by providing them appropriate working tools, engender participatory governance, stimulate inclusive economic development that will reduce poverty. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2016.v7n1s1p145

Inside Papua: The Police Force as Counterinsurgents in Post-Reformasi Indonesia

Following Indonesia’s democratic transition in 1998, the nation’s counterinsurgency strategy shifted from enemy-centric operations led by the military to population-centric operations led by police forces. This was an important move-by the Indonesian government to signal that it intended to include democratic principles in its fight to maintain its sovereignty against the threat of insurgency. In West Papua, the Indonesian police have been empowered to lead the counterinsurgency operation against the Free Papuan Movement (OPM). Nonetheless, the Indonesian police’s deficiencies in battling OPM requires that the police maintain a strong partnership with the Indonesian military. This study examines the complex interplay between the Indonesian military and police in post- Reformasi Indonesia with regard to their counterinsurgency approaches. The article explores the contemporary dynamics between the Indonesian military and police, both tension and cooperation, when conducting operations. It does so by examining a single case study of Indonesia’s counterinsurgency operation in one of the high-risk regions in Indonesia-the Aman Matoa operation against the OPM in West Papua region-which emphasizes law enforcement and building support among local inhabitants. The essay provides a detailed description of the police-military’s joint collaboration in responding to insurgents in West Papua region. (Despite the competition between military and police, the two have been able to work together in West Papua region, especially to extract information about insurgents and to sever the links between guerrillas and their support base.) Further, this study provides a description of the contemporary anatomy of the Free Papua Movement with its current strategy of both violent and nonviolent tactics, from the point of view of counterinsurgency agencies. This empirical study deploys qualitative analyses with data collected through interviews and discussions with relevant stakeholders in West Papua.

The view from above: how the Royal Air Force provided a strategic vision for operational intelligence during the Malayan Emergency

It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.

Afghanistan after NATO Withdrawal

Abstract The conclusion of a conflict, called by some American analysts as “America’s Longest War”, after the withdrawal of the majority of NATO military forces, requires a careful analysis of the conditions and security environment that ISAF mission, International Security Afghan Forces, leaves as legacy to the Afghan military forces. The transfer of authority towards a strong government, recognized by most Afghan provinces, and benefiting from the support of national military forces able to cope with terrorist and insurgent threats on its own, are the minimum and necessary conditions leading the country towards a stable and secure environment and towards a sustainable development. Given these realities, any approach on the consequences of the transition towards self-sustainable governance becomes interesting and timely for any military political study. These are the prospects that we propose in our paper.

The (in)effectiveness of torture for combating insurgency

It is commonly believed that torture is an effective tool for combating an insurgent threat. Yet while torture is practiced in nearly all counterinsurgency campaigns, the evidence documenting torture’s effects remains severely limited. This study provides the first micro-level statistical analysis of torture’s relation to subsequent killings committed by insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. The theoretical arguments contend that torture is ineffective for reducing killings perpetrated by insurgents both because it fails to reduce insurgent capacities for violence and because it can increase the incentives for insurgents to commit future killings. The theory also links torture to other forms of state violence. Specifically, engaging in torture is expected to be associated with increased killings perpetrated by counterinsurgents. Monthly municipal-level data on political violence are used to analyze torture committed by counterinsurgents during the Guatemalan civil war (1977–94). Using a matched-sample, difference-in-difference identification strategy and data compiled from 22 different press and NGO sources as well as thousands of interviews, the study estimates how torture is related to short-term changes in killings perpetrated by both insurgents and counterinsurgents. Killings by counterinsurgents are shown to increase significantly following torture. However, torture appears to have no robust correlation with subsequent killings by insurgents. Based on this evidence the study concludes that torture is ineffective for reducing insurgent perpetrated killings.

Colombia: Changing strategy amidst the struggle

From 1965 to the present, Colombia has been confronted by the insurgency of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The threat reached a new level in 1996 with the advent of mobile warfare, whereby large units sought to neutralize the military in an effort to seize power and institute a Marxist-Leninist regime. Unlike Vietnam, what followed was a regaining of the strategic initiative by the government and a decimation of the insurgent threat. This was accomplished with US assistance but from first to last was driven by Colombian leadership and strategy. The strategy which led to this signal change, ‘Democratic Security’, unfolded under the leadership of President Álvaro Uribe. It was a civil–military partnership, which sought to expand the writ of Colombian democracy to all elements of society. Securing the population provided the shield behind which economic, social, and political life could occur as driven by the will of the people. It was the agreement upon legitimacy as the strategic goal and reform as the route to that goal which allowed the Colombians and the Americans to work so well together.