Instrumental Voting Research Articles

The value of being the decisive voter: Exploratory evidence from a hedonic model

In the field of public economics, there is a literature on calculating the probability of being a decisive voter. The raison d'etre of this literature is to explain voter turnout. In this short empirical paper, we look at the question from a different angle. Heterogeneity in voting preferences means that some individuals vote rationally, others instrumentally, and some individuals are marginal and respond to changes in the probability of being decisive. Individuals with a preference for instrumental voting might be willing to pay more to live in an area with a greater probability of being a decisive voter. If this is the case, housing prices should reflect this higher willingness to pay. We test our theory using hedonic data from Columbus Ohio and find suggestive evidence that voters are willing to pay for a greater likelihood of being a decisive voter. Our results, however, cannot rule out other interpretations.

Instrumental voting under authoritarianism: evidence from Chinese village elections

Using data on 8,872 voters in 209 villages from Chinese Family Panel Studies, this paper uncovers compelling evidence of instrumental voting in the context of Chinese rural elections. First, voter turnouts are significantly higher in villages where rural committees control greater income opportunities and provide more public goods; second, voters’ economic reliance on these income opportunities and public goods is found to be positively correlated with their participation; third, the effects of economic reliance are more pronounced and precisely estimated in resource-affluent villages. One theoretical implication of our findings is that authoritarian elections can be instrumentally appealing enough to elicit mass interest while leaving intact the essence of an authoritarian regime’s rule.

Voting turnout in Greece: expressive or instrumental?

The study analyses the micro-level determinants of voting turnout rates in Greece. In particular, we test for the effects of citizens’ socio-economic features, political participation, activism and trust as pointing to either an expressive or instrumental voting decision process. The analysis involves bootstrap logistic regression techniques and ESS data covering the 2002-2011 period. Evidence is found of instrumental voting in Greece as suggested by the effects of absolute and relative income and the effect of civic participation and trust variables. In addition, the profile of voters is differentiated in the pre- and during the crisis periods. The study makes a twofold contribution. First, the suggested analysis is unique for Greece, and thus it provides important information regarding citizens’ motives towards electoral participation. The second contribution relates to the study’s relevance to policy analysis and design. Results suggest that not only ideology but also the economic agenda might be an important predictor of electoral participation and consequently, legitimization and the quality of democracy in Greece.

Voting Behavior Under Proportional Representation

We unearth the conceptual challenges of constructing a theory of sincere voting in proportional rule elections. Using a rich but tractable model of instrumental voting in closed-rule settings, we show how voters' expectations about the election's outcome shape the relative salience of different candidates in the ballot.

External Validation of Voter Turnout Models by Concealed Parameter Recovery

We conduct a model validation analysis of several behavioral models of voter turnout, using laboratory data. We call our method of model validation concealed parameter recovery, where estimation of a model is done under a veil of ignorance about some of the experimentally controlled parameters — in this case voting costs. We use quantal response equilibrium as the underlying, common structure for estimation, and estimate models of instrumental voting, altruistic voting, expressive voting, and ethical voting. All the models except the ethical model recover the concealed parameters reasonably well. We also report the results of a counterfactual analysis based on the recovered parameters, to compare the policy implications of the different models about the cost of a subsidy to increase turnout.

External validation of voter turnout models by concealed parameter recovery

We conduct a model validation analysis of several behavioral models of voter turnout, using laboratory data. We call our method of model validation concealed parameter recovery, where estimation of a model is done under a veil of ignorance about some of the experimentally controlled parameters—in this case voting costs. We use quantal response equilibrium as the underlying, common structure for estimation, and estimate models of instrumental voting, altruistic voting, expressive voting, and ethical voting. All the models except the ethical voting model recover the concealed parameters reasonably well. We also report the results of a counterfactual analysis based on the recovered parameters, to compare the policy implications of the different models about the cost of a subsidy to increase turnout.

The discerning voter: Party–voter linkages and local distribution under multilevel governance

What shapes voters’ expectations of receiving private benefits and local public goods in developing world democracies? Models of instrumental voting suggest that voters’ expectations are shaped by co-partisanship; however, this work does not consider the calculations that voters make in multilevel systems where different types of goods are allocated by different tiers of government. In this article, I argue that voters condition their expectations of private benefits on co-partisan ties with the local leader, but only do so with respect to local public goods when the local leader is aligned with the state government that controls the allocation of pork barrel spending. I test my argument with a vignette experiment conducted in rural India that randomly assigns the partisan affiliation of real village politicians and find empirical support for the argument. I also find suggestive evidence of strategic voting in local elections towards leaders aligned with the ruling party.

Costly Voting: A Large-Scale Real Effort Experiment

We test the turnout predictions of the standard two-party, private value, costly voting model through a large-scale, real effort experiment. We do this by recruiting 1,200 participants through Amazon's Mechanical Turk and employing a 2 x 2 between subjects design encompassing small (N=30) and large (N=300) elections, as well as close and one-sided elections. We find partial evidence of selfish instrumental voting. Participants with a higher opportunity cost are less likely to vote (cost effect); turnout rate decreases as the electorate size increases (size effect) in one-sided elections and increases the closer the election is (competition effect) in large elections. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, in large one-sided elections the majority turns out to vote at a higher rate than the minority. We propose an alternative theory assuming that voters obtain a small non-monetary utility if they vote and their party wins.

The Discerning Voter: Partisan Alignment and Local Distribution Under Multi-Level Governance

What shapes voters’ expectations of receiving private benefits and local public goods in developing world democracies? Models of instrumental voting suggest that voters’ expectations are shaped by co-partisanship; however, this work does not consider the calculations that voters make in multi-level systems where different types of goods are allocated by different tiers of government. In this article, I argue that voters condition their expectations of private benefits on co-partisan ties with the local leader, but only do so with respect to local public goods when the local leader is aligned with the state government that controls the allocation of pork barrel spending. I test my argument with a vignette experiment conducted in rural India that randomly assigns the partisan affiliation of real village politicians and find empirical support for the argument. I also find suggestive evidence of strategic voting in local elections toward leaders aligned with the ruling party.

Are marginals different? Evidence from British elections 1950\u20132015

We analyse the results of British general elections from 1950 to 2015. In our model, voting is both instrumental and expressive, and is driven both by ideology and the perceived valence of different parties. On most assumptions the model predicts that the safer the seat the lower the swing. The exception is where ideological factors are relatively dominant in instrumental voting, and valence factors are relatively dominant in expressive voting. In this case the highest swings might be in the safest seats. Alternatively swing might peak at intermediate majorities, and this is what we find when we look at swings between Conservative and Labour in seats held by one or other of these parties. We also find that marginals behave more distinctively when the national result is expected to be close or when there has been another general election recently; and that at least some voters have a sense of what is a ‘bellwether’ seat i.e. one that would be marginal in a close election. However in those seats where the main contest has been between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, the swing is positively related to the closeness of the contest.

Pocketbook Voting and Social Preferences in Referenda

We study the role of self-interest and social preferences in referenda. Our analysis is based on collective purchasing decisions of university students on deep-discount flat rate tickets for public transportation and culture. Individual usage data allows quantifying monetary benefits associated with each ticket. We find that turnout is much higher among students who benefit a lot from having a ticket, suggesting instrumental voting. In each referendum, a majority votes in line with self-interest, providing strong evidence for pocketbook voting. However, social preferences like altruism, public good considerations and paternalism shift the vote of a sizable minority against their own financial interest.

Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors

We perform an experiment in which subjects bid for participating in a vote. The setting precludes conflicts of interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have only instrumental reasons to vote and form correct beliefs. Yet, we find that experimental subjects are willing to pay for the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can only be accounted for if some subjects either overestimate their pivotality or do not pay attention to pivotality at all. A model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of others, is consistent with results from treatments that make the issue of pivotality salient to experimental subjects.

Taxing expats — instrumental versus expressive voting compared

It is common knowledge that mobile individuals are difficult to tax. Governments accommodate these difficulties by granting special tax reductions to mobile individuals as it is expedient to get some tax revenue from these individuals rather than to lose them as tax payers completely. Taxing according to expediency is, however, criticized by ordinary tax payers who claim that the basic principles of tax equity are consequently violated. Therefore governments have to solve a difficult trade off between the two goals in order to survive. The variables entering in this optimization process remain disguised in the normal case of a representative democracy. In a direct democracy, however, the trade-off between tax expediency and tax equity principles is revealed by voters.In this paper we distinguish between situations where voters vote instrumentally in favour of tax expediency and where voters vote expressively in favour of equity principles. A popular vote in the canton of Zurich of 2009 serves as a natural experiment for testing the instrumental versus expressive voter hypotheses. We find that instrumental voting prevails in small rural municipalities and expressive voting in larger cities. As expressive voters are in majority in the canton, they exert a cross border externality by imposing their will on the majority decisions of the smaller municipalities. This observation may be of a particular importance when, on the federal level, expressive urban voters may impose their will on the voters of rural cantons voting instrumentally.

Taxing Expats: Instrumental Versus Expressive Voting Compared

It is common knowledge that mobile individuals are difficult to tax. Governments accommodate these difficulties by granting special tax reductions to mobile individuals as it is expedient to get some tax revenue from these individuals rather than to lose them as tax payers completely. Taxing according to expediency is, however, criticized by ordinary tax payers who claim that the basic principles of tax equity are consequently violated. Therefore governments have to solve a difficult trade off between the two goals in order to survive. The variables entering in this optimization process remain disguised in the normal case of a representative democracy. In a direct democracy, however, the trade-off between tax expediency and tax equity principles is revealed by voters. In this paper we distinguish between situations where voters vote instrumentally in favour of tax expediency and where voters vote expressively in favour of equity principles. A popular vote in the canton of Zurich of 2009 serves as a natural experiment for testing the instrumental versus expressive voter hypotheses. We find that instrumental voting prevails in small rural municipalities and expressive voting in larger cities. As expressive voters are in majority in the canton, they exert a cross border externality by imposing their will on the majority decisions of the smaller municipalities. This observation may be of a particular importance when, on the federal level, expressive urban voters may impose their will on the voters of rural cantons voting instrumentally.

Does social capital increase political accountability? An empirical test for Flemish municipalities

Social capital has been shown to positively influence government performance. Boix and Posner (Br. J. Polit. Sci. 28:686–693, 1998) suggest a possible explanation: social capital makes citizens monitor the government more closely. Such monitoring will be more explicit to the extent that instrumental voting motivations outweigh expressive considerations. We identify social capital as a source that facilitates instrumental voting and thus political accountability. We present an empirical test of the Boix and Posner hypothesis and find a positive link between perceived quality of government and election results of the incumbent parties. Crucially, we find this link to be stronger in municipalities high in social capital.

An institutional analysis of voter turnout: the role of primary type and the expressive and instrumental voting hypotheses

Recent events highlight primary type as an institutional variable that merits further examination in the economics literature on voter turnout. Using panel data for U.S. gubernatorial elections and treating primary type as a proxy for candidate deviation from the median voter, we test whether primary type changes voter turnout and whether that change is dominated by instrumental or expressive voting. The results show that states with more open primaries tend to have greater voter turnout in general elections, and that this increase reflects the effect of open primaries on expressive voting.

Trial and Error: Electoral Reform through Bypass and its Repeal

‘The second republic’ is how Asher Arian defined Israel's government in the 1990s, referring to the ‘new issues, new constitutional rules, new leadership’ that emerged at the beginning of that era....

Why Votes have a Value

We perform an experiment where subjects bid for the right to participate in a vote and where the theoretical value of the voting right is zero if subjects are fully rational. We find that experimental subjects are willing to pay for the right to vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. A model of instrumental voting behavior is consistent with our results if individuals are overconfident, overestimate the errors of other players, and also overestimate how often they themselves are pivotal for the outcome. Eliciting beliefs about pivotality shows that individuals value the right to vote more, the more they overestimate their probability of being pivotal. Eliciting beliefs about pivotality reduces the willingness to pay for the right to vote.

Why Votes Have a Value

We perform an experiment where subjects bid for the right to participate in a vote and where the theoretical value of the voting right is zero if subjects are fully rational. We find that experimental subjects are willing to pay for the right to vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. A model of instrumental voting behavior is consistent with our results if individuals are overconfident, overestimate the errors of other players, and also overestimate how often they themselves are pivotal for the outcome. Eliciting beliefs about pivotality shows that individuals value the right to vote more, the more they overestimate their probability of being pivotal. Eliciting beliefs about pivotality reduces the willingness to pay for the right to vote.

Campaign Effects and Second-Order Cycles

Second-order elections theory explains cyclical losses by national government parties in elections to the European Parliament (EP) through strategic protest voting owing to performance deficits in policy-making. This paper confronts the conventional bottom-up view with a top-down approach to second-order elections. Ultimately, the electoral cycle is driven not by instrumental voting behaviour but by party strategies oriented towards governmental power in the member states of the European Union. Based on survey data from the European Election Studies of 1999 and 2004, firstorder campaign mobilization is shown to determine the prospects of government parties in second-order elections. Mobilization itself depends on the quality of spatial representation in terms of distinct programmatic alternatives, which governments are unable to provide during the midterm. Although this process can be traced on the left—right dimension, parties prevent it with regard to integration issues by systematic demobilization. After all, EP elections are still second order, but first-order politics exert their influence through cyclical campaign mobilization and not through strategic protest voting.