Institutions Of Global Economic Governance Research Articles

Chinese Economic Diplomacy before and during the COVID-19 Pandemic

The process of globalization has turned international economy into an arena of direct and indirect conflict of interests of various actors. It has also provided states with a new tool for their foreign policy activity — economic diplomacy. The paper focuses on the economic diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China, which not only has become the second important center of the world economy, but is starting to realize its increased capabilities, demonstrating ambitions of a new leader in international relations. The first section outlines the main features of the PRC’s economic diplomacy. The second section focuses on the key areas and specific mechanisms of the so-called incentive economic diplomacy. In this regard, the author emphasizes two trends: on the one hand, China aims at effectively integrating into existing international formats and institutions of global economic governance, but, on the other hand, it shows willingness to take the lead and initiate its own ambitious projects. The Silk Road Fund and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as well as the mega-project ‘The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road’ are the most striking examples of the latter trend. Incentive economic diplomacy also serves as an important tool for strengthening the soft-power potential of the PRC in the international arena, especially in developing countries. At the same time, the author stresses that in recent years the PRC resorts more actively to the use of offensive forms of economic diplomacy, such as sanctions. This trend is examined in the third section of the paper. The international crisis provoked by SARS-CoV-2 pandemic became a moment of truth and a stress test for the new foreign policy system of the PRC. The fourth section analyses new challenges faced by China’s economic diplomacy in the context of the pandemic. These challenges have both an objective (the need for quick national economic recovery) and subjective dimensions. The latter implies the wholescale information war as the PRC and the countries of the collective West led by the United States started playing blame game. The author notes that, under these circumstances the PRC’s ‘COVID-19 diplomacy’ becomes more aggressive, which negatively affects the already tarnished national image. However, the author concludes, that although the current Chinese economic diplomacy generates rather negative sentiments in both developed and developing countries, it is exactly economic diplomacy that could, if properly used, help the PRC to establish itself as a leading actor in the new bipolar world order.

Gendering global economic governance after the global financial crisis

How can we better understand how changes in global economic governance since the global financial crisis are gendered? In response to pleas for gender research that moves away from ‘somewhat stifling critiques of co-optation’ and the ‘dichotomization of co-optation and resistance’, this article ‘studies up’ to answer unresolved questions about ‘how feminist agendas have been absorbed into international governance’. It also makes visible ‘contradictions, and tensions and spaces for subversion’, as advocated by Prugl and True. Using an approach informed by insights from feminist institutionalism, constructivism and practice theory, it opens the ‘black box’ of GEG to look at how gender actors could ensure that a (limited) gender equality agenda was adopted by some institutions of global economic governance after the crisis. It ends with an analysis of how one ‘gender equality as smart economics’ measure – decreasing the gap in women’s labor force participation by 25% – was adopted at the G20 in 2014. It shows the impact of new developments in GEG, like the increased role of informal, but influential organizations like the G20, on the gendering of global economic governance.

Cost-benefit analysis at the floodgates: Governing democratic futures through the reassembly of Iran's waterways.

A burgeoning scholarship has taken seriously the use and management of the world's fresh water as a site of critical investigation, highlighting the contribution of science and technology studies in making the infrastructural life of water visible. However, studies say little about the calculative terms of the decision-making process involved in infrastructural appraisal which are often taken for granted as something inevitable. This article examines the unexpected and remarkable role that cost-benefit analysis played in governing Iran's democratic future through the assembling of a dam in the mid-20th century. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis traveled the world via flows of water. I investigate the ways in which the calculation of risk generated by the device of cost-benefit analysis of neoclassical economics became over several decades the most influential language for explaining and organizing the relationship between humans and nature in southwest Iran. The waters of the Dez River and other major rivers of the world shaped the building of large-scale infrastructural projects around dams, but they were simultaneously entangled with the production of economic information about the costs and benefits to local areas, making possible the development of new methods of governing democracies in terms of risk. US-based government aid agencies, institutions of global economic governance, private American investors, engineers, and agricultural scientists converged in a small corner of Iran to transform the region, its water, and its farmers into a laboratory of grass-roots democracy for a profit.

Authority, politicization, and alternative justifications: endogenous legitimation dynamics in global economic governance1

Recent mobilization against core tenets of the liberal international order suggests that international institutions lack sufficient societal legitimacy. We argue that these contestations are part of a legitimation dynamic that is endogenous to the political authority of international institutions. We specify a mechanism in which international authority increases the likelihood for the public politicization of international institutions. This undermines legitimacy in the short run, but also allows broadening the justificatory basis of global governance: Politicization allows civil society organizations (CSOs) to transmit alternative legitimation standards to global elite discourses. We trace this sequence for four key institutions of global economic governance – the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and the NAFTA – combining data on authority and protest counts with markers for CSOs and legitimation narratives in more than 120,000 articles in international elite newspapers during 1992–2012. The uncovered patterns are consistent with a perspective that understands legitimation dynamics as an endogenous feature of international authority, but they also show that alternative legitimation narratives did not lastingly resonate in the global discourse thus far. This may explain current backlashes and calls for active re-legitimation efforts on part of international institutions themselves.

Новые тенденции в развитии мировой экономики

After the crisis of 2008–2009, dynamics and structural characteristics of the global economy experienced profound changes. Instead of shifting to a ‘New Normal’ of any kind, it presented both developed and developing economies with a set of strategic options involving technological, institutional, and economic policy trade-offs. Most resourceand technology-related ‘forks in the road’ are relatively growth-friendly, as the choice among the available strategic alternatives can rely on efficiency-maximizing economic calculus (although in some cases, as with the labor-saving technological change, social costs can be rather sensitive). This applies also to the dynamics of institutional change, with different economic and social institutions having proved their compatibility with positive GDP growth. On the contrary, economic policy trade-offs are much more challenging, as efficiency-improving policy reforms often bring opposition by vested interests and/or electoral risks. As for global economic governance, these risks are complemented with nationalist temptations inviting political decision makers to sacrifice global norms for country-specific benefits. In this sense, recent trends in global trade are especially warning, as proliferation of trade barriers can further reduce growth in global trade and downgrade the role of export demand as the engine of global development. Thus far, both markets and most experts considered new US protectionist initiatives as elements of the bargaining strategy used by the Trump administration, which will more likely result in concessions by the affected country partners rather than in retaliatory measures. However, the scenario of full-fledged trade wars should not be ruled out. The history of the global economy presents numerous cases when political ambitions and conflicting trading interests generate outcomes leaving all the parties worse off. Preventing the collapse of the existing regimes and institutions of global economic governance appears one of the key factors responsible for keeping growth rates of global GDP above 3 per cent in short- and medium-run perspective.&nbsp

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Bringing ‘Asian Values’ to Global Economic Governance?

This paper examines the recent establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) through the prism of the 'Asian values' debate. It maps the key attributes of these 'Asian values' first, to the established institutional governance structures of the AIIB, and second, to its proposed decision-making procedures; specifically, in relation to the criteria and process for evaluating, assessing, and monitoring the economic, social and environmental sustainability of infrastructure projects that this new Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) will be supporting. The object of this exercise is to postulate whether an 'Asian values' approach to international development finance can be proposed as a viable alternative to currently Western-dominated institutions of global economic governance and ultimately, the Anglo-American form of capitalism that still underpins the global economy. The twin roles of China within the AIIB, first as the financial catalyst for AIIB investment in regional infrastructure projects, and second, as a potential regional hegemon through its dominance of the AIIB governance structure, will be canvassed. The essay concludes by proposing an ‘Asian values’ approach to global economic governance as the foundation of a new research agenda which can be used to assess the future operations of this Bank and other new MDBs.

Global Economic Governance and the British Economy: From the Gold Standard to the G20

The paper considers the extent to which the G20 process has assisted British state managers with key problems of economic management. It conceptualises the state as the political form of capital and argues that the institutions of global economic governance have helped British state managers reconcile the objectives of accumulation and legitimation from the Gold Standard to the G20. In particular, it argues that the technocratic approach adopted by the G20 from the finance ministers’ meetings to the leaders’ summits has provided British policymakers with a discourse of international expert consensus that reinforces domestic economic strategy based on financialisation, and in the process contributes to the depoliticisation of welfare state retrenchment and labour market discipline in the context of liberalisation and globalisation.

Brazil's Role in Institutions of Global Economic Governance: The WTO and G20

The article evaluates the extent to which Brazil's foreign policy actions, negotiating positions and diplomatic strategies in global governance institutions contribute to supporting its national interest and foreign policy aims. It compares Brazil's preferences and behaviour in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Group of 20 (G20). For decades, Brazil's primary national interest has been national economic development. The article argues that Brazil is moving from a material interests based definition of its prime national interest to a more complex one that includes both material and prestige/status based aspects. Research demonstrates that Brazil has become increasingly focused on gaining recognition as a leader of developing countries, sometimes even at the cost of realising its full material interests. It considers the value of constructivist international relations theory to understanding Brazilian foreign policy.

Contesting the Governance of Capital Flows at the IMF

Financial crises can trigger different actors to reassess their ideas, interests, and policies, and sometimes change them. The Global Financial Crisis triggered a reassessment at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding the utility of capital account liberalization and the management of capital flows. In 2010, the IMF embarked upon an official reassessment of these issues and in 2012 published an official “institutional view” on capital account liberalization and managing capital flows that gives more caution toward capital account liberalization and endorses the use of capital controls in certain circumstances. This article traces the political process that yielded the IMF's new view and draws out lessons for thinking about policy change in global economic governance institutions.

‘Financial Globalisation’ and the ‘Crisis’: A Critical Assessment and ‘What is to be Done’?

Do we have a genuine global financial system? This article challenges the strong notion that the recent financial crisis was global in scope. It argues the international financial system is quite differentiated, being made up of domestic-national, supranational regional and international aspects. The system is characterised by contagion, however, and the article goes on to consider the role of this in generating spill-overs into the wider economic mechanism. Given this characterisation of the financial system the implications for how to organise a regulatory response are pursued. Here the argument is that the principle of ‘distributed preparedness for resilience’ should guide this response not a new set of top-down global rules and norms organised once again by the institutions of global economic governance.

The Decline of Global Economic Governance and the Role of the Transatlantic Powers

Although the global economy has flourished in the current global economic governance regime, the foundations of this order are starting to crumble. Both in trade and in finance, the existing institutions are under severe stress. In trade, more and more countries undermine the WTO by implementing preferential trade agreements. In finance, the IMF has been weak for most of this decade, although it experienced a revival in the current crisis. First and foremost, this weakness of the institutions of global economic governance is the result of policies implemented by the transatlantic powers. Both the European Union and the United States are actively pursuing policies that weaken the existing institutions. In trade, there is a large gap between the official rhetoric, which highlights the importance of the multilateral regime, and the trade policy practice, which is weakening the WTO. In finance, the transatlantic powers have until very recently blocked any progress in the IMF with regard to lending policies. In addition, the EU continues to defend its unjustified overrepresentation in the IMF's governance structures. The article suggests that one of the key explanations for this development is the weak support for globalization in most OECD-countries. Confronted with no enthusiasm for globalization in their domestic constituencies, policy makers in Europe and the United States are increasingly opting for policies that will, over time, erode the existing regimes of global economic governance.

NESG BOOK REVIEW: Jonathan. A. Aremu's book - Attracting and Negotiating Foreign Direct Investment with Transnational Corporations in Nigeria

faults the negotiating procedures in foreign direct investment and highlights the failure of the global economic governance institutions to protect the interests of developing economies from the operations of transnational corporations and the globalisation process. NESG Economic Indicators Vol. 12 (3) 2006: pp. 52-53

Investment as the Achilles Heel of Globalisation?: The Ongoing Conflict between the Rights of Capital and the Rights of States

Efforts to extend global trade and investment governance seem at an impasse. Many disputes, including over investment rules, the focus of this article, and continued controversies over inequality and fairness in the global economy have contributed to the collapse of various trade and investment initiatives. Especially in the investment area, the collapse of mulilateral initiatives has led to bilateral “solutions” – the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment chapters included in bilateral or small group free trade agreements has increased. These are frequently depicted as evidence that the investment protection goals of the capital exporting states, especially the US, are being achieved by bilateral means. However, this article shows that while the bilateral route does enhance capital's rights at the expense of state autonomy, the process is far from an inexorable, linear progression. There has been more contestation and the results are more uneven than is often conceded. In particular there is considerable variation in the contents of BITs and most continue to leave space for states to design economic development policies and retain some leverage over the uses of foreign investment. The US model of investment protection may have made inroads but in its full form it is the exception rather than the rule. The struggle between relative rights of capital and of states remains intense and is one of the central factors that explain the impasse in extending the reach of global economic governance institutions.

Democratizing Global Economic Governance: A PERI Symposium

This working paper is the fruit of a symposium on Democratizing Global Economic Governance held at the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) on October 20, 2000, an event co-sponsored by the Five-College Peace and World Security Studies program. The speakers were asked not only to critique briefly the principal institutions of global economic governance - the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank - but also to suggest progressive alternatives. In other words, they were asked for their views on not only what progressives should be against, but also what they should be for. A recurrent theme in their remarks is the 'fix it' or 'nix it' debate: whether to seek reform of the existing international economic institutions or their outright abolition. As several speakers suggest, the tension between these two positions can be creative, with both sides playing complementary roles in advancing a process of change. Beyond this strategic issue, however, is the more fundamental question of what would constitute a desirable and feasible institutional architecture for democratic global economic governance. Like states, international institutions will always be imperfect. It would be ironic if those who reject the neoliberal vision of a minimalist state, in which vital decisions are left tocompeting private interests, in turn were to embrace a minimalist vision of global economic governance, in which vital decisions are left to competing nation-states. The struggle to build a democratic framework for such governance is among the great challenges that humankind will face in this century. The discussion presented here is intended as a modest contribution to that historic task.