Insensitive Semantics Research Articles

Tipper is ready but he is not strong enough: minimal proposition, question under discussion, and what is said

A standard objection to Cappelen and Lepore’s (Insensitive semantics: a defense of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism, Blackwell, Oxford, 2005) Semantic Minimalism is that minimal propositions are explanatorily idle. But Schoubye and Stokke (Nous 50:759–793, 2016) recently proposed that minimal proposition and the question under discussion of a conversation jointly determine what is said in a systematic and explanatory way. This note argues that their account both overgenerates and undergenerates.

What is Said and Indirect Speech Reports

In their Insensitive Semantics (2005) Cappelen and Lepore argue for the Controversial Aspect (CA) which is a part of their Speech Act Pluralism and which says that speakers don’t have privileged access to what they say. Gross (2006) criticizes C&L’s argument for CA and urges them to abandon that claim. I argue that on C&L’s broad understanding of the notion of what is said, CA (and whole SAP) is trivial, whereas on a more restricted understanding CA is indeed controversial and plausibly false. Moreover, the broad reading of what is said is incompatible with one of C&L’s tests for context-sensitivity.

The collapse of insensitive semantics

The idea motivating their account, Cappelen and Lepore (C&L) say in Insensitive Semantics (2005), is that semantic content is context invariant, and that all colleagues who take, or even consider, different accounts are just on the wrong track. It is the purpose of their book to disprove all alternative accounts by way of an argument ‘by elimination’. The conclusion they arrive at is that their own account must be accepted by everyone as “the only game in town at the end of the day”. The present paper is intended to examine this conclusion; its more significant findings are these. Firstly, C&L’s account is not, as they suggest, strictly minimalist, but in fact just a moderate version of contextualism. Secondly, prematurely associating semantical incompleteness and context sensitivity, they overlook some possible alternatives to their own view, among them at least one that is attractive. Thirdly, their argument ‘by elimination’ has an inductive structure, but is inexhaustive, and therefore inconclusive. Fourthly, for several different reasons, their attempts to reject arguments in favour of semantical incompleteness do not work. Finally, their contention that arguments in favour of semantical incompleteness employ metaphysical premisses for semantical conclusions rests on a faulty interpretation of these arguments. In the light of these findings, it is concluded that the central argument of Insensitive Semantics fails.

Insensitive Semantics. A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism: Herman Cappelen, Ernest Lepore, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, XII + 219 pp.

Insensitive Semantics. A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism: Herman Cappelen, Ernest Lepore, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, XII + 219 pp.

Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism ‐ by Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore

<i>Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism</i> ‐ by Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore

Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore, Insensitive Semantics. A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism

Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore, Insensitive Semantics. A Defenceof Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism, Blackwell,Oxford, 2005, xii + 219 pp.

Insensitive Semantics: A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism

Book Review| January 01 2008 Insensitive Semantics: A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism Herman Cappelen and Ernst Lepore, Insensitive Semantics: A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. xii + 219 pp. John Collins John Collins Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 126–130. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-029 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation John Collins; Insensitive Semantics: A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. The Philosophical Review 1 January 2008; 117 (1): 126–130. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-029 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2007 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

INSENSITIVE SEMANTICS

Insensitive Semantics is a spirited, engaging and argument‐rich defence of the claim that natural languages contain only a small number of semantically context‐sensitive expressions. Cappelen and Lepore (hereafter C&L) tell us that these are more or less the expressions which Kaplan classifies as indexicals in his ‘Demonstratives’: personal pronouns, demonstratives (‘that’, ‘this’), indexicals or demonstratives of place (‘here’, ‘there’), indexicals of time (‘now’, ‘today’, ‘yesterday’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘ago’, ‘hence(forth)’, ‘present’, along with words or aspects of words that indicate tense, and ‘actual’. C&L say they are neutral on ‘says that’, and dubious about so‐called contextuals such as ‘enemy’ and ‘exported’. Their view runs contrary to the more widely held view that context‐sensitivity is a widespread or even ubiquitous feature of natural language. I shall call ‘contextualists’ those who admit more than the ‘basic set’ of context‐sensitive expressions above. Ch. 2 introduces two types of argument which C&L consider as common and central to all defences of contextualism, and which they argue are flawed.

The Excluded Middle: Semantic Minimalism without Minimal Propositions

Insensitive Semantics is mainly a protracted assault on semantic Contextualism, both moderate and radical. Cappelen and Lepore argue that Moderate Contextualism leads inevitably, like marijuana to heroin or masturbation to blindness, to Radical Contextualism and in turn that Radical Contextualism is misguided. Assuming that the only alternative to Contextualism is their Semantic Minimalism, they think they’ve given an indirect argument for it. But they overlook a third view, one that splits the difference between the other two. Like Contextualism it rejects Propositionalism, the conservative dogma that every indexicalfree declarative sentence expresses a proposition. Unlike Contextualism, it does not invoke context to fill semantic gaps and, indeed, denies that filling those gaps is a semantic matter. In rejecting Propositionalism, it is more radical, indeed, more minimalist than Cappelen and Lepore’s brand of Semantic Minimalism. It does not imagine that sentences that intuitively seem not to express propositions at least express “minimal propositions.” Radical Semantic Minimalism, or simply Radicalism, says that the sentences in question are semantically incomplete – their semantic contents are not propositions but merely “propositional radicals.” [PPR commentary on Cappelen and Lepore, Insensitive Semantics] The Excluded Middle: Semantic Minimalism without Minimal Propositions

Précis of Insensitive Semantics

Insensitive Semantics (I) has three components: It defends a positive theory; it presents a methodology for how to distinguish semantic context sensitivity from other kinds of context sensitivity; and finally, it includes chapters critical of other contributors on these issues. In this Précis, we outline each component, but before doing so a few brief ‘big picture’ remarks about the positions defended in is are in order:

Review: Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism

Review: Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism

A Tall Tale: In Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism

In Insensitive Semantics (2005), we argue for two theses: Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. In this paper, we outline our defense against two objections often raised against Semantic Minimalism. We begin with five stage-setting sections. These lead to the first objection, viz., that it might follow from our view that comparative adjectives are context insensitive. We defend our view against that objection (not, as you might expect, by denying that implication, but by endorsing it). Having done so, we address a second objection, viz., that Semantic Minimalism makes it difficult to see what role semantic content plays in communicative exchanges. We respond and end with a reversal, i.e., we argue that even though the second objection fails against us, it works against those who raise the objection. In particular, we show that our critics, in particular, Carston (2002) and Recanati (2004), end up with a notion of communicated content that fails various tests for psychological reality.