Inner-party Democracy Research Articles

Rethinking representative democracy in Croatia

The article analyses the development of representative democracy in Croatia from its independence to today. During the 1990s, Croatia changed its electoral system several times and had a bicameral parliament. With the constitutional changes implemented in 2001, the legislative power was organized on a unicameral principle. At the same time, the previous semi-presidential system was replaced by a parliamentary one. These changes represent only the basic framework within which representative democracy in Croatia developed over time. An important milestone in this development was the introduction of preferential voting at the national elections in 2015, which allowed the voters to vote for a particular list and a specific candidate on that list. According to some, this improved the problematic state of inner-party democracy, although, for others, the reform was not far-reaching enough. Given that representative democracy does not function in a vacuum, the article also considers the impact of direct democracy on the functioning of representative democracy in Croatia. Referring to the Croatian experience, it argues that this complementary form of democracy had a positive impact on the quality of representative democracy in the country. Nevertheless, in the face of representative democracy in Croatia, many open questions still need to be addressed. The most important one is how to increase the turnout in the elections, which is still comparatively low and arguably related to the low trust in politics.

Path to opposition: the motives of the student protest in Leningrad in the 1920-ies

Students have traditionally been a breeding ground for political protest. This tradition was formed back in the pre-revolutionary period, when students of universities and institutes were active participants in both the work of political parties of various persuasions and the all-university struggle for expanding the autonomy of higher education. In the first period after the revolution, the students continued to be one of the most active protest groups, which was most clearly manifested during the intra-party struggle of the 1920-ies. Continuing the theme of the student movement in the early USSR, which we touched upon in previous publications, in this article we turned to the problem of motivating opposition university students. To do this, we used materials from the Control Commissions of the CPSU (b) and personal party files, which make it possible to compensate for the small number of sources of personal origin related to the history of the Left Opposition. Despite the great growth of interest in the topic of the anti-Stalinist alternative in the CPSU(b), this valuable range of sources was not included in the existing studies. The article provides a grouping of the main motives and reasons for involvement in opposition work, as well as an assessment of how they coincided with the content of program documents prepared by the leaders of the movement. Among the main reasons that we have identified are: disagreements with the Central Committee on the peasant and Chinese issues, suppression of inner-party democracy, the search for thrills, the protection of the authority of the Bolshevik leaders (G.E. Zinoviev, L.D. Trotsky), etc. We will also describe the path of involvement of students in the opposition struggle, and the role of informal and family ties in this process will be determined as well

The Labor-Progressive Party in Crisis, 1956–1957

The Labor-Progressive Party in Crisis, 1956–1957 Karen Levine (bio) Keywords Labor-Progressive Party, Canadian Communism, 1956, Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Tim Buck, J.B. Salsberg, Norman Penner, Gui Caron, Anti-Semitism, Stanley B. Ryerson Mots-clés Parti ouvrier-progressiste, communisme canadien, 1956, Joseph Staline, Nikita Khrouchtchev. 20e congrès du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, Tim Buck, J.B. Salsberg, Norman Penner, Gui Caron, antisémitisme, Stanley B. Ryerson On 19 April 1957, 110 delegates from across the country gathered in Toronto to participate in the 6th National Convention of the Labor-Progressive Party (lpp), Canada's major Communist organization. On the heels of the most intense and damaging crisis in the party's history, this convention was deemed highly significant. It was the culmination of twelve months of acute and acrimonious ideological and political struggle. The conflict divided both the leadership and the membership, involving a thorough re-examination and questioning of the strategy, philosophy, structure, and, ultimately, the very existence of the lpp. Several major issues shaped the debate at the convention. Of major controversy were the questions of the relationship of the lpp to the international Communist movement in general, and to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (cpsu) in particular; the role of the party in relation to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (ccf), the trade-union movement, and other "progressive" forces in the country; and the theory and practice of inner-party democracy. In the eyes of the majority of the delegates, however, one question was of overwhelming significance: that of the need for a Marxist-Leninist party in Canada. Around these very basic issues, two distinctly antagonistic positions crystallized. [End Page 161] A minority grouping, led by J. B. Salsberg, a long-standing leader of the party and one of its most able spokesmen, had decided that the lpp, "with its long history of dogmatism, subservience to the cpsu, sectarianism and isolation from the masses," was no longer an adequate tool with which to build socialism in Canada.1 On this basis, Salsberg and his supporters advocated the dissolution of the lpp and a "socialist realignment" of progressive forces throughout the country. This stand could be characterized as essentially social democratic. The large majority of delegates, however, stood behind the position held by the national leader, Tim Buck, and most prominently defended by Leslie Morris, who would become leader in 1961. To them, Salsberg's proposals represented "rank opportunism," "defeatism," and, worst of all, "revisionism" – an attempt to water down Marxism-Leninism in an effort to achieve "bourgeois respectability."2 Buck and his followers were prepared to admit that Soviet precepts had been followed too closely in the past, that inner-party democracy suffered in the process, and that the lpp was insufficiently flexible in its policies. Certain changes and corrections would have to be made. For the majority, however, such errors did not bring the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism into question. In its essence, the political line of the party had been correct. Proletarian internationalism, democratic centralism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat remained valid and necessary concepts. And most importantly, the need for a Communist party in Canada was indisputable; the lpp was that party and was still the vanguard of the Canadian working class. While attempting to rid the party of its dogmatic and sectarian tendencies, those aligned with Buck felt that the primary task at hand was to defeat the "revisionists" and "liquidationists."3 Yet not all delegates fit neatly into either group. Besides those affiliated with Salsberg, two other minority positions were discernible at the convention, one advocating the need for change, the other more hardened in its position. A small cluster gathered around Norman Penner, Edna Ryerson, and Charles Sims, all leading members in the party.4 This group was more critical [End Page 162] of the lpp's past record than were the majority and advocated more far-reaching changes. Seeing "left-sectarianism" as the main danger in the party, they felt that to transform itself the lpp would have to alter its whole approach to politics...

Analysis on the Relationship between the Construction of the Ruling Party and Consultative Democracy

Deliberative democracy is not only the Chinese people's summary of China's historical experience, but also the urgent requirement of building China's political civilization. Strengthening democratic construction includes the establishment of inner-party democracy and the construction of people's democracy, and the promotion of people's democracy by inner-party democracy. The democratic politics of the consultative party and the deliberative democracy of the masses are an important part of people's democracy. In order to strengthen the construction of the ruling party, we must strengthen the construction of consultative democracy and promote the further development of people's democracy. This paper mainly analyzes the relationship between the construction of the Communist Party and deliberative democracy.

Postrevolutionary Syndromes

Postrevolutionary Syndromes Éric Aunoble Gianni Haver, Jean-François Fayet, Valérie Gorin, and Emilia Koustova, eds., Le spectacle de la Révolution: La culture visuelle des commémorations d'Octobre( The Spectacle of the Revolution: The Visual Culture of the Commemorations of October). 301 pp. Lausanne: Antipodes, 2017. ISBN-13 978-2889011353. CHF 36. Aleksandr Reznik, Trotskii i tovarischi: Levaia oppozitsiia i politicheskaia kul´tura RKP(b), 1923–1924(Trotskii and Comrades: The Left Opposition and the Political Culture of the RCP[b]). 382 pp. St. Petersburg: Evropeiskii universitet v Sankt-Peterburge, 2017. ISBN-13 978-5943802249. Andy Willimott, Living the Revolution: Urban Communes and Soviet Socialism, 1917–1932. 203 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. ISBN-13 978-0198725824. £60.00. The centenary of the Russian Revolution had the welcome effect of bringing the events of 1917 back to the forefront of Western public interest. Yet it reduced an entire process to two dates at best, February and October. The Russian Revolution was not only the history of two insurrections; nor was it the matter of a single year. At the end of 1917, there were still many events to come; and the changes in Russia's political, economic, and social structures were only beginning. It would take at least three more years of turmoil and struggle to shape the new regime. In addition to the country's appalling situation at the end of the Civil War and the concern about the future of its people, there are questions about its supporters' state of mind. A look through the Communist Party's archives for 1920–23 reveals entire folders of documents about sick leaves on physical or mental grounds. Exhaustion was not only the consequence of stress, disease, and poor material condition; it also [End Page 879]reflected acute social and political concerns. How could an activist transcend his/her own heroism and dedication during the Revolution and Civil War? How would he/she build a new set of beliefs and values adapted to the new period of "peaceful socialist construction"? Three recent books give us some enlightening clues about different ways of tackling this issue. One option was to stick to revolutionary ideals in politics as the Left Oppositionists did. A second consisted in transferring communist commitment to everyday life and becoming a communard. Ossifying the past by celebrating the revolution again and again was a third alternative. ________ Lev Trotskii's struggle against Stalin was magnified for a long time as revolutionary romanticism before being vilified as a mere struggle for power between leaders. Yet this crucial episode of early Soviet history is still a new field for academic research. 1The young Russian historian Aleksandr Reznik aims at going beyond "textocentrism" and "Trostkocentrism" (14) and tries to describe the 1923 Left Opposition as a living social group and not only as Trotskii's followers or disembodied bearers of ideology. On the basis of party and state sources from the center and the provinces (mostly Perm´), Reznik delineates the "political culture" (19) of Russian Communists, defined not only as a set of values but also as practices, emotions, and ways of communicating. The chronological framework of his study covers a short period, from August 1923 until January 1924. Two texts were milestones of the crisis: the "Declaration of 46" in October 1923 claimed that "The factional regime must be eliminated and … must be replaced by a regime of comradely unity and inner-party democracy." In December, Trotskii published a series of articles in Pravdaarguing for The New Courseand analyzing bureaucratization, which was for him the background of the struggle inside the Party itself. However, the 13th Party Conference ended on 18 January with the defeat of the opposition, three days before Lenin's death became a major reason to close off discussion. In the first chapter, Reznik traces this story in detail. He highlights some particularly sensitive core issues in the conflict, which he develops in later chapters: from Trotskii's role and his relations with other oppositionists to the mechanism of inner-party discussion and the type of [End Page 880]arguments exchanged and to the strategy of both camps to obtain defined...

Inner-Party Democracy and State Interference into Party Activity (Russian Case)

Inner-Party Democracy and State Interference into Party Activity (Russian Case)

Peculiarities of structural construction and ideological positioning of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”

Evolution of the Vse-Ukrainske Obiednannia (hereinafter VO) “Svoboda” (the All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom”) has been traced back; special attention has been paid to the issues of the leader in the organizational structure and the state of inner-party democracy. A high level of centralization and leadership format in the structure of the party has been justified. On the basis of the analysis of the party documents the ideological positioning of the party in the context of such variables as: radicalism, left-right positioning has been determined. It has been proved that the AU “Svoboda” most fully correspond to the parameters of radical and national ideology, combining left and right approaches with populism as an integral element.

The failure of China's "democratic" reforms

Contents Foreword Preface Acknowledgments Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: for Township Executives Chapter 3: Inner-Party Democracy and the Experiments of Direct Elections for Township Party Secretaries Chapter 4: Another Form of Inner-Party Democracy: The Party Congress Reform Chapter 5: The Experiments with Deliberative Democracy Chapter 6: A Reform Instigated from the Outside of the Bureaucratic System: Independent Candidates in China's Local Congress Elections Conclusion Bibliography Index

Democracy Within and Without: A Report on Inner-Party Democracy in Political Parties in India

Political parties can have internal decision making processes that are democratic or undemocratic. Members could be given a say or party elites could be given total power over choosing party leaders and choosing candidates for elections. Democratic processes within political parties are beneficial for many of the same reasons that democracy is beneficial within a state: it promotes accountability through elections, it allows members to have their views better represented and it encourages politicians to compete for access to power. Inner-party democracy (IPD) is practiced in a variety of ways around the world, providing many possible models for other countries to adopt.Indian National Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party both are discussed in detail. Both have hierarchically structured internal decision making processes. Our research and interviews about the internal processes in political parties across India suggests that there are many problems, some of which could be addressed through use of IPD. During our research it became clear that it is difficult to remove party leaders, there is little discussion or consultation with ordinary members when setting the party agenda, young politicians find it difficult to climb the ranks and gain influence, and the influence of family connections remains powerful.To help combat these issues, RFGI suggests several reforms. Party members should directly elect their leaders. This will encourage accountability and give members a larger voice within the party. Party members should also be able to influence candidate selection through use of a veto or 'no-confidence' vote. This will allow them to prevent irregularities of the nomination system while still enabling the party elites to make strategic decisions. Elected representatives should be able to dissent from their party openly, and parties should hold meetings more regularly and encourage open dialogue within the party. India should adopt laws that govern political parties to help give these reforms legal standing.Democracy requires more than just institutions. It also requires that people use those institutions in good faith, and believe in them. It requires that individuals encourage substantial debate, allow for dissent, and seek compromise rather than misuse power. Nonetheless, democratic institutions are important because they enable such individuals to pursue changes. Democratizing India's political parties is an important step towards improving Indian politics as a whole.

Vietnam Through Chinese Eyes: Divergent Accountability in Single-Party Regimes

In 2006, a flurry of articles appeared in Chinese newspapers comparing China’s democratic development unfavorably with that of Vietnam. Chinese journalists cited several features which revealed sharp differences across cases, and despite Communist Party leadership existing in both places. These differences included: (a) the direct election of the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party; (b) the power of the Vietnamese Central Committee (CC) to make decisions independently of the Political Bureau (Politburo) and even to overrule the Politburo on occasion; (c) the encouragement of public commentary on the Vietnamese Communist Party’s political report in advance of its party congress; and (d) countrywide direct elections of members of Vietnam’s National Assembly, including a relatively high number of candidates per seat. Vietnam remains a one-party state, therefore advances in democratic development remain deeply constrained. Nonetheless, attraction to its political institutions was severe enough that Hu Jintao, president and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), felt compelled to issue an internal CCP document. He criticized the Vietnamese authorities for moving “too quickly toward inner-party democracy,” even warning that a de-stabilizing Mikhail Gorbachev-like figure may come to power. The CCP also banned public discussion of Vietnam’s reforms, deploying instead party intellectuals to argue against a Vietnam-like course of political development. Clearly, the comparison was found unflattering to the present Chinese leaders. Early on, they had advocated greater “inner-party democracy” and a “serve the people” credo to draw distinctions from the prior Jiang Zemin era. Such unwanted comparisons also reveal an intriguing puzzle for the comparative politics sub-field. That is, no indices of governance currently available can account adequately for the institutional differences revealed in the Chinese press, no less their relation to the persistence of communist rule in each place. To the contrary, political dynamics continue to be assumed instead of explained through the close conceptual association of regime type with degrees of political accountability that remains in the comparative politics literature. The subsequent inability of existing scales to capture within-typology variation is an important lacuna in our understanding of authoritarian regimes, and perhaps more critically the mechanisms by which they remain resilient or collapse. Taking this shortcoming as our starting point, we focus on formal institutions of accountability within these two single-party states.

Hong Kong’s Democratic Prospects after the 17th CCP Congress

Paper for the Association of Chinese Political Studies International Symposium & the 21st ACPS Annual Meeting, 11 to 12 October 2008The 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) heralded new leadership for China’s administration of Hong Kong affairs and also promised greater inner-party democracy. Taken together, these events could portend changes in policies and approaches by Beijing towards Hong Kong’s democratic evolution, which to date, have been less than satisfactory to some in Hong Kong. Nor has it resulted in the model political transition or control over Hong Kong that Beijing has desired.Since China’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, realization of the promise of universal suffrage for Hong Kong has remained constrained, elusive and amorphous. Indeed, Beijing-induced ambiguities, shifting definitional constructs and differing interpretations by primary stakeholders in Hong Kong’s political development over what actually constitutes “democracy” have characterized the struggle for suffrage in the Special Administrative Region.Now, ten years on, demands for “real democracy,” a defined timetable, and a faster pace toward universal suffrage in Hong Kong are mounting and could lead to a more dramatic confrontation with Beijing. Some disillusioned Hong Kong democrats have criticized post-17th CCP National People’s Congress Standing Committee decisions on Hong Kong electoral reforms and the timetable for suffrage, suggesting that more radical political actions may be in order if Beijing continues to retard the progress of reform. Such developments would likely emasculate advances towards allowing universal suffrage in Hong Kong, subvert or delay plans to expand democracy within the CCP, and represent a major challenge for Chinese leadership.This paper proposes to examine what has been China’s policy towards allowing universal suffrage in Hong Kong, what it considers democracy and universal suffrage to encapsulate, and how those policies and definitions may change after the 17th CCP congress given the new leadership responsible for Hong Kong affairs and emphasis on expanding democracy within the Party.

The Chinese Communist Party: Recruiting and Controlling the New Elites

This article explores two interrelated aspects of the new dynamics within the CCP leadership – the new elite groups and the new ground rules in Chinese politics. The first shows profound changes in the recruitment of the elite and the second aims to reveal the changing mechanisms of political control and the checks and balances of the Chinese political system. The article argues that the future of the CCP largely depends on two seemingly contradictory needs: how broad-based will the Party's recruitment of its new elites be on the one hand and how effective will the top leadership be in controlling this increasingly diverse political institution on the other. The emerging fifth generation of leaders is likely to find the challenge of producing elite harmony and unity within the Party more difficult than their predecessors. Yet, the diverse demographic and political backgrounds of China's new leaders can also be considered a positive development that may contribute to the Chinese-style inner-Party democracy.

Political culture in Bangladesh: Does leadership matter ?

Ever since it emerged as a sovereign State, Bangladesh has been in the grip of power politics. Coups have been common, the military has infiltrated the political process, and the political scene is marked by a patron-client culture, one in which black money plays a major role in elections and mastans (goondas) are extensively relied upon to do the bidding of their political masters. Political leaders draw their strength by donning the mantles of the slain charismatic leaders-Sheik Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur Rahman; they care little for inner-party democracy, are distanced from the people, and are caught up in an ‘enemy discourse”, in which each political party reviles the other. Bangladesh's political leaders must work for a genuine democratic culture in the country.

Party building since Mao—a question of style?

Party workstyle remains a problem for the CPC leadership, reinforced by rejection of Cultural Revolution methods and re-evaluation of Mao which have confused many cadres. In a number of ways, Mao had destroyed the ‘rules of the game’ of the Leninist Party- state. Yet the problem is one of structure of power not merely of attitude.Development strategies have been changing; moves have been made towards economic reforms. These call for a different kind of Party than that which existed prior to 1976. For example, in relations with other institutions, the dominating role of the Party will need modification. In combating ‘sickness’ within the Party, two problems have been diagnosed by the authorities: bureaucratism and feudal hangovers. These lead to corruption, patronage and lack of inner-Party democracy. Earlier ideas of inner-Party struggle by democratic means and a real role for the Constitution have been revived. The latter now includes restrictions on individuals acting beyond the scope of Party policy — a thrust at the personality cult that develops around Party leaders. Life-long tenure for cadres is being abolished, and interpenetration of state and Party organs limited to a degree, though differences continue on how far this should proceed and on the amount of freedom to be given to intellectuals to intervene in the process.

Democracy and the Legal System

Strengthening the socialist legal system is an important guarantee for dealing blows at the enemy, protecting the people and accomplishing the general task for the new period. It should be given our serious attention. Our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao, at an enlarged work conference convened by the CCP Central Committee in 1962, emphatically pointed out: "Unless we fully promote people's democracy and inner-party democracy and unless we fully implement a system of proletarian democracy, it will be impossible for China to have true proletarian centralism. Without a high degree of democracy it is impossible to have a high degree of centralism, and without a high degree of centralism it is impossible to establish a socialist economy." It is clear that the socialist legal system and the principle of democracy are problems to which Chairman Mao attached great importance.

From the Eighth Congress to the Ninth Congress

Any intelligent CCP cadre, when looking through the Party Constitution of the Eighth Congress [of the Chinese Communist Party (1956)] and making a close comparison with the Party Constitution of the Ninth Congress [1969], will no doubt be unable to avoid a shock of surprise and a sigh that "the present just isn't like the past." Some may say, "The Party is already dead!" And it is true, today's "Party" is not the same as yesterday's "Party," at least judging by the two Party constitutions. In the new Constitution, there is no "nation" [kuo-chia], nor is there any "people" [jen-min], and even "the working class" [kung-jen chieh-chi] has been replaced by the "proletariat" [wu-ch'an chieh-chi]. According to the Constitution of the Ninth Party Congress, Party members have only obligations, no rights; basic-level Party organizations have only responsibilities, no power. No longer is there collective leadership, and in some places there is only an oligarch, a dictator, a leader worshipped as an individual who is no longer among the masses, but who remains high above the masses. No longer is there supervision from below, but in some places only orders from above. "Inner-Party democracy" has been totally buried, and all that is left is centralism. The new Party Constitution not only concentrates political power in the hands of Mao [Tsetung] and Lin [Piao] but also attempts to guarantee that the group now in power will remain in power forever. Even if Mao and Lin were never to convene a national congress, lower-level Party organizations and Party members in general could do nothing about it!.

Oligarchy in the British Communist Party

T tNTIL RECENTLY, although much has been surmised about the foci of power in the Communist Party of Great Britain tJ (C.P.), Iittle reliable direct evidence has been available, but in January, I957, the C.P. published the report of its commission on 'Inner-Party Democracy', in fact, two reports: a majority report and a minority report. It may be convenient before proceeding to an examination of the evidence offiered in these reports to give a brief account of the formal structure of the Party and the situation which led to the appointment of the commission.