Ingrid Robeyns Research Articles

Housing Limitarianism: What’s Wrong with Owning Excess Homes?

ABSTRACT There is a growing contention in the Housing Justice movement from activists, theorists, and politicians that not only should everyone have enough housing, but there is something wrong with having too much of it. This paper provides a framework to articulate and defend efforts to create housing wealth ceilings. Building on the work of Ingrid Robeyns, it develops the moral and political doctrine of housing limitarianism. This doctrine asserts it is morally wrong to have too much housing while others, human or animal, do not have enough, and that governments ought to limit the excessive acquisition/consumption of housing by individuals and corporations. I employ the Rawlsian ideal of property-owning democracy to argue for the dispersal of homeownership throughout society. Lastly, I discuss how housing justice can ethically negotiate the apparent conflict between increasing the supply of affordable housing and the preservation of natural habitat for wildlife.

Realising Capabilities for Street Young People in Harare, Zimbabwe: A New Approach to Social Protection

ABSTRACT Living in social contexts characterised by poverty and inequality, street young people have limited access to healthcare, water sanitation and hygiene services; exacerbating effects of ill health, infections, lack of nutrition and substance abuse that undermine their wellbeing. In Harare, Zimbabwe, they are also excluded from Social Protection Programmes (SPPs) which potentially assist other impoverished Zimbabweans, two-thirds of whom live below the poverty line (WFP 2019. Zimbabwe Annual Country Report 2019. World Food Programme). In this paper, we propose a reassessment of SPPs, in particular the Assisted Medical Treatment Order (AMTO), identifying barriers to access, and benefits for extending access to street young people . Drawing on secondary analysis of data from Growing up on the Streets, this paper re-conceptualises Ingrid Robeyns’ (2005. “The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey.” Journal of Human Development 6 (1): 93–117. https://doi.org/10.1080/146498805200034266) model of capabilities and applies it to the reversal of street youth exclusion and the application of government-targeted initiatives which have failed to reach those in the most vulnerable situations. In so doing, we propose an adapted model which recognises how the capabilities of street young people are enhanced when they are integrated into SPPs. This adapted model can be replicated and applied to relevant interventions for other groups of marginalised people in across contexts.

Protecting the Autonomy of Patients with Severe Mental Illness Through Psychiatric Advance Directive Peer-Facilitation

Protecting the Autonomy of Patients with Severe Mental Illness Through Psychiatric Advance Directive Peer-Facilitation

Collective political capabilities

ABSTRACT Monique Deveaux’s Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-led Social Movements makes a significant contribution to contemporary capability theories by challenging their individualism. Mainline versions of the Capabilities Approach (CA), including those developed by Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen, and Ingrid Robeyns, insist on a methodological and normative individualism. And with good reason: communitarianism most often reinscribes patriarchal power, especially within the family. Deveaux, however, argues that this individualism yields a depoliticized account of poverty as capability deprivation, thereby downplaying or even denying the agency of the poor. But poor-led social movements politicize poverty, understanding it as a social and political relation between individuals and institutions. These movements build collective political capabilities: capabilities that can be exercised only by groups or that promote collective goods. The current paper explicates, extends, and defends this powerful challenge to mainline capability theories.

Introduction: Symposium Limitarianism: Extreme Wealth as a Moral Problem

The growing concentration of wealth has acquired a new urgency in recent years. One particular view in this context is developed by Ingrid Robeyns in her ground-breaking work on limitarianism. According to this view, no one should have more than a certain amount of valuable goods, such as income and wealth. The contributors to this symposium, Brian Berkey, David Axelsen and Lasse Nielsen, Jessica Flanigan and Christopher Freiman, and Lena Halldenius, critically examine various aspects of limitarianism. In particular, they examine how limitarianism should be interpreted and developed as a principle of justice, on what reasons speak in favour and against limitarianism, and on how limitarianism relates to other principles of distributive justice. Our hope is that this symposium will contribute to the ongoing debate in political philosophy about the concentration of wealth and economic justice.

Wealth Without Limits: in Defense of Billionaires.

In this essay we argue against preventing people from amassing extreme wealth via increased taxation. The first argument in favor of such a proposal, recently advanced by Ingrid Robeyns (2018), states that billionaires' resources would be better spent addressing morally important goals such as meeting disadvantaged people's needs and solving collective action problems. In response to this claim, we argue that billionaires are typically in a better position to benefit the poor and to solve collective action problems than public officials. The second argument in favor of preventing extreme wealth accumulation, advanced by Robeyns and Robert Reich (2018), states that billionaires have an inappropriate amount of influence in public life, which undermines political equality. We argue that corporate leaders tend to be more accountable to their fellow citizens than public officials. We then consider and criticize the objection that billionaires' success is typically a result of public investment, which entitles public officials to enforce taxes that demand a return on the public investment.

Why Limitarianism Fails on its Own Premises – an Egalitarian Critique

This article is a critical analysis of Ingrid Robeyns’ “economic limitarianism” (2017, 2019, 2022), the suggestion that there is a moral case against allowing people to be richer than they need to be in order to achieve full flourishing. Wealth above a certain “riches line” lacks value and should be capped at that level. Robeyns claims that limitarianism is justified as a partial theory of economic justice, since vast wealth is a threat to political equality and the revenue raised from taxing wealth can be used to meet urgent needs. She also claims that limitarianism is problem-driven philosophy and should be judged by its capacity to address problems in the world as it is. The argument in this article is that limitarianism fails on its own premises, both as partial theory of justice and as guide to decision-making. The arguments invoked in its favour as theory does not provide reasons to support it over other redistributive schemes. As guide to practical action, it runs counter to what empirical research reveals about how attitudes to economic inequality works in that people’s acceptance of inequality adjusts: the more unequal a society is, the more inequality is accepted as fair. By disregarding inequalities below the riches-line as well as the economic system that produces them, limitarianism has no tools for countering this adjustment and risks legitimating a politics of inequality. Anyone who shares Robeyns’ concerns about economic inequality have reason to be wary of limitarianism.

Care-deficits and polarization: Why the time is ripe for a universal care conscription.

A large share of countries is struggling to provide adequate care to their older populations. To deal with this challenge, philosopher Ingrid Robeyns has advocated legislation that requires (most) citizens to spend 1 year of their life providing dependency care. My aim of this contribution is to strengthen the case for this proposal, which I will refer to as a ‘universal care conscription’. I do so by defending this type of conscription against various alternative ways of addressing care-deficits that have been proposed. As I show, not only is it doubtful whether pursuing these alternatives will always, or even generally, suffice to prevent and/or alleviate care-deficits at reasonable financial and moral cost, a universal care conscription has significant civic benefits in an age of polarization that count strongly in its favour.

The Limits of Limitarianism*

Journal of Political PhilosophyEarly View Symposium on Limitarianism The Limits of Limitarianism* Robert Huseby, Robert Huseby Political Science, University of OsloSearch for more papers by this author Robert Huseby, Robert Huseby Political Science, University of OsloSearch for more papers by this author First published: 29 January 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12274 * Earlier versions of this article were presented at a GOODPOL workshop in 2020, the Nordic Network in Political Theory in 2020, the Norwegian Network for Practical Philosophy in 2021, and a workshop on sufficientarianism organized by the University of Liverpool in 2021. I am grateful to Didde Boisen Andersen, David Axelsen, Katharina Bohnenberger, Lars Christie, Sebastian Johansen Conte, Ben Davies, Keith Dowding, Jakob Elster, Hallvard Fossheim, Markus Furendal, Andreas Føllesdal, Ian Gough, Clare Heyward, Fredrik Dybfest Hjorthen, Cathrine Holst, Simo Kyllönen, Ortrud Lessmann, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Alejandra Mancilla, Jasmina Nedevska, Frank Nullmeier, Jørgen Pedersen, Thomas Princen, Jouni Reinikainen, Magnus Reitberger, Ingrid Robeyns, Rudolf Schuessler, Liam Shields, Espen Dyrnes Stabell, Attila Tanyi, Jesse Tomalty, Dick Timmer, David Vogt, and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions. ‡ Copyright notice: © 2022 The Author. Journal compilation © 2022 Wiley Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation

Limitarianism: Utopia or Real Alternative to the Existing World Order?

The increasing wealth inequality is one of the main challenges of the 21st century. The gap between the poorest and the richest people on the planet is growing steadily. Obviously, such trend could not escape attention of social thinkers. One of the responses to the unfolding processes is the increasing popularity of the topic of the ethics of wealth. Within this framework the concept of limitarianism elaborated by Ingrid Robeyns, Professor at the University of Utrecht, is of particular interest. Limitarianism, being a political and ethical doctrine, postulates the inadmissibility of possessing wealth in excess of a certain threshold. According to Robeyns, any material wealth that goes beyond what is necessary for a fulfilling life is both redundant and ethically unacceptable, and must be redistributed. Not surprisingly, such a radical idea has been met with a wave of a wellgrounded criticism. The article examines the theoretical basis of limitarianism, analyzes the main arguments in favor and against this concept, and also attempts to answer the question about the possibility of practical implementation of Robeyns’ ideas. According to the author’s conclusion, limitarianism as a political concept has a number of serious flaws and bears a clear imprint of utopianism. However, since the concept has a very promising moral dimension, it would be wrong to write it off completely. Since limitarianism aims at the broad participation of individuals in the fate of other people and solution to the problems of humanity as a whole, it is able to gain wide public support, developing as a form of a personal ethics.

Ingrid Robeyns, Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-Examined

Ingrid Robeyns, <i>Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-Examined</i>

Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-Examined, Ingrid Robeyns. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2017, 256 pages.

Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-Examined, Ingrid Robeyns. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2017, 256 pages.

Limitarianism and Relative Thresholds

In her groundbreaking paper “Having too much” Ingrid Robeyns presents a limitarian theory of justice, the crux of which is that it is morally impermissible to have more resources than needed for a maximally flourishing life. This paper focuses on one component of Robeyns’ limitarian theory, namely the nature of the riches threshold, the point above which the limitarian restriction kicks in. The threshold, according to Robeyns, is located at the point in which human flourishing is satiated; above this threshold, surplus resources do not have any moral weight. In this paper I offer an alternative account of the riches threshold: a relative, resource based threshold. On this account, the riches threshold represents the maximal permissible ratio between the resources available to the richest and poorest members of society. For example, limitarianism could maintain that it is morally impermissible to have more than one hundred times the resources that the poorest member of society has. A relative threshold, I argue, offers a more attractive account of limitarianism: it is more compatible with the intuition underlying limitarianism, better attuned to the justifications of limitarianism, and it is not susceptible to objections that the flourishing satiation threshold faces.

Wellbeing, Freedom, and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Reexamined. By Ingrid Robeyns. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2017.

Wellbeing, Freedom, and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Reexamined. By Ingrid Robeyns. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2017.

Assessing Non-intrinsic Limitarianism

In this paper we aim to examine a novel view on distributive justice, i.e. limitarianism, which claims that it is morally impermissible to be rich. Our main goal is to assess the two arguments provided by Ingrid Robeyns in favour of limitarianism, namely the democratic argument and the argument from unmet urgent needs and the two distinct limitarian views which these arguments give rise to. We claim that strong limitarianism, which is supported by the democratic argument, should be rejected as it fails to fully instantiate the value of political equality, while having some other unattractive implications as well. By contrast, we argue that weak limitarianism, which is supported by the argument from unmet urgent needs, should be endorsed, albeit in a qualified version which also takes responsibility constraints into consideration.

Gender Sensitive Capabilities Framework: An Emerging Approach to the Study Capability Deprivation of Elderly Women in India

The author traces the history of capability approach to Amartya Sen and Martha Nabussum. She identifies with the gender sensitive list of capabilities generated by Ingrid Robeyns. The paper focuses advocates for using the gender sensitive capabilities framework for studying deprivation of elderly women in India.

Sen on Rawls’s “transcendental institutionalism”: An analysis and critique

This paper evaluates Amartya Sen’s criticisms of Rawls’s theory of justice, in particular his critique of the ideal versus nonideal distinction in Rawls, and corrects what I take to be various misconceptions that underpin this critique. I will then move on to the more general issue of how we are to understand the role of the ideal versus nonideal distinction (and how we ought not to understand it) before going on to consider one focused application of Sen’s ideas. I will look at the choice between property-owning democracy and welfare state capitalism, drawing on the important work of Ingrid Robeyns specifically on “gender justice”, in order to argue that Sen’s methodological claims will – if heeded – send us all off on the wrong track.

Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities. Edited by Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 268p. $89.00 cloth, $31.00 paper.

Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities. Edited by Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 268p. $89.00 cloth, $31.00 paper.

Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities edited by Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, x + 257 pp., $29.99 (paperback), $85.00 (hardcover)

Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities edited by Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, x + 257 pp., $29.99 (paperback), $85.00 (hardcover)

Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities, Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 247 pp., $85 cloth, $29.99 paper.

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