Information Flow Control Policies Research Articles

CVTEE: A Compatible Verified TEE Architecture With Enhanced Security

Sensitive resources in Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) have suffered serious security threats in recent years. Previous protection approaches either lack a strong assurance of TEE security properties or are limited to a single platform. We propose a compatible verified TEE architecture, called <monospace>CVTEE</monospace> , which delegates a security monitor to manage TEE resources securely. This architecture has two key advantages: i) its functional correctness and security are guaranteed by a machine-checkable proof of security objectives of Trusted Application (TA) isolation, runtime confidentiality, and runtime integrity, and ii) it is applicable to different TEE platforms and implementation-independent due to its high level of abstraction and non-determinism of data types. Note that access control policy and information flow control policy are the core for security management of resources. After formally specifying the security attributes of TEE resources, we develop these policies based on Common Criteria (CC) in the security monitor and provide atomic interfaces. <monospace>CVTEE</monospace> is formally verified with 386 lemmas/theorems and <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\sim$</tex-math></inline-formula> 10,000 LOC of Isabelle/HOL. In addition, we implement a proof of concept for the access control module of Teaclave, and prove that the constructed access control model meets the security requirements through 5 theorems.

Fine-grained information flow control using attributes

Information flow control (IFC) mechanisms regulate where information is allowed to travel. To enhance IFC, access control encryption (ACE) was proposed where both the no write-down rule and the no read-up rule are supported. Nevertheless, there are still two issues: (1) how to determine whether a communication request should be permitted or denied was not considered; (2) the commutation cost is linear with the number of receivers.Attribute-based system (ABS) can implement one-to-many communication and fine-grained access policies. In this paper, a new IFC scheme is proposed by combing ACE with ABS. Our scheme provides the following features: (1) IFC policies are defined over a universe set of attributes; (2) the computation cost to determine whether a communication request should be permitted or denied is constant, instead of linear with the number of required attributes or receivers; (3) weak attribute privacy is achieved; (4) fine-grained access policies on encrypted data are supported; (5) the communication cost is linear with the number of required attributes and is independent of the number of receivers. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first IFC scheme enforced by using attributes.

Recent advances in cloud data centers toward fog data centers

Recent advances in cloud data centers toward fog data centers

Secure‐CamFlow: A device‐oriented security model to assist information flow control systems in cloud environments for IoTs

SummaryRecent developments in the cloud technologies have motivated the migration of distributed large systems, specifically the Internet of Things to the cloud architecture. Since Internet of Things consist of a vast network and variety of objects, the cloud platform proves to be an ideal option. It is essential for the proper functioning of the Internet of Things to be able to share data among the system processes. The biggest problem faced during the transition of the IoTs to the cloud is the security of data especially while data sharing within the cloud and among its tenants. Information Flow Control mechanisms are one of the many solutions to enable a controlled sharing of data. Integration of Information Flow Control Systems to the existing architecture requires various levels of re‐engineering efforts. Moreover, most of the Information Flow Control systems focus on data flow within the cloud and neglect the security and integrity of data while it is being transferred to the cloud from various devices. This research focuses on securing the entire process of data migration to cloud from devices while the in‐cloud data flow is monitored by the Information Flow Control policies specified by the users. We have developed a prototype for the proposed model, and results are evaluated on the basis of energy consumption and execution time. As proposed model provides security services such as privacy, integrity, and authentication, hence it takes more execution time and consumes more energy as compared with the existing model.

Paragon – Practical programming with information flow control

Conventional security policies for software applications are adequate for managing concerns on the level of access control. But standard abstraction mechanisms of mainstream programming languages are not sufficient to express how information is allowed to flow between resources once access to them has been obtained. In practice we believe that such control – information flow control – is needed to manage the end-to-end security properties of applications. In this paper we present Paragon, a Java-based language with first-class support for static checking of information flow control policies. Paragon policies are specified in a logic-based policy language. By virtue of their explicitly stateful nature, these policies appear to be more expressive and flexible than those used in previous languages with information-flow support. Our contribution is to present the design and implementation of Paragon, which smoothly integrates the policy language with Java’s object-oriented setting, and reaps the benefits of the marriage with a fully fledged programming language.

Applying Cyber Risk Management To Medical Device Design

Recent U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance recognizes that today’s medical devices face a host of cyberthreats. Medical device manufacturers, in turn, face the need to assess and mitigate cyber risks. By combining the cyber risk framework of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with the existing International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14971 Safety Risk Management (SRM) process, manufacturers can leverage proven best practices to make their devices safer and more effective. The cyberthreat to medical devices is based on two factors. First, increasingly faster and more efficient processors now enable full operating systems to run on small implant devices. Previously, only dedicated firmware could have been used. Second, modern hardware can readily connect to networks using wired and wireless protocols. Both factors offer markedly increased capability for patients, physicians, caregivers, and healthcare technology management (HTM) professionals, at the cost of opening unforeseen and unintended doorways into a device. Opening unintended doorways can compromise medical devices in three major areas of cybersecurity: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality refers to preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting patient privacy and corporate proprietary information. Integrity means guarding against improper information modification or destruction and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity. Availability is ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. As embedded medical devices grow in complexity and ability, an end-to-end cybersecurity framework is needed to ensure that they achieve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability required for successful operation. Cybersecurity concerns have factored into medical device design for some time, but additional attention has been focused on the topic by recent FDA communications, including a recent guidance document and a safety communication. These documents, however, lack clear instructions on what needs to be considered and tested—a comprehensive standard could be years away. To ensure safety and effectiveness and reduce exposure to liability, device manufacturers need to be proactive in defining and applying cybersecurity controls for their medical devices. The problem facing medical device development teams is complex; it involves securing a device against an ever-growing number of cybersecurity threats while balancing usability, performance, and safety. A viable approach Applying Cyber Risk Management To Medical Device Design