Informal Interest Rate Research Articles

Protecting land and livelihood under climate risks: What hinders crop insurance adoption?

Small-scale agriculturists in developing countries face continuous weather-related risks, which are exacerbated by the growing issues of climate change (See Shah et al., 2018 for Pakistan; Zakaria et al. (2020) for Sub Sahara Africa). Despite efforts to introduce formal crop insurance at a subsidized rate by many governments, including in India, insurance penetration rates remain low in less developed countries (LDCs). One reason for this is continued reliance on informal credit as a risk-coping mechanism in poorer regions in times of agricultural distress. This prompts the question as to why farmers rely on these methods when apparently less expensive formal crop insurance is available. To answer, we investigate the link between the conditionalities of informal credit and the decision to adopt crop insurance together with other factors such as farmers’ socioeconomic class, education, and attitude to risk. Thereby, we derive policy implications for enhancing insurance penetration among poor farmers. A theoretical model is first constructed to provide a motivation for the empirical relation examined. An analysis of the decision to adopt crop insurance and the extent of insurance coverage availed is undertaken using a two-part fractional logistic regression with crop insurance data from India (provided by the National Sample Survey Office). The results demonstrate that informal interest rates are significantly and positively correlated with the probability of taking up crop insurance, and disparities between economic and social classes in the adoption of crop insurance exist. Although the ills of usurious informal interest rates are often highlighted (Bhaduri, 1997), this indirect positive effect on crop insurance penetration has not been established heretofore. The exercise also looks at the possibility of loss expected by a farmer and their insurance adoption behaviour by relating it to Prospect Theory (Kanheman, Tversky, 1979).

An empirical equilibrium model of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries

I develop and estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of risky entrepreneurs' borrowing and savings decisions incorporating both formal and local-informal credit markets. Households have access to an exogenous formal credit market and to an informal credit market in which the interest rate is endogenously determined by the local demand and supply of credit. I estimate the model via Simulated Maximum Likelihood using Thai village data during an episode of formal credit market expansion. My estimates suggest that a 49 percent reduction in fixed costs increased the proportion of households borrowing formally by 36 percent, and that a doubling of the collateralized borrowing limits lowered informal interest rates by 24 percent. I find that more productive households benefited from the policies that expanded borrowing access, but less productive households lost in terms of welfare due to diminished savings opportunities. Gains are overall smaller than would be predicted by models that do not consider the informal credit market.

An Empirical Equilibrium Model of Formal and Informal Credit Markets in Developing Countries

I develop and estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of risky entrepreneurs’ borrowing and savings decisions incorporating both formal and local-informal credit markets. Households have access to an exogenous formal credit market and to an informal credit market in which the interest rate is endogenously determined by the local demand and supply of credit. I estimate the model via Simulated Maximum Likelihood using Thai village data during an episode of formal credit market expansion. My estimates suggest that a 49 percent reduction in fixed costs increased the proportion of households borrowing formally by 36 percent, and that a doubling of the collateralized borrowing limits lowered informal interest rates by 24 percent. I find that more productive households benefited from the policies that expanded borrowing access, but less productive households lost in terms of welfare due to diminished savings opportunities. Gains are overall smaller than would be predicted by models that do not consider the informal credit market.

Informal financial transactions and monetary policy in low-income countries: Interpolated informal credit and interest rates in Malawi

Background: Official monetary data usually exclude informal financial transactions although the informal financial sector (IFS) forms a large part of the financial sector in low-income countries. Aim and setting: Excluding informal financial transactions in official monetary data, however, underestimates the volume of financial transactions and incorrectly presents the cost of credit, bringing into question the accuracy of expected effects of monetary policy on economic activity. Methods: Using IFS data for Malawi constructed from two survey data sets, indigenous knowledge and elements of Friedman’s data interpolation technique, this study employs innovation accounting in a structural vector autoregressive model to compare monetary policy outcomes when IFS data are taken into account and when they are not. Results: The study finds evidence that in certain instances, the formal and informal financial sectors complement each other. For example, it is observed that the rate of inflation as well as output increase following a rise in either formal financial sector (FFS) or IFS lending. Further investigation reveals that in other cases, the FFS and IFS work in conflict with each other. Demonstrating this point, the study finds that a rise in FFS interest rates is followed by a decline in FFS lending while IFS lending does not respond significantly and the response of FFS and IFS loans combined is insignificant. When IFS interest rates are raised, total loans decline significantly. Conclusion: The study, therefore, concludes that exclusion of IFS transactions from official monetary data has the potential to frustrate monetary policy through wrong inferences on the impact of monetary policy on economic activity.

Dependence of Informal Interest Rates and Level of Lenders’ Influence in the Informal Loan Market in Thailand

Informal finance with usurious interest rates seems to be the last resort for the poor in many developing countries. In Thailand, informal credit lenders can freely set up extortionate interest rates and use controversial enforcement actions to pressure borrowers to repay loans, because that legal enforcement is not practical due to the low punishment levels for those lenders. Despite widespread interest in the determinants of the informal interest rates, it remains a largely unexplored area. This study investigates whether level of lenders’ influence over the borrower, and some characteristics of the borrowers, are related to informal interest rates, enabling the rates to be classified into particular categories. Ordered logistic regression is used to analyze the data. The investigation was based on information collected in a survey presented to a sampled population of 694 participants from Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Phathum Thani, and Samut Prakan where the number of informal loans during the last seven years is highest when compared to other regions of the country. The results suggest that the level of lenders’ influence over the borrower in order to obtain a loan correlates with the informal interest rates applied. Moreover, some characteristics of a borrower, i.e., debt-to-income ratio and high level of familiarity between an informal lender and a borrower, also significantly affect the rates.

HOW COULD THE CREDIBILITY OF THE HARRIS–TODARO MODEL BE IMPROVED?

A damaging property of the two‐sector, mobile capital Harris–Todaro model (known as the Corden–Findlay model) is that growth in capital (labor) endowment accentuates (mitigates) urban unemployment in a dual economy, limiting the model's applicability to the field of trade and development. To resolve this problem, we introduce the informal credit market, which provides consumption loans to rural workers during the lean season. The informal interest rate is endogenously determined from the maximizing behavior of the informal sector lender. Factor accumulations produce their expected results on the absolute level of urban unemployment, while poverty eradication programs raise the informal interest rate and diminish borrowers' welfare under a wide range of parametric values. Finally, a wage subsidy policy to the urban sector unambiguously lowers the informal interest rate. Urban unemployment decreases while worker welfare improves under reasonable conditions. The result on unemployment is contrary to results of the Corden–Findlay model.

The Impact of Microfinance Institutions on the Informal Credit Market: Evidence from Andhra Pradesh

This paper explores the reaction of informal lenders to the expansion of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the rural credit market of Andhra Pradesh. Using an IV strategy to deal with endogeneity concerns, we document that an increase in MFI loans significantly raises the informal interest rate. Yet, we show that the effect of MFI expansion on the informal interest rate differs across villages according to the level of competition in the informal credit market, as measured by the landless share in the village. In particular, we find that the impact of microcredit supply is positive and significant in villages with low level of competition, but not significant in villages with high level of competition. We argue that in less competitive villages, increasing MFI loans generate detrimental consequences for the poorest, by worsening their informal credit market access conditions, while in more competitive villages, MFIs cannot subtract clients from moneylenders.

Microfinance spillovers: A model of competition in informal credit markets with an application to Indian villages

Despite widespread interest in the development of microfinance, spillover effects on the non-using population and redistributive issues remain largely unexplored. I study a competition game between microfinance institutions (MFIs) offering joint-liability loans and moneylenders offering individual loans in presence of adverse selection. I show that one unintended consequence of the entry of a microfinance sector in local credit markets can be to trigger an increase in the equilibrium informal interest rate, because MFIs tend to attract a disproportionately-safe share of the borrower pool away from incumbent moneylenders. The existence of such composition externality depends crucially on the size of the microfinance sector and the risk composition of the borrower pool. The model predicts a non-linearly increasing relationship between informal interest rates and MFIs' capacity in relatively safe credit markets, and no relationship in risky villages. I show evidence supporting these predictions, using a first-hand panel database that records all credit transactions over 8 years for a sample of about 1000 households living in Indian villages with extensive space and time variation in the size of their microfinance sector.

Microfinance spillovers: A model of competition in informal credit markets with an application to Indian villages

Despite widespread interest in the development of microfinance, spillover effects on the non-using population and redistributive issues remain largely unexplored. I study a competition game between microfinance institutions (MFIs) offering joint-liability loans and moneylenders offering individual loans in presence of adverse selection. I show that one unintended consequence of the entry of a microfinance sector in local credit markets can be to trigger an increase in the equilibrium informal interest rate, because MFIs tend to attract a disproportionately-safe share of the borrower pool away from incumbent moneylenders. The existence of such composition externality depends crucially on the size of the microfinance sector and the risk composition of the borrower pool. The model predicts a non-linearly increasing relationship between informal interest rates and MFIs' capacity in relatively safe credit markets, and no relationship in risky villages. I show evidence supporting these predictions, using a first-hand panel database that records all credit transactions over 8 years for a sample of about 1000 households living in Indian villages with extensive space and time variation in the size of their microfinance sector.

A theory of interactions between MFIs and informal lenders

We provide a theoretical analysis of effects of entry of a microfinance institution (MFI) into an informal credit market which is segmented, whereby informal lenders derive some market power owing to privileged information concerning borrower-specific default risks. Relative to informal lenders, the MFI has a cost advantage and an informational disadvantage regarding borrower risk. Borrowers differ along another dimension: landholding, which is observable to all lenders. MFI entry is shown to induce selection effects (across risk and landownership dimensions) in shifts of borrowers from informal lenders to the MFI, which could raise informal interest rates, as observed in many LDCs. The model is consistent with evidence from Bangladesh and West Bengal, in contrast to hypotheses based on cream-skimming, scale-diseconomy-inducing, collusion-facilitating or crowding-in effects of MFIs on informal credit. The model implies that MFI entry is Pareto improving for borrowers, irrespective of effects on informal interest rates.

International factor mobility, informal interest rate and capital market imperfection: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper makes an attempt to provide a theory of determination of interest rate in the informal credit market in a less developed economy in terms of a three-sector static deterministic general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ labour from the informal labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs labour at an institutionally fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal credit market. We show that an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour raises (lowers) the informal (formal) interest rate but lowers the competitive wage rate in the informal labour market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the informal agricultural sector. International factor mobility, therefore, raises the degrees of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.

Informal finance: A theory of moneylenders

I present a model that analyzes the coexistence of formal and informal finance in underdeveloped credit markets. Formal banks have access to unlimited funds but are unable to control the use of credit. Informal lenders can prevent non-diligent behavior but often lack the needed capital. The theory implies that formal and informal credit can be either complements or substitutes. The model also explains why weak legal institutions increase the prevalence of informal finance in some markets and reduce it in others, why financial market segmentation persists, and why informal interest rates can be highly variable within the same sub-economy.

What determine the interest rates in China’s informal market?

The interest rate is one of the most important factors in farmers’ decision-making of borrowing and lending in the informal financial market in China. This paper explores the determinants of the interest rate with microfinance data. Results show that the income disparity, the relationship between borrowers and lenders, the usage of borrowing, and formal credit constraints are important factors affecting interest rates. More importantly, to borrow from those in the higher income hierarchy, farmers have to bear higher interest rates. We attribute this to different social capitals across income groups and higher default risks for the poor. This paper contributes to a better understanding of the informal financial market in rural China and sheds light on the mechanism of higher informal interest rate formation.

Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy

The present note develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing dominant moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially. The existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate. We show that there may arise a case where an increase in the supply of formal credit results in an increase in the informal interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. This shows that apart from (i) asymmetric information on the part of informal sector lenders (Bose, 1998), (ii) an increase in the probability of default of all informal sector lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz 1997), and the (iii) possibility of informal lenders to collude (Floro and Ray 1997), the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit might be another factor responsible for the policy of vertical linkage to break down.

Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders

I study the coexistence of formal and informal finance in underdeveloped credit markets. Formal banks have access to unlimited funds but are unable to control the use of credit. Informal lenders can prevent non-diligent behavior but often lack the needed capital. The model implies that formal and informal credit can be either complements or substitutes. The model also explains why weak legal institutions raise the prevalence of informal finance in some markets and reduce it in others, why financial market segmentation persists, and why informal interest rates can be highly variable within the same sub economy.

Efficiency and equity in groundwater markets: the case of Madhya Pradesh, India

This paper examines efficiency and equity in groundwater markets with special attention to output sharing contracts and to the bargaining relationships between sellers and buyers, using household level data from Madhya Pradesh, India. Regression results find no significant inefficiency on farms managed by output sharing buyers, presumably because optimal input intensities are achieved through effective monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms embedded in long-term and intensive personal relationships between sellers and buyers. As for equity, the finding is that, while output sharing buyers pay higher water prices, the rate of premiums is merely 5 percentage points higher than the informal interest rate that they would have had to carry under other types of groundwater contracts. The results also show that buyers who have access to alternative water sellers pay lower water prices. These findings indicate that if the imperfection of credit and contingent markets in rural areas are taken into account, informal groundwater markets work fairly well in agrarian communities if monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms are embedded and a sufficient number of potential sellers are available.

Horizontal and Vertical Linkages Between Formal and Informal Credit Markets in Backward Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis

The paper shows that the policy of forging a vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets is distinctly superior to the existing credit policy of horizontally substituting the informal sector by the formal one. An inflow of subsidized formal credit to the informal lenders not only ensures better terms of borrowing to the small borrowers but also leads to higher agricultural productivity vis-a-vis the horizontal linkage case. Even if the informal sector lenders are allowed to collude, the informal interest rate is still lower in the vertical linkage case.

Interaction Of Formal and Informal Credit Markets In Backward Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis

In this paper, a model of interaction of formal and informal credit markets has been developed where the bank official (the ultimate provider of formal credit) faces a lending constraint. The bank official takes a bribe from the borrowers to disburse formal credit and he deliberately debars some potential borrowers from getting bank credit. Inadequate supply of formal credit and exclusion of a few borrowers by the official create a market for informal credit. The bank official and the moneylender (the supplier of informal credit) play a non-cooperative game in determining the bribing rate and the informal interest rate simultaneously. The central objective of the paper is two-fold. First, it shows that an agricultural credit subsidy policy may be counterproductive even when formal and informal credits are substitutes. This is contrary to the Gupta and Chaudhuri (1997) result that a credit subsidy policy is counterproductive only when the two types of credit are complementary to each other. Secondly, the paper considers two alternative ways of formulating a credit subsidy policy: (1) through an increase in the aggregate volume of formal credit supplied to the borrowers, keeping the formal sector interest rate at a reasonable level; and, (2) through a decrease in the rate of interest charged on this type of credit. The paper shows that if a credit subsidy policy is undertaken via the first path, it is actually able to lower the informal sector interest rate and improve both the agricultural productivity and welfare of the farmers. This result is crucial because all the earlier papers in this line have analyzed the effects of a credit subsidy policy through the second route and found it to be counterproductive in the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit.

Formal and Informal Credit Markets in Egypt

This paper examines empirically the markets for formal and informal credit in Egypt. Using a dataset specifically collected for the purpose, it examines what factors determine whether or not a person borrows from the informal sector using a probit analysis. The paper then conducts a similar exercise for the informal financial sector and seeks to examine whether any link between borrowing in the formal and the informal financial sectors exists. Conclusions are then drawn as to the role of informal financial markets in the development process. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture: a Theoretical Analysis

The paper presents a theory of interest rate determination on informal credit in backward agriculture when there is a market for formal credit. The farmer has to bribe the official of the formal credit agency in order to get formal credit. The official and the moneylender play a non‐cooperative game in choosing the amount of formal credit and the informal interest rate, respectively. The informal‐sector interest rate and the effective formal‐sector interest rate (incorporating the bribe) are equal in equilibrium. A reduction in the formal interest rate and/or an increase in the price of the product may lead to an increase in the equilibrium bribing rate and the informal interest rate when the formal credit and the informal credit are complementary to each other.