Individual Differences In Moral Judgment Research Articles

Why moral psychology needs personality psychology.

People vary in how they perceive, think about, and respond to moral issues. Clearly, we cannot fully understand the psychology of morality without accounting for individual differences in moral functioning. But decades of neglect of and explicit skepticism toward such individual differences has resulted in a lack of integration between moral psychology and personality psychology-the study of psychological differences between people. In recent years, these barriers to progress have started to break down. This special issue aims to celebrate and further increase the visibility of the personality psychology of morality. Here, we introduce the articles in this special issue by highlighting some important contributions a personality-based perspective has to offer moral psychology-particularly in comparison to the currently prominent social psychological approach. We show that personality psychology is well-placed to (a) contribute toward a rigorous empirical foundation for moral psychology, (b) tackle the conceptualization and assessment of stable moral tendencies, (c) assess the predictive validity of moral traits in relation to consequential outcomes, (d) uncover the mechanisms underlying individual differences in moral judgments and behavior, and (e) provide insights into moral development. For these reasons, we believe that moral psychology needs personality psychology to reach its full scholarly potential.

Adam Smith’s relevance for contemporary moral cognition

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to show the relevance of Adam Smith’s moral philosophy for contemporary trends in moral cognition. According to these accounts, research on moral judgment should start focusing more on its diachronic dimension, as opposed to its synchronic one, so that it can properly account for the constitutive and developmental integration of automatic and controlled processes, of emotions and reasons (§1). Smith’s reflective sentimentalism – appropriately interpreted (§2) – can provide the theoretical and philosophical framework for these accounts. On the one hand, Smith’s account makes the collaboration and integration of emotions and reason necessary for an appropriate normative moral judgment in typically developed individuals: developing a moral conscience requires both automatic and controlled processes (§3). Furthermore, since Smith was very aware of the limits and flaws of sympathy and of the impartial spectator’s possibility of error, his theory is capable of explaining the many ways in which typical individuals can misjudge, individual differences in moral judgments, and some of the ways in which the development of a full-blown moral conscience can go wrong (§4).

Individual differences in moral judgment predict attitudes towards mandatory vaccinations

Skepticism about the efficacy and risks related to Covid-19 vaccinations has become a politicized issue. In response, some politicians have proposed policies (such as imposing vaccine passports) aimed at increasing public vaccination rates. The response has been mixed. In the current study (N = 266), we examined the role of conservatism and moral judgments in accounting for these differences. Results from data collected between January and March 2021 showed that increased levels of conservatism and deontological processing (i.e., having a stronger D-process) were associated with less agreement to a government-imposed Covid-19 vaccine mandate. However, participants who made utilitarian responses to traditional switch and footbridge dilemmas reported greater agreement towards the same mandate. These results are consistent with prior findings showing political divides surrounding Covid-19 and indicate that individual differences in moral judgment predict opinion about a significant and current real-world issue.

The Implications of Diverse Human Moral Foundations for the Ethicality of Artificial Intelligence

Organizations are making massive investments in artificial intelligence (AI), and recent demonstrations and achievements highlight the immense potential for AI to improve organizational and human welfare. But realizing the potential of AI necessitates a better understanding of the various ethical issues involved with deciding to use AI, developing and maintaining it, and allowing it to make decisions that have moral consequences. People want organizations using AI and the AI systems themselves to behave “ethically”. But “behaving ethically” means different things to different people. How should organizations using AI—and the AI itself—handle ethical dilemmas where humans cannot agree on the right course of action? Though a variety of ethical frameworks have been suggested, these approaches do not adequately answer how people make ethical evaluations of AI systems or how to incorporate the fundamental disagreements that people have regarding what is and is not ethical behavior. Drawing on moral foundations theory, we theorize that a person will perceive an organization’s use of AI and AI decisions as ethical to the extent that those decisions resonate with the person’s moral foundations. Since people hold diverse moral foundations, this highlights the crucial need to address individual moral differences in the development, application, and evaluation of AI systems. Our approach addresses several unresolved issues existing in the current state of the ethical AI literature. It suggests potential solutions to handling conflict in moral judgment and highlights future directions to augment ethical AI frameworks by incorporating individual differences in moral judgment.

Model-free decision making is prioritized when learning to avoid harming others

Moral behavior requires learning how our actions help or harm others. Theoretical accounts of learning propose a key division between "model-free" algorithms that cache outcome values in actions and "model-based" algorithms that map actions to outcomes. Here, we tested the engagement of these mechanisms and their neural basis as participants learned to avoid painful electric shocks for themselves and a stranger. We found that model-free decision making was prioritized when learning to avoid harming others compared to oneself. Model-free prediction errors for others relative to self were tracked in the thalamus/caudate. At the time of choice, neural activity consistent with model-free moral learning was observed in subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC), and switching after harming others was associated with stronger connectivity between sgACC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Finally, model-free moral learning varied with individual differences in moral judgment. Our findings suggest moral learning favors efficiency over flexibility and is underpinned by specific neural mechanisms.

The 5-HTTLPR polymorphism impacts moral permissibility of impersonal harmful behaviors.

Inspired by the roles of serotonin in an emotional aversion to harmful actions, we examined to what extent serotonin transporter gene (5-HTT)–linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR), a proxy for measuring serotonin function, underpinned the individual differences in moral judgment through cross-sectional analysis and two-wave comparison. The cross-sectional analysis with a larger cohort (N = 1197) showed that the SS carriers of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism, corresponding to the low ratio of serotonin recycling from the synaptic cleft, rated impersonal harmful actions (e.g. flipping a switch to divert a train to hit one person instead of five people) as more permissible as compared with the L-allele carriers. The two-wave comparison with a subsample from the larger cohort (N = 563) indicated that the association between 5-HTTLPR polymorphism and moral permissibility of impersonal harmful actions was stable from wave 1 to wave 2. Thus, these findings highlight the importance of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism to harmful moral behaviors.

Pathological Personality Traits and Utilitarian Moral Judgments

Recent research has highlighted important individual differences in moral judgment. The present study extends these findings by examining the associations between pathological personality traits and utilitarian moral judgments. This was accomplished by asking 2,121 Israeli community members to complete self-report measures concerning their pathological personality traits and evaluate the acceptability of utilitarian moral judgments in various sacrificial dilemmas (is it acceptable to intentionally kill one person in order to save several other people?). The results showed that the pathological personality traits of antagonism and disinhibition were positively associated with the endorsement of personal utilitarian moral judgments (i.e., those decisions requiring the individual to directly inflict harm on the would-be sacrificed individual), whereas negative affectivity was negatively associated with personal utilitarian moral judgments. Antagonism was the only pathological personality trait associated with impersonal utilitarian moral judgments (i.e., those decisions that did not require the individual to directly inflict harm on the would-be sacrificed individual). Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for understanding the associations between pathological personality traits and moral judgments.

Neuroanatomical correlates of forgiving unintentional harms

Mature moral judgments rely on the consideration of a perpetrator’s mental state as well as harmfulness of the outcomes produced. Prior work has focused primarily on the functional correlates of how intent information is neurally represented for moral judgments, but few studies have investigated whether individual differences in neuroanatomy can also explain variation in moral judgments. In the current study, we conducted voxel-based morphometry analyses to address this question. We found that local grey matter volume in the left anterior superior temporal sulcus, a region in the functionally defined theory of mind or mentalizing network, was associated with the degree to which participants relied on information about innocent intentions to forgive accidental harms. Our findings provide further support for the key role of mentalizing in the forgiveness of accidental harms and contribute preliminary evidence for the neuroanatomical basis of individual differences in moral judgments.

The CAG polymorphism in androgen receptor (AR) gene impacts the moral permissibility of harmful behavior in females

The moral permissibility of harm is strikingly varied among individuals. In light of the connection between testosterone levels and utilitarian moral judgment, this study examined to what extent a CAG polymorphism in the androgen receptor gene, a genetic polymorphism with the ability to regulate testosterone function, contributes to individual differences in moral judgment. Four hundred and thirty-nine Chinese Han participants completed permissibility ratings of harm in moral dilemmas and moral transgression scenarios. Results showed a significant association between the CAG polymorphism and moral permissibility of harm in females. Females with more copies of the S allele, which is associated with higher availability of testosterone, were more likely to judge harmful utilitarian acts and unintentionally harmful acts as permissible, while these effects were absent in males. The findings provide the first evidence for a link between the androgen receptor gene and moral judgment and highlight the role of androgens in moral foundations.

Mechanisms Linking Ethical Leadership to Ethical Sales Behavior.

This study investigated the relationship between ethical leadership and ethical sales behavior. A total of 248 matched surveys with participant responses from insurance agents and their customers were collected. The insurance agents were asked to rate the ethical leadership of their leaders, the ethical climate in their organization, and their individual moral identity. Customers were asked to rate the perceived ethical sales behavior of the insurance agents. This empirical study utilized moderated mediation techniques to analyze the data. Results indicated that ethical climate mediated the relationship between ethical leadership and ethical sales behavior when moral identity was high, however, did not when moral identity was low. The research framework including contextual effects (i.e., ethical climate) and individual differences in moral judgment (i.e., moral identity) can provide a comprehensive picture of how ethical leadership influences ethical sales behavior. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are also discussed.

Moral competence and brain connectivity: A resting-state fMRI study

Moral competence (MC) refers to the ability to apply certain moral orientations in a consistent and differentiated manner when judging moral issues. People greatly differ in terms of MC, however, little is known about how these differences are implemented in the brain. To investigate this question, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and examined resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) in n=31 individuals with MC scores in the highest 15% of the population and n=33 individuals with MC scores in the lowest 15%, selected from a large sample of 730 Master of Business Administration (MBA) students. Compared to individuals with lower MC, individuals with higher MC showed greater amygdala-ventromedial prefrontal connectivity, which may reflect better ability to cope with emotional conflicts elicited by moral dilemmas. Moreover, individuals with higher MC showed less inter-network connectivity between the amygdalar and fronto-parietal networks, suggesting a more independent operation of these networks. Our findings provide novel insights into how individual differences in moral judgment are associated with RSFC in brain circuits related to emotion processing and cognitive control.

Once a Utilitarian, Consistently a Utilitarian? Examining Principledness in Moral Judgment via the Robustness of Individual Differences.

Although individual differences in the application of moral principles, such as utilitarianism, have been documented, so too have powerful context effects-effects that raise doubts about the durability of people's moral principles. In this article, we examine the robustness of individual differences in moral judgment by examining them across time and across different decision contexts. In Study 1, consistency in utilitarian judgment of 122 adult participants was examined over two different survey sessions. In Studies 2A and 2B, large samples (Ns = 130 and 327, respectively) of adult participants made a series of 32 moral judgments across eight different contexts that are known to affect utilitarian endorsement. Contrary to some contemporary theorizing, our results reveal a strong degree of consistency in moral judgment. Across time and experimental manipulations of context, individuals maintained their relative standing on utilitarianism, and aggregated moral decisions reached levels of near-perfect consistency. Results support the view that on at least one dimension (utilitarianism), people's moral judgments are robustly consistent, with context effects tailoring the application of principles to the particulars of any given moral judgment.

Dark and immoral: The links between pathological personality features and moral values

Recent research on morality has highlighted important individual differences in moral judgment and reasoning. The present study extends these findings by examining the connections between moral concerns and pathological personality features. This was accomplished by asking 447 community participants to complete self-report measures concerning their pathological personality features and moral concerns. The results showed that pathological personality features differ in their associations with moral concerns as measured by individualizing values (i.e., sensitivity to harm and fairness) and binding values (i.e., reflecting in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and sanctity). For example, negative affect was associated with stronger individualizing and binding values, whereas antagonism was associated with weaker individualizing values. Discussion focuses on the implications of these results for understanding the connections between pathological personality features and moral concerns.

“Lean not on your own understanding”: Belief that morality is founded on divine authority and non-utilitarian moral judgments

AbstractRecent research has shown that religious individuals are much more resistant to utilitarian modes of thinking than their less religious counterparts, but the reason for this is not clear. We propose that a meta-ethical belief that morality is rooted in inviolable divine commands (i.e., endorsement of Divine Command Theory) may help explain this finding. We present a novel 20-item scale measuring a belief that morality is founded on divine authority. The scale shows good internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. Study 1 found that this scale fully mediated the relationship that various religiosity measures had with a deontological thinking style in our sample of American adults. It also accounted for the link between religiosity and social conservative values. Furthermore, the relationship between the scale and these outcome variables held after statistically controlling for variables related to actively open-minded thinking and the Big Five. Study 2 replicated the results using naturalistic moral dilemmas that placed deontological and utilitarian concerns in conflict, and showed that the results of Study 1 cannot be explained by differences in moral foundations (e.g., concern for authority more generally) or differences in the perceived function of rules. Quite the contrary, endorsement of the divine origins of morality fully mediated the relationship religiosity had with the so-called “binding” foundations (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity). Our findings highlight the importance of meta-ethical beliefs for understanding individual differences in moral judgment.

Individual differences in sensitivity to reward and punishment predict moral judgment

Dual process models of moral judgment propose that such judgments are produced by interacting neural systems: a controlled cognitive system and an automatic affective system. Individual differences in moral judgment may therefore arise from variation in cognitive control ability and/or from variation in affective sensitivity. Previous research indicates that individual differences in cognitive control, indexed by working memory capacity, predict moral judgment ( Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). Here we replicate group level findings from Moore et al. (2008) and demonstrate that individual differences in sensitivity to reward and punishment are strong predictors of moral judgment. Higher reward sensitivity positively correlates with willingness to sacrifice one life to save multiple others and moderates the impact of self-interest on participants’ judgments. Higher punishment sensitivity negatively correlates with willingness to kill, particularly when negative affective information is present. These results help to revise current dual process models of moral judgment.

Sex Differences in Moral Judgments? A Test of Gilligan's Theory

This study was designed to test Gilligan's (1982) claim that men and women differ in moral judgments. One hundred and one college students read four traditional moral dilemmas and rated the importance of 12 considerations for deciding how the protagonist should respond. Six of the statements were derived from the description by Kohlberg et al. (1978) of post-conventional moral reasoning, and six were derived from Gilligan's description of women's style of moral reasoning. Subjects also rated themselves on a measure of sex-typed personality attributes. There were no reliable sex differences on either of the types of moral reasoning, and confidence intervals allowed the rejection of all but negligible differences in the directions predicted by Gilligan's model. Furthermore, men and women showed highly similar rank orders of the items for each dilemma. The personality measures also failed to predict individual differences in moral judgments.

Moral Judgment as a Function of Age, Sex, and Stimulus

Summary Individual differences in moral judgment as related to age and sex of Ss and stimulus variables of sex of story-model and situational familiarity-remoteness were investigated. An objective instrument based on Kohlberg's dilemmas was developed and administered to 240 boys and girls at three age levels. Developmental trends in moral judgments as predicted by Kohlberg's theory were obtained, lending validity to the objective measure. While level of moral judgment was comparable for boys and girls at ages 11 and 17, 14-year-old girls showed higher moral reasoning than their male peers. Higher level moral judgments were made for remote dilemmas and for those with same sex story models.