Indirect Costs Of Financial Distress Research Articles

Indirect Costs of Financial Distress

Abstract We estimate the indirect costs of financial distress due to lost sales by exploiting real estate (RE) shocks and cross-supplier variation in RE assets and leverage. We show that for the same client buying from different suppliers, the client’s purchases from distressed suppliers decline by an additional 13% following a drop in local RE prices. The effect is more pronounced in more competitive industries, manufacturing, durable goods, less-specific goods, and when the costs of switching suppliers are low. Our results suggest that clients reduce their exposure to suppliers in financial distress.

The Economic Costs of Financial Distress

We estimate the economic costs of financial distress by exploiting cross-supplier variation in real estate assets and leverage, and the timing of real estate shocks. We show that for the same client buying from different suppliers, its purchases from suppliers in financial distress decline by an additional 10% following a drop in local real estate prices. The effect is more pronounced in more competitive industries, manufacturing and durable goods industries, for producers of less-specific goods, and when the costs of switching suppliers are low. Our results suggest that the indirect costs of financial distress are economically important.

How does labor market size affect firm capital structure? Evidence from large plant openings

I examine how the labor market in which firms operate affects their capital structure decisions. Based on US Census Bureau data and information on companies’ decisions to locate their new operations, I use a large plant opening as an abrupt increase in the size of a local labor market. I find that a new plant opening leads to an increase of 2.5–3.9 percentage points in the debt-to-capital ratio of existing firms in the “winner” county relative to the “runner-up” choice. This result is consistent with the argument that larger labor markets make job loss less costly, which in turn reduces the indirect costs of financial distress. Notably, this spillover effect is larger for firms that employ the same type of workers as the new plant in the affected county.

Exploring the indirect costs of a firm in business rescue

It may be argued that the indirect costs of financial distress are substantially higher than the direct costs. Consequently, indirect costs of participating in a formal turnaround may hinder the success of a reorganisation attempt. This study set out to explore the indirect costs financially distressed firms face as a consequence of participating in business rescue in South Africa. Due to the implicit nature of these costs, the focus was placed on investigating and identifying the sources of the indirect costs associated with business rescue. This study employed a qualitative research design, whereby semi-structured interviews were conducted with 13 business rescue practitioners. The study confirmed that firms may experience six difficulties during business rescue. However, there are several factors that influence the severity of these difficulties. Conversely, it appears that indirect costs may also offer firms several benefits. The results of the study may assist affected parties, as they offer some insight and clarity on the indirect costs of business rescue. Understanding indirect costs may assist stakeholders involved in the process to find strategies that will help to preserve the value of the firm and reduce the negative impact for all stakeholders involved.

The Economic Costs of Financial Distress

We estimate the economic costs of financial distress by exploiting cross-supplier variation in real estate assets and leverage, and the timing of real estate shocks. We show that for the same client buying from different suppliers, its purchases from distressed suppliers decline by an additional 10% following a drop in real estate prices. The effect is more pronounced in more competitive industries, manufacturing and durable goods industries, for less-specific goods, and when the costs of switching suppliers are low. Our results suggest that the indirect costs of financial distress are driven mostly by clients reducing their purchases from distressed suppliers.

Indirect Costs of Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Law: Evidence from Trade Credit and Sales*

We argue that stronger debt enforcement in bankruptcy can reduce indirect costs of financial distress: (i) by increasing the likelihood of restructuring outside bankruptcy and (ii) by improving the recovery rate of stakeholders, such as trade creditors, through explicit legal provisions. Consistent with these predictions, we find that when debt enforcement is stronger, financially distressed firms are less exposed to indirect distress costs in the form of reduced access to trade credit and forgone sales. We document these effects in a panel of firms from forty countries with heterogeneous debt enforcement characteristics and in differences-in-differences tests exploiting several recent bankruptcy reforms.

How Does Labor Market Size Affect Firm Capital Structure? Evidence from Large Plant Openings

I examine how the labor market in which firms operate affects their capital structure decisions. Using the US Census Bureau data, I exploit a large plant opening as an abrupt increase in the size of a local labor market. I find that a new plant opening leads to a 2.6% to 3.9% increase in the debt-to-capital ratio of existing firms in the “winner” county relative to the “runner-up” choice. This result is consistent with larger labor markets making a job loss less costly, which in turn reduces indirect costs of financial distress. Moreover, this spillover effect is larger for firms 1) that have a larger fraction of employees in the affected county, 2) that employ the same type of workers as the new plant, and 3) that have larger unexploited benefits of debt.

The disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities: Evidence from asbestos litigation

I study firms with past asbestos ties that suffer from significant increases in legal liabilities after a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1999. This event provides a natural experiment setting to estimate the indirect effects of financial distress on real activities. While direct litigation and bankruptcy costs are significant, value computations and clinical evidence at the operational level show that defendant firms suffer only minor indirect costs of financial distress. Furthermore, these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations during distress. Overall, my results provide support for potentially significant disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities.

Thriving in the Midst of Financial Distress? An Analysis of Firms Exposed to Asbestos Litigation

I study firms with past asbestos ties that suffer from significant increases in legal liabilities after a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1999. This event provides a natural experiment setting to estimate the indirect effects of financial distress on real activities. While direct litigation and bankruptcy costs are significant, value computations and clinical evidence at the operational level show that defendant firms suffer only minor indirect costs of financial distress. Furthermore, these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations during distress. Overall, my results provide support for potentially significant disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities.

Indirect Costs of Financial Distress in Durable Goods Industries: The Case of Auto Manufacturers

Financial distress can disrupt a durable goods producer's provision of complementary goods and services such as warranties, spare parts and maintenance. This reduces consumers' demand for the core product, causing indirect costs of financial distress. We test this hypothesis in the market for used cars sold at wholesale auctions. An increase in a manufacturer's credit default swaps significantly decreases the prices of its cars at auction, especially cars with longer expected service lives. Our estimates imply substantial indirect costs of financial distress for car manufacturers. These costs have occasionally even exceeded the tax savings benefits for General Motors and Ford.

Resolution of financial distress: A theory of the choice between Chapter 11 and workouts

We model the reorganization decision of distressed firms. One of the novel features of our paper is that we examine the asset and liability side restructuring decisions jointly to resolve financial distress. Secondly, we model several institutional features of coping with financial distress such as debtor-in-possession financing, prepackaged bankruptcies, and asset sales. In our model, asset liquidity, indirect costs of financial distress, and the option value of equity are the determinants of the choice between Chapter 11 reorganizations and workouts. The model develops several testable predictions, some of which are novel and others of which are able to explain previously documented empirical results.

Labor Unemployment Risk and Corporate Financing Decisions

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers’ exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.

Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.

Labor Market Size and Employer Capital Structure: Evidence from Large Plant Openings

I examine how the labor market in which firms operate affects their capital structure decisions. Using the US Census Bureau data, I exploit a large plant opening as an abrupt increase in the size of a local labor market. I find that a new plant opening leads to a 2.6% to 3.9% increase in the debt-to-capital ratio of existing firms in the “winner” county relative to the “runner-up” choice. This result is consistent with larger labor markets making a job loss less costly, which in turn reduces indirect costs of financial distress. Moreover, this spillover effect is larger for firms 1) that have a larger fraction of employees in the affected county, 2) that employ the same type of workers as the new plant, and 3) that have larger unexploited benefits of debt.

Convex costs and the hedging paradox

Financial theory suggests that hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence of capital market imperfections, including direct and indirect costs of financial distress, costly external financing, and convex tax exposure. The influence of these costs, which are high when profits are low and low or negligible when profits are large, on the extent of firm hedging has not been consistently addressed in the finance literature. In Brown and Toft's (2002) model, more convex costs imply that a firm will decrease the extent of hedging. At the same time, one version of Smith and Stulz's (1985) tax hypothesis implies that a given firm is expected to increase the extent of hedging under a more convex tax exposure. I address this ambiguity in the literature by showing that, in incomplete markets, value-maximizing firms that stand to gain the most from hedging may in fact hedge less than otherwise identical firms with less to gain from hedging. This hedging paradox can partly account for the lack of conclusive evidence to suggest that convex costs can influence both a firm's decision to hedge and the extent of the firm's hedging. Finally, I introduce a new interpretation of empirical relations between potential hedging gains and the extent of hedging.

Thriving in the Midst of Financial Distress? An Analysis of Firms Exposed to Asbestos Litigation

I analyze a comprehensive sample of 270 defendant firms exposed to an unexpected wave of asbestos litigation in the wake of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Amchem (1997) and Ortiz (1999). Due to insurance coverage and the strategic use of Chapter 11, most firms in the sample have manageable cash outflows and do not suffer materially from the litigation. Because of the long delay between exposure to asbestos and its related illnesses, the subset of firms with substantial legal cash outflows and liabilities provide a natural experiment to study financial distress unrelated to economic distress. When analyzing these firms throughout the distress period, I find little evidence of indirect costs of financial distress. Furthermore, I find empirical support for a significant disciplinary effect of financial distress as these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations.

Soft vs. Tough Bankruptcy Law. Evidence from the US and Germany

We argue that stronger debt enforcement in bankruptcy can reduce indirect costs of financial distress: (i) by increasing the likelihood of restructuring outside bankruptcy and (ii) by improving the recovery rate of trade creditors through explicit legal provisions. Consistent with these predictions, we find that when debt enforcement is stronger, financially distressed firms are less exposed to indirect distress costs in the form of reduced access to trade credit and forgone sales. We document these effects in a panel of firms from 40 countries with heterogeneous debt enforcement characteristics and in differences-in-differences tests exploiting a 2005 U.S. bankruptcy reform.

The Indirect Costs of Financial Distress in Indonesia

This paper presents quantitative estimates of the indirect cost of financial distress and its determinants. In order to measure the cost, this study estimates the annualized changes in industry-adjusted operation profit and sales from a year before the onset of distress to the resolution year. Using those approaches, the median of indirect financial distress cost is estimated between three and 11 percent annually. To the extent that the direct cost of financial distress reduces reported operating income, the estimated costs are overstated. The simple regressions analysis suggest that the indirect cost of financial distress significantly increases with size, leverage, number of creditors, and poor industry performance, but is not related to degree of bank loan reliance. The findings provide a weak support for the financial distress theory which suggests that conflicts of interest render the costs of financial distress.

Why firms hedge with currency derivatives: an examination of transaction and translation exposure

This article examines Swedish firms' use of currency derivatives to provide empirical evidence on the determinants of firms' hedging decisions. The study uses survey data in combination with publicly available data.The use of survey data makes it possible to differentiate between currency derivative usage aimed at hedging translation exposure and that aimed at hedging transaction exposure. This is of interest since translation exposure and transaction exposure tend to affect firms differently. The results are consistent with the conjecture that firms hedge transaction exposure with currency derivatives to increase firm value by reducing indirect costs of financial distress or alleviating the underinvestment problem. No evidence is found to support the notion that translation exposure hedges are used to increase firm value.

An Analysis of the Underreported Magnitude of the Total Indirect Costs of Financial Distress

In this paper we examine 1,041 ongoing firms over the time period 1982–92. Using quarterly data for the detection and measurement of the magnitude of the indirect costs of financial distress, we find three important explanatory factors: (a) the distinctiveness of the pattern of increasing financial distress over time, (b) the degree of leverage in the capital structure and (c) the size of the firm. For those firms with a distinctive pattern of increasing financial distress over time, the average annual losses as a percentage of market value is −10.3%. The maximum loss is −76%. Even if the firm never fails, its market value can be severely impacted by the presence of the indirect costs of bankruptcy over time. This study finds a significantly positive relationship between Altman's Z-score and the firm capital investment growth rate. This relation holds after controlling for other variables such as leverage, firm size and market/book ratio. This implies that lost investment opportunities may be also an important part of the total indirect costs of financial distress, which appear now to be much larger than previously recorded.