Indian Nuclear Tests Research Articles

Exercising status recognition sensibility: the empathic de-escalation of the Sino-Indian 1998 status dilemma

Uncertain processes of status recognition might generate status dilemmas in world politics. While existing accounts are limited to the fatalist assumption that status dilemmas inevitably lead to dangerous international conflicts, I argue that status dilemma dynamics can be mitigated if one or both sides in a dyad are able to exercise a form of empathy that I call ‘status recognition sensibility’. This is the capacity and intention to understand that the actions of the adversary might be driven by erroneous perceptions of status misrecognition and to reassure them that their status is not under threat. The article investigates the case study of Sino-Indian competition in the aftermath of the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, where each side perceived the other to be challenging its claim to great power status. It concludes that the status recognition sensibility was key for ensuring diplomatic rapprochement and de-escalate tensions between the two countries.

Dynamics of Normative Change for International Nuclear Export Controls

Abstract Like other normative systems, the international nuclear export control norms are incomplete and at times contradictory. Thus, contestations to the international nuclear export control norms inevitably emerge, as they did in the wake of the 1974 Indian nuclear test and the 1991 discovery of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. These two nuclear crises prompted intense debates regarding the adequacy of the existing norms. The outcome of the debates generated overwhelming agreement and action among nuclear suppliers that they required strengthening. Drawing on Wayne Sandholtz’s theory of normative change, which argues that events trigger disputes whose outcomes modify norms, this article illustrates how the nuclear export control norms have evolved in a cyclical fashion. The article aims to contribute to the constructivist literature on normative change and discusses policy implications.

The Smiling Buddha effect: Canadian and US policy after India's 1974 nuclear test

ABSTRACT The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) faced a serious threat only a few years after it came into force in 1970. India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE) in May 1974 rocked the nuclear-nonproliferation regime and cast doubt on the prospects of the NPT. Yet during the two years following the PNE, several significant countries ratified the treaty. Why did states that had been notable holdouts, like Italy, Japan, and South Korea, ratify the treaty soon after the Indian nuclear test? This article finds that the PNE galvanized pro-NPT forces in the United States and Canada, leading to changes in nonproliferation policy. In particular, it led them to threaten to withhold access to nuclear technology and materials unless the holdouts ratified the NPT. It also motivated Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to change his secret advice to Japan that the United States did not want Japan to ratify the NPT in order to keep the People’s Republic of China unsure about Japan’s nuclear intentions.

Nuclear India and the Global Nuclear Order

The 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India heralded yet another nuclear age. The instant response of a section of the international community was highly pessimistic. It foresaw regional instability, collapse of the global nuclear order and serious crisis in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. As a result, overlooking India’s security imperatives, a number of countries reacted with hostility against the Indian nuclear tests. Even international organisations were mobilised against India. However, the two decades of India’s nuclearisation appear to have falsified the prediction of doomsayers. On the contrary, India has assumed the mantle of stabilising the global nuclear order and enhancing its own security in the process. Although it has not joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has accepted the norms of non-proliferation. It is promoting non-proliferation and has joined different institutions associated with it. Concurrently, the international community has also started integrating and accommodating India in the global nuclear order in general and the non-proliferation regimes in particular.

Making of the Seventh NWS: Historiography of the Beginning of the Nuclear Disorder in South Asia

ABSTRACTEfforts to explore Pakistan's nuclear weapons options had been underway since 1972 alongside Pakistan's quest for nuclear energy. However, the American concerns about Pakistan developing a nuclear weapons capability did not surface until after the Indian test in May 1974. The Indian nuclear test marked the beginning of the nuclear disorder in South Asia and paved way for Pakistan's nuclearization. This article assesses US non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under the Gerald Ford administration from 1974 to 1977. The administration attempted to curb Pakistan's latent proliferation potential by pressuring France and Pakistan to cancel their plutonium reprocessing agreement. Though it remained unsuccessful in its attempts to restrain Pakistan's nuclear development, the administration tried to develop a quid pro quo with Pakistan by pushing the country to choose military aid over bomb. Pakistan chose the bomb for it felt that US non-proliferation policy in South Asia was skewed in favor of India.

India and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was founded in 1974 in response to the Indian nuclear test in order to prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling nuclear exports. In 2008, the NSG exempted India from its full-scope safeguards (FSS) condition, making it the first country to be allowed to have nuclear trade with NSG members while retaining its nuclear weapons program. India won this waiver after tough negotiations and having resisted tough nonproliferation conditions. India is now bidding for NSG membership. This paper analyses the prospects for the membership in light of the waiver negotiations and how the waiver negotiations can guide us in assessing the likely path of the membership negotiations. This study concludes that India will resist any conditions and the US and India have to invest massive diplomatic efforts to reach a formula that addresses the nonproliferation concerns of member states.

India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Membership

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was founded in 1974 in response to the Indian nuclear test to prevent the nuclear proliferation by controlling nuclear exports. In 2008, the NSG exempted India from its full scope safeguards (FSS) condition, making it first country to be allowed to have nuclear trade with NSG members along with its nuclear weapons program. India got this waiver after tough negotiations and resisted strong nonproliferation conditions. India is now bidding for the NSG membership. This paper analyses the prospects for the membership in light of the waiver negotiations and how the waiver negotiations can guide us about the likely path of membership. This study concludes that India will resist thenonproliferation conditions and the U.S. and India have to invest massive diplomatic efforts to reach a formula that addresses the nonproliferation concerns of member states.

Review: Legacy of Ashes

LEGACY OF ASHES History of the CIA Tim Weiner Toronto: Doubleday, 2007. 702pp, $35.95 cloth (ISBN 978-0385514453)Writing about national intelligence systems can be tricky work. Writing about American national intelligence is doubly so, and the decisive politicisation of the study of intelligence has become clear over the last decade. CIA, rightly or wrongly, has come to represent all that people feel is either or right about America's intelligence community and indeed America's foreign policy.No better example of the very wrong school can be found than Legacy of Ashes, an attempt at a definitive history of the CIA, written by Pulitzerprize winning journalist Tim Weiner, who covered the CIA for more than 20 years as the New York Times's national security correspondent. Aware of the personalities and fights in the capital, having interviewed 10 former directors of central intelligence, dozens of other senior intelligence officers, and enjoying access to many government officials, he would seem an ideal candidate to write a balanced account of the CIA's first 50 years. He has not done so.In the second sentence of his introduction, Wiener states his argument clearly: The most powerful country in the history of western civilisation has failed to create a first-rate spy service. 500 pages of text that follow attempt, through a breathtaking post hoc ergo propter hoc argument, to prove that CIA's putative failures surrounding 9/11 were the direct result of its preceding 50 years of botched operations. polemical style of the prose-which I must add is impeccable and pleasant to read-does not let up. If the CIA got it wrong, Weiner tells you about it in episodic, anecdotal, and high-impact style.On the surface this might suit most people. CIA has indeed made a big mess of a lot of big operations. North Korea's invasion of the south caught it by surprise, and the agency failed to predict the first Soviet, Chinese, and even Indian nuclear tests. Whether they succeeded or not, CIA covert actions in places such as Guatemala, Iran, Indonesia, and Cuba deserve much criticism.But a litany of failures does not a definitive history of the CIA make. Through the first third or so of the book, Weiner concentrates heavily on covert action but says little about the CIA's efforts to build up a picture of the world-the intelligence function which is its core, if not sole, mission. Worse, he discusses these covert actions in isolation from the global context of the Cold War. This myopia leads to an image of the agency as an unprovoked bully in cases when it was-at least in part-responding to aggressive opponents on the basis of explicit instructions from legitimate policymakers. While this does not excuse every action of the US government, it does put them in proper perspective. Weiner accuses the CIA of not understanding the wider world, but he seems to suffer the same deficit himself. …

From Non-Proliferation to Post-Proliferation: Explaining the US–India Nuclear Deal

How can the reversal in American policy toward South Asia from the Clinton administration's strong condemnation of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 and the enforcement of American non-proliferation legislation to the lifting of sanctions and the de facto recognition of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states be explained? The Indian–American nuclear deal of March 2006/July 2007 is examined here through alternative theoretical perspectives to explain the American reversal. Defensive realism and social constructivism offer the strongest explanations for the shift under the Bush administration. Both can be used to explain a deal that makes major concessions in previous American policy. They also help draw attention to the problems arising from a situation where the future of Indian–American relations will depend not only on Indian but also American actions. The nuclear deal, it is concluded here, could irreparably damage the Non-Proliferation Treaty while increasing the danger of actual use of nuclear weapons in a future Indo-Pakistani war.

How Big is Nuclear News? Views from the South Asian Stock Markets

This paper analyzes the differential impact of on the Pakistani and Indian stock markets using a GARCH (1,1) model. In May 1998, India carried out a series of nuclear tests; Pakistan reacted like wise in the very same month. Although it was not the first series of tests for India, it was for Pakistan. In December 2001, after the Indian parliament was attacked by a group of alleged militants, missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads were deployed along the international border by both countries. This event made the threat of a nuclear war very real, as has been agreed upon by different analysts. The econometric results show that Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE-100 index) reacted negatively based on mean level effects to nuclear in 1998 and in 2001; whereas the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE-100 index) reacted negatively only to the Indian nuclear tests in 1998. The GARCH variance analysis shows that the level effects are followed with high uncertainty for both the markets. Moreover, the differential immediate variance of the two markets suggests that Pakistan economy is more likely to face hardships of any nuclear fallout than the Indians. Thus not only does the nuclear news have non-symmetric effects on the two markets, Pakistan is more likely to be negatively effected than India as viewed by the stock market investors.

South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China and India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status

South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China. Edited by Lowell Dittmer. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. 296p. 28.95 paper.India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status. By Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 302p. 25.99 paper.The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan caught the attention of international relations theorists as never before. While the earlier analyses of South Asia came primarily from those working on nonproliferation issues and regional conflict-prevention perspectives, the advent of overt nuclear weapon status of India and Pakistan presented IR scholars with the opportunity to explore a range of hypotheses about new nuclear powers. Was South Asia going to be able to take advantage of its backwardness/late entry into the deterrence game and learn from the considerable research and experience of the two superpowers during the Cold War? Were India and Pakistan as rational as the United States and the Soviet Union (if not more), and could they manage their rivalry without resorting to nuclear exchange? Will their overt nuclear weapons capabilities make India and Pakistan more careful in their responses to each other's provocative moves? Is a rivalry based in political ideology (like the U.S.-USSR one) more susceptible to rational decision making than a rivalry based in religious ideology (supposedly the primary basis of the India-Pakistan dispute)? A related set of questions raised by the tests focused primarily on the reasons/motivations behind Indian nuclear tests and their impact on the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Yield Estimation of the 11 May 1998 Indian Nuclear Test Using Relative Static Source Strength

The predicted total yield of the Indian nuclear tests at Pokhran on May 11, 1998 (POK2) ranges from 12 to 60kt according to the literature. A factor of about five in the uncertainties of yield estimation motivated this study. Based on the broadband seismic body wave data from the Global Seismic Network, we inverted for the effective source model parameters and estimated the seismic yield of event POK2. We found that the empirical equation between the relative static strength and yield in Nevada test site (NTS) obtained by Lay[1] is appropriate for estimating the Indian nuclear test. Our result of 36kt for event POK2 supports the point of view that the yield of POK2 is significantly less than 60kt.

The role of science in treaty verification

Technologically advanced nations are currently applying more science to treaty verification than ever before. Satellites gather a multitude of information relating to proliferation concerns using thermal imaging analysis, nuclear radiation measurements, and optical and radio frequency signals detection. Ground stations gather complementary signals such as seismic events and radioactive emissions. Export controls in many countries attempt to intercept materials and technical means that could be used for nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, we have witnessed a plethora of nuclear proliferation episodes, that were undetected (or were belatedly detected) by these technologies—the Indian nuclear tests in 1998, the Libyan nuclear buildup, the Iranian enrichment program and the North Korea nuclear weapons program are some prime examples. In this talk, we will discuss some of the technologies used for proliferation detection. In particular, we will note some of the issues relating to nuclear materials control agreements that epitomize political difficulties as they impact the implementation of science and technology.

Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Posture

The Indian nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May, 1998 lifted the shroud of ambiguity that had defined the nuclear postures of both India and Pakistan for well over a quarter of a century. Pakistan’s reactive tests on May 28 and 30 1998, confirmed this belief. How many weapons and of what quality, and how they would be delivered continue to remain a subject of speculation. The ‘bomb-in-thebasement’ posturing served two important purposes—covert development of wide-ranging nuclear technologies for military uses in an effort to escape international sanctions, and dissuading the regional rival from taking the next step towards weaponization. The historical roots of confrontation between India and Pakistan are complex. Pakistan’s anxieties and fears about India are rooted as much in the imbalance of power and India’s design for regional security as in the pre-Partition communal conflict and contrasting ideas about nationalism. Pakistan had a very limited resource base for balancing what it saw as a looming Indian threat.

Constructivism, identity and neoliberal (in)security

How do we understand the relationship between ‘national security’ and a global capitalist economy? I argue in this article that liberal constructivist scholars have tended to ignore the constitutive effects of the global economy in the process of distancing themselves from ‘materialist ontologies’ and ‘rationalist epistemologies’. I contend that an important aspect of state identities is that they are dynamic and are historically constituted in and through a relationship to global capital. Only by paying close attention to this fluctuating terrain, can one make sense of the security practices of nation-states. In the latter half of the article, I illustrate my argument with an analysis of the Indian nuclear tests of 1998.

Optimized Seismic Threshold Monitoring - Part 2: Teleseismic Processing

This second paper (Part 2) pertaining to optimized site-specific threshold monitoring addresses the application of the method to regions covered by a teleseismic or a combined regionalteleseismic network. In the first paper (Part 1) we developed the method for the general case, and demonstrated its application to an area well-covered by a regional network (the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site). In the present paper, we apply the method to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear test sites, and show results during the periods of nuclear testing by these two countries in May 1998. Since the coverage by regional stations in these areas is poor, an optimized approach requires the use of selected, high-quality stations at teleseismic distances.

Seismic Discrimination of the May 11, 1998 Indian Nuclear Test with Short-period Regional Data from Station NIL (Nilore, Pakistan)

Regional seismic discriminants for the May 11, 1998 Indian underground nuclear test(s) and earthquakes recorded at station NIL (Nilore, Pakistan) provide new data to test strategies that can be used to monitor the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Three categories of regional discriminants (ratios of P- and/or S- wave energy) were measured on short-period (0.5-6 Hz) seismograms: P/S amplitude ratios (phase ratios) measured in the same frequency band, P- and S -wave spectral ratios (i.e., low frequency to high frequency for the same phase) and P/S cross-spectral ratios (i.e., low frequency S- wave to high frequency P -wave). The P/S amplitude ratios show good separation of the Indian nuclear test and regional earthquakes for Pn/Lg and Pn/Sn, however Pg/Lg does not discriminate as well. Pn/Lg and Pn/Sn discriminate well at frequencies as low as 0.5-2 Hz, especially after accounting for path effects. This observation differs from previous studies that report poor separation of earthquakes and explosions at lower frequencies. The P/S amplitude ratios do not show any magnitude dependence, suggesting that forming the ratios in a fixed frequency band cancels the effects of source size-corner frequency scaling. Spatial variability of the observed discriminants arises from variations in crustal waveguide and/or attenuation structure (path propagation effects). Grouping amplitude ratios for earthquakes with paths similar to the Indian test greatly improves discrimination. Removing distance trends does not generally improve discrimination. Accounting for path effects with Bayesian kriging significantly improves discrimination. Spectral ratios (e.g., Pn [0.5-1 Hz]/Pn [4-6 Hz]) and cross-spectral ratios (e.g., Lg [1-2 Hz]/Pn [4–6 Hz]) show distance and magnitude dependence. We developed a technique for simultaneously removing the effects of distance and source size-corner frequency scaling on amplitude and spectral ratios. The technique uses a gridsearch to find several parameters that characterize the observed distance and magnitude dependence. Discrimination of the Indian test improved dramatically after the distance and magnitude trends were removed from the spectral and cross-spectral ratio data.

Signal Processing for Indian and Pakistan Nuclear Tests Recorded at IMS Stations Located in Israel

— In compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) the International Monitoring System (IMS) was designed for detection and location of the clandestine Nuclear Tests (NT). Two auxiliary IMS seismic stations MRNI and EIL, deployed recently, were subjected to detectability, travel-time calibration and discrimination analysis. The study is based on the three recent 1998 underground nuclear explosions: one of India and two of Pakistan, which provided a ground-truth test of the existing IMS. These events, attaining magnitudes of 5.2, 4.8 and 4.6 correspondingly, were registered by many IMS and other seismic stations.¶The MRNI and EIL broadband (BB) stations are located in Israel at teleseismic distances (from the explosions) of 3600, 2800 and 2700 km, respectively, where the signals from the tests are already weak. The Indian and the second Pakistan NT were not detected by the short-period Israel Seismic Network (ISN), using standard STA/LTA triggering. Therefore, for the chosen IMS stations we compare the STA/LTA response to the results of the more sensitive Murdock-Hutt (MH) and the Adaptive Statistically Optimal Detector (OD) that showed triggering for these three events. The second Pakistan NT signal arrived at the ISN and the IMS stations in the coda of a strong Afghanistan earthquake and was further disturbed by a preceding signal from a local earthquake. However, the NT signal was successfully extracted at EIL and MRNI stations using MH and OD procedures. For comparison we provide the signal analysis of the cooperating BB station JER, with considerably worse noise conditions than EIL and MRNI, and show that OD can detect events when the other algorithms fail. Using the most quiet EIL station, the most sensitive OD and different bandpass filters we tried in addition to detect the small Kazakh chemical 100-ton calibration explosion of 1998, with magnitude 3.7 at a distance approaching 4000 km. The detector response curve showed uprising in the expected signal time interval, but yet was low for a reliable decision.¶After an NT is detected it should be recognized. Spectra were calculated in a 15-sec window including P and P-coda waves. The spectra for the first Pakistan NT showed a pronounced spectral null at 1.7 Hz for all three components of the EIL station. The effect was confirmed by observation of the same spectral null at the vertical component of the ISN stations. For this ground-truth explosion with a reported shallow source depth, the phenomenon can be explained in terms of the interference of P and pP phases. However, the spectral null feature, considered separately, cannot serve as a reliable identification characteristic of nuclear explosions, because not all the tests provide the nulls, whereas some earthquakes show this feature. Therefore, the multi-channel spectral discrimination analysis, based on a spectral ratio of low-to-high frequency energy (in the 0.6–1 Hz and 1–3 Hz bands), and a semblance of spectral curves (in the 0.6–2 Hz band), was conducted. Both statistics were calculated for the vertical component of the ISN stations as well for the three components of the EIL station. The statistics provided a reliable discrimination between the recent NT and several nearby earthquakes, and showed compliance with the former analysis of Soviet and Chinese NT, where nuclear tests demonstrated lower values of energy ratio and spectral semblance than earthquakes. ¶Accurate location of NT requires calibration of travel time for IMS stations. Using known source locations, IASPEI91 travel-time tables and NEIC origin times we calculated expected arrival time for the P waves to the EIL and MRNI stations and showed that the measured arrival time has a delay of about 4 sec. Similar results were obtained for the nearby Pakistan earthquakes. The analysis was complimented by the P travel-time measurements for the set of Semipalatinsk NT, which showed delays of about 3.7 sec to the short-period MBH station which is a surrogate station for EIL. Similar delays at different stations evidence a path- rather than site-effect. The results can be used for calibration of the IMS stations EIL and MRNI regarding Asian seismic events.

India's Rise After Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments

Research Article| December 01 2001 India's Rise After Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments Jing-Dong Yuan Jing-Dong Yuan Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (2001) 41 (6): 978–1001. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.6.978 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Jing-Dong Yuan; India's Rise After Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments. Asian Survey 1 December 2001; 41 (6): 978–1001. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.6.978 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. © Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

On Dan Halton's Review of Foreign News Coverage

ANYONE WHO SAT IN A FOREIGN EDITOR'S CHAIR during the 1990s will recognize the decline of foreign news coverage by Canadian media as described by Dan Halton. He suggests that it was part of a trend across North America and predicts that Canada will follow the United States in further deterioration. However, it could be argued that Canada's experience in the 1990s was slightly different from that of its southern neighbour and that the trend for the future is more positive.Halton cites the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as one of the reasons for Canadian media preoccupation with domestic events. This is certainly true, but Canada was also rocked by the near victory by separatists in the Quebec Referendum in 1995 and by the gradual realization that government deficits were bringing the country to the verge of bankruptcy. Complacency turned to concern, and the media, quite rightly, reflected that concern with more domestic coverage.Of course, anyone interested in the rest of the world would argue that understanding conditions abroad would give a fresh perspective to solving domestic problems, but that argument was drowned out in the babble of voices screaming for attention on the domestic scene. Print and radio were affected, but television news suffered the most, especially after cutbacks at CBC and CTV.Halton argues that this preoccupation with domestic news will only worsen with the advent of corporate convergence in the media. He paints a gloomy and convincing picture of what happened in the United States, but his presumption that this pattern will repeat itself in Canada doesn't appear to hold up under initial scrutiny.Convergence in this country clearly raises questions about editorial independence and the control of the national news agenda in the hands of a few huge corporations, but some recent developments at CTV suggest convergence may have some positive effects on foreign coverage. And, curiously, these developments are driven by the same market forces that resulted in cutbacks in the United States.Shortly after being taken over by BCE, CTV News announced plans for new bureaus in Mexico City, Nairobi, Los Angeles, and Sydney to augment existing bureaus in London, Washington, Jerusalem, Moscow, and Beijing. It will also re-open the bureau in India that was shut down for two years.Of the new bureaus, Mexico City will be a full bureau, operated jointly with the American network, ABC. A similar arrangement has been in place for almost 20 years in Beijing where ABC provides logistical support for the CTV correspondent. In a rather ironic reversal of roles, ABC relies on CTV to provide reports on breaking news. This sometimes results in a Canadian point of view leading the coverage. ABC viewers may not have realized that Christine Nielsen worked for CTV when she described the demonstrations outside the United States embassy in Beijing in 1999 after NATO accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the crisis in Kosovo.The other four bureaus will consist of reporters who will shoot most of their own material with small digital cameras. When big stories break (Indian or Pakistani nuclear tests, for example), the reporter will hire a local crew and feed stories to Canada by satellite. However, most stories will be sent to Toronto by airfreight at a cost of a few hundred dollars compared to two or three thousand for satellite transmission. …