Independent Remanufacturer Research Articles

Demand Information Forecasting and Sharing in a Remanufacturing Closed‐Loop Supply Chain

ABSTRACTWe delve into the incorporation of demand information forecasting and the subsequent information sharing in a closed‐loop supply chain (CLSC). We consider the competition between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent remanufacturer (IR). The OEM autonomously determines whether to forecast demand information and further considers whether to disseminate the realized demand signal to the IR. We find that the IR adopts either a partial‐ or a full‐remanufacturing strategy to compete with the OEM. The OEM shares negative demand signals with the IR, as such signals decrease the retail prices and increase the production quantity of all‐new products. Additionally, the sharing of negative demand signals helps alleviate the cannibalization effect caused by the introduction of remanufactured products. When examining the optimal sharing strategy in equilibrium, the OEM only invests in forecasting demand if the forecasting cost is relatively low. Furthermore, the numerical studies reveal that, in equilibrium, the OEM does not necessarily benefit from possessing more precise demand information. Additionally, we assess the influence of consumers' environmental awareness on the production decisions of both companies. The findings indicate that heightened environmental awareness prompts the IR to adopt a full‐remanufacturing strategy, and the information management strategies remain robust.

Eco-Design in Manufacturing or Remanufacturing? The Sustainable Options in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Outsourcing

Here, the authors focused on determining the increase in consumers’ preferences for sustainable products, including that of OEMs, who are responsible for the drop in new product sales. We also assessed the effects of remanufacturing by outsourcing to third-party remanufacturers. However, the outsourcing of remanufacturing not only enables the producer to offer a remanufactured product at the same time as manufacturing new units; it also provides OEMs with the flexibility required to peruse eco-design in manufacturing and/or remanufacturing. For instance, Gree and Midea have heavily invested in eco-design to reduce energy costs in manufacturing, while Xerox has adopted a modular design approach to divert materials away from landfills and towards remanufacturing. Following observations of real-world applications, the authors developed two theoretical models in which remanufacturing can be outsourced to an independent remanufacturer, endowing the OEM with the flexibility required to enact eco-design in manufacturing or remanufacturing. This analysis reveals that OEMs tend to put more effort into eco-design in manufacturing than in remanufacturing. Furthermore, such efforts in the name of eco-design may be beneficial for both the OEM and the third-party remanufacturer. As such, this paper encourages governments to provide more incentives that will encourage OEMs to invest in eco-design in manufacturing and establish a possible “win–win” scenario in terms of both environmental and economic performances.

Competition in Remanufacturing with Asymmetric Demand Information

This paper examines remanufacturing decisions in the context of outsourcing, which have important implications for environmental and economic sustainability. Specifically, we model the competition between an experienced Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and an emerging Independent Remanufacturer (IR). The OEM can decide the manufacturing quantities of a brand-new product, and the IR can collect the OEM’s used products and remanufacture them for resale. The information structure is asymmetric, as only the OEM knows the market size. We identify the equilibrium quantities of both firms, which are shown to be strongly influenced by the IR’s cost efficiency and the consumers’ willingness to pay for the IR’s products. Asymmetric information also plays an important role. Is it always better to hide information? Interestingly, the OEM makes the most profit when the IR has full information on the market size. We find that when the market size is high, the OEM’s and IR’s production and encroachment decisions are the same as when both parties have equal information. The OEM also does not benefit from hiding market information from the IR when the market size is low. Indeed, if the IR’s cost efficiency is moderate and the market size is low, the OEM’s profits are actually hurt by hiding market information. Here, the diminished profits from hiding market information arises from the OEM’s substantially reduced production quantity to prevent IR encroachment. The OEM’s production quantity is higher if the OEM shares market information and the IR encroaches on the market. Thus, by sharing information, the OEM’s benefit gained from increased production quantity outweighs the cost of losing its monopoly. Additionally, consumer surplus increases when the IR engages in remanufacturing, while social surplus increases only when either the OEM’s or IR’s product is strongly favored. Even if the IR does not engage in remanufacturing, the resulting OEM monopoly can still lead to a higher environmental impact under certain market conditions. This arises when the OEM lowers production quantities when the IR encroaches on the market, thereby improving the overall environmental impact. Therefore, policymakers seeking to improve environmental and economic sustainability by encouraging IRs must consider these complex competition dynamics and consumer preferences, as they indirectly influence OEMs’ production decisions.

Impact of Intercompetitor Licensing on Remanufacturing Market Competition and Cooperation

This article investigates the impact of intercompetitor licensing between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent remanufacturer (IR) on market competition between new and remanufactured products, the IR's remanufacturing strategy, and the IR's optimal quality choice for remanufactured products. In the considered supply chain, the OEM sells new products, and the IR collects used products and then sells remanufactured products to compete with the OEM. To produce remanufactured products, the IR can acquire remanufacturing technology either by paying a licensing fee to the OEM or self-developing it in-house by incurring a fixed research and development cost. We develop game-theoretic models to determine the optimal supply chain decisions concerning the royalty licensing fee, IR's remanufacturing strategy and production quality, and product sale prices. We find that a licensing contract will always induce the OEM and the IR to increase their sales price for new and remanufactured products. However, the OEM will always increase the sales price for new products to a larger degree than that of the IR. This can alleviate price competition between new and remanufactured products and make remanufactured products more competitive in the market. Under licensing cooperation, the IR will always remanufacture used products to a higher quality level that will intensify quality competition. No matter whether the royalty fee is exogenously or endogenously determined by the OEM, there exists a wide range of parameter regions such that a licensing contract will produce a win-win solution for the OEM and the IR. A licensing cooperation may be reached even when the unit royalty fee is at a relatively low level and the total royalty fee is higher than the self-development option.

The effects of low-carbon awareness on remanufacturing strategy in the presence of competition

PurposeThis paper examines how the level of low-carbon awareness (LCA) affects the remanufacturing strategy in a supply chain with an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent remanufacturer (IR) competing with each other.Design/methodology/approachGame theory and operations optimization.FindingsThe studies analytically characterize the threshold levels of the LCA in response to which the OEM and the IR will change their remanufacturing strategies from no remanufacturing to partial remanufacturing and then to full remanufacturing. In addition, the studies reveal that as compared with the OEM, the IR has more flexibility in terms of the market entry to remanufacturing with the level of LCA increasing. With the extended studies, it is exhibited that the above findings are robust to a good extent.Originality/valueIt can provide decision support for remanufacturing enterprises.

Optimal remanufacturing strategies for original equipment manufacturers: partner and mode selection

This study examines a supply chain with three players which are a contract manufacturer (CM), an independent remanufacturer (IR) and an original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The OEM outsources the production process of new products to the CM and enters the remanufacturing market by cooperating with the remanufacturer which can either be the CM or IR through outsourcing or authorization remanufacturing modes. We investigate the OEM's remanufacturing partner choice when the remanufacturing mode is given, and the remanufacturing mode choice when the remanufacturer is selected. We consider profitability and environmental performance as the OEM's decision-making criteria. When the wholesale price of the new product is exogenously determined, we find that cooperating with the remanufacturer that has a lower variable cost is the dominant strategy given a specific remanufacturing mode. When the CM strategically determines the wholesale price of the new product, the OEM should never select the CM as the remanufacturing partner, and the IR is always a preferable remanufacturing partner for the OEM. In addition, both outsourcing and authorization modes are optimal when the CM is the remanufacturer. However, when the IR is the remanufacturer, the OEM should always choose the outsourcing mode.

Production decisions in remanufacturing under the cap-and-trade considering consumer education and government subsidies

Remanufacturing, which is encouraged by the government but lacks consumer acceptance, can help manufacturers relieve carbon emission pressure under the carbon cap and trade mechanism (CCT-mechanism). In our research, there is an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent remanufacturer (IR) in the market. A game-theoretic model is constructed to discuss the optimal production decisions of the OEM and IR under the CCT-mechanism. Furthermore, the level of consumer education may affect the acceptance of remanufactured products and government subsidy, so an extended model is proposed. Then, the effects of the CCT-mechanism, government subsidies and consumer education on production decisions are analysed. The results show that the CCT-mechanism can prompt the OEM to enter remanufacturing and that the impact of the increasing rate is similar to the carbon price, but the latter is more effective. Government subsidies to the OEM are more efficient than those to the IR. Subsidization plays an important role in the early stage of remanufacturing, but it is not always necessary. IRs benefit from consumer education; however, OEMs cannot always benefit from consumer education.

Remanufacturing with innovative features: A strategic analysis

In this study, we investigate the best remanufacturing strategy for the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and independent remanufacturer (IR) in an innovative industry where the consumer valuation of the products increases with the level of innovation, and we characterize how the best strategy changes with the identity of the remanufacturer. Our work differs from existing articles that investigate the remanufacturing strategy in the presence of quality decisions, by actively including the innovative features in the remanufactured products, as opposed to passively carrying over product quality to the remanufactured products. We consider three remanufacturing strategies: (i) not remanufacturing, (ii) remanufacturing without adding innovative features, and (iii) remanufacturing adding innovative features (upgrading). To analyze the problem, we create a single-period model where the OEM determines the level of innovation and the quantity of new products, in both competitive settings, and either the OEM or IR determines the remanufacturing quantity depending on the competitive setting. We investigate how the firms’ environmental impact and the consumer surplus are affected by the competition and the remanufacturing strategy.

The effects of government subsidies and environmental regulation on remanufacturing

It has been recognized that regulatory policies are important to promote remanufacturing. However, scant studies have evaluated and compared the performance of different regulatory policies on remanufacturing operations. This paper analyzes the effects of the government subsidy policy and the carbon cap and trade policy (CTP) on remanufacturing in a closed-loop supply chain comprising a manufacturer, an independent remanufacturer (IR), and a retailer. We develop stylized models for evaluating three subsidy policies: the IR subsidy policy, the retailer subsidy policy, and the consumer subsidy policy, develop a stylized model for assessing CTP, and incorporate technology licensing for remanufacturing into our models for analyses. We examine two issues 1) subsidizing which stakeholder is optimal and 2) whether CTP is able to replace the government subsidy policy. We compare these policies from economic, environmental, and social perspectives concerning their value for remanufacturing in closing supply chain loop. The results show that both the subsidy policy and CTP are able to promote remanufacturing. The government subsidy, the cost savings per remanufactured product, and the carbon trading price are key factors that influence the promotion of remanufacturing. Although increasing those factors can stimulate remanufacturing activity, we find that increasing the cost savings, regardless of the production cost savings or the carbon emission cost savings, should be the first option for governments and manufacturers. Based on the results of stylized models, the three subsidy policies show same performance on promoting remanufacturing, and we interpret it as an insight that government policy makers need not to worry about choosing which stakeholder to subsidize. Technology licensing is unfavorable for remanufacturing development regardless of policy types, where a lower licensing fee or the coordination between the manufacturer and IR is necessary in the process. CTP performs better or on par with the subsidy policy in most cases, suggesting that CTP is an ideal substitution for the government subsidy policy.

Impact of government subsidy on the remanufacturing industry regarding technology cooperation

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Under the environmental concerns of consumers, this study uses game theory to analyze the impact of government subsidies on remanufacturing and environmental protection. The original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the independent remanufacturer (IR) can select cooperation and non-cooperation, which are facilitated by government subsidies, in two ways, including technology licensing and R & D joint-venture. We design a market where consumers care about the environment, involving the government, an OEM and an IR. The study finds that the quality level of products and the proportion of technology transfer are important factors influencing cooperation strategies. If the government wants to develop high-quality remanufactured products to make up for the lack of new products, it should increase remanufacturing subsidies to help remanufacturers obtain technology. If the government wants to reduce environmental pollution through the development of remanufacturing, the level of technology transfer of remanufactured products that can be mass-produced is generally not high.We compare the profit and environmental performance of the three strategies under the government subsidy policy and find that when the government subsidy is moderate, we can realize the triple win of enterprise and environment.</p>

Impact of remanufacturing optimism on competitive quality choice and product-design strategy

Research has shown that managers typically display optimistic expectations for the future. In a competitive market, remanufacturers may overestimate consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for remanufactured products. We develop a game-theoretic model of competition between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent remanufacturer (IR), where the OEM determines interchangeability in product design, and the IR may have an optimistic bias about remanufacturing market demand and adopt different quality strategies. We find that the OEM is always strategic about the interchangeability design of its products. Interestingly, remanufacturing optimism triggers more significant changes in the degree of interchangeability. In some cases, the IR’s optimistic bias can lead to a win–win outcome for both firms. In addition, we find that a moderate increase in the quality of remanufactured products alleviates the weak situation in consumer quality perception. But when the WTP of remanufactured products is generally low, it is more profitable for the optimistic IR to keep the quality of remanufactured products equivalent to new products than to blindly upgrade the product quality. Our findings suggest that applying bounded rationality to issues in remanufacturing may yield new insights into the determinants of product design and quality management.

Rent, sell, and remanufacture: The manufacturer's choice when remanufacturing can be outsourced

Manufacturers have increasingly started offering rental options for the products they sell. Renting products offers an opportunity: segmenting consumers. However, this also raises a challenge: what to do with the returned products? One solution is to remanufacture these products and then rent or resell them. Subsequently, should remanufacturing be outsourced to a third-party firm that can remanufacture at a lower cost? Here, we use a multi-period setting and examine the optimal decisions for different selling and renting constellations. Importantly, we allow the manufacturing costs of the sales and rental products to differ, as they seem to be critical in determining the manufacturer's renting and selling decisions and remanufacturing strategies. For example, under integrated (i.e. in-house) remanufacturing, when the new rental product's manufacturing cost is sufficiently high, no remanufacturing happens. Under both remanufacturing strategies—integrated and outsourced—the manufacturer does not rent new products in the second period if the manufacturing costs of the sales and rental products are identical. If the rental product's manufacturing cost is either sufficiently low or high, then integrated remanufacturing is more profitable; when this manufacturing cost is within a moderate range, the manufacturer outsources remanufacturing to an independent remanufacturer. Surprisingly, in some situations, the production quantity of the new sales product may even increase with its manufacturing cost. This is because the manufacturer may extract an even higher margin compared with the new rental product. Finally, we also consider several extensions such as uncertainty regarding the quality of the returned goods, simultaneous selling and renting of remanufactured goods, and longer horizons and the product's life cycle.

Decision Analysis for the Remanufacturing System in the Presence of Carbon Cap and Trade Policy and Low‐Carbon Consumers

This paper considers a remanufacturing system in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent remanufacturer (IR) compete with each other. The paper conducts a model analysis for the optimal decisions in the remanufacturing system, taking into account the impacts of consumers’ low‐carbon awareness and carbon cap and trade (CCT) policy. With the studies, it is found that the effects of CCT and consumers’ low‐carbon awareness can be trading off sometimes on the remanufacturing system, and in this case, excessive cultivation of consumers’ low‐carbon awareness will weaken the beneficial effects of CCT on the remanufacturing system due to the resulted excessive consumers’ willingness to pay for the remanufactured products.

Remanufacturing Marketing Decisions in the Presence of Retailing Platforms in the Carbon Neutrality Era.

Background: In response to the specific goals of carbon peaking and neutrality, remanufacture is becoming increasingly popular. With the marketplace being more and more adopted, an independent remanufacturer (IR) could sell its products via either the reselling model or the marketplace model. In order to contribute more to carbon neutrality, we investigate the optimal marketing decision for remanufacturing. We construct two models namely reselling model and the marketplace model, and further explore the effects of each marketing model on the decisions and profits of both the IR and the platform firm. Methods: We examine a platform firm that sells new products and an IR that sells remanufactured products under two marketing models based on game theory: (1) a reselling model in which the IR sells remanufactured products to the platform firm; then the platform firm resells to consumers; (2) a marketplace model in which the IR sells remanufactured products to consumers through the platform. Results: Our results show that aiming at carbon neutrality, the IR would be induced by the marketplace model to undertake remanufacturing operations and remanufacture products as many as it could still meet the market demand. Meanwhile, the marketplace model encourages the IR to rethink its work and manufacture more products under certain conditions. Furthermore, both the platform firm and the IR prefer the marketplace model to the reselling model within a Pareto zone. In addition, we find that both the platform firm and the IR could benefit from the marketplace model when they take carbon neutrality under consideration. Conclusions: This study provides managerial insight from two aspects. Remanufactures could decide their marketing model via thorough consideration of market competition, commission rate, and production cost. The government could do more to protect the marketplace environment in order to stimulate the internal vitality of the platform in the achievement march of carbon neutrality purpose. That is, this study will provide good guidance for sustainable development decision-making of remanufacturing marketing platforms, and further contributes to the achievement of the carbon neutrality goal.

Impact of product design on remanufacturing under environmental legislation

Facing take-back and carbon tax legislation, the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is proactively engaged in product design to enhance the recyclability and reusability of products and cut carbon emissions. This paper uses stylized models with a monopoly OEM and provides four legislative scenarios to analyze fundamental conflicts of interest in remanufacturing and product design. Unlike previous literature, we consider remanufacturing and product design as two operating strategies simultaneously and investigate the OEM’s production and collection decisions in the hybrid legislative structure. The optimal strategies are characterized by using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions. Our results show that high product design levels do not imply more remanufacturing. Remanufacturing indeed benefits from low tax rates, take-back legislation, and high-cost savings for remanufactured products, but there are some potential unintended consequences when the mandatory target becomes stringent. Then, through a numerical study, we analyze and compare different legislative structures from stakeholder perspectives. Surprisingly, our numerical result observes that take-back legislation with reuse targets maximizes the benefits for both the OEM and policy maker under certain conditions, suggesting that the reuse target can be a perfect substitute for the collection target that is the dominant form in take-back legislation worldwide. Finally, we extend the model to the competitive environment, and we find that the invasion of an independent remanufacturer will cause a significant drop in profits for the OEM since the double cannibalization effect.

Implication of take-back and carbon emission capacity regulations on remanufacturing in a competitive market

As waste from consumer electronics sector grows steadily, manufacturers are facing take-back and carbon emission capacity regulations, which mandates them to properly treat the waste through remanufacturing and reduce carbon emissions. However, implications of the two regulations on remanufacturing activities and market competition remain unclear. We use a stylized model with a manufacturer facing competition from an independent remanufacturer and provide four legislative scenarios, i.e., no regulation, take-back regulation, carbon emission capacity regulation and dual regulation to study these questions. We characterize equilibrium strategies of the two firms under different legislative structures by using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and examine the effects of two regulations on three key aspects: remanufacturing level, prices for new and remanufactured products as well as the manufacturer's profits. We find that an increase in the collection target or a decrease in the carbon emission cap actually may cause a drop in remanufacturing under single regulation, which means stringent regulation do not imply more remanufacturing. Intuitively, low carbon emission cap always increases the price of two products as it reduces the manufacturer's total production quantity. However, we find that the price for remanufactured products may decrease when remanufacturing strategy is an attractive alternative for the manufacturer under high collection targets. In addition, the manufacturer's profits may drop when carbon emission capacity regulation or dual regulation exists in the market. Finally, through a numerical study, we investigate the changes in firms' profits, environmental impact and social welfare under different legislative scenarios with high collection targets or low carbon emission caps.

Remanufacturing authorization strategy for competition among OEM, authorized remanufacturer, and unauthorized remanufacturer

Engaging authorized manufacturers (ARs) is a strategy that has been adopted by many original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to compete with unauthorized remanufacturers (URs). As a result, new products, authorized remanufactured products, and unauthorized remanufactured products may coexist in the same market. The OEM needs to strategically determine whether to compete with the UR only through new products or to authorize another independent remanufacturer to compete with the UR. This paper examines a supply chain consisting of an OEM, an UR and an AR competing in the same market. We develop a game-theoretic model and investigate the equilibrium decisions for two scenarios: the unauthorized remanufacturing and authorized remanufacturing scenarios. In the unauthorized remanufacturing scenario, which only the OEM and the UR compete in the market, we derive the OEM's and UR's optimal production quantities and the UR's product quality. We find that the UR would always remanufacture at a high-quality level when the remanufacturing cost is low, and vice versa. In the authorized remanufacturing scenario, the AR remanufactures by cooperating with the OEM through an authorization fee contract. We find that (1) when the AR implements the authorization fee decision, a Pareto improvement region exists when the remanufacturing cost is low; (2) when the OEM implements the authorization fee decision, a Pareto improvement region exists when remanufacturing is lower than a given threshold; and (3) when neither the OEM nor the AR has the full bargaining power to make the authorization fee decision, the UR will benefit from an OEM with a stronger bargaining power. That is because the OEM's authorization fee decision will compromise the AR's competitiveness in the market, which benefits the UR. Finally, we extend the model to investigate whether the OEM should conduct remanufacturing as its optimal strategy.

Distribution channel and licensing strategy choice considering consumer online reviews in a closed-loop supply chain

This research builds two-period game models to address the choice issues of the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)’s licensing strategy and the Independent Remanufacturer (IR)’s distribution channel, considering consumer online reviews in a closed-loop supply chain. In both periods, the OEM sells new products by the direct distribution channel. In period 2, the OEM determines the licensing strategy (the fixed or royalty fee) to authourize the IR to remanufacture, and then the IR chooses the distribution channel (direct or indirect) for remanufactured products. Interestingly, our results show that the IR prefers the direct channel when the remanufacturing cost is smaller. And the obtained willingness-to-pay (WTP) from consumer online reviews has a positive impact on the threshold value of the remanufacturing cost. Moreover, we find that the OEM’s licensing strategy choice depends on the sizes of the fixed licensing fee and the obtained WTP. The OEM will choose the royalty licensing strategy to the IR who has chosen the direct channel, when the fixed fee and the obtained WTP are smaller. Finally, we find the optimal royalty fee, numerically examine the impact of the interaction among these factors on consumer surplus and social welfare, and relax the basic assumption to show the robustness of our model.

Production decisions of a closed-loop supply chain considering remanufacturing and refurbishing under government subsidy

Remanufacturing and refurbishing, as two essential strategies in the sector of reverse logistics, play a vital role in the area of sustainable development. With the increasing concerns on the environment friendly supply chain by the general public, we construct two remanufacturing models dominated by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the independent remanufacturer (IR) based on the auto parts market which provides new products, remanufactured products and refurbished products. Considering the remanufacturing subsidy and the market environment parameters, we analyze the full-remanufacturing and partial-remanufacturing using the Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly game models. We then obtain the equilibrium strategies for each of these scenarios. We further carry out sensitivity analysis for the two remanufacturing models and investigate the impact of the remanufacturing subsidy on these two models. The findings in this paper enable us to compare the remanufacturing modes and show how the equilibrium outcome depends on the key model parameters. In the comparison and numerical analysis, they are revealed that (i) the improvement on the quality level of the refurbished products is always unfavorable to the quality level and the production quantity of both the new and the remanufactured products, especially in the OEM remanufacturing model; (ii) subsidy is ineffective in the IR remanufacturing mode when the remanufacturing cost is low; (iii) the IR remanufacturing outperforms the OEM remanufacturing in both economic benefits and social welfare, when the cost of remanufacturing and the customer willingness to pay for remanufacturing products are low, and the quality of refurbished products is high. These findings have potential implications for enterprise remanufacturing production and government policy-making in complex market environments.

Team of rivals: How should original equipment manufacturers cooperate with independent remanufacturers via authorisation?

Authorisation is a commonly used strategy for OEMs who do not have remanufacturing capability but still want to extract some benefits from the remanufacturing market. In this paper, we analyse two authorisation strategies: one is dealer authorisation, i.e., the OEM turns the independent remanufacturer (IR) into an authorised dealer selling both new and remanufactured products; the other is remanufacturing authorisation, i.e., the OEM authorises the IR to remanufacture used products by charging an authorisation fee. A stylised model is developed to compare the three scenarios: competition, cooperation with dealer authorisation and cooperation with remanufacturing authorisation. Our results show that cooperation depends on the effect of authorisation on the improvement of customers’ willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products. Although remanufacturing authorisation is preferred by the OEM, only dealer authorisation is achievable under certain conditions. Interestingly, while the OEM’s profit decreases in new product cost in general, it may increase when higher cost causes a strategy switch from competition (dealer authorisation) to remanufacturing authorisation. Furthermore, we analyse the environmental and social impact of cooperation and identify the conditions under which cooperation benefits the environment and consumers. While cooperation can achieve a win-win-win situation on the triple bottom line, the choice of authorisation mode always presents a conflict between environmental and consumer benefit.