Independent Expenditures Research Articles

Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence

The impact of money on politics—whether through campaign finance, lobbying, or independent expenditure—raises key normative questions about democratic representation and accountability. In recent years there has been a deluge of new data allowing researchers to study money in politics from new and exciting perspectives. As a complement to this trend, there has also been a resurgence of interest in developing formal models to provide new theoretical insights that can help us understand how, why, and when money influences politics and policy. We review several major themes in this literature, focusing specifically on exchange-based models, informational models, and subsidy-based models. We compare and contrast the key contributions, and limitations, of each approach in understanding the role of lobbying and campaign finance in politics. We also discuss future avenues for research that incorporate aspects of each approach, which, we believe, will introduce new theoretical insights for understanding special interest influence.

Citizens united and state environmental policy, regulations, and outcomes

ABSTRACT The impact of corporate political spending on environmental policy has drawn numerous attention from researchers and policymakers. However, few studies have analyzed the empirical effect of corporate spending on environmental policy in aggregate. In this study, I analyze the impact of corporate independent spending bans on state environmental policy, utilizing the repeal of such bans in 23 states following the 2010 Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision as a research design. Through difference-in-differences tests, I find no evidence that the removal of independent expenditure bans influenced state environmental policy, regulations, or outcomes, or overall policy liberalism. I also find that corporate direct contributions did not increase in treated states, which may explain the lack of environmental policy effects. These results demonstrate that corporations did not utilize the new spending avenue after Citizens United to influence state environmental policy in aggregate and raise questions concerning corporate political spending and environmental preferences.

Dark Parties: Unveiling Nonparty Communities in American Political Campaigns

Since 2010, independent expenditures have grown as a source of spending in American elections. A large and growing portion comes from “dark money” groups—political nonprofits whose terms of incorporation allow them to partially obscure their sources of income. I develop a new dataset of about 2,350,000 tax documents released by the IRS and use it to test a new theory of political spending. I posit that pathways for anonymous giving allowed interest groups to form new networks and create new pathways for money into candidate races apart from established political parties. Akin to networked party organizations discovered by other scholars, these dark money networks channel money from central hubs to peripheral electioneering groups. I further show that accounting for these dark money networks makes previously peripheral nodes more important to the larger network and diminishes the primacy of party affiliated organizations in funneling money into candidate races.

Corporate political spending and state tax policy: Evidence from Citizens United

To what extent is U.S. state tax policy affected by corporate political contributions? The 2010 Supreme Court Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling provides an exogenous shock to corporate campaign spending, allowing corporations to spend on elections in 23 states which previously had spending bans. Ten years after the ruling and for a wide range of outcomes, we are not able to identify statistically significant effects of corporate independent expenditures on state tax policy, including tax rates, discretionary tax breaks, and tax revenues. Our results allow for a moderate economic effect on corporate tax rates and revenues, but suggest economically insignificant effects for other tax outcomes of interest to firms and their owners. A complementary analysis of the original introduction of the spending bans supports our finding that corporate spending has modest, if any, effects on tax policy.

Allocating Unlimited Money: What Explains Super PAC Spending in Congressional Elections?

Abstract How do Super PACs allocate their resources? The question is both timely and relevant, particularly as we reflect on the ten-year anniversary of the Citizens United ruling. Super PACs now outspend – sometimes by huge margins, as in the 2016 presidential election – all other groups’ independent expenditures including those of parties, unions, and 501(c) organizations. The issue is especially important in congressional politics, where Super PACs have an opportunity to shape the institution every two years through congressional elections. Utilizing outside spending data from the Center for Responsive Politics, we analyze four U.S. House election cycles since the Supreme Court’s landmark 2010 Citizens United ruling (2012–2018). The likelihood that Super PACs invest in a race is strongly determined by the electoral context, even after controlling for the legislative influence of the incumbent member of Congress.

On Data, Media, and the Deconstruction of the Administrative State

On Data, Media, and the Deconstruction of the Administrative State

Campaign Contributions, Independent Expenditures, and the Appearance of Corruption: Public Opinion vs. the Supreme Court's Assumptions

We use survey experiments to test the validity of judicial assumptions underlying campaign finance regulation. Our evidence supports the key assumption that “appearance of corruption” is directly r...

Education resources and student performance: evidence from Arab municipalities in Israel

ABSTRACT This paper is offering a new identification strategy in order to estimate the effect of education resources on students’ achievements at the municipal level. We use the appointment of an external accountant to financially distressed municipalities in Israel as an instrumental variable for independent education expenditures, and control for selection bias. We find that the decline in independent education expenditures per capita in Arab municipalities did not affect the share of matriculation certification recipients. This result suggests that changes in municipal education resources might not affect students’ achievements, at least in less-developed municipalities.

Campaign Finance Regulations and Public Policy

AbstractDespite a century of efforts to constrain money in American elections, there is little consensus on whether campaign finance regulations make any appreciable difference. Here we take advantage of a change in the campaign finance regulations of half of the U.S. states mandated by the Supreme Court’sCitizens Uniteddecision. This exogenously imposed change in the regulation of independent expenditures provides an advance over the identification strategies used in most previous studies. Using a generalized synthetic control method, we find that afterCitizens United, states that had previously banned independent corporate expenditures (and thus were “treated” by the decision) adopted more “corporate-friendly” policies on issues with broad effects on corporations’ welfare; we find no evidence of shifts on policies with little or no effect on corporate welfare. We conclude that even relatively narrow changes in campaign finance regulations can have a substantively meaningful influence on government policy making.

The Evolution of Independent Expenditures in U.S. Federal Elections Before and After Citizens United

L’une des caractéristiques distinctes du financement des campagnes électorales aux États-Unis est le rôle important que jouent les dépenses indépendantes (DI) des groupes et des individus dans le financement des élections. Les critiques des dépenses indépendantes accusent ces dernières d’accroître la polarisation partisane, de diminuer la transparence politique et d’exacerber l’influence disproportionnée de certains intérêts économiques. Le Congrès a tenté de réguler les dépenses indépendantes dans les années 1970 avec la loi sur la réforme des campagnes électorales fédérales, mais en 1976, la Cour suprême des États-Unis en a fortement réduit la réglementation tant qu’elles ne sont pas utilisées pour soutenir ou s’opposer expressément à un candidat. Bien que la décision de 2010 de la Cour dans l’affaire Citizens United contre Federal Election Commission soit souvent accusée, à juste titre, d’amplifier l’influence des dépenses indépendantes, nous soutenons que c’est une interdiction antérieure du « soft money » qui a en fait conduit à l’augmentation de ce type d’activité électorale. L’interdiction du « soft money » est advenue en 2002 avec la loi sur la réforme des campagnes électorales bipartites (Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, BCRA), mais les groupes ont réagi en orientant l’argent des partis politiques vers des comités extérieurs. L’interdiction du « soft money » par la BCRA et ses restrictions sur les DI ont également incité les groupes à organiser des contestations judiciaires, dont l’une a finalement abouti à l’affaire Citizens United. L’effort de déréglementation des activités des groupes d’intérêt lors des élections s’est poursuivi bien après l’affaire Citizens. Bien que les données sur les effets des différentes décisions de la Cour suprême, des arrêts de la Cour fédérale et des avis consultatifs de la FEC offrent des résultats mitigés, nous constatons un changement notable dans la portée de ces DI. Alors qu’elles étaient à l’origine utilisées par des groupes principalement pour encourager les candidatures de certains candidats à des fonctions électives, elles sont maintenant de plus en plus utilisées pour cibler et attaquer les opposants.

Factional Conflict and Independent Expenditures in the 2018 Democratic House Primaries

The 2018 House of Representatives elections were a historic victory for the Democratic Party. As has been the case in past “wave” elections, however, this victory has posed the risk of factionalism within the party. In this paper we draw upon data on primary competition and independent spending to assess claims that Democratic primaries showed signs of emerging factional conflict within the party, and we compare Democratic primary competition to competition that emerged within the Republican Party during the early 2010s. We show that, despite arguments from progressive activists about reshaping the party, there was relatively little money spent in 2018 for primary challengers or for other primary candidates who ran against the party establishment. Most consequentially, the money that was spent came from groups with narrow issue concerns or with concerns about descriptive representation, not from insurgent ideological groups. Democrats, then, might develop a “primary problem” that resembles the one faced by Republicans in prior election cycles, but there is little evidence that the 2018 primaries were the beginning of such a development.

The Determinants of Healthcare Cost for Glaucoma Patients in Cicendo Eye Hospital, Bandung, Indonesia

Glaucoma is the second foremost cause of impaired vision. People whosuffered from Glaucoma face the independent expenditure for thetreatment as blind people with Glaucoma could not be cured perfectly.This study intends to analyze the effect of age, types of patient care, typesof Glaucoma, and types of payment on the total cost of care of glaucomapatients at Cicendo Eye Hospital, Bandung, Indonesia. This study uses3,358 patient medical records of Cicendo Eye Hospital, Bandung,Indonesia, in 2018. The 3,358 samples were selected from the patient’smedical record based on patients’ categories indicated or convicted ofhaving Glaucoma. Robust Linear Regression is applied in this study tomeasure the additional cost for Glaucoma treatment. The results showedthat the total cost of patient care was positively and significantly affectedby hospitalization status (p=0.000), age (p=0.000), times of treatment(p=0.000), having primary glaucoma (p=0.000), having congenitalglaucoma (p=0.000), and presence of intraocular (p=0.000). Conversely,patient care’s total cost was negatively and significantly affected usinginsurance (p=0.082). This result would be a precautionary measure forthe medical institution to consider better financial planning, servicedelivery improvement, and the patient’s payment scheme effectiveness.

Citizens United and Independent Expenditures in State Supreme Court Elections

Following the decision by the US Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010, questions about the impact of unlimited independent expenditures on state supreme court elections emerged. For those critical of the decision, an area of concern was how elected state courts could be adversely affected by outside group spending. Utilizing data from thirteen states that required disclosure of money spent by outside groups between 2006 and 2016, this research explores patterns of independent expenditures to determine if fears about spending in judicial elections were justified. Using both descriptive and regression analyses, the results indicate that independent expenditures have been on the rise, though important differences exist across the states and by sector. Where states once limited outside groups, their spending activity increased in the post-Citizens United era. Where state laws were not affected, outside group spending declined. The impact of the Supreme Court’s decision therefore is most clearly observed in states that once sought to limit the influence of outside groups.

Assessing Group Incentives, Independent Spending, and Campaign Finance Law by Comparing the States

Independent expenditures (IEs) in U.S. elections have increased substantially at nearly all levels of government over the past decade, but judicial decisions are only a partial explanation for this...

Following the money: uses and limitations of FEC campaign finance data

Disclosure requirements under US federal campaign finance laws and subsequent court rulings have created greater transparency into the financing of campaigns that allow election watchdog groups to monitor and track the flow of money to and by outside groups. These requirements also have generated an extensive new source of quantitative data for scholars to use. Because of the substantial increase in spending by outside groups, it is both timely and important to examine the influence of independent expenditures on election outcomes, political behavior, and fairness in the democratic process. To evaluate and understand the impact of this spending, researchers must be aware of the scope and limitations of the campaign finance data collected by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). This article provides scholars who would like to use FEC data to answer some of these questions with an introduction to the data source, a discussion of how other scholars have used the data, and a case study to generate guidance on the challenges and potential solutions associated with accessing and analyzing these data.

Do Campaign Finance Reforms Insulate Incumbents from Competition? New Evidence from State Legislative Elections

Variations in state campaign finance regulations across states and over time provide an opportunity to test the effects of reforms on the electoral success of incumbent state legislators. We use the most recent state legislative election returns dataset to test whether state campaign finance reforms help or hinder incumbents. Our analysis of nearly 66,000 contests in 33 years reveals that campaign contribution limits and partial public financing have little impact on incumbent reelection prospects. However, full public financing and prohibitions on corporate independent expenditures significantly increase the probability of incumbent reelection.

Legitimacy Matters: The Case for Public Financing in Prosecutor Elections

Since 2015, there has been much excitement and debate over a new wave of elected prosecutors known as prosecutors. Counties that include major cities like Chicago, Dallas, Boston, and Philadelphia now have top local prosecutors who have promised to help end mass incarceration. The elephant in the room when it comes to these progressive prosecutors is that a huge portion of them were elected with the help of George Soros-affiliated Super PACs that have contributed millions to local races in the form of independent expenditures. While much of their work is to be commended, it is crucial that criminal justice reformers take stock of the degree of influence has in these elections. This Article contributes the first-ever empirical studies on the Soros effect in these races, examining the percentage of progressive prosecutor candidate funding that comes from Soros-affiliated PACs and the Cost Per Vote value of the Soros-financed independent expenditures for these candidates. Findings include that the existence of Soros-affiliated PAC money in a race and its Cost Per Vote can usually lead to successful predictions for the success of progressive prosecutor candidates. In addition, the higher the Cost Per Vote value that benefited an individual candidate is, the more radical that candidate's policy agenda will likely be, as well as any ensuing political backlash. This authenticates the popular narrative that is buying locally elected prosecutor seats, which has done great harm to progressive elected prosecutors once in office. The Article suggests that one solution is small-donor public financing, which would encourage robust competition in these elections without sacrificing criminal justice legitimacy.

Extremism Grows in the Dark: Political Non-Profits, Disclosure and Ideological Interest Group Spending

Following the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC, independent expenditures have grown dramatically both in terms of raw dollars and as a percentage of spending in elections. A large and growing portion comes from political nonprofits—so called “dark money” groups—named because the terms of their incorporation allow them to partially obscure the sources of their income. I posit that the pathways for anonymous giving that emerged from the Citizens United decision allowed ideologically motivated interest groups to aggressively challenge more established factions of political parties in way previously unfeasible. Testing this theory, I find strong support that dark money groups back more extremist candidates—especially during primary elections—than either formal party organizations or access-oriented interest groups. These results indicate that the anonymous pathway to giving offered by dark money has created a new font for ideologically motivated interest groups to spend in American elections.

Regulating the Political Wild West: State Efforts to Disclose Sources of Online Political Advertising

The problem of disinformation in online political advertising is growing, with ongoing and potential threats to campaigns coming from both within and outside the United States. Most scholarship in this area has focused on either disclosures and disclaimers under the proposed Honest Ads Act or other fixes aimed at a gridlocked Federal Election Commission (FEC). With federal reform at a standstill, states have jumped into the void. Since 2016, eight states have passed legislation to expressly regulate online political advertising for state candidates and ballot measures, including Maryland, whose state law was declared unconstitutional as applied to a group of media plaintiffs by a federal appeals court. This article examines these state laws as well as the one federal appeals court opinion as a springboard for thinking about efforts at the national level to address the problem. We raise important considerations for future legislation in light of the appeals court decision. We propose that independent record-keeping bodies, similar to what the state of New York has established for independent expenditure committees, are more likely to pass First Amendment scrutiny than requiring record-keeping of platforms or websites.

NJ Statute Impinging on Independent Advocacy Rights Ruled Unconstitutional

The US District Court for the District of New Jersey, by decision dated October 2, enjoined the governor of the state and other defendants from enforcing a state law that compels disclosure of the identities of donors to “independent expenditure committees” and enforces compliance with the law's financial‐reporting and money‐handling requirements, on the grounds that the law unconstitutionally infringes on the plaintiff's First Amendment rights and because it is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, as it will chill its First Amendment rights by deterring potential contributors from contributing to the organization (Americans for Prosperity v. Grewal).