Independent Commission Against Corruption Research Articles

Perbandingan hukum perampasan aset hasil tindak pidana korupsi di Indonesia, Singapura Dan Hongkong

Corruption in law is a chronic issue with corrosive effects. In Indonesia, there institutions involved in handling criminal acts of corruption; the prosecutor`s Office, the Police, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). However, corruption cases in Indonesia continue to increase and fluctuate in their eradication efforts. The KPK is the main institution tasked with combating corruption in Indonesia, but it is perceived as not yet maximizing the seizure of assets resulting from corrupt activities. Singapore has a reputation for being stringent in combating corruption, boasting a powerful anti-corruption institution known as the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), which holds authority to investigate and prosecute corruption cases without political intervention. Hong Kong has an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) that has significantly succeeded in eradicating corruption. A comparative study of laws regarding the confiscation of assets resulting from acts of corruption in Indonesia, Singapore, and Hong Kong is needed to identify similarities, differences, and to analyze the similarities and differences in asset seizure resulting from corruption between the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau Singapore, and the Independent Commission Against Corruption Hong Kong

Comparative Analysis of The Effectiveness of Punishment Over Corruption in Indonesia and Hong Kong

This research aims to compare the effectiveness of punishment imposed on corruption as a crime in Indonesia and Hong Kong. The normative method was employed by conducting library research in the process of data searching, where the authors read and studied the primary and secondary research data. The analysis result concludes that Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 on Corruption Eradication and Law Number 20 of 2001 on the Amendment to Law Number 31 of 1999 on Corruption Eradication and Law Number 30 of 2002 on Corruption Eradication Commission deal with corruption crimes. Moreover, Indonesia establishes an official body particularly intended to deal with corruption investigations, the Corruption Eradication Commission (henceforth referred to as KPK). In comparison, Hong Kong also governs corruption cases using the Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance, Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, and the Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance. Further, Hong Kong has Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) as an institution fully authorized to investigate corruption cases. The KPK and ICAC share a similar strategic model but employ different ways of execution. From the effectiveness of the law perspective, Hong Kong seems to demonstrate a more effective approach since the real and deterring sentence is directly imposed on the case to encourage others to think twice before committing corruption. The sentencing in Hong Kong was once lambasted and condemned since it was perceived as violating human rights, but it seems to be the only way for Hong Kong to eradicate corruption effectively. This research recommends that another amendment to Law Number 20 of 2001 on Corruption Eradication. 
 
 Received: 4 February 2023 / Accepted: 15 July 2023 / Published: 5 September 2023

Investigating corruption, maladministration and misconduct in public administration: Has South Australia struck the right balance?

This article considers the appropriateness of reforms to the South Australian Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) passed by the state Parliament in 2021. Specifically, the author considers the narrower definition of ‘corruption’ in public administration for the purposes of ICAC investigations, and further examines the transfer of ‘misconduct’ and ‘maladministration’ investigations to the SA Ombudsman. The author contends that the excessive application of ICAC power on alleged minor offending justified a transfer of responsibility for such matters. However, the amended definition of corruption in public administration is argued to unreasonably limit the intended utility of the ICAC.

It takes a whole society: why Hong Kong’s ICAC cannot succeed alone

PurposeTo show that establishing an anti-corruption agency (ACA), by itself, is not likely to be a successful anti-corruption strategy. Instead, a solid base of social trust, participation, and support is just as essential as creating an ACA with significant powers and resources.Design/methodology/approachThis is a historical review of the origins and development of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong, and an assessment of its three-pronged approach strategy at both strategic and tactical levels.FindingsAn ACA requires broad and deep social support and participation if it is to succeed. That the ICAC remains nearly unique in developing such a base of support provides important lessons for those countries with ineffective ACAs.Originality/valueA reassessment of the ICAC after a half-century shows that the Hong Kong case, despite its familiarity, has much to teach us if we understand it in its broadest implications.

Unpacking Public Perceptions of Effectiveness in Anti-Corruption Agencies: The Case of Hong Kong

Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) serve the important function of protecting society’s moral and legal standards. How does the public perceive their effectiveness? What variables influence these perceptions? To what extent does perceived effectiveness interact with the level of trust in a government institution? Using the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong as a case and based on a disaggregated approach, this study attempts to unpack and understand public perceptions of ACA’s effectiveness in controlling corruption. It argues that the perceived effectiveness of the ICAC has two dimensions: an organizational dimension reflecting public perceptions of its structure, functions, procedures, and the integrity of personnel and an environmental dimension focusing on its ability to deal effectively with the changing social environment. The study also shows that trust may serve as a moderating variable to substitute or complement the impact of these dimensions on perceptions of institutional effectiveness. The data of this study are drawn mainly from a large-scale original survey conducted in Hong Kong in June 2019 and from official documents of the ICAC and the Hong Kong government.

Discontinuation of Corruption Investigation and Prosecution: A Comparison of Indonesia, The Netherlands, and Hong Kong

The discontinuation of the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes is one of the important substances of the amendment to Law No. 19 of 2019 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission which then led to debates both among academicians and legal practitioners. The discourse focused on the essence and concerns of transactional practices in the process of law enforcement for corruption crimes in the future. By using the legal comparative method, this paper tries to compare the provisions regarding the discontinuation of the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes in Indonesia, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands. The results of the study show that the provisions regarding the discontinuation of the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes in the three countries have differences in their arrangements. Normatively, Indonesia and the Netherlands regulate this matter in several articles, while for Hong Kong, although they do not regulate it in an expressis verbis manner in the law, the provisions concerning the discontinuation of investigations and prosecutions of corruption crimes are known in their law enforcement practices as seen in the case handling scheme published by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). However, the use of the mechanism for terminating the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes can be seen as a balancing mechanism against the legal process. Regulations regarding the discontinuation of investigations in corruption crimes must be maintained as a control mechanism against the possibility of errors in law enforcement procedures or for other technical reasons.

A survey dataset on the perception of public-sector corruption in Mauritius and a framework analysis of corruption court cases.

This data article provides research data on the perception of public-sector corruption in Mauritius, captured using a survey questionnaire as well as a thematic framework for the analysis of corruption court cases prosecuted by the national anti-corruption body, namely, the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC). A sequential mixed methods design was adopted. First, a quantitative approach was used, whereby a questionnaire was developed and administered on 600 persons to gauge public opinion on the perceived seriousness of the phenomenon of public-sector corruption in the country while at the same time recording citizens’ perceived effectiveness of the ICAC in its fight against public corruption in Mauritius. Second, to cross-validate the quantitative findings on the perceived effectiveness of the ICAC in fulfilling its mandate as an anti-corruption agency, a content analysis of court judgments prosecuted by ICAC from 2002 to 2018, was conducted to find out whether or not the respondents’ perceptions of the prosecutorial efficacy of the ICAC was justified. The questionnaire, the raw dataset as well as the analysis of court judgments can be downloaded from the Mendeley Data repository (https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/h8k5ghvhgh/1). The data may be reused for similar research in other parts of the world.The research findings have been published in The International Journal of Law, Crime, and Justice.

A Comparative Analysis of Indonesia’s KPK and Hong Kong ICAC in Eradicating Corruption

This article seeks to discusses anti-corruption policies in Indonesia and Hong Kong. This research arises from the phenomenon of corruption that has become widespread in Indonesia and seems to be a never-endingproblem that has caused great damage in all sectors of life. It's not only a matter of how much the state loss or corrupt modus operandi that is even more sophisticated and even makes Indonesia one of the highest-rankingcountries in corruption cases, but it is also a matter of law enforcement whihch is less smart in handling corruption cases themselves. On the other hand, reportedly having a different approach in combating corruption, Hong Kong is considered to have been successful in carrying out its duties. With comparative study, this article will elaborate various patterns of work conducted by anti-corruption institutions in Indonesia and Hong Kong, namely the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).

Exterminating Corruption in Nigeria: <i>The Cressey’s Approach</i>

The two objectives set for this research were to assess how well, the Cressey’s hypothesis, also known as fraud triangle theory, can explain the reasons behind corruption in Nigerian institutions, and to assess the significance of capability from the fraud diamond theory, towards the detection and prevention of corruption in Nigeria. The researcher adopts a critical review approach of past literature. From the conclusion reached, two recommendation for successful eradication of corruption in Nigeria are: (1) to adopt the Cressey’s fraud triangle approach as well as the fraud diamond to fight corruption (in micro level), from organization to organization and (2), to adopt a more fundamental approach similar to the Hong Kong’s Two-Pronged approach to improve overall accountability and fight opportunity for corruption from a wider macro level. Suggested step for the federal government of Nigeria to successfully fight corruption at a macro level, is to merge the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) to form one single and properly resourced independent corruption fighting agency, similar to that of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).

The Importance of Understanding the Anti-Corruption Legislation to Promote Corruption Reporting: Lessons from Mauritius

ABSTRACT Anti-corruption campaigns usually focus on educating the population. However, little is known about the impact of knowledge, especially understanding of the anti-corruption legislation and the function of Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) body in practice. This study sheds light on the factors influencing the likelihood of reporting a case of corruption in Mauritius. Cross-sectional data are compiled from a household survey with a sample size of 380 observations. To perform the investigation, an ordered probit model is employed. Knowledge about the Prevention of Corruption Act (PoCA) is found to be a crucial variable in determining the functional form of the empirical model. In general, media consumption and knowledge about the PoCA increases the probability of reporting an act of corruption, while Interest in politics decreases the likelihood of reporting a case of corruption to the ICAC. In addition, age, educational attainment, income level, family size and civil status are found to be important predictors of corruption reporting.

ICAC Prosecution, Capital Investment, and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong

Using an original dataset on the enforcement activities of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), I examine the effects of ICAC prosecutions on judicial independence in Hong Kong. I find that evaluations of Hong Kong's rule of law and judicial independence decrease as the ICAC's prosecution rates increase. However, this negative relationship exists only when the unemployment rate is low and gradually disappears as the unemployment rate climbs. Also, when capital investment plays an important role in Hong Kong's economy, ICAC would prosecute less enthusiastically, given that the overall level of societal grievance is low. Nevertheless, capital investment would not dampen ICAC's prosecution activity if social discontent is at high levels.

The challenge of preserving Hong Kong’s successful anti-corruption system

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the factors explaining the success of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and the challenges which it faces in maintaining that success.Design/methodology/approachUtilising a review of primary and secondary sources, a syndrome of success characteristics is developed and analysed against a backdrop of recent high-level scandals involving corruption and unethical behaviour.FindingsThe paper concludes that the institutionalisation of key structures and processes has enabled the ICAC to perform successfully to date but that the prospect of political interference may represent a significant future challenge.Originality/valueAlthough there has been widespread attention to ICAC success factors, some important features have been neglected and little academic attention has been devoted to recent political challenges to its position.

Using the Law to Combat Public Procurement Corruption in South Africa: Lessons from Hong Kong

Since South Africa’s political transition in 1994, corruption has been a major feature of the country’s politics. However, the complexity of post-apartheid South African politics has sometimes prevented allegations and suspicions of corruption from being adequately dealt with by the law. This article examines the legal framework used to combat public procurement corruption in South Africa. Using a comparative approach, the article also examines the legal framework of Hong Kong – with a view to identifying lessons that South Africa can learn therefrom. Such lessons include but are not limited to Hong Kong’s specific laws dedicated to public procurement, its particular legislative and institutional features, its commendable constitutional commitment to eradicating corruption, and the fact that Hong Kong’s rules pertaining to procurement processes are more consistent and are not hidden in several legislative prescripts. South Africa may also do well to learn from the successes of Hong Kong’s iconic anti-corruption agency, the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) – in attempting to model its own anti-corruption agency.
 

Mainlandization, the ICAC, and the Seriousness Attached by Local Politicians to Corruption in Post-1997 Hong Kong.

To date, few studies have focused on how the public has perceived the effectiveness of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Furthermore, little is known about how the public has assessed the functions of the ICAC during the political-economic convergence between Hong Kong and mainland China since 1997. This study attempts to explore local politicians' perceptions towards the ICAC in post-1997 Hong Kong. The quantitative data show that the important historical juncture of mainlandization has been politicized in Hong Kong and has deeply influenced the seriousness attached by local politicians to corruption. Moreover, a mediating path of the effect of "Conflict of Interest" on the "Perceived Seriousness of Corruption" has been found, that is, mainlandization is found to have brought about increased levels of conflict of interest among government officials, which has weakened the symbolic anti-corruption function of the ICAC and, in turn, has affected the perceived seriousness attached to corruption.

A Case Study: Lessons from the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption

This article is a case study that examines the three-pronged approach (TPA) of the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong. Its functions and operations on anti-corruption matters will be assessed from an institution-oriented perspective. It is suggested that for decades, the TPA had been misunderstood in its role as a conventional investigation, prevention and education tool and that such misconceptions may lead to a failure in anti-corruption institutional reform. By better understanding the TPA and its simplistic traits of deterrence and trust then we may be able to remedy the misconceptions the public has about ICAC’s strategies. Policy implications involve further improvements in anti-corruption agencies that will enhance their role in maintaining an environment free of corruption.

Making Hong Kong companies liable for foreign corruption

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to assess the extent to which Hong Kong’s laws deter its companies from engaging in corruption and bribery abroad. Design/methodology/approach – A mix of economics, public administration, management and legal analysis was used to assess weaknesses in Hong Kong’s laws governing the prohibition of bribe payments abroad. Findings – Hong Kong does not explicitly criminalise corporate bribery abroad. Companies – as legal persons – can not be found guilty of corruption. It is argued that Hong Kong’s Legislative Council should amend various laws to modernise Hong Kong’s approach to tackling corruption committed by its companies abroad. The various approaches lawmakers can take towards assigning responsibility for corruption to companies are presented. The approaches that prosecutors at the Department of Justice can take to adopt prosecutorial methods like those used in other upper-income jurisdictions and the ways that Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) can assist in this work are also described. Practical implications – This research has practical findings for Hong Kong’s policymakers, law firms and companies which operate in Hong Kong. For policymakers, we describe legal changes Hong Kong’s legislators will likely make in the years ahead and the preferred ways of engaging in such change. For law firms, we describe the legal changes coming to Hong Kong which legal advisors will need to advise their clients on. For companies, we describe changes that companies operating in Hong Kong will likely need to comply with in the future. Social implications – This paper shows that when Hong Kong adopts best practice in the field of corporate criminalisation, Hong Kong’s role in “exporting” corruption will likely fall. Originality/value – This article describes a set of legal changes which will change the way Hong Kong treats corruption. The literature tends to glamorise Hong Kong’s anti-corruption work. It is shown that its law falls far behind other jurisdictions, as well as how “treating companies like people” in the case of Hong Kong will likely change the way Hong Kong’s prosecutors think about crime and criminal perpetrators.

Can the Hong Kong ICAC Help Reduce Corruption on the Mainland?

Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) serves as the example par excellence of a successful anti-corruption agency. Yet, the Agency works in one of the more corrupt jurisdictions world-wide (the People’s Republic of China). To what extent can the ICAC – and the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) which regulates its work – contribute to reductions in corruption on the Mainland? In this paper, we look at the ways in which the ICAC – technically a Chinese agency (albeit operating in a legally independent jurisdiction) – can help to reduce and prevent corruption on the Mainland. We find that with the proper modifications to the POBO, the Agency can reduce the value of corruption on the Mainland between $5-$20 billion. Through the right regulatory design, these amendments can help actually increase tax revenue by about $200 million per year. We also analyse the political-economy aspects of the reform – and present an example of an optimal reform path. Using economic analysis to assess the costs and benefits of reform – as well as the winners as well as losers of reform – this paper provides an illustration of evidence-based legislative analysis.

The crusade against corruption in Hong Kong in the 1970s: Governor MacLehose as a zealous reformer or reluctant hero?

The creation of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in February 1974 was arguably one of the most important developments in Hong Kong since 1945. Not only did major corruption syndicates disappear from the fabric of public administration in the colony, but the popular acceptance of bribery as a component of social life also faded away. Sir Murray MacLehose, who served as Governor of Hong Kong between 1971 and 1982, was regarded by locals as the maverick behind this miracle. This article argues, however, that the genesis of the ICAC could be better understood as a product of the cumulative efforts of MacLehose and his predecessors. The initiative should also be considered in the political context of the rising tension between London and the local community. In a way, the establishment of the ICAC helped pre-empt London’s intervention in this matter. Also, despite a public appearance of unbridled support for the crusade against corruption, MacLehose’s resolve was severely tested during the early years of the ICAC, and he did contemplate moderating the operation of the Commission, even before the partial amnesty in 1977.

Law of the Hong Kong Constitution - Executive Government

This chapter provides an overview of: the Central Institutions (CIs) of the Executive Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR); and the Principal Supervisory Bodies (PSBs) of the Executive Government of the HKSAR (not including the Judiciary). The chapter places this discussion within the context of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Basic Law) and certain other relevant Hong Kong Ordinances. The CIs primarily discussed here are the Principal Officials (of the Executive Government) and the HKSAR Civil Service. The Principal Officials, together with the Chief Executive (CE) comprise the Executive Authorities in Hong Kong. (The CE is discussed in a separate chapter.) The Basic Law stipulates that 'the Government of the HKSAR shall be the Executive Authorities of the Region.' The PSBs that we consider are: the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC); the Ombudsman; the Audit Commission; and other commission(er)s, such as the Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC), the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (PCPD) and the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance (CIOCS). Because we are concerned here with the structures and functions of the Executive Government, as such, our main focus with respect to the PSBs is to review the interaction between the PSBs and the CIs. The PSBs discussed in this chapter also interact significantly with the private sector. This interaction is only discussed in this chapter in a peripheral way. The private sector–PSB interaction (including the role of the Police Force within the HKSAR) is dealt with, in context, in other chapters of this book.

The contemporary role of private investigators in Australia

The private investigation industry in the United Kingdom has been challenged by dubious work practices arising from the activities of a number of private investigators undertaking work for The News of the World. The allegations of private investigators acting as a conduit for improper behaviour are not new; in Australia this assessment was borne out in the 1992 New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) inquiry which found that investigators acted as the go-betweens in a ‘massive illicit trade’ in confidential information (Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), 1992). The last study on private investigator's in Australia was undertaken by Prenzler (2001). In terms of public awareness the image of the private investigator remains a person of dubious character spying on domestic couples. Since the last study the private investigation industry has undergone significant changes in terms of licensing training, regulation and investigative services. These developments have not r...