Incumbent Party Candidate Research Articles

Examining the “Referendum Theory” in Taiwan’s Local Elections

This paper analyzes the extent to which the performances of local and national governments can shape local election outcomes. Specifically, we use various waves of survey data from Taiwan’s Elections and Democratization Studies (TEDS) to explore whether a person’s assessments of local and central government performances affect his/her vote for the incumbent party candidate. Our empirical findings partially verify the so-called “referendum theory” and can be summarized as follows: First, voters who hold a positive assessment of the performance of local government are more likely to vote for an incumbent who seeks reelection, but this is not necessarily the case for an incumbent party candidate in an open-seat contest. Second, Taiwan’s local elections cannot be regarded as referenda on the central government because the central government approval rating does not consistently affect vote choices across different types/levels of local elections.

Cash and Ballots: Conditional Transfers, Political Participation, and Voting Behavior

We estimate the effect of participation in a large antipoverty program in Colombia on turnout and electoral choice. Using variation in the proportion of beneficiaries across voting booths within a polling station and eligibility as an instrument for take-up, we find that in the 2010 presidential elections, enrolled women were more likely to vote and support the incumbent party candidate. Results for men are smaller and not always significant. Voters respond to targeted transfers, and women, as the direct recipients of the transfers, respond more strongly. Potential mechanisms explaining the results are civic engagement and gratitude toward the incumbent party.

경제투표, 선거심판과 민주주의 : 경제에 대한 객관적·주관적 평가와 전망이 여당후보 지지에 미치는 영향

경제투표, 선거심판과 민주주의 : 경제에 대한 객관적·주관적 평가와 전망이 여당후보 지지에 미치는 영향

Much Ado About Nothing: RDD and the Incumbency Advantage

An influential paper by Caughey and Sekhon (2011a) suggests that the outcomes of very close US House elections in the postwar era may not be as-if random, thus calling into question this application of regression discontinuity for causal inference. We show that while incumbent party candidates are more likely to win close House elections, those who win are no different on observable characteristics from those who lose. Further, all differences in observable characteristics between barely winning Democrats and barely winning Republicans vanish conditional on which party is the incumbent. Any source of a special incumbent party advantage in close elections must be due to variables that cannot be observed. This finding supports the conclusion of Eggers et al. (2015) that Caughey and Sekhon’s discovery of lopsided wins by incumbents in close races is a mere statistical fluke.

A Functional Analysis of UK Debates in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales

In 2010, the UK held its first ever televised debates for Prime Minister, featuring Gordon Brown, David Cameron, and Nick Clegg. At the same time debates were held in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. These “regional” UK debates were a mixed bag. The debate in Northern Ireland included candidates for members of the Northern Ireland parliament; the debate in Scotland featured candidates running for the UK parliament, and the Wales debate included both kinds of candidates. The debates featured a mixture of issues, touching on “regional” and UK questions and candidates. Previous research has studied the three UK debates (Benoit & Benoit-Bryan, 2013); this study applies Functional Theory to three debates, one from Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. Overall in these three debates acclaims were more common than attacks and defenses were the least common function. Incumbent party candidates acclaimed and defended more, and attacked less, than challengers. This relationship was particularly strong when these politicians discussed their records in office (past deeds). The candidates in these debates discussed policy more than character. The participants acclaimed more and attacked less when discussing general goals and ideals.

FORECASTING WITH LEADING ECONOMIC INDICATORS AND THE POLLS IN 2012

On August 1, 2012, we prepared a forecast of the 2012 presidential vote forPS. Our model contains two variables: (1) the cumulated weighted growth in leading economic indicators (LEI) through quarter 13 of the current presidential term and (2) the incumbent party candidate's share in the most recent trial-heat polls, which were for the month of July. What mostly distinguishes our model from others is the reliance on leading indicators from the quarter ending in March of the election year. The early reading of LEI works well as a predictor because it summarizes growth in the economy leading up to the election year and also provides advance indication of changes in the economy during the election year. The exact equation and the exact forecast change as the poll readings change during the election year.

The Objective and Subjective Economy and the Presidential Vote

The importance of the economy in US presidential elections is well established. Voters reward or punish incumbent party candidates based on the state of the economy. The electorate focuses particularly on economic change, not the level of the economy per se, and pays more attention to late-arriving change than earlier change. On these points there is a good amount of scholarly agreement (see e.g., Erikson and Wlezien 1996; Hibbs 1987). There is less agreement, however, on what specific indicators matter to voters. Some scholars rely on income growth, others on GDP growth, and yet others on subjective perceptions (see Abramowitz 2008; Campbell 2008; Holbrook 1996b; also see Campbell and Garand 2000). In our work, we have used the index of leading economic indicators, a composite of ten variables, including the University of Michigan's index of consumer expectations, stock prices, and eight other objective indicators.

THE ECONOMY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN 2008

The October 2008 issue of PS published a symposium of presidential and congressional forecasts made in the summer leading up to the election. This article is an assessment of the accuracy of their models.Prior to the 2008 presidential election we provided forecasts of the final vote relying on a model containing only two variables: (1) the cumulated weighted growth in leading economic indicators (LEI) through the thirteenth quarter of the sitting president's term; and (2) the incumbent party candidate's share in the most recent trial-heat polls. The novelty is the reliance on the advanced reading of the economy from the quarter ending in March of the election year. (The exact equation and the exact forecast change as the poll readings get closer to the election.) Our final forecast (Erikson and Wlezien 2008) based on trial-heat polls in August was that Barack Obama would win 52.2% of the two-party popular vote. This turned out to be quite close to the Election Day outcome of 53.5% (as of December 2), a little more than one percentage point above what we predicted.

Economic Voting and Political Sophistication in the United States

The authors propose a reexamination of the conditioning effect of political sophistication on economic voting in U.S. presidential elections. Replicating Gomez and Wilson's (2001) analysis with survey data from the past five American presidential elections (1988—2004), they show that low sophisticates strictly rely on sociotropic economic judgments in their intention to support the incumbent party's candidate. For their part, high sophisticates appear to use both sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations in their voting intention, but only in elections where the sitting incumbent is running for reelection (1992, 1996, and 2004). Most of these findings do not hold, however, once the postelectoral reported vote is used as the dependent variable. Indeed, the authors find that pocketbook evaluations do not have a significant impact on high sophisticates' reported vote choice, and they also find important variance in economic voting effects among low sophisticates. The results indicate that high sophisticates continue to use sociotropic evaluations in their voting decision, but only in incumbent elections. Overall, the analysis raises doubts about some of the previous studies' conclusions and underlines the importance of considering the moderating role of contextual factors such as incumbency and political campaigns in economic voting studies.

Does the smart guy win? An individual capability model for predicting presidential elections

AbstractCurrent models for predicting US presidential elections focus on economic growth, the popularity of the current President, and incumbency. Most presume implicitly that the election is a referendum on the performance of the sitting President and his party. Characteristics of the opponent and personal characteristics of the incumbent party's candidate are not accounted for. In this paper, we explain and test a new model drawn from the literature on the performance of corporate executives. The model relies on objective measures of the complexity with which each candidate processes information. In all presidential elections for which these measures are available, the candidate who demonstrated the greater complexity of information processing won. Adding the information processing assessment also improves the predictive performance of current models. These findings suggest that the referendum model is needlessly limited, and that voters in fact compare the expected performance of both candidates before making a decision. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A Functional Analysis of the 2002 Korean Presidential Debates

This study applied the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Discourse to the 2002 Korean presidential debates. These messages stressed acclaims (positive statements) more than attacks; defenses were the least common function. Policy (issues) occurred more frequently than character (image). General goals and ideals were used more to acclaim than attack. The incumbent party candidate acclaimed more and attacked less than challenger party candidates (and acclaimed more and attacked less on past deeds in particular). The most common form of defense was simple denial. These results were contrasted with the most recent American presidential debates to reveal similarities and differences between presidential debates in these two cultures.

A Functional Analysis of Presidential Direct Mail Advertising

This study investigated the nature of direct mail advertising, a commonly used but little studied form of political campaign communication. 715 brochures were content analyzed employing the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Discourse and Issue Ownership Theory. Acclaims were more common than attacks, which in turn were more frequent than defenses. Primary campaign pamphlets used more acclaims and fewer attacks than general campaign brochures. Democrats used more attacks and fewer acclaims than Republicans. In the general campaign, incumbent party candidates acclaimed more and attacked less than challengers. Incumbents were also prone to use past deeds to acclaim more, and attack less, than challengers. Incumbents tended to use future plans to acclaim more, and attack less, than challengers. Winners used more acclaims and fewer attacks than losers. Overall, direct mail brochures discussed policy more than character. Democrats discussed policy more and character less than Republicans. Democrats discussed Democratic issues more, and Republican issues less, than Republicans. Incumbent party candidates discussed policy more, and character less, than challengers. Winners discussed policy more, and character less, than losers. Winners attacked more on policy, and less on character, than losers. Similarities and differences between direct mail advertising and other message forms were discussed.

A functional analysis of presidential television spots: A comparison of Korean and American ads

This study applies the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Discourse to the television spots from the 2002 Korean presidential campaign. TV ads appear to have become an institutionalized component of the Korean presidential campaign; as yet no study has examined the most recent Korean presidential ads. Like American candidates, Korean presidential candidates rely more on acclaims (positive utterances) than attacks (negative statements). They also rarely defend in spots. The incumbent party candidate, Roh, offered more acclaims than the challenger Lee, whereas the challenger Lee used more attacks than did Roh. However, unlike American candidates (who emphasized policy over character), policy (issue) and character (image) were almost equally discussed in Korean advertisements. Unlike American presidential candidates, the winner in Korea in 2002 emphasized character more than policy. It is clear that presidential campaign messages from these two cultures possess both similarities and differences.

A Functional Analysis of the 1988 Bush-Dukakis Presidential Debates

This study applies the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Discourse to the 1988 presidential debates between George Bush and Michael Dukakis. It challenges the notion that this campaign was mostly negative: The candidates relied more heavily on acclaims (59%) than on attacks (33%) or defenses (8%). The incumbent party candidate, Bush, devoted more discourse to acclaiming (62%) than the challenger (56%). The challenger attacked more (39%) than the incumbent (25%), which refutes the idea that Bush was more aggressive. Bush, who was subjected to more attacks, had more defenses (12% to 5%). Despite the belief that modern campaigns are devoid of substance, these debates stressed policy about twice as much as character.

Forecasting with Mixed Economic Signals: A Cautionary Tale

In every respect, the 2000 election defied what had become the conventional wisdom about American presidential elections—that the electorate rewards the incumbent administration for good economic times and punishes it for bad economic times. Occurring at a time when the incumbent president enjoyed fairly high levels of approval and the nation enjoyed relative economic prosperity, it seemed the 2000 election had all the markings of an election in which voters would support the status quo and vote to return a Democrat to the White House. Indeed, a group of election forecasters gathered at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and offered predictions that Gore would win a plurality of the two-party popular vote that ranged from 52.8% to 60.3%.The forecasts were as follows: Alan Abramowitz, 53.2%; James Campbell, 52.8%; Thomas Holbrook, 60.3%; Michael Lewis-Beck and Charles Tien, 55.4%; Brad Lockerbie, 60.3% (revised after the APSA roundtable); Helmut Norpoth, 55.0%; Christopher Wlezien and Robert Erikson, 55.2%. All forecasts are for the incumbent party candidate's percent of the two-party vote. Of course, we now know that although Gore did manage to win the popular vote by the slimmest of margins, he lost the electoral vote by an equally slim margin, and George W. Bush was elected president.

Fiscal Policy and Presidential Elections: Update and Extension

According to two articles previously published in this journal, fiscal policy exerts a predictable effect on the outcome of presidential elections in the United States (Cuzan and Heggen 1984; Cuzan and Bundrick 1992). It appears that, independent of economic conditions, fiscal restraint is rewarded but fiscal expansion is rejected at the polls. These findings are consistent with those of William Niskanen (1975, 1979) and Sam Peltzman (1990, 1992), the only other scholars, both economists, who have explored the impact of fiscal policy on American presidential elections.(1) This article updates, deepens, and extends the earlier work. The 1992 and 1996 elections are added to the set, for a total of thirty-two elections (or thirty, depending on data availability--see below) extending across a period of well over a century, one of the two longest data series that, to the best of our knowledge, is accounted for by any one presidential elections model.(2) An improved specification of the multiple regression model, one that uses the percentage of the two-party vote, rather than the percentage of the total vote, and which adds the number of consecutive terms that presidents of the same party have occupied the White House, results in a respectable fit with the data. Finally, analysis of the relationship between fiscal policy, presidential incumbency, and election outcome shows that it is not incumbency but fiscal policy that accounts for the success of sitting presidents. This last finding raises intriguing questions about the role of presidential leadership in democratic government. Fiscal Policy and Presidential Elections: Testing an Implausible Hypothesis Following Cuzan and Heggen's original article, published in this journal (see also Cuzan and Heggen 1985; Cuzan and Bundrick 1996), it is hypothesized that the outcome of presidential elections is contingent on fiscal policy. If fiscal policy is expansionary, incumbents are defeated; if it is cutback, they are reelected. By incumbents we mean the president or his party's candidate, along with his team. Fiscal policy is expansionary if F, the ratio of federal expenditures to gross national product (GNP) between election years, rises at a rate that is equal or greater than during the previous presidential term; it is cutback if this ratio declines or increases at a slower rate than in the previous administration (for a formal definition, see Table 1). There is a third possibility: a steady-state fiscal policy, where the ratio stays the same for two consecutive administrations. However, there is not one such case since 1872. Thus, de facto, fiscal policy or FISCAL is a binary variable (more about this below). Note that what defines fiscal policy are not the changes in the absolute amount of federal expenditures but in the percentage of GNP spent. It is in this relative sense that terms such as federal spending or expenditures and size of the budget are used here. TABLE 1 Definitions and Measurements of Variables VOTE2 Percentage of the two-party vote won by the incumbent party candidate (adapted from Fair 1996a). ELECT ELECT = 1 if incumbents (the president or his party's nominee) win reelection; ELECT = -1 if incumbents are defeated. GROWTH (g3) The annualized rate of growth of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) through the first three quarters of the presidential election year (Fair, 1996a, 1996b). INFLATION (p15) The annualized rate of growth of the GDP price index in the first fifteen quarters of the presidential term (Fair 1996a, 1996b). TERMS (T) The number of consecutive terms by presidents of the same party affiliation. …

Measurement of campaign efficiency using data envelopment analysis

Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is proposed as a method for measuring the efficiency of presidential campaigns. Campaign efficiency is defined as the success of incumbent party candidates in converting the economic conditions and presidential popularity of July into actual votes in November. DEA is described and illustrated using a case study (US presidential elections 1948–1996). Differences between outcome and efficiency and reasons for inefficiencies are explored.

Fiscal expansion and political instability in the Iberic-Latin region

Recent research by public choice-oriented economists and political scientists points to a negative relation between fiscal expansion and voter support for the incumbents. Real per capita federal spending is negatively associated with the vote for the incumbent party's candidate in American presidential elections (Niskanen, 1979). There is a negative relation between increases in the percent of Gross National Product spent by the central government and incumbent party reelection to the White House and the British parliament (Cuzain and Heggen, 1984, 1985). Furthermore, the incumbent party's vote in American gubernatorial elections varies inversely with increases in the ratio of state general revenues to state personal income between elections (Peltzman, 1987). Fiscal expansion is also associated with the overthrow of Latin American governments (Cuzin, 1986). Fiscally expansionist Latin American regimes whether civilian governments or military juntas tend to be overthrown, while democracies and dictatorships practicing fiscal restraint usually survive. Together, these findings suggest that fiscal expansion costs the incumbent party a loss of political support, resulting in its being voted out or forced out of office. Since the stability of any government depends partly on support for the incumbents, it is hypothesized that, ceteris paribus, fiscal expansion is a cause of political instability. According to this hypothesis, fiscal expansion has a boomerang effect on the incumbents, increasing the likelihood that the party will lose executive office either by election or coup. The purpose of this paper is twofold. One is to bring additional empirical