Incumbent Defeat Research Articles

Where Are the Sore Losers? Competitive Authoritarianism, Incumbent Defeat, and Electoral Trust in Zambia's 2021 Election.

How do electoral turnovers shape citizen perceptions of election quality in competitive authoritarian regimes? We argue that electoral outcomes are crucial for determining perceptions of electoral quality. While detailed evaluation of electoral trust is complex in competitive autocracies with institutional uncertainty and polarized electoral environments, turnovers send strong and unequivocal signals about election quality. Previous literature has noted a strong partisan divide in electoral trust in competitive authoritarian regimes, but turnovers can boost trust among both incumbent and opposition supporters. We test this argument in the case of Zambia's 2021 election, a case where a ruling party lost despite electoral manipulation and strong control over the Election Management Body (EMB). Empirically, we leverage the first-ever panel survey carried out during Zambian elections. Comparing trust in elections before and after the election, we find that perceived election quality increased after the 2021 electoral turnover among both losers and winners. We find that trust in elections increased the most among winning opposition supporters. Moreover, despite the outgoing president's attempt to portray the election as fraudulent, losing ruling-party supporters also increased their trust in elections after the turnover. The study has important implications for the literature on democratic consolidation and institutional trust.

Transactional Political Practices and Incumbent Defeat in the 2021 Patengteng Kab. Bangkalan Election

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan praktik politik transaksional yang dilakukan oleh kandidat MH. Rohim dan kekalahan petahana pada pemilihan kepala desa Patengteng Kabupaten Bangkalan tahun 2021. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian kualitatif dengan memadukan data primer dan data sekunder diperoleh melalui literatur, pemberitaan, dan dokumentasi yang menunjang penelitian ini. Pandangan Susan C. Stokes mengenai politik transaksional dipilih sebagai upaya penulis untuk melihat lebih lanjut bentuk dan operasi politik transaksional. Didukung oleh pandangan Frederick Charles Schaffer mengenai politik transaksional untuk melihat perspektif transaksi politik dari sudut pandang kandidat dan pemilih. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa transaksi politik yang dilakukan oleh seorang kandidat dapat menjadi penyebab pemilih mengubah dukungannya di beberapa kelompok masyarakat sekaligus menjadi penyebab kekalahan petahana. Hal ini dibuktikan dengan cara MH. Rohim melakukan transaksi politiknya di pos-pos penting di desa Patengteng seperi masjid, madrasah, makam ulama. Sang kandidat dapat mengambil hati para pemilih dengan memperhatikan rumah ibadah, pendidikan dan ulama. Selain itu dalam melakukan transaksi politiknya MH. Rohim berperan sebagai problem solver atas persoalan yang ada di masyarakat Patengteng. Masyarakat melihat distribusi bantuan tersebut sebagai penghormatan dan hadiah. Penilaian tersebut kemudian terkonfirmasi dengan adanya perubahan dukungan di beberapa kelompok masyarakat di Patengteng yang menyebabkan kekalahan dari petahana. Faktor lain yang menyebabkan petahana kalah adalah ketidakpuasan pemilih terhadap keputusan petahana yang melakukan pernikahan dengan klebun Sadi tanpa menunggu masa iddah. Hal ini membuat citranya buruk di mata masyarakat Patengteng. Karena tindakannya tersebut telah menciderai norma-norma yang ada di masyarakat Patengteng

New Media, Incumbency and Malaysian Politics: The Defeat of the Barisan Nasional (BN) in GE14 (2018)

The Malaysian 14th General Election (GE14) has ended the political domination of Barisan Nasional (BN) of the last 61 years and resulted in a new discussion in Malaysian politics. The main purpose of this study is to explore the factors that caused BN to fail in the last election and to refine the incumbency theory posited by Hirano and Snyder Jr (2012) and Torcal (2014). We argue that various factors have contributed to the defeat of the BN government in the 14th GE, namely the 1MDB corruption scandal, the implementation of the progressive Good and Service Tax (GST), the rise of living costs, and the China-oriented foreign and economic policies, as well as the Mahathir factor. Our results also contribute to further developing incumbency theory. Instead of relying on traditional factor of incumbent defeat in election such as scandal and economic factors, the role of new media in spreading the news about the corruption scandal and the government’s economic underperformance have also contributed to a political shift in Malaysia.

‘The outcome of a historical process set in motion in 1991’: explaining the failure of incumbency advantage in Zambia’s 2021 election

ABSTRACT This article uses a longitudinal comparative perspective to analyse Zambia's 2021 transfer of power. The article takes the previous elections since the transition to multi-party democracy in 1991 as a body in which patterns of incumbency failure can be seen. It identifies five pervasive patterns that seem present in all polls that have resulted in leadership change or turnovers: a struggling economy with a clear blame orientation, a unified opposition, a depoliticised military, a rather impartial electoral commission, and collective memory of incumbent defeat. The importance of each of these factors varies over time, but collectively they shape election outcomes in decisive ways. Drawing on interviews and newspaper sources, I apply these variables to the 2021 election that resulted in the defeat of President Edgar Lungu and the victory of the opposition candidate. I argue that the repeated failure of incumbency advantage in Zambia reflects the institutionalisation of democratic processes, notably embodied in competitive elections, an increasingly independent electoral commission, effective opposition parties that can devise robust campaign strategies, and a military that continues to choose non- intervention whenever an incumbent is defeated. More broadly, I demonstrate why alternation is becoming routine while the power of incumbency is in decline.

Don’t Touch My Constitution! Civil Society Resistance to Democratic Backsliding in Africa´s Pluralist Regimes

AbstractAnalyzing civil society resistance to elite‐led democratic backsliding in Africa, the article argues that the non‐militant, civil society‐based transitions experienced in the 1990s left a legacy of a pro‐democracy cleavage that is mobilized when central constitutional rights are threatened. Building on insights from social movement theory, the paper argues that the conduct of multiparty elections at regular intervals provides an opportunity for contestation over constitutional rules, and the historical legacy of pro‐democracy movements provides a mobilizing structure for civil society to organize for the protection of constitutional rights. The theoretical argument is illustrated by a comparison of the democratic trajectories in Zambia and Malawi. In both countries, incumbent elites’ have attempted to remain in power through constitutional revisions. However, processes of executive aggrandizement have been stalled by civil society mobilization that again have resulted in incumbent defeat and electoral turn‐overs. Recent waves of democratic backsliding suggest that the autonomy of civil society from political parties may be a key factor for the ability of civil society to challenge autocratization. Malawi’s civil society has maintained a high degree of autonomy but in Zambia, the close cooperation between civil society and the Patriotic Front (PF) and the resulting cooptation of key civil society actors have resulted in a process of autocratization.

Kegagalan Praktik Patronase-Klientelisme pada Pemilihan Kepala Desa di Kabupaten Klaten Tahun 2019

The study patronage-clienttelism at the level Village Head Selection is still an important concern. Therefore, this study aims to explain the phenomenon of incumbent defeat and the failure patronage-clienttelism practices in the 2019 Village Head Elections in Klaten Regency. This study uses qualitative method with case study approach in Randusari Village, Jimbung Village, and Jiwowetan Village. Data collection using interviews and documentation studies, informants are selected purposively, consisting prospective village heads, successful teams, and voters. Data analysis techniques are carried out through data collection, data reduction, data presentation and drawing conclusions. The results showed that Village Head Elections Simultaneously Randusari, Jimbung and Jiwowetan 2019 are full of patronage-clienttelism practices. The types of patronage-clienttelism used vary quite by type, as well as actors who are directly related to the electorate. The practice patronage-clienttelism in all three villages, was unable to encourage the incumbent candidate to win the election result. The challengers managed to explore the limitations and cursess that exist in the incumbent. So that it is able to change the behavior of choosing society through psychological, sociological and rational choices.

The Paradox of Incumbency: Patronage, Clientelism, and Incumbent Defeat in Village Chief Elections

This article examines the practices of patronage and clientelism during village elections. Examining Mekarsari Village, Yogyakarta, this study finds that patronage strategies such as programmatic politics, vote buying, club goods, and individual gifts were used by all candidates during village elections owing to the lack of strong social bonds between candidates and voters. The incumbent with all advantages and access to material resources also used patronise and clientelism as strategy, but in fact, it cannot guarantee they win the election. This suggests that the societal relationships and practices of patronage and clientelism continue to affect voter’s preference. Applying sociological, psychological, and rational approaches to understanding voter behaviour especially in Java, the study found that, apart from the instrumental and social distance considerations, territorial representation also influenced voter’s preference at Village.

PREELECTION MOBILIZATION AND ELECTORAL OUTCOME IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES*

Does preelection protest have an effect on the outcomes of authoritarian elections? Electoral authoritarian regimes use elections to consolidate their power and claim democratic legitimacy. Nonetheless, on some occasions authoritarian incumbents lose elections despite their advantages, and a democratic breakthrough is achieved. I propose that preelection protests contribute to such election results. Existing scholarship focuses primarily on the effectiveness of postelection upheavals, and the effects of preelection protest are still theoretically and empirically understudied. This article proposes a theory for why preelection contention has an independent effect on incumbent defeat of authoritarian regimes and democratization. I present empirical support for the association between preelection protest activities, incumbent defeat, and democratization using data from 190 elections across 65 countries with nondemocratic regimes. The findings of this analysis have important implications for studies of social movements, authoritarian politics, and democratization.

Electoral Security of Members of the U.S. House, 1900–2006

Previous studies have documented that the increase in the incumbency advantage in the 1960s did not decrease the probability of defeat of incumbents in the U.S. House. I define a method for establishing bounds on the probability of incumbent defeat and find that it decreases significantly in the 1950s, before the rise of the incumbency advantage. Incumbency advantage does not have a direct relationship with incumbent defeat rates, raising questions about the use of the incumbency advantage as a means for making inferences about the electoral security of incumbents.

Do electoral coalitions facilitate democratic consolidation in Africa?

In a region where democratization has led to a proliferation of opposition parties, pre-electoral coalitions represent an obvious means by which to reduce excessive party fragmentation in Africa. However, this article examines whether such coalitions facilitate democratic consolidation in terms of contributing to incumbent turnovers as well as creating competitive, institutionalized party systems. Election data for all opposition coalitions formed in Africa’s electoral democracies since 2000 reveals that coalitions rarely result in incumbent defeat. In addition, I find that a sizeable share of a country’s total electoral volatility is often due to fluctuations in voting for opposition parties that enter and exit coalitions, indicating the inability of coalition members to build loyal constituencies and become institutionalized over time. I argue that this is because many of these coalitions are primarily office-seeking and consist of parties that are distinguished predominantly by the personality of their leaders rather than a distinct political programme that is relevant to the concerns of African citizens.

Do Low Contribution Limits Insulate Incumbents from Competition?

This paper examines whether campaign contribution limits lead to closer elections and improve challengers' chances of victory, or insulate incumbents from challenge. Empirical work helps to determine which of these theoretical predictions is correct. A good test of these predictions is to test the effect of low contribution limits ($500/individual contributor or less) on the competitiveness of elections, because low limits are most likely to affect the campaigns of incumbents and challengers. States are natural laboratories to examine the consequences of tight contribution limits because state legislative races, unlike Congressional races, have campaign finance limits within a large range, from stringent to non-existent. This paper analyzes state assembly races from 1980 to 2006, and examines whether candidates’ vote shares and election outcomes are altered by changes in state campaign contribution restrictions over time, using five different measures of election competitiveness. The findings are that contribution limits in general lead to more competitive elections, and that this effect is largest for low contribution limits. Relative to races with contribution limits of $2,000 and higher, the tightest limit considered - a $500 cap on contributions by individuals - reduces the average margin of victory of incumbents by 14 percent, increases the likelihood of a close race by over 15 percent, and increases the likelihood of incumbent defeat by 10 percent.

The public incumbent's defeat in mobile competition: Implications for the sequencing of telecommunications reform

Within a mere 5 years of market competition, the mobile communications sector in Taiwan has exceeded a 100% penetration rate, currently ranking near the top of the world. In an even more stunning development, the public incumbent, Chunghwa Telecom, has handed the leadership status to a market entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp., despite phenomenal mobile communications growth. This paper explores the factors that hamstrung Chunghwa Telecom in competition against its rival entrants. Our econometric analysis substantiates the fact that handset subsidies are the most effective instrument for mobile firms to gain market share. Chunghwa Telecom, due to its public ownership status, was nevertheless prohibited at first from adopting such a marketing strategy. The empirical results provided in this paper indeed pinpoint the importance of the sequencing of reform mandates in developing telecommunications: a prolonged privatization could help to promote competition in the industry. Public ownership makes Chunghwa Telecom vulnerable to political intervention and operational inefficiency, which is a barricade to performance and competitiveness for the not-yet-privatized company in a liberalized market. Taiwan's case presents an interesting deviation from conventional development theories, while it deserves scrutiny as it paves a shortcut to successful implementation of telecommunication reform in a timely fashion.

The Public Incumbent's Defeat in Mobile Competition: Implications for the Sequencing of Telecommunications Reform

Within a mere five years of market competition, the mobile communications sector in Taiwan has exceeded a 100 percent penetration rate, currently ranking near the top of the world. In an even more stunning development, the public incumbent, Chunghwa Telecom, has handed the leadership status to a market entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp., despite phenomenal mobile communications growth. This paper explores the factors that hamstrung Chunghwa Telecom in competition against its rival entrants. Our econometric analysis substantiates the fact that handset subsidies are the most effective instrument for mobile firms to gain market share. Chunghwa Telecom due to its public ownership status was nevertheless prohibited at first from adopting such a marketing strategy. The empirical results provided in this paper indeed pinpoint the importance of the sequencing of reform mandates in developing telecommunications: a prolonged privatization could help to promote competition in the industry. Public ownership makes Chunghwa Telecom vulnerable to political intervention and operational inefficiency, which is a barricade to performance and competitiveness for the not-yet-privatized company in a liberalized market. Taiwan's case sheds light on how to produce a better outcome for telecommunications: market reform should be carried out by liberalizing the market first and privatizing the public incumbent later.

Spending cuts or tax increases? The composition of fiscal adjustments as a signal

This paper shows that the composition of fiscal adjustments, spending cuts versus tax increases, serves as a signal of the government's degree of collusion with special interests. The politico-economic model of fiscal policies, combining retrospective voting with common-agency-type lobbying, presents undominated separating equilibria and intuitive pooling ones, in both of which fiscal adjustments with sufficiently large spending cuts lead to incumbent reappointment whereas those with only tax increases lead to incumbent defeat. These findings are consistent with the recent empirical evidence of voters behaving as fiscal conservatives. The efficiency-enhancing aspects of the signaling mechanism and the effects of imposing a deficit limit are also analyzed.

“Bricks and Mortar” Politics: How Infrastructure Decisions Defeat Incumbents

“Bricks and mortar” issues have replaced taxes and services as the focal point of local elections in many communities. Voters dissatisfied with elected officials' infrastructure decisions have increasingly tossed them out of office. This study analyzes municipal election data from 47 Florida cities and 60 electoral contests where incumbents lost in 2001. (Florida's incumbent defeat rate exceeds that of the nation at large.) The larger the city, the more likely an infrastructure issue is at the heart of an incumbent's defeat. Infrastructure issues can spell defeat for elected officials in both high‐ and low‐growth communities, but for different reasons.

The Public Incumbent's Defeat in Mobile Competition: A Revisited Study of Telecommunication Reforms

Within a mere five years of market competition, the mobile communications sector in Taiwan has reached over a 100 percent penetration rate, currently ranking near the top of the world. However stunningly this is, the state-owned incumbent, Chunghwa Telecom, handed the leadership status to a market entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp., despite excessive mobile communications development. This paper explores the causes that placed Chunghwa Telecom behind in competition against its rival entrants. Our ECM analysis substantiates that handset subsidies are the most effective instrument among others for mobile firms to gain the market share. Chunghwa Telecom was nevertheless prohibited from adopting such a marketing strategy due to budgetary constraints governing state-owned enterprises provided by Budget Law. The econometric results provided in this paper indeed contradict the state theory in that a state-owned enterprise under market competition might no longer remain strong and capable in extracting social resources. Instead, state ownership evolves into a barricade to capability and competitiveness for the not-yet-privatized company in a liberalized market. Taiwan's case sheds light on how to produce a better outcome for telecommunications reforms: privatization should be simultaneously carried on with liberalization.

Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables

To examine the traditional view that challenger spending is more effective than incumbent spending, I reestimate the effects of spending using instrumental variables that affect a candidate's ability to raise campaign funds, such as candidate wealth levels. When the endogeneity of candidate spending levels is properly taken into account, the marginal effects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal. In contrast to previous research showing that, because of higher marginal returns to challenger spending, the incumbent's spending advantage cannot explain high incumbent reelection rates, this article shows that in an average Senate election the incumbent's spending advantage yields a 6% increase in the incumbent's vote share. That incumbent spending wins elections has direct implications regarding the consequences of campaign finance reform. My findings imply that equalizing spending levels may significantly increase incumbent defeat rates, and caps on candidate spending may improve the chances of challengers.

The Political Costs of Taxes and Government Spending

The marginal political costs of different types of taxes and government spending, as well as voter preferences over different fiscal variables, are examined using two different specifications for political cost - one based on the probability of incumbent defeat and the other based on the incumbent's percentage of the vote. Models associated with these two specifications, in which voting behaviour depends on disaggregated taxes and government expenditures, are estimated using clata from Canadian provincial elections. The empirical results, which indicate that different types of taxes and expenditures have quite different marginal political costs, have important implications for models that incorporate voter pref- erences.

The Dissat-Factor: Recent Discoveries in the Dissatisfaction Theory

During an AERA symposium, Douglas Mitchell (1988) charged dissatisfaction theory to live up to the expectations of it. He suggested that it was perhaps time to abandon the theory because it had not been able to predict the political upheavals it described. Coming from one who has contributed significantly to the theory, and is probably the one who labeled it, his suggestion that it should perhaps be abandoned because of its failure to provide reliable prediction indeed deserves serious consideration. This article deals with that assertion in two ways. First, it reports the first instance of actually predicting school board member incumbent defeat. Second, it suggests why prediction, in its absolute statistical sense, is not the only goal or perhaps even an achievable expectation for such a social/political theory.

Predicting Public Dissatisfaction: A Study of School Board Member Defeat

Using data collected in 95 Ohio school districts by Hunt (1980), this study reanalyzed those data, examined the reasons for Hunt's inability to predict school board member incumbent defeat, and developed a model that would have predicted those Ohio school board ekctions.