A general-equilibrium model is developed to highlight the link between neo-Keynesian models of unemployment and recent results on the constrained sub-optimality of competitive economies with incomplete asset markets. Although the model deviates from the Arrow-Debreu paradigm only by the absence of some contingent claims, the competitive equilibrium exhibits under-employment and balanced-budget fiscal policies have Keynesian effects which are Pareto improving. Will a market economy, left to itself, fully employ its resources? In The General Theory, Keynes exploited several mechanisms through which real economies differ from the classical paradigm where unemployment is either voluntary or non-existent. A common characteristic of these mechanisms is the difficulty of coordinating production and consumption plans in a decentralized economy. In recent years neo-Keynesians have sought to develop general-equilibrium models from micro foundations where this coordination problem can be analyzed. These efforts are of interest for two reasons. First, as an intellectual exercise it is of interest to explore which deviations from the classical paradigm are necessary and/ or sufficient to generate Keynesian effects. Second, from a policy perspective, it is important to start from micro-foundations to verify the welfare implications of policy. The neo-Keynesian literature has gone in several directions. We will not review them here.' At this point it is sufficient to note that the argument developed below is based on incomplete financial markets and thus is related to the asymmetric information models of Greenwald and Stiglitz.2 The main contribution of this paper is the development of a model where we can make the following three points: 1) The Keynesian coordination problem can arise naturally in a competitive system with perfectly flexible prices and rational expectations. 2) The mechanism underlying the coordination problem is related to recent work on the constrained sub-optimality of competitive equilibria with incomplete markets. As such, the coordination problem is generic to this and other models with incomplete financial markets. 3) Familiar, and feasible, policies can be welfare improving even though they do not directly address the fundamental microeconomic causes of the coordination failure. We study in detail the welfare effects of two fiscal policies and discuss briefly how other policies can be studied within this model.
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