Incommensurability Of Theories Research Articles

Triangulation, incommensurability, and conditionalization

Abstract We present a new justification for methodological triangulation (MT), the practice of using different methods to support the same scientific claim. Unlike existing accounts, our account captures cases in which the different methods in question are associated with, and rely on, incommensurable theories. Using a nonstandard Bayesian model, we show that even in such cases, a commitment to the minimal form of epistemic conservatism, captured by the rigidity condition that stands at the basis of Jeffrey’s conditionalization, supports the practice of MT.

Thomas Kuhn’s Late Incommensurability Thesis as a Wittgensteinian Pragmatism

This paper explores Thomas Kuhn’s mature conception of incommensurable theories as collective structured lexicons that are not mutually translatable. As will be argued, his view on this issue can profitably be approached in the light of the broad pragmatist attitude that one finds at the core of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy of language, which can also consistently be ascribed to Kuhn.

Incommensurability of Theories as Incompatibility of Taxonomic Categories

Incommensurability of Theories as Incompatibility of Taxonomic Categories

The Paradox of Strategizing: Embracing Managerial Agency without Throttling it

Strategizing implies making agentic choices in some middle ground between un-analyzable free will and agency-denying determinism. Paradoxically, neither view can capture the strategist’s situation or process. So how are strategy theorists approach agency? In our opening sections, we review the mainstream literature and find seven main arguments or tracks. Five, by improving methodological accuracy and reducing variance, effectively throttle or deny the strategist’s agency. The two other tracks offer agency an ontological or epistemological place in the analysis but underplay the synthetic nature of the strategist’s practice. In our final sections, we treat strategizing as handling the practice-based constraints to the strategist’s agency. A positivist approach makes little sense here for ex definition strategy supposes a finite option-space into which the strategist’s agency is ‘thrown’. Practitioners focus on their choices within this space rather than on the application of a generalized ‘theory of strategy’. There is little new here; but analyzing it means moving away from causal modeling and towards exploring the options remaining after all reasonable determining causes have been identified - leaving the strategist with the under-determined middle ground s/he ‘synthesizes’ from incommensurable theories and empirically justified heuristics. Concluding, we propose a novel track of theorizing for those strategists seeking to engage their agentic capabilities rather than theorizing about agency as a component of a rigorous academic model.

Kuhn’s Theory of Incommensurability: A Special Reference to Theory of Meaning

The Structure of Scientific Revolution (1962) is the famous work by Thomas Kuhn which challenged traditional understanding of science and philosophy of science. His research activities are wide-ranging; central to his notion of incommensurability are the ideas of meaning variance and lexicon, and the impossibility of translation of terms across different theories. It is closely related to the linguistic analysis of scientific language. The schematic nature of Kuhn’s work and his ongoing clarification of its key concepts fostered additional problems of understanding, interpretation, and attribution. This paper analyses the notion of scientific language in the context of incommensurability with special reference to the theory of meaning. Linguistic experts have not attempted to incorporate Kuhn’s incommensurability to address the issues related to epistemology. This Paper shows how Kuhn’s theory of incommensurability can be applied to linguistics to overcome the problems that arise due to similar lexical terms. It argues that Kuhn’s epistemological analysis of incommensurability, particularly the challenge of understanding the process of symbolization in scientific theories, when applied to linguistics can revolutionize the discipline itself which fills the existing knowledge gap.

Structural Correspondence Between Organizational Theories

Organizational research constitutes a differentiated, complex and fragmented field with multiple contradicting and incommensurable theories that make fundamentally different claims about the social and organizational reality. In contrast to natural sciences, the progress in this field can’t be attributed to the principle of truthlikeness where theories compete against each other and only best theories survive and prove they are closer to the truth and thus demonstrate scientific knowledge accumulation. We defend the structural realist view on the nature of organizational theories in order to demonstrate that despite the multiplicity of isolated and competing explanations of organization-environment relations these theories are still logically compatible and mutually consistent which, in turn, assures theoretical progress in the field. Although postulating different and incompatible ontologies, three most successful organization-environments theories, namely, contingency theory, new institutionalism and population ecology share the same explanations of the relations between organizations and environments at the structural level. Without this principle one would say that what occurs in the field of organization theory is a change rather than a progress.

Incommensurability, types of phenomena and relevant incompatibility (part II)

Although incommensurability between theories has been object of study during many years, there does not seem to be a clear consensus regarding the notion of meaning according to which it should be characterised. Based on the notion of incommensurability proposed here, the common ground between incommensurable theories is neither determined by the sense nor by the reference of the relevant terms, but by a given phenomenon type, which fixes the subject matter of inquiry. Phenomenon types are understood as expressions that are associated with some phenomenon and describable or understandable in some language. In this proposal, two theories can refer to a same phenomenon type even if they are mutually incommensurable about the concepts used in them to grasp it. This possibility may serve as a way of fixing the subject matter of an investigation and, thus, to characterise the common ground between incommensurable paths of inquiry, offering also a strategy to solve some remaining problems associated with realism and scientific progress.

Incommensurability, types of phenomena and relevant incompatibility (part I)

Although incommensurability between theories has been object of study during many years, there does not seem to be a clear consensus regarding the notion of meaning according to which it should be characterised. Based on the notion of incommensurability proposed here, the common ground between incommensurable theories is neither determined by the sense nor by the reference of the relevant terms, but by a given phenomenon type, which fixes the subject matter of inquiry. Phenomenon types are understood as expressions that are associated with some phenomenon and describable or understandable in some language. In this proposal, two theories can refer to a same phenomenon type even if they are mutually incommensurable about the concepts used in them to grasp it. This possibility may serve as a way of fixing the subject matter of an investigation and, thus, to characterise the common ground between incommensurable paths of inquiry, offering also a strategy to solve some remaining problems associated with realism and scientific progress.

Specialisation and the Incommensurability Among Scientific Specialties

In his mature writings, Kuhn describes the process of specialisation as driven by a form of incommensurability, defined as a conceptual/linguistic barrier which promotes and guarantees the insularity of specialties. In this paper, we reject the idea that the incommensurability among scientific specialties is a linguistic barrier. We argue that the problem with Kuhn’s characterisation of the incommensurability among specialties is that he presupposes a rather abstract theory of semantic incommensurability, which he then tries to apply to his description of the process of specialisation. By contrast, this paper follows a different strategy: after criticising Kuhn’s view, it takes a further look at how new scientific specialties emerge. As a result, a different way of understanding incommensurability among specialties will be proposed.

Cognitive archaeology without behavioral modernity: An eliminativist attempt

During the last decade, evidence of artifacts typically associated with the European Upper Palaeolithic has gradually accumulated in the archaeological record of early modern human and late Neanderthal populations. These artifacts, in particular instances of “symbolic” body ornaments, have been considered proof of “behavioral modernity” and used to draw inferences about the cognitive equivalence between primitive and modern human populations. Very recently, however, proponents of holistic mapping and material engagement theory have provided two separate lines of argument criticizing the notion of behavioral modernity and its use in cognitive archaeology. Major problems with this concept have been identified at both the epistemological and metaphysical levels. In this paper I will articulate a critique of behavioral modernity by integrating the preliminary tenets of the aforementioned approaches within a unitary perspective. This integrative process will provide close examination of behavioral modernity under the lights of scientific eliminativism. I will argue that behavioral modernity fails to instantiate a natural kind and thus it cannot be the object of reliable scientific analysis. Furthermore, behavioral modernity does also not represent a useful functional kind, for it offers no explanatory role in the mapping of artifacts and mental architectures. The current use of behavioral modernity in cognitive archaeology is grounded in a series of arbitrary categories and unwarranted inferences. In consequence, this notion can, and in fact, does harm this domain, because it fosters incommensurable theories. For these reasons, I conclude that behavioral modernity ought to be eliminated from the cognitive archaeology vocabulary.

Incommensurability, Comparability, and Non-reductive Ontological Relations

We begin by highlighting some points related to Kuhn’s later thoughts on the incommensurability thesis and then show to what extent the standard version of the thesis given by the structuralist metatheory allows us to capture Kuhn’s ideas. Our main aim is to establish what constitutes the basis of comparability between incommensurable theories, even in cases of incommensurability with respect to theoretical and non-theoretical terms. We propose that comparability between (radical) incommensurable theories requires some connection between their respective ontologies that can be captured by means of an ontological non-reductive relation. At this point, the structuralist notion of “echeloned partial substructure” may be of help. When the incommensurability is very drastic, the existence of ontological connections between the theories involved may only be evident by common terms of their non-characteristic vocabularies. So, this notion of non-characteristic vocabulary becomes relevant in our proposal.

The Incommensurability Thesis: Has It Lost Its Bite?

Incommensurability constitutes the focal point of Kuhn’s departure from the prevailing traditions in Philosophy of Science. The paper traces the mathematical origin of the concept of “incommensurability” and philosophical environment that constrained the introduction of the idea in the literature. It then discusses the stages through which the concept of “incommensurability” evolved in Kuhn’s thought. The final account of “incommensurability,” viz., Kinds Theory of Incommensurability or Taxonomic Incommensurability, is also expounded, and some associated philosophical problems are discussed. We analyze two case studies, provide textual and historical evidence, and cite the work of scholars supporting the conceptual continuity across the revolutionary divide in both the case studies. Kuhn acknowledges the rigidity of his earlier position and softens his stand on incommensurability in his last formulation of the thesis, justifying the title of the paper that Kuhn’s thesis lost its bite. At the end of the paper, we discuss some of the philosophical problems arising out of it and make certain critical remarks on the final account.

Racionalidad y elección de teorías: una aproximación a Howard Sankey

This paper aims to explore some possibilities of application of the pluralist model for the choice of theories proposed by Howard Sankey. It claims that this model is effective to explain some problems associated with the rational theory-choice, such as the historical variability of the choice mechanisms, the epistemic components of the criteria and the risk of relativism. The paper states that the model is an interesting strategy to defend rationality preserving a version of the incommensurability thesis. The second section addresses the problem of the translatability of incommensurable theories and the varia-tion in meaning, with an emphasis on the concept of background natural language. The third section presents Sankey’s model, tracing antecedents in Kuhn, Feyerabend and Wittgenstein, and analyzing the thesis that states that no criterion of evaluation of theories is inviolable. The concept of rational disagreement is also discussed, using events of the Copernican revolution as reference. The section four continues with the issue of Copernicanism, focusing on the conditions for the breakdown of consensus in the scientific communities. Finally, the paper concludes by defending the functionality of Sankey’s model for dealing with problems associated with rationality.

Thinning Out Structural Theory

In this article, I argue that we can construct a new kind of account of constitutional doctrine, in which courts implement a handful of abstract norms — for example: “states may not undermine the constitutional structure” — with different doctrinal devices depending on the practical problems of implementation in different contexts. The central insight is that if we look carefully, we can find patterns in the forests of convoluted constitutional doctrine. These patterns suggest deep and long-lived consensuses on certain fundamental constitutional requirements; and we can explain a great deal of constitutional doctrine with these basic consensus norms and jettison standard justifications that make many of these doctrines controversial. This is surprising, and runs against the conventional picture of constitutional theory and practice as dominated by battles between incommensurable theories of value or constitutional interpretation. This account is preferable to conventional views on criteria for selecting among competing theories developed in the philosophy of science: It is consistent with our best general theory of law, legal positivism; it can advance constitutional theory beyond the interpretive debates in which the research program often seems mired; and it is simpler, more capacious, and more fruitful for future research than conventional accounts. At a time when it seems that we are fundamentally divided on nearly every constitutional question, this approach can begin dispelling this appearance by providing an alternative to constitutional theory’s traditional focus on interpretive and value controversies and by countering the increasing politicization of constitutional questions with evidence that we actually agree on important constitutional matters.

Kuhn’s notion of scientific progress: “Reduction” between incommensurable theories in a rigid structuralist framework

In the last two sections of Structure, Thomas Kuhn first develops his famous threefold conception of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms and, subsequently, a conception of scientific progress as growth of empirical strength. The latter conception seems to be at odds with the former in that semantic incommensurability appears to imply the existence of situations where scientific progress in Kuhns sense can no longer exist. In contrast to this seeming inconsistency of Kuhns conception, we will try to show in this study that the semantic incommensurability of scientific terms appears to be fully compatible with scientific progress. Our argumentation is based on an improved version of the formalization of Kuhns conception as developed in the 1970s by Joseph Sneed and Wolfgang Stegmuller: In order to be comparable, incommensurable theories need the specification of relations that refer to the concrete ontologies of these theories and involve certain truth claims. The original structuralist account of reduction fails to provide such relations, because (1) it is too structural and (2) it is too wide. Moreover, the original structuralist account also fails to cover important cases of incommensurable theories in being too restrictive for them. In this paper, we develop an improved notion of “reduction” that allows us to avoid these shortcomings by means of a more flexible device for the formalization of (partially reductive) relations between theories. For that purpose, we use a framework of rigid logic, i.e., logic that is based on a fixed collection of objects.

Kuhn on incommensurability and theory choice

The incommensurability of two theories seems to problematize theory comparisons, which allow for the selection of the better of the two theories. If so, it becomes puzzling how the quality of theories can improve with time, i.e. how science can progress across changes in incommensurable theories. I argue that in papers published in the 1990s, Kuhn provided a novel way to resolve this apparent tension between incommensurability and scientific progress. He put forward an account of their compatibility which worked not by downplaying the negative consequences of incommensurability but instead by allowing them to reach their natural end: a process of specialisation. This development in Kuhn’s thought has yet to be properly recorded but it is also interesting in its own right. It shows how a robust version of incommensurability—one which really does have severe negative consequences for scientists’ capacity to perform comparative evaluations of incommensurable theories—need make no puzzle of the progress of science.

Thomas Kuhn et l’oubli de la pratique

Cet article examine l’œuvre de Thomas Kuhn au prisme du rôle que joue la notion de pratique dans le développement de sa théorie de la rationalité scientifique. Je commence par exposer les enjeux épistémologiques de la théorie de l’incommensurabilité. Je montre ensuite comment l’intuition originale d’une conception pratique et sociale de l’incommensurabilité en vient à être remplacée par une interprétation linguistique plus conventionnelle. Dans la deuxième partie de l’article, j’examine la solution donnée par Kuhn au problème de l’incommensurabilité et j’en montre l’insuffisance. Je montre ensuite que c’est l’incapacité à penser la dimension épistémologique de la pratique qui empêche Kuhn de donner une solution pleinement satisfaisante au problème épistémologique soulevé par La structure des révolutions scientifiques.

Verballed? Incommensurability 50 years on

Someone is “verballed” in the Anglo-Australian idiom if they have attributed to them statements they did not actually make and indeed have explicitly denied. We will examine the evidence that Kuhn and Feyerabend were verballed in this sense by their critics and that the role of the idea of incommensurability in their argumentation has been systematically misunderstood and -represented. In particular, we will see that neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend, despite what their critics often say about them, held that incommensurability of theories implies the rational incomparability of theories. This is especially clear in the case of Feyerabend, whose argument is NOT that theories in a scientific tradition are on occasion incommensurable, but, rather, that, when the relations of theories in a tradition are represented in a particular way, they may on occasion be incommensurable according to that representation and hence incomparable if that representation is taken as providing the mechanisms of comparison. And the point of this claim is not to establish something about science, but, rather, to establish something about the representations of science which yield this result (i.e. that two theories might be incommensurable). Feyerabend in other words invokes incommensurability (according to the standards of a particular representation) as a reductio of that mode of representation. And this argument in fact depends precisely on the comparability of theories which are, according to the representation, incommensurable. Feyerabend’s argument is about the ways in which we should understand progress in science and he is concerned, in particular, to establish that a historically informed approach is superior to an approach which, if applicable, is applicable only to what he calls “abstract traditions”. Kuhn’s work, especially in the Postscript—1969, provides complementary materials, especially in relation to a collectivised and non-“algorithmic” account of theory choice across formally incommensurable paradigms.

RISE,GRUBENHUND: ON PROVINCIALIZING KUHN

Bilingualism was Kuhn's solution to the problem of relativism, the problem raised by his own theory of incommensurability. InThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he argued that scientific theories are separated by gulfs of mutual incomprehension. There is no neutral ground from which to judge one theory fitter than another. Each is formulated in its own language and cannot be translated into the idiom of another. Yet, like many Americans, Kuhn never had the experience of moving comfortably between languages. “I've never been any good really at foreign languages,” he admitted in an interview soon before his death. “I can read French, I can read German, if I'm dropped into one of those countries I can stammer along for a while, but my command of foreign languages is not good, and never has been, which makes it somewhat ironic that much of my thought these days goes to language.” Kuhn may have been confessing to more than a personal weakness. His linguistic ineptitude seems to be a clue to his overweening emphasis on the difficulty of “transworld travel.” Multilingualism remained for him an abstraction. In this respect, I will argue, Kuhn engendered a peculiarly American turn in the history of science. Kuhn's argument for the dependence of science on the norms of particular communities has been central to the development of studies of scienceinandasculture since the 1980s. Recent work on the mutual construction of science and nationalism, for instance, is undeniably in Kuhn's debt. Nonetheless, the Kuhnian revolution cut off other avenues of research. In this essay, I draw on the counterexample of the physician–historian Ludwik Fleck, as well as on critiques by Steve Fuller and Ted Porter, to suggest one way to situate Kuhn within the broader history of the history of science. To echo Kuhn's own visual metaphors, one of the profound effects ofThe Structure of Scientific Revolutionson the field of history of science was to render certain modes of knowledge production virtually invisible.

Incomensurabilidade, comparabilidade e objetividade

Este artigo pretende mostrar que o termo utilizado por Kuhn fornece, juntamente com o conceito de comparabilidade, as condicoes para uma escolha objetiva entre teorias. Procura-se defender que a filosofia de Kuhn nao e uma filosofia relativista. Discutem-se as nocoes de incomensurabilidade em sentido amplo e de incomensurabilidade local. Apresenta-se um evento da historia da astronomia ligado ao copernicanismo para ilustrar que a adequacao empirica permite a comparacao entre teorias localmente incomensuraveis.