Inclusive Legal Positivism Research Articles

ԻՐԱՎԱԸՆԿԱԼՈՒՄԸ ԵՎ CONTRA LEGEM ԻՐԱՎՈՒՆՔԻ ԶԱՐԳԱՑՈՒՄԸ / LEGAL UNDERSTANDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF LAW CONTRA LEGEM

The purpose of the work is to present the conditions in which legal understanding the doctrine of the development of law contra legem is possible. The doctrine of the development of law contra legem has the possibility of application in the context of legal relativism, when any type of legal understanding is not absolutized. The doctrine of natural law creates fertile ground for the development of law contrary to the law, and strict legalism excludes any manifestation of the development of law contrary to the law by a judge. The doctrine of the development of law contra legem is considered from the point of view of exclusive and inclusive legal positivism. It is concluded that exclusive legal positivism considers it possible in certain situations that law can develop contrary to the law. In the conditions of post-Soviet traditions, a positivist judge, even if he actually acts contrary to the law, will use the wording “interpretation correcting the law” or “reasonable exception to the law” in order to mask this phenomenon. The doctrine of the development of law contra legem is understood in relative and absolute terms.

Inclusive legal positivism: Basic arguments

The relevance of the topic of this paper is due to the insufficient study of the problems of inclusive legal positivism in the modern philosophy of law. The problem of substantiating the thesis of the inclusion of morality in law on the basis of rational argumentation of scientists and legal practice data considered in the paper allows an innovative analysis of basic legal concepts. The subject of the research is to analyze the methods of moral, ethical and legal argumentation in the works of representatives of inclusive legal positivism. The purpose of the work is to theoretically reconstruct the essence of the debate between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism. The novelty of the topic is due to the lack of studies in the educational and scientific literature on the specifics of the argumentation of inclusive legal positivism, set out in the scientific works of Will Waluchow and Kenneth Himma, the need to rethink traditional ideas about the theory of legal positivism. The research methods used in the paper is the methods characteristic of analytical jurisprudence, including those related to the use of methods of logical and linguistic analysis, as well as special legal methods (formal legal method of interpretation of regulatory prescriptions). The main conclusions of the paper are to reveal the key arguments of the concept of inclusive legal positivism. It is proved that from the point of view of this concept, the law has moral grounds, and judges in some cases use moral reasoning when making court decisions.

The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: Critical Capacity for Russian Legal Theory

This article is devoted to an analysis of the early arguments within the Anglo-American philosophical and legal discussion, known in the academic literature as the “Hart-Dworkin” debate. The key theses attributed by R. Dworkin to the legal positivism of H. Hart and his proponents are examined: the pedigree thesis, the discretion thesis, the obligation thesis and the separability thesis. R. Dworkin’s criticism of these theses, on the basis of legal positivists’ undervaluing of the role of legal principles, as well as the capacity of these arguments for reconsideration of the key assumptions of mainstream Russian legal theory, is characterized. The central statements of the exclusive (hard) and inclusive (soft) legal positivism as two strategies of reaction to R. Dworkin’s critique are analysed. The separability thesis is discussed through the framework of J. Coleman’s distinction between positive and negative versions of the positivist legal theory. The conclusion that the nature of the nexus between moral and legal norms has not been properly problematised in contemporary Russian legal theory and that the arguments in the Hart-Dworkin debate have critical capacity to challenge dogmatism on this issue is justified.

Realism and Positivism

ABSTRACT Several scholars advance the ‘LR-LP thesis’: the claim that American Legal Realism presupposes Legal Positivism. Brian Leiter and Frederick Schauer, prominent scholars of Realism, delimit that thesis to a Razian version of Exclusive Legal Positivism (‘ELP’). This article nevertheless argues that Leiter and Schauer’s respective accounts of Legal Realism are difficult to square with Razian ELP. Indeed, the Realist hypotheses about alternative drivers of official decision, concerning ‘working’ rules, ‘real’ rules, and ‘situation-types’, if correct, actually threaten Razian ELP. Problems arise for the LR-LP thesis (as delimited to Razian ELP) irrespective of whether those three Realist alternative drivers are classified as legal or non-legal norms. If they are non-legal, merits-based norms, then (a) those alternative drivers do much more work within official decision than ELP suggests is the case for those sorts of norms, and (b), Inclusive Legal Positivism may better, and might even be required, to explain them. Alternatively, if those Realist alternative drivers are better understood as source-based legal norms, then they cannot fulfil (or even be claimed by the law to fulfil) certain core functions that ELP attributes to legal norms.

On the Concept and the Nature of Law

The central argument of this article turns on the dual-nature thesis. This thesis sets out the claim that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension. The dual-nature thesis is incompatible with both exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. It is also incompatible with variants of non-positivism according to which legal validity is lost in all cases of moral defect or demerit (exclusive legal non-positivism) or, alternatively, is affected in no way at all by moral defects or demerits (superinclusive legal non-positivism). The dual nature of law is expressed, on the one hand, by the Radbruch formula, which says that extreme injustice is not law, and, on the other, by the correctness argument, which says that law’s claim to correctness necessarily includes a claim to moral correctness. Thus, what the law is depends not only on social facts, but also on what the law ought to be.

Between Populism and Juristocracy: The Republicanism of Rainer Knopff

AbstractRainer Knopff's scholarship on Canadian constitutionalism has offered some of the most trenchant criticism of the exercise of judicial review under the Charter, yet his theory has largely been misunderstood (as has that of his frequent co-author F. L. Morton). This article exposes two prominent critiques of Knopff's constitutional writings as straw man arguments and provides a republican account of his constitutional theory. The first straw man argument is that Knopff supports a majoritarian or populist conception of direct democracy. This claim is belied by Knopff's embrace of representative democracy and institutions structured to encourage reflexive deliberation. The second straw man argument is that Knopff is a moral rights skeptic. Knopff's rights skepticism is a legal skepticism about the determinacy of many rights that is merely a function of his inclusive legal positivism. The article concludes by reflecting on the republican lessons that Knopff's constitutional scholarship continues to offer, including how holding legislatures responsible for settling reasonable disagreements about legally indeterminate Charter rights might help counteract the twin threats of populism and juristocracy.

Wilfrid J. Waluchow: el positivismo incluyente y el constitucionalismo del “árbol vivo”

Este artículo presenta los dos temas centrales de la filosofía del derecho de Wilfrid J. Waluchow -el positivismo incluyente y el constitucionalismo del “árbol vivo”- con una exposición crítica de sus principales tesis, los contextos en los que surgen y las principales objeciones y desafíos a los que aún deben responder.

Incorporationism, Inclusivism, and Indeterminacy

This paper, which has been written as a contribution to a festschrift for Wil Waluchow, concentrates on the area of legal philosophy in which his finest accomplishments have occurred: namely, the area of general jurisprudence. Indeed, it concentrates more specifically on Inclusive Legal Positivism and especially on Incorporationism. Ever since the publication of Waluchow’s magisterial 1994 volume Inclusive Legal Positivism, the phrase “Inclusive Legal Positivism” has come to be the dominant designation for both of the two doctrines just mentioned. Nevertheless, I shall continue here my practice of referring to them with the separate designations which I have employed. This paper will mull over some issues that arise from my previous work on Inclusive Legal Positivism and Incorporationism, in order to amplify and refine and somewhat modify that earlier work by pondering some complexities that are not fully explored therein. Though a recent essay by Waluchow (2021) was not aimed at prompting my present meditations, that essay is in fact what has inspired them.

В поисках моральных оснований права: дебаты о природе инклюзивного правового позитивизма

The paper is devoted to the analysis of the arguments of foreign jurists about the nature and advantages of inclusive legal positivism as a legal theory that justifies the existence of moral foundations of the legal system. Examples from judicial practice are considered, as well as key theoretical approaches that reveal the necessary and sufficient features of inclusive legal positivism, as well as its subject specifics and basic provisions on the relationship between law and morality. The paper is prepared within the framework of the HSE research project «Applied Ethics».

The Inner Logic of Exclusivism (and Inclusivism): Shapiro's Shadowing

AbstractScott Shapiro, a prominent defender of exclusive legal positivism—exclusivism—has intriguingly (re)introduced a logical principle, the endorsement and rejection of which he (I take it) supposes can helpfully distinguish exclusivism from its contrary, inclusive legal positivism—inclusivism. It is an intriguing thought that principles pitched at such a high level of abstraction as this could distinguish between the two versions of positivism. My aim will be to test whether this principle—and associated principles—can do such distinguishing work.

Standardisation of legal documentation in Islamic home financing in Malaysia

PurposeThis paper aims to provide an analytical literature survey of selective studies on legal documentation in Islamic home financing with particular reference to Malaysia.Design/methodology/approachThis study adopts the legal positivist methodology, with particular reference to inclusive legal positivism which takes into consideration the possibility of moral values challenging positive law. Within the context of this study, though positive law provides for rules that govern contractual matters in Islamic home financing, standardisation is a functionality of maslahah (or public interest) which transcends the mandatory provisions of positive law but helps to protect the interest of all stakeholders. This is analysed through a systematic literature review which aims to provide practical insights into industry practices relating to Islamic home financing in Malaysia.FindingsThis paper provides information on the standard documentation used by conventional banks and existing practices of diverse models of legal documentation in the home financing sector within the Islamic financial services industry in Malaysia. It also recognises the need for standard documentation that is not only Sharīʿah-compliant but also consumer-friendly, as the terms of any standard financing agreement ought to ensure consumer protection. There is also the need for a Shari’ah-compliant Sales and Purchase Agreement, as it forms part of the complete set of legal documentation for Islamic home financing.Research limitations/implicationsIt is not an exhaustive study, as it did not consider practices in other jurisdictions offering Islamic financial services and products but only focusses on Malaysia. Though one may not generalise the findings of this study, Malaysia remains a leading model and a global hub for Islamic financial services and products.Practical implicationsA very useful source of information on the current state of legal documentation in Islamic home financing in Malaysia and the prevailing practices in the industry, which may serve as a guide for policymakers such as the Association of Islamic Banks in Malaysia (AIBIM) to embark on a full scale project of standardisation of all the legal documentation used in Islamic home financing.Originality/valueThis study fulfils an identified need of standardisation of legal documentation used in Islamic home financing in Malaysia and offers practical help to policymakers and future researchers starting out on systemic reforms.

Waluchow and Dworkin’s Disagreement on Legal Theory, Precedent and Adjudication: A Family Affair

In this paper, I would like to address some of the criticisms that Waluchow raised against Dworkin that appear in his book Inclusive Legal Positivism, in particular (i) the response to Dworkin’s methodological contention that jurisprudence should be regarded as a first-order interpretation of the law and (ii) the contention that Dworkin’s “law as integrity” provides a deficient description of the practice of precedent, inasmuch as it does not distinguish between theories of law and theories of adjudication and creates a set of puzzles that cannot be resolved with Dworkin’s interpretive account of the legal practice. In response to Waluchow, I argue that regardless of their methodological disagreements, law as integrity and inclusive legal positivism are very similar descriptions of the social practice of law, and that the former can also provide a sound theory of precedent and adjudication.

"Moralidad" como límite de la libertad de expresión. STC 62/1982, de 15 de octubre

The first part of this paper is a brief introduction to the topic. Next, the second part reviews the limits of the freedom of speech in the case "A Ver" of Constitutional Court of Spain; analysis of the consideration that is an excuse for the development of the underlying subject: the relationship between law and morality. The third part explains the argumentative structure of an inclusive natural law theory and an inclusive legal positivism. The purpose is to describe the different fundamentals and point out the similar conclusions. Finally, it describes the consequences of this constitutional and philosophical analysis for the future of the law and morality.

Los intocables del Derecho

Josep Joan Moreso (Tortosa, España, 1959) es Catedrático de Filosofía del Derecho de la Universitat Pompeu Fabra de Barcelona de la que fue Rector (2005-2013). Después de escribir su tesis doctoral sobre la teoría jurídica de Jeremy Bentham en la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, realizó sendas estancias de investigación en la Universidad de Buenos Aires, en el Balliol College de Oxford o en Génova. Ha sido profesor en las Universidades Autónoma de Barcelona y de Girona. Sus líneas de investigación e interés se han centrado en problemas relativos al concepto de Derecho, los desacuerdos teóricos, la teoría de la interpretación jurídica, la dinámica e identidad de los sistemas jurídicos, la fundamentación del constitucionalismo, entre otros. El profesor Moreso es reconocido por defender las tesis del “positivismo jurídico inclusivo” siendo uno de los protagonistas de la ilosofía del Derecho contemporánea en nuestro entorno. Doctor Honoris Causa por la Universidad de Valparaíso, Chile y la Universidad Antenor Orrego, de Trujillo, Perú. Desde el año 2013 es Profesor Adjunto de la Universidad Diego Portales, Chile. Entre sus contribuciones destacan: Constitución. Un modelo para armar (2012); La indeterminación del Derecho y la interpretación de la Constitución (1997); La teoría jurídica de Bentham (1992)

El incorporacionismo entre la espada del realismo moral y la pared del positivismo excluyente

De acuerdo con Juan Carlos Bayón, el positivismo jurídico incluyente es inconsistente, por cuanto sus presupuestos alegadamente convencionalistas serían incompatibles con las consecuencias de la incorporación de principios morales como criterios de validez jurídica que esta corriente teórica asume como posibles. Concretamente, el positivismo incluyente enfrentaría un dilema: si sostiene que el derecho remite al juez a la moral positiva para la identificación de contenidos normativos, colapsa con la versión excluyente; si en cambio sostiene que el derecho remite al razonamiento moral sustantivo, se ve obligado a abandonar sus presupuestos convencionalistas, en favor del realismo moral. En este trabajo analizaré esta crítica de Bayón, e intentaré proponer un argumento con el cual afrontar dicho cuestionamiento.

The Logic of Showing Possibility Claims: A Positive Argument for Inclusive Legal Positivism and Moral Grounds of Law

U ovome radu zagovaram stajaliste koje ukljucni pozitivisti dijele s Ronaldom Dworkinom. Prema tezi o ukljucenosti morala (TUM), logicki je moguce da pravni sustav ukljucuje moralne kriterije pravnosti (ili, kao sto to Dworkin kaže, „temelje prava”). Do ovoga trenutka rasprava je uvijek imala oblik napada na koherentnost TUM-a, pri cemu su branitelji TUM-a samo pokusavali osporiti napadajuci argument. Ja u prilog TUM-u iznosim pozitivan argument, koji zapocinjem objasnjenjem logike dokazivanja mogucnosnih tvrdnji kao sto je to TUM. Pritome na samom pocetku vrijedi istaknuti da se logika dokazivanja mogucnosnih tvrdnji umnogome razlikuje od logike dokazivanja kontingentnih deskriptivnih tvrdnji ili nužnih tvrdnji. Zbog toga ce ovdje biti potrebno dati neka pojasnjenja važnih obilježja semantike modalne logike. Nakon prikladne razrade strukturnog okvira, argument u prilog TUM-a bit ce zasnovan na iznenađujuce jednostavnom mislenom eksperimentu. Zapravo, argument pronalazi svoje nadahnuce u Razovom argumentu u prilog mogucnosti postojanja pravnog sustava koji se ne temelji na prisilnoj masineriji izvrsavanja prava; prema njemu, drustvo anđela i dalje bi imalo sustav prava, iako u tom sustavu ne bi postojala prisilna masinerija. Moj argument sadržavat ce dvije teorijski važne znacajke koje sadrži i Razov snažno jednostavan, ali u konacnici neuspjesan argument.

A Typological Reading of Prevailing Legal Theories

AbstractA classic debate in the history of philosophy is that between rationalists and empiricists concerning the “true” source of human knowledge. In legal philosophy this debate has been reflected in the classic opposition between natural law and legal positivist perspectives. Even the currently predominant inclusivist perspectives on the nature of law, such as inclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal non‐positivism, are not immune to such a dichotomy. In this paper I attempt to present an understanding of specific cognitive characteristics of prevailing legal theories from the perspective of the theory of psychological types as developed by Carl G. Jung.

Positivismo jurídico incluyente

Generally speaking, legal positivism is composed of different Thesis: The Social Fact Thesis, the Conventionality Thesis and the Separability Thesis. Depending on the stance that is chosen regarding each of these Thesis, le- gal positivists can be either inclusive or exclusive. This article pretends to outline some of the claims that are commonly identified with inclusive legal positivism, while at the same time presenting some of the criticisms that rise from other traditions, such as exclusive legal positivists and antipositivists. Ultimately, the perspectives exposed herein are weighed in order to discern which of the theoretical claims hold up and which can be defeated by counter-arguments.Resumen:El positivismo jurídico en general se compone de distintas Tesis: la Tesis Social, la Tesis de Convencionalidad y la Tesis de la Separabilidad. De acuerdo con la postura que se adopte respecto de cada una de estas Tesis, los positivistas jurídicos se dividen en excluyentes e incluyentes. Este artículo pretende esbozar algunos argumentos que comúnmente son asociados con el positivismo jurídico incluyente, y al mismo tiempo presenta una discusión en torno a algunas de las críticas provenientes de otros frentes, específicamente los de los positivistas jurídicos excluyentes y los de diversos antipositivistas. En última instancia, se sopesan las perspectivas expuestas a fin de dilucidar cuáles de los postulados teóricos se sostienen y cuáles pueden ser derrotados frente a los contraargumentos.

En torno a la doble naturaleza del Derecho de Robert Alexy

The central argument of Robert Alexy’s thesis is developed, concerning the dual nature of Law that includes a real or factual dimension, and another, ideal or critical. This thesis is inconsistent with both the exclusive legal positivism and the inclusive legal positivism, and with some thesis of non-positivism in its extreme version. The dual nature of law expresses and justifies by Gustav Radbruch´s formula which states that the “extreme injustice is not Law” on the one hand, andby the argument of moral correctness on the other. As a result of this analysis, the definition of the Law is something that depends on social facts in what the Law should be.

Normativity and the nature of the obligation to obey the law

The explanation of the obligation to obey the law given by Inclusive Legal Positivism, especially by Jules Coleman, is the main subject of this paper. After that, this work deals with some critical observations in order to achieve a more general conclusion about the issue.