Incidental Mood Research Articles

Deciphering Decision Making: The Interplay of Mood States and Decision Styles

Recent theories of Decision- Making have advocated the role of emotions in the cognitive processes of decisions. One such approach is the EIC model (Lerner et al., 2015) which posits – mood to indirectly affect decision making by impacting current emotions, indicating individual’s overall emotional states to indirectly influence cognitive decision processes. The study aimed to understand the role of emotions on decision making and the nuances that underlie it. The 6 main hypothesis of the paper focused on evaluating whether incidental emotions via current emotions affect decision making significantly or do decision styles have a stronger significant effect on decision making. The paper used a mixed method design where the qualitative data was collected via interviews and thematic analysis and labels were attuned via open coding that helped in triangulation and pattern generation. Tools used were the YDMC, Mood induction videos of OPENLAV Database, Decision Style questionnaire (DSQ), Ryff’s well-being scale and an Interview schedule. A purposive sampling was done to obtain the sample (N=29) for the pre-test post-test design. Results for the quantitative data concluded that sad and angry incidental mood had significant effects on FR1 and FR2 (Resistance to Framing and Sunken costs) of YDMC and, that happy mood had no significant effect on risk perception. The decision styles that have been seen to dominate were Vigilant followed by Dependent and Spontaneous style. For qualitative data, based on the dominant responses for the entire sample an Interactive Hexagonal map was constructed. STB (Self -thoughts & Beliefs), FP (Futuristic perspective), CE (Current experiences), EE (Environmental ‌effects), and PEx (Past experiences) were the dominant pattern connections found for the current sample. Thus, Incidental Mood had a significant effect on Resistance to Framing and Sunken costs whereas had no significant effect on Consistency with Risk Perception. Future work on the nuances of mood on decision-making can help determine the affective, cognitive, and neuropsychological models of decision-making where neural correlates could help delve deeper in these higher cognitive and emotional processes.

Mood fluctuations shift cost–benefit tradeoffs in economic decisions

Mood effects on economic choice seem blatantly irrational, but might rise from mechanisms adapted to natural environments. We have proposed a theory in which mood helps adapting the behaviour to statistical dependencies in the environment, by biasing the expected value of foraging actions (which involve taking risk, spending time and making effort to get more reward). Here, we tested the existence of this mechanism, using an established mood induction paradigm combined with independent economic choices that opposed small but uncostly rewards to larger but costly rewards (involving either risk, delay or effort). To maximise the sensitivity to mood fluctuations, we developed an algorithm ensuring that choice options were continuously adjusted to subjective indifference points. In 102 participants tested twice, we found that during episodes of positive mood (relative to negative mood), choices were biased towards better rewarded but costly options, irrespective of the cost type. Computational modelling confirmed that the incidental mood effect was best explained by a bias added to the expected value of costly options, prior to decision making. This bias is therefore automatically applied even in artificial environments where it is not adaptive, allowing mood to spill over many sorts of decisions and generate irrational behaviours.

Mood and judgment in a dyadic stress context.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a surge of psychological research addressing the role of affect in social judgments. Evaluations of others were shown to be shaped, at least in part, by a person's incidental mood in the moment of social evaluation; while negative moods instigated negative interpersonal evaluations, positive moods instigated positive interpersonal evaluations. Interestingly, these effects only emerged when the reason for the evaluator's mood was not obvious. Over 30 years later, we expand these findings to the dyadic domain. Rather than conceptualize interpersonal evaluations as occurring solely within an individual, we introduce the Dyadic Affect Infusion/Diffusion (DAID) model to suggest that interpersonal evaluations occur as fundamentally dyadic phenomena. Using 6 weeks of daily diary data from 311 couples in which one member approached a stressful event, we show that (a) mood influences relationship evaluations at both the intraindividual (i.e., affect infusion) and interindividual (i.e., affect diffusion) levels, (b) both affect infusion and affect diffusion are turned off by the availability of attributional information, and (c) these effects are better explained by affect infusion/diffusion rather than by several alternative mechanisms. Taken together, the DAID model bolsters the view that individualistic approaches to emotion and social cognition are insufficient and require theory and data at the dyadic and group levels of analysis. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Risky Therefore Not Beneficial: Replication and Extension of Finucane et al.’s (2000) Affect Heuristic Experiment

Risks and benefits are negatively related in people’s minds. Finucane et al. causally demonstrated that increasing risks of a hazard leads people to judge its benefits as lower. Vice versa, increasing benefits leads people to judge its risks as lower (original: r = −.74 [−0.92, −0.30]). This finding is consistent with an affective explanation, and the negative relationship is often presented as evidence for an affect heuristic. In two well-powered studies, using a more stringent analytic strategy, we replicated the original finding. We observed a strong negative relationship between judgments of risks and benefits across three technologies, although we do find that there was no change in risks when highlighting low benefits. We note that risks seem to be more responsive to manipulation (as opposed to benefits) and find evidence that the negative relationship can depend on incidental mood. We provided materials, data sets, and analyses on https://osf.io/sufjn/?view_only=6f8f5dc6ff524149a4ed5c6de9296ae8.

Incidental mood state before dissonance induction affects attitude change.

The way that incidental affect impacts attitude change brought about by controlled processes has so far been examined when the incidental affective state is generated after dissonance state induction. We therefore investigated attitude change when the incidental mood occurs prior to dissonance state induction. We expected a negative mood to induce systematic processing, and a positive mood to induce heuristic processing. Given that both systematic processing and attitude change are cognitively costly, we expected participants who experienced the dissonance state in a negative mood to have insufficient resources to allocate to attitude change. In our experiment, after mood induction (negative, neutral or positive), participants were divided into low-dissonance and high-dissonance groups. They then wrote a counterattitudinal essay. Analysis of their attitudes towards the essay topic indicated that attitude change did not occur in the negative incidental mood condition. Moreover, written productivity–one indicator of cognitive resource allocation–varied according to the type of incidental mood, and only predicted attitude change in the high-dissonance group. Our results suggest that incidental mood before dissonance induction influences the style of information processing and, by so doing, affects the extent of attitude change.

Uncertainty Increases the Reliance on Affect in Decisions

How do psychological states of uncertainty influence the way people make decisions? We propose that such states increase the reliance on affective inputs in judgments and decisions. In accord with this proposition, results from six studies show that the priming of uncertainty (vs. certainty) consistently increases the effects of a variety of affective inputs on consumers’ judgments and decisions. Primed uncertainty is shown to amplify the effects of the pleasantness of a musical soundtrack (study 1), the attractiveness of a picture (study 2), the appeal of affective attributes (studies 3 and 4), incidental mood states (study 6), and even incidental states of disgust (study 5). Moreover, both negative and positive uncertainty increase the influence of affect in decisions (study 4). The results additionally show that the increased reliance on affective inputs under uncertainty does not necessarily come at the expense of a reliance on descriptive attribute information (studies 2 and 5), and that the increased reliance on affect under uncertainty is distinct from a general reliance on heuristic or peripheral cues (study 6). The phenomenon may be due to uncertainty threatening the self, thereby encouraging a reliance on inputs that are closer to the self and have high subjective validity.

Affect, emotion, and decision making

This article reviews research on affect, emotion, and decision making published in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes from the 1990s onward. The review is organized around four topical areas: the influence of incidental mood states and discrete emotions on decision making, the influence of integral affect on decision making, affect and emotion as a consequence of decision making, and the role of regret in decision making. Some potential limitations of extant work on affect, emotion, and decision making are discussed. Lastly, particularly promising directions for future research are elaborated including intuition and decision making, ethical decision making, and affect and emotion over time and decision making.

Uncertainty Increases the Reliance on Affect in Decisions

Uncertainty is an unavoidable part of human life. How do states of uncertainty influence the way people make decisions? We advance the proposition that states of uncertainty increase the reliance on affective inputs in judgments and decisions. In accord with this proposition, results from six studies show that the priming of uncertainty (vs. certainty) consistently increases the effects of a variety of affective inputs on consumers’ judgments and decisions. Primed uncertainty is shown to amplify the effects of the pleasantness of a musical soundtrack (study 1), the attractiveness of a picture (study 2), the appeal of affective attributes (studies 3 and 4), incidental mood states (study 6), and even incidental states of disgust (study 5). Moreover, both negative and positive uncertainty increase the influence of affect in decisions (study 4). The results additionally show that the increased reliance on affective inputs under uncertainty does not necessarily come at the expense of a reliance on descriptive attribute information (studies 2 and 5), and that the increased reliance on affect under uncertainty is distinct from a general reliance on heuristic or peripheral cues (study 6).

“I” Follow My Heart and “We” Rely on Reasons: The Impact of Self-Construal on Reliance on Feelings versus Reasons in Decision Making

Results from six experiments support the hypothesis that an accessible independent self-construal promotes a greater reliance on feelings in making judgments and decisions, whereas an accessible interdependent self-construal promotes a greater reliance on reasons. Specifically, compared to an interdependent self-construal, an independent self-construal increases the relative preference for affectively superior options as opposed to cognitively superior options (experiments 1A and 1B) and strengthens the effects of incidental mood on evaluations (experiment 2). Further, valuations of the decision outcome increase when independent (interdependent) consumers adopt a feeling-based (reason-based) decision strategy (experiment 3). Finally, these effects are moderated by decision focus (whether the decision is made for oneself or for others; experiment 4) and need for justification during decision making (experiment 5). Theoretical implications and managerial implications are discussed.

Two birds, one stone? Positive mood makes products seem less useful for multiple-goal pursuit

Negotiating the pursuit of multiple goals often requires making difficult trade-offs between goals. In these situations, consumers can benefit from using products that help them pursue several goals at the same time. But do consumers always prefer these multipurpose products? We propose that consumers' incidental mood state alters perceptions of products in a multiple-goal context. Four studies demonstrate that being in a positive mood amplifies perceptions of differences between multiple conflicting goals. As a consequence, consumers are less likely to evaluate multipurpose products as being able to serve multiple distinct goals simultaneously. We conclude by discussing implications of these findings for marketers of multipurpose products.

Two Birds, One Stone? Positive Mood Makes Products Seem Less Useful for Multiple-Goal Pursuit

Negotiating the pursuit of multiple goals often requires making difficult trade-offs between goals. In these situations, consumers can benefit from using products that help them pursue several goals at the same time. But do consumers always prefer these multipurpose products? We propose that consumers’ incidental mood state alters perceptions of products in a multiple-goals context. Four studies demonstrate that being in a positive mood amplifies perceptions of differences between multiple conflicting goals. As a consequence, consumers are less likely to evaluate multipurpose products as being able to serve multiple distinct goals simultaneously. We conclude by discussing implications of these findings for marketers of multipurpose products.

Two Birds, One Stone? Positive Mood Makes Products Seem Less Useful for Multiple-Goal Pursuit

Negotiating the pursuit of multiple goals often requires making difficult trade-offs between goals. In these situations, consumers can benefit from using products that help them pursue several goals at the same time. But do consumers always prefer these multipurpose products? We propose that consumers’ incidental mood state alters perceptions of products in a multiple-goals context. Four studies demonstrate that being in a positive mood amplifies perceptions of differences between multiple conflicting goals. As a consequence, consumers are less likely to evaluate multipurpose products as being able to serve multiple distinct goals simultaneously. We conclude by discussing implications of these findings for marketers of multipurpose products.

The Effects of Hot Temperature on Impulsive Behaviors

Temperature and weather are all around us, quite literally. Furthermore, temperature and weather not only permeate our atmosphere, constantly affecting our visceral states of warmth and coldness, but they metaphorically permeate our language. People, products, and ideas can all be “hot” or “cold.” Given this ubiquity, it is perhaps surprising that relatively little research has systematically examined the influence of temperature on choice and judgment. Temperature-related words such as “hot” and “cold” are often used to describe impulsive and calculated behaviors, respectively. These metaphoric connotations of thermal concepts raise the question as to whether temperature, psychological states and decision making are related to each other, and if so, how. The current research examines these questions and finds support for a relationship. Across one field study and one laboratory experiment, I demonstrate that both hot ambient room temperature (Spa) and hot temperature primes (words) trigger decision outcomes in line with the metaphoric association between hot temperature and impulsivity. In the field study, participants were recruited in hot (40-50 degrees Celsius) and cold (10 degrees Celsius) rooms at a spa. Participants were simply asked to indicate their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for three product categories (travel package, birthday dinner, and cell phone). The results showed that participants in the hot room in comparison to those in the cold room were willing to pay more for the same products. Next, I tested if our results would go beyond ambient temperature and would hold if I were to prime temperature concepts by using a different priming method (i.e., subliminal vs. supraliminal). In line with the previous findings in the spa, participants in the hot priming condition were more likely to choose the wrong answer for the bat and baseball question than those in the cold priming condition. In addition, product type (e.g., pleasure vs. necessity) can moderate the effect of hot temperature on impulsivity. Mood and arousal did not mediate participants` responses. My findings seem to suggest that the effects of temperature on decision outcomes can be attributed to metaphoric associations rather than incidental mood or arousal. The current research applies a novel perspective in understanding the relationship between temperature and judgment and decision making. Also, the results have practical implications for packaging, advertising, merchandising, and pricing of goods and services, as well as for public policy and awareness. One of the most natural implications of my findings would be that retailers would be better off carrying more impulse purchase items on hot days. Furthermore, point-of-purchase promotions encouraging impulse purchase is more likely to be effective in retail environments with higher temperature than with lower temperature. In addition, advertisements and product packages evoking hot temperature associations (e.g., beach, sunshine, summer) might lead consumers to pay higher price for the advertised product than those with cold temperature associations.

Risk and rationality: The effects of mood and decision rules on probability weighting

Abstract Empirical research has shown that people tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities when valuing risky prospects, but little is known about factors influencing the shape of the probability weighting curve. Based on a laboratory experiment with monetary incentives, we demonstrate that pre-existing good mood is significantly associated with women’s probability weights: Women in a better than normal mood tend to weight probabilities relatively more optimistically. Many men, however, seem to be immunized against effects of incidental mood by applying a mechanical decision criterion such as maximization of expected value.

When Do Incidental Mood Effects Last? Lay Beliefs versus Actual Effects

In a series of studies we examine how incidental mood present at the time of an experience affects judgments made long after the mood has dissipated and compare this to lay beliefs about how mood affects memory-based judgments. We find that memory-based judgments are affected by incidental mood only when there is an external prompt to evaluate the stimulus in real time. This is contrasted with lay beliefs about the effects of mood, which are not sensitive to delay or to the presence of real-time evaluations. The mismatch between lay beliefs and actual effects leads consumers to distort previously unbiased memory-based judgments when they are reminded of the source of the incidental mood.

In the mood to get over yourself: Mood affects theory-of-mind use.

Understanding others' behavior often involves attributing mental states to them by using one's "theory of mind." We argue that using theory of mind to recognize differences between one's own perspective and another's perspective is a deliberate process of inference that may be influenced by incidental mood. Because sadness is associated with more systematic and deliberate processing whereas happiness is associated with more heuristic processing, we predicted that theory-of-mind use would be facilitated by sadness compared with happiness. Two experiments supported this prediction, demonstrating that participants were more likely to utilize knowledge about others to make inferences about their mental states when they were induced to feel sad than when they were induced to feel happy. These results provide both theoretical insight into the psychological mechanisms that govern theory of mind as well as practical insight into a common source of variability in its use.

Negative incidental affect and mood congruency in crossed categorization

Examined the effects of incidental sadness and anger on affiliative responses to crossed categorization targets. Affect manipulations included an anger-provoking frustration (Study 1), a sad film clip (Study 2), and autobiographical essays about sad or anger-provoking topics (Studies 3 and 4). By comparison with a neutral mood, anger (Study 1) reduced affiliative tendencies toward persons possessing an out-group membership but not toward those possessing only in-group memberships. Study 2 showed a similar pattern for sadness. Studies 3 and 4 replicated these effects in designs including both types of negative mood. Meta-analytic integration showed the pattern of greater rejection of targets with an out-group membership to be stronger under anger than sadness. Study 4 also showed that despite yielding a consistent pattern for affiliation, sadness and anger differentially elicited aggressive tendencies toward the same targets.