Incidental Fear Research Articles

Self-Distancing Moderates the Effect of Incidental Fear vs. Anger on Risk Taking and Loss Aversion

Studies have shown that incidental and normatively irrelevant emotions can carry over and bias decisions. However, people respond to and manage their emotions in different ways. Thus, incidental emotional influences might depend on how individuals regulate their emotions. In a preregistered experiment, we examined how the regulation of fear and anger impacts risk-taking and information processing in a task that mimics complexity and uncertainty. Drawing on the appraisal tendency framework, we propose that fear and anger lead to opposite effects on risk-taking and that these effects are moderated by decision makers’ use of a tactic of emotion regulation known as self-distancing. Participants were asked to recall and describe a fear-inducing or anger-inducing event from either an immersed or self-distanced perspective. Next, they completed the Iowa Gambling Task for our measure of risk-taking. A series of linear mixed random-effects models supported our hypotheses. First, incidental fear reduced risk-taking relative to incidental anger, and this effect reversed among participants who engaged in self-distancing. Second, self-distancing reduced reliance on intuitive information processing during the task. Third, analytical (but not intuitive) processing was negatively related to risk-taking. Finally, exploratory analyses revealed that fearful and angry people’s choices were driven more by their sensitivity to losses and gains than their sensitivity to risk. Incidental fear led to an aversion to decks associated with frequent losses.

Fear increases likelihood of seeking decisional support from others when making decisions involving ambiguity

AbstractIndividuals often turn to others for decision‐making advice, which has the potential to improve decision‐making outcomes when advice is drawn from a reliable source. Because seeking advice is a kind of information seeking, it is likelier to occur when decisions involve ambiguity or when full information about outcomes is unavailable. We examined whether experimentally induced incidental fear, known to increase information seeking, increased intentions to seek decision‐making advice and whether this effect was stronger for decisions involving ambiguity. In Study 1, fear increased the likelihood of seeking advice about an ambiguous decision in which both options carried some risk, compared to neutral emotion (and anger). In Study 2, a 2 (emotion) by 2 (minimal vs. extensive information) design, fear increased the likelihood of seeking advice about palliative care only after a simple definition of palliative care (minimal information), but not after more comprehensive (extensive) information about its nature, benefits, and efficacy. These findings suggest that incidental fear may encourage people to seek advice about decisions involving ambiguity or when full information to make the decision is not available.

Fear From Afar, Not So Risky After All: Distancing Moderates the Relationship Between Fear and Risk Taking.

A growing line of research has shown that individuals can regulate emotional biases in risky judgment and decision-making processes through cognitive reappraisal. In the present study, we focus on a specific tactic of reappraisal known as distancing. Drawing on appraisal theories of emotion and the emotion regulation literature, we examine how distancing moderates the relationship between fear and risk taking and anger and risk taking. In three pre-registered studies (Ntotal = 1,483), participants completed various risky judgment and decision-making tasks. Replicating previous results, Study 1 revealed a negative relationship between fear and risk taking and a positive relationship between anger and risk taking at low levels of distancing. Study 2 replicated the interaction between fear and distancing but found no interaction between anger and distancing. Interestingly, at high levels of distancing, we observed a reversal of the relationship between fear and risk taking in both Study 1 and 2. Study 3 manipulated emotion and distancing by asking participants to reflect on current fear-related and anger-related stressors from an immersed or distanced perspective. Study 3 found no main effect of emotion nor any evidence of a moderating role of distancing. However, exploratory analysis revealed a main effect of distancing on optimistic risk estimation, which was mediated by a reduction in self-reported fear. Overall, the findings suggest that distancing can help regulate the influence of incidental fear on risk taking and risk estimation. We discuss implications and suggestions for future research.

Incidental fear reduces empathy for an out-group's pain.

Humans generally fear those different to them (i.e., an out-group) in the same way they fear natural predators. But fear pushes us to derogate others, whether they constitute a threat or not. Research has examined how fear associated with specific intergroup relations interferes with how individuals relate to in-group and out-group members. However, we know relatively little about how intergroup relations might be affected by incidental emotions. We tested how incidental fear affects empathy toward in-group and out-group members. We found that exposing participants to fearful imagery was sufficient to reduce empathy, but only in response to out-group suffering. We discuss how these findings provide insight into how fear is often leveraged to encourage social tribalism. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Preliminary evidence for differential effects of integral and incidental emotions on risk perception and behavioral intentions: A meta‐analysis of eight experiments

AbstractJudgment and decision‐making research often examines effects of emotion unrelated (i.e., incidental) to the decision when research questions center on emotion related (i.e., integral) to the decision, with a theory‐based assumption that the two types of emotion have equivalent influence. Experimentally targeting incidental emotion can overcome practical and ethical challenges that preclude manipulating integral emotion, particularly in medical contexts; however, the validity of the assumption that integral and incidental emotions have interchangeable influences on judgments and decisions, such as risk perceptions and behavioral intentions, has not been systematically examined. In a pre‐registered meta‐analysis of eight experiments (n = 5,336), we examined whether incidental fear and anger influenced risk perceptions and intentions similarly to integral fear and anger. To ensure the quality and intensity of the emotional experience remained constant across conditions, we rendered emotion integral or incidental to the threat by varying the type of outcomes assessed (matched or unmatched to the emotion induction). Results provide preliminary evidence that integral and incidental influences can differ. Most notably, incidental anger decreased risk perceptions, whereas integral anger increased them. Moreover, even when the direction of the effect of integral and incidental emotions was similar, the magnitude of the integral effect was larger. These findings suggest that the common practice of manipulating incidental emotions and generalizing findings to integral emotions may not be advisable, and as such, future work is needed to identify the specific features of the incidental and integral emotional experience that contribute to similarities and differences in their influence.

Retraction: Attention, Attitudes, and Action: When and Why Incidental Fear Increases Consumer Choice

Retraction: Attention, Attitudes, and Action: When and Why Incidental Fear Increases Consumer Choice

How do different kinds of incidental emotions influence risk decision making?

Incidental emotions, which are irrelevant to the ongoing decision, play a significant role in decision-making processes. In this study, we investigated the influence of specific incidental emotions on behavioral, psychological, and electrophysiological responses during the process of decision making. Participants finished a forced-choice gambling task, during which incidental emotions (anger/fear/happiness) were elicited by recalling emotional experiences. Behavioral and event-related potential (ERP) data were recorded in the experiment. Behavioral results showed that risk preference was weaker in the fearful condition than in the angry and happy conditions, but emotional feelings to outcome feedback were not influenced by incidental emotions. The feedback-related negativity (FRN) amplitude was larger in the fearful condition than in the angry, happy, and neutral conditions for large outcomes, whereas there was no difference between the four conditions for small outcomes. In addition, the influence of outcome magnitude (small/large) on the P3 amplitude was stronger in the fearful condition than in the angry, happy, and neutral conditions. We suggest that incidental fear elicits risk-avoidant behavior (manifested in behavioral choices), stronger motivation (manifested in the FRN amplitude) and cognitive resources (manifested in the P3 amplitude) for risky outcomes of decision making unconsciously (indicated by unchanged subjective emotional experiences). The current findings have expanded our understanding of the role of specific incidental emotions in decision making.

Does Fear Increase Search Effort in More Numerate People? An Experimental Study Investigating Information Acquisition in a Decision From Experience Task.

The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of numeracy and the emotion of fear on the decision-making process. While previous research demonstrated that these factors are independently related to search effort, search policy and choice in a decision from experience task, less is known about how their interaction contributes to processing information under uncertainty. We attempted to address this problem and to fill this gap. In the present study, we hypothesized that more numerate people would sample more information about a decision problem and that the effect of fear would depend on the source of this emotion: whether it is integral (i.e., relevant) or incidental (i.e., irrelevant) to a decision problem. Additionally, we tested how these factors predict choices. We addressed these hypotheses in a series of two experiments. In each experiment, we used a sampling paradigm to measure search effort, search policy and choice in nine binary problems included in a decision from experience task. In Experiment 1, before the sampling task we elicited incidental fear by asking participants to recall fearful events from their life. In Experiment 2, integral fear was elicited by asking participants to make choices concerning medical treatment. Decision problems and their payoff distributions were the same in the two experiments and across each condition. In both experiments, we assessed objective statistical numeracy and controlled for a change in the current emotional state. We found that more numerate people sampled more information about a decision problem and switched less frequently between alternatives. Incidental fear marginally predicted search effort. Integral fear led to larger sample sizes, but only among more numerate people. Neither numeracy nor fear were related to the number of choices that maximized expected values. However, across two experiments sample sizes predicted the number of choices that maximized experienced mean returns. The findings suggest that people with higher numeracy may be more sensitive to integral emotions; this may result in more effortful sampling of relevant information leading to choices maximizing experienced returns.

Positive thinking elevates tolerance: Experimental effects of happiness on adolescents' attitudes toward asylum seekers.

Inducing emotional reactions toward social groups can influence individuals' political tolerance. This study examines the influence of incidental fear and happiness on adolescents' tolerant attitudes and feelings toward young Muslim asylum seekers. In our experiment, 219 16- to 21-year-olds completed measures of prejudicial attitudes. After being induced to feel happiness, fear, or no emotion (control), participants reported their tolerant attitudes and feelings toward asylum-seeking young people. Participants assigned to the happiness condition demonstrated more tolerant attitudes toward asylum-seeking young people than did those assigned to the fear or control conditions. Participants in the control condition did not differ from participants in the fear condition. The participants in the happiness condition also had more positive feelings toward asylum-seeking young people than did participants in the control condition. The findings suggest that one way to increase positive attitudes toward asylum-seeking young people is to improve general emotional state.

Retracted: Attention, Attitudes, and Action: When and Why Incidental Fear Increases Consumer Choice

Past research finds that general negativity inherent to a choice set increases deferral. In contrast, we adopt a functional perspective—linking fear to narrowed attention, negative expectations of the future, and an increased readiness for action—and propose that incidental fear increases the likelihood of consumer choice and reduces deferral. Six studies find consistent support for this view, using both hypothetical and consequential choices. We demonstrate that relative to other emotions (disgust, sadness, hope, pride, anger) and general feelings of uncertainty, those experiencing incidental fear choose significantly more and defer less. This increased choice, however, is only realized for decisions made in the present (vs. future), when information about the deferred options is not available. Importantly, increased choice from incidental fear is mediated by increased attention and liking. Moreover, we also demonstrate individuals with high levels of trait fear (versus trait anger) are more likely to choose and less likely to defer.

"Incidental fear cues increase monetary loss aversion": Correction to Schulreich, Gerhardt, and Heekeren (2016).

Reports an error in "Incidental fear cues increase monetary loss aversion" by Stefan Schulreich, Holger Gerhardt and Hauke R. Heekeren (Emotion, 2016[Apr], Vol 16[3], 402-412). In the current article, there was an error in the Study 2 portion of the article. The fourth paragraph of the Results section should read as follows: Performing the same analyses as in Study 1, we found an effect of incidental fear cues on decision behavior. Participants accepted fewer gambles in the fearful-face condition (32.77%) than in the neutral-face condition (33.96%), with Z = -2.187, p = .027, d = -0.998 in the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test and β = 0.012, SE = 0.0053, F(1, 21) = 4.434, p = .047, partial η² = .174 in the linear regression. This suggests increased risk aversion in the fearful-face condition. Concerning personality, however, there were no significant between-subjects effects or between-within interaction effects (all ps = .349). (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2015-52358-001.) In many everyday decisions, people exhibit loss aversion-a greater sensitivity to losses relative to gains of equal size. Loss aversion is thought to be (at least partly) mediated by emotional-in particular, fear-related-processes. Decision research has shown that even incidental emotions, which are unrelated to the decision at hand, can influence decision making. The effect of incidental fear on loss aversion, however, is thus far unclear. In two studies, we experimentally investigated how incidental fear cues, presented during (Study 1) or before (Study 2) choices to accept or reject mixed gambles over real monetary stakes, influence monetary loss aversion. We find that the presentation of fearful faces, relative to the presentation of neutral faces, increased risk aversion-an effect that could be attributed to increased loss aversion. The size of this effect was moderated by psychopathic personality: Fearless dominance, in particular its interpersonal facet, but not self-centered impulsivity, attenuated the effect of incidental fear cues on loss aversion, consistent with reduced fear reactivity. Together, these results highlight the sensitivity of loss aversion to the affective context. (PsycINFO Database Record

Anger Strays, Fear Refrains: The Differential Effect of Negative Emotions on Consumers’ Ethical Judgments

Although various factors have been studied for their influence on consumers’ ethical judgments, the role of incidental emotions has received relatively less attention. Recent research in consumer behavior has focused on studying the effect of specific incidental emotions on various aspects of consumer decision making. This paper investigates the effect of two negative, incidental emotional states of anger and fear on ethical judgment in a consumer context using a passive unethical behavior scenario (i.e., too much change received). The paper presents two experimental studies. Study 1 focuses on the interaction of moral intensity (amount of change) and incidental emotion state in predicting the ethical judgment while study 2 investigates the underlying causal mechanism behind the process, using a mediation analysis. The results reveal a significant interaction between moral intensity and incidental emotion. Specifically, individuals in the state of incidental fear exhibit higher levels of ethical judgment as the moral intensity increases as compared to individuals in the state of incidental anger. Further, perceived control is found to mediate the relationship between emotional state and ethical judgment under higher moral intensity condition.

Incidental fear cues increase monetary loss aversion.

In many everyday decisions, people exhibit loss aversion-a greater sensitivity to losses relative to gains of equal size. Loss aversion is thought to be (at least partly) mediated by emotional--in particular, fear-related--processes. Decision research has shown that even incidental emotions, which are unrelated to the decision at hand, can influence decision making. The effect of incidental fear on loss aversion, however, is thus far unclear. In two studies, we experimentally investigated how incidental fear cues, presented during (Study 1) or before (Study 2) choices to accept or reject mixed gambles over real monetary stakes, influence monetary loss aversion. We find that the presentation of fearful faces, relative to the presentation of neutral faces, increased risk aversion-an effect that could be attributed to increased loss aversion. The size of this effect was moderated by psychopathic personality: Fearless dominance, in particular its interpersonal facet, but not self-centered impulsivity, attenuated the effect of incidental fear cues on loss aversion, consistent with reduced fear reactivity. Together, these results highlight the sensitivity of loss aversion to the affective context.

The impact of incidental fear and anger on in- and outgroup attitudes

Abstract The aim of this research was to examine the impact of two specific negative emotions of anger and fear on intergroup attitudes. In Study 1 we measured emotions of anger and fear and in Study 2 we evoked these emotions incidentally, that is independently of any intergroup context. In both studies we measured attitudes towards the ingroup (Polish) and the outgroup (Gypsies).We expected that fear would lead to more positive ingroup attitudes and anger to more negative outgroup attitudes. The results of the correlational study (Study 1) confirmed the predictions regarding anger and decreased outgroup evaluations, and the experimental study (Study 2) revealed that fear enhanced positivity towards the ingroup, but anger increased negativity towards the outgroup. The impact of fear and anger on social attitudes in the specific context of a negatively self-stereotyped ingroup is discussed.

Fear, excitement, and financial risk-taking

Can fear trigger risk-taking? In this paper, we assess whether fear can be reinterpreted as a state of excitement as a result of contextual cues and promote, rather than discourage, risk-taking. In a laboratory experiment, the participants' emotional states were induced (fear vs. control), followed by a purportedly unrelated financial task. The task was framed as either a stock market investment or an exciting casino game. Our results showed that incidental fear (vs. control) induced risk-averse behaviour when the task was framed as a stock investment decision. However, fear encouraged risk-taking when the very same task was framed as an exciting casino game. The impact of fear on risk-taking was partially mediated by the excitement felt during the financial task.

Fear, Social Projection, and Financial Decision Making

The number of individual investors who trade stocks online has significantly increased in recent years. Surprisingly, consumer researchers have paid little attention to how emotions influence individual investors’ stock-trading decisions. In a series of three experiments, the authors investigate the impact of incidental fear on the decision to sell in a stock market simulation. The results show that fearful (vs. control) participants sell their stock earlier (Experiments 1–3). This effect, however, is contingent on particular features of the market. Fear leads to early sell-off when parti-pant believe the value of the stock is peer generated but not when they believe the value of the stock is computer generated (Experiment 2). Early sell-off as a result of incidental fear also occurs when participants believe their risk attitude is common in the market but not when they believe their risk attitude is unique (Experiment 3). Social projection—that is, people's tendency to rely on their current state of mind to estimate other people's actions—explains the phenomenon.