Incentives For Banks Research Articles

Unintended consequences of the introduction of specialized bankruptcy courts: evidence from zombie lending

We examine the economic consequences of the introduction of specialized bankruptcy courts (SBCs) from the perspective of zombie lending, using a sample of Chinese listed zombie firms in the 2016–2021 period. We find that the introduction of SBCs unexpectedly and significantly increases zombie lending, given the perverse incentives for banks and the intervention of local governments. The mechanism is that the introduction of SBCs improves the firms' bankruptcy efficiency, which increases the exposure probability of banks' bad loans and regional unemployment. To conceal these bad loans and unemployment, banks and local governments have to dramatically increase zombie lending. Thus, while better bankruptcy procedures are typically assumed to discourage zombie lending, we show that the introduction of SBCs may instead encourage such lending by exacerbating conflicts among creditors and political-economic frictions.

Greenwashing in green finance and measures to prevent it

Aim. To study the phenomenon of greenwashing in the spheres of green bonds issuance and banks’ activities.Objectives. To show the degree of study of the problem in foreign and Russian scientific literature; to analyze the methods of combating greenwashing; to estimate the probability of greenwashing in the financial sphere in Russia.Methods. The author used the methods of bibliographic analysis, studied the legislation and documentation of banking organizations in the context of greenwashing prevention.Results. The author traces the growth of cases of greenwashing in the financial sphere, shows the main forms of its manifestation emphasized in modern scientific literature. As a result of the analysis of the European Union (EU) legislation on counteraction to financial greenwashing the ineffectiveness of the EU measures on prevention of unfair behavior of issuers of “green” bonds and banking institutions is proved. The analysis of the Russian practice of green finance shows the low demand for the services of green bond verifiers and the low degree of state control over this sphere, which may affect the spread of financial greenwashing in Russia. Based on the results of the analysis of the sphere of counteraction to greenwashing in the sphere of green finance in Russia, the main directions of improvement of the domestic policy of counteraction to greenwashing are proposed.Conclusions. Greenwashing is an urgent problem for the development of green finance. The measures taken by the EU to regulate the green bond market do not lead to a reduction in greenwashing and even provoke its development. Measures on state control and tougher penalties for greenwashing are more effective than the emphasis on information disclosure. This seems significant not only for the European market, but also for the Russian market, which will have to face this problem. It is necessary to develop measures to detect and overcome unfair behavior of participants of Russian financial markets, including the development of state control mechanisms, a unified methodology for assessing green bonds and issuers’ reporting, as well as the responsibility of issuers and verifiers when greenwashing is detected. Equally important are incentives for banks to finance green projects and control of the banking system in the framework of greenwashing prevention.

Інституційне середовище банківської підтримки розвитку малого підприємництва в україні

The article is devoted to the study of the evolution of the formation of the institutional environment for the functioning of small businesses in Ukraine and the development of proposals for its improvement to stimulate bank support in the field of small business. The regulatory and legal basis for developing small entrepreneurship has been staged. A portrait profile of a small business entity in Ukraine has been created. A scheme of interaction of state institutions supporting small entrepreneurship by supplementing its infrastructural block with new institutional units has been developed. Within the framework of the existing infrastructure, it is proposed to create a Bureau of credit histories of small business entities and a Unified platform for financing small business development. The priority directions for optimizing regulatory and legal support for small businesses are substantiated. The following are defined as control points for the regulation of small entrepreneurship: approximation of business management and regulation standards to EU standards; development of financial instruments alternative to lending; digitization of financial services, etc. It is essential to direct regulatory efforts in regulating alternative banks’ activities to support financial market intermediaries (fintechs, microfinance organizations, leasing and factoring companies) and diversify funding sources (factoring, crowdfunding). Stimulating the development of microcredit in Ukraine requires a comprehensive approach, the components of which can be simplifying the mechanism of obtaining microcredit, creating conditions for the development of non-bank financial institutions, improving the legislative provision of bank microcredit, state incentives for banks to expand micro- and other types of lending; creation of cooperative banks specialized in lending to small businesses; state support for microcredit information programs; reduction of the tax burden and improvement of investment and credit support mechanisms for small businesses; expansion of the list of state preferential lending programs for small enterprises; gradual increase in the volume of microcredit to support start-ups; expanding the use of digital financial technologies. Keywords: small business, institutional environment, banking support, regulatory and legal support.

Board Structure, CEO Equity-Based Compensation, and Financial Performance: Evidence from MENA Countries

This paper investigates the association between board of director (BOD) structures and CEO equity-based compensation (long-term incentive) for commercial banks (conventional and Islamic banks) in MENA countries. Specifically, we take board size and board independence to measure the board structure. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of board structure on the association between CEO equity-based compensation and financial performance. Moreover, we compare conventional and Islamic banks in testing these relationships. Using a sample of 65 banks in MENA countries for the period between 2009 and 2020, we show a significant positive association between board size and CEO compensation. However, we find the same association between these variables for IBs, but the effect of board size on CEO compensation is less. We also show that board independence is negatively correlated with CEO compensation. Nevertheless, the relationship between board independence and CEO ownership is positive for IBs. For the moderating test, we find that effective board structure provides more incentives to the CEO, leading them to achieve higher financial performance. The Islamic bank’s business model (based on Shari’ah principles) contributes to the different influences of board structure on CEO compensation. Our results provide the insight that a strong and effective board is important for managing the executive’s compensation system. The findings of this study have implications for financial firms, policymakers, and regulators. Specifically, the study may help in understanding the benefits of different compensation structures relative to different types of financial firms.

Policy Changes and Bank Incentives: An Analysis of Liquidity Ratios

Policy Changes and Bank Incentives: An Analysis of Liquidity Ratios

Stress Testing and Bank Lending

Abstract Stress tests convey information about the strictness of future tests, creating incentives for banks to alter their future lending behavior. Regulators recognize and use this influence: they may conduct softer stress tests to encourage lending or tougher stress tests to reduce risk-taking. This information management can lead to inefficiencies when (a) the test loses credibility or (b) the test becomes self-fulfilling. In addition, banks may distort their lending behavior in anticipation of the stress test design, leading to further surplus losses. The analysis applies to banking supervision and regulation more broadly.

Collateral and bank screening as complements: A spillover effect

I analyze a novel spillover effect from collateralized to uncollateralized loans. High-type borrowers have good projects, while low-type borrowers do not know their project quality. High-type borrowers post collateral, and a monopolist bank screens only low-type borrowers' projects. Different from existing models, equilibrium collateral requirements are stricter than the minimum necessary to achieve separation, even if collateral is costly. When high-type borrowers post more collateral, the bank charges a higher interest rate to low-type borrowers. This, in turn, enhances the bank's incentives to screen the low-types' projects, thereby improving the average quality of uncollateralized loans.

Carbon taxes and the geography of fossil lending

Using data on syndicated loans, we find that the introduction of a carbon tax is associated with a decline (increase) in bank lending to coal, oil, and gas companies in domestic (foreign) markets. This manifestation of tax arbitrage is particularly pronounced for banks with large fossil-lending exposures, suggesting a role for bank specialization. Lending to private companies in foreign markets increases relatively more, implying bank incentives to avoid public scrutiny. We also find that banks reallocate a relatively larger share of their fossil loan portfolio to countries with less strict environmental regulation and bank supervision.

Bank risk-taking in emerging economies: Empirical evidence and theory

This article empirically studies the impact of foreign shocks on bank risk-taking in emerging economies. We use a country panel model for the 2001–2017 period. Using several measures of bank risk-taking, financial openness and foreign debt participation, we find if anything that the lower the financial openness in an economy, the higher the likelihood that the foreign monetary policy rate increases bank risk-taking and that the foreign debt participation reduces bank risk-taking. To provide an intuition of these results, we develop a simple small open economy model with banks facing foreign borrowing limits and taking excessive risk. The novel result is that, when the foreign borrowing limit binds, a lower foreign interest rate reduces excessive bank risk-taking. Since the foreign borrowing limit binds, the lower foreign rate does not boost bank credit but reduces bank default probability, which diminishes bank incentives to take excessive risk. Similarly, greater access to the international credit markets reduces excessive bank risk-taking.

Bank competition, regulatory capital, and risk taking: international evidence

PurposeMotivated by recent financial liberalization policies in emerging markets, this study investigates whether bank competition and regulatory capital affect bank risk taking in an international banking context.Design/methodology/approachBank competition is regressed, using GLS regression, on various measures of bank risk, to reflect regulatory, accounting and market-based risk-taking. The authors use a sample of publicly traded banks operating in Africa during 2004–2019.FindingsResults show that higher level of bank competition increases bank risk taking and results in greater financial fragility in the absence of banking capital regulations. Furthermore, larger capital adequacy ratios control the risk-taking incentives of managers and guard banks against the risk of default. Further tests confirm the significance of market-based risk measures over accounting and regulatory measures.Practical implicationsFindings are relevant to bank managers and regulators in their sustained effort of finding an optimal balance between bank competition and financial stability. Increased competition should be balanced with capital regulations to curtail bank excessive risky behavior and derive the social benefits of greater competition in the market while sustaining overall economic growth.Originality/valueThis study provides novel evidence in an international context. First, it uses regulatory, accounting and market-based measures of bank risk taking to reflect regulators', management and market participants' emphasis. Another original contribution is the investigation of bank competition across African economies characterized by financial liberalization, stringent banking system and interesting socio-economic challenges.

Staying on top: Political cycles in private bank lending

The incentives for state-owned banks to boost lending before elections in order to improve the re-election odds of incumbent politicians are well recognized. We hypothesize that political influence on lending behavior in electoral autocracies extends to all banks, irrespective of ownership or political connections. Employing monthly data on individual banks, we consider the lending behavior of Russian banks in the four presidential elections held between 2004 and 2019. We find that both state-owned and private banks increased their lending before these presidential elections. Controlling for economic fluctuations, the pre-election lending surge is followed by a deterioration of loan quality the following year. We show that private banks are rewarded for boosting their lending before an election with government deposits after the election. Our findings support the view that the authorities in electoral autocracies such as Russia have the capacity and means to influence lending of private and state-owned banks in pursuit of favorable election outcomes.

GREEN TREND IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING BUSINESS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR UKRAINE

The main forces influencing the bank's decision to switch to green banking are systematized, the potential for its growth in Ukraine is identified. Green banking in developing countries is explored, taking into account the growing need for finance to combat climate change in this group of countries. The conceptual and categorical apparatus of green finance research is improved due to the presentation of the author's approach to the interpretation of the "green bank" category, which is understood as a bank that, in both its credit and investment activities, gives priority to environmental protection over profit maximization. Based on the analysis of the latest scientific research, the systematic identification and classification of factors influencing the bank's decision to switch to green banking, which include economic (bank competition) and non-economic (ecological, cultural, moral, political) factors, are improved. It is concluded that the motives and pressure on banks for their switch to green banking have, unlike the factors, more subjective nature and are closely related to the future benefits or losses that each specific bank plans to receive or incur as a result of such switch. The ultimate goal of most motives is to increase the value of the bank, but political and economic motives for expansion and various non-economic goals of some international banks should be factored in, since they can significantly limit the effect of the market mechanism in the banking systems of recipient countries and lead to increased instability. Motives (risk avoidance, cost reduction, reputation improvement, profit maximization) are proposed to be identified as positive incentives for banks to switch to green banking, and pressure (regulatory or governmental; from stakeholders, customers and employees) as negative ones. Opportunities and challenges for international banking business in the process of the switch to green banking are considered. In the context of global trends in the development of international banking business, the development potential of green banking in Ukraine is analyzed.

Bank provision reversals and income smoothing: A case study

Incentives for banks to achieve income targets have previously been identified as a strong motivation for income smoothing (IS). Extant literature captures bank IS indirectly via discretionary provision estimations. In turn, our study directly locates IS through loan loss provision reversals. Drawing from bounded rationality perspectives, we investigate a systemic European Bank from January 2006 to September 2017, with 15,931 unique loan portfolio-quarter observations, employing a frequency and machine learning analysis. Our empirical investigation reveals both the main incentives underlying provision reversals recognition and the reported income consequences of such reversals, in times of recession. In particular, we find that provision reversals are principally used to avoid negative reported income (i.e., net losses). There is also some evidence that provision reversals are used to avoid income decline compared to the previous quarter. Finally, we show an asymmetric pattern of provision reversals over time with an emphasis on the early recession years. Our study contributes to the efforts of policy makers (both banking and accounting regulators) to reduce opportunistic, income-increasing actions by bank executives in difficult times.

The role of governance in enabling the pursuit of dual mission in bank-based impact investing

ABSTRACT Impact investing, defined as direct investments into small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with intentionality to realize social impact and financial returns, simultaneously, has emerged as an attractive, alternative source of entrepreneurial finance in marginalized communities. In this paper, we focus on bank-based impact funds (BBFs), where impact investors and commercial bank partner to create different vehicles of impact investments (managed funds, grants/guarantees or co-financing BBFs) for financing SMEs. Through the theoretical lens of governance, as applied to bank-SME financing and the pursuit of dual mission in social entrepreneurship studies, we develop qualitative case studies in Ghana, uncovering how BBFs enable the pursuit of dual mission by SMEs. The findings are drawn upon to develop a theoretical framework that depicts a unique form of governance as constituting the (i) alignment of the incentives of impact investors and banks to resolve structural and dual-mission tensions in bank-SME financing; and (ii) pre-approval, control and monitoring mechanism necessary for the pursue of the dual mission of financial returns and social impacts in bank-based impact investing. The findings have implications for fund managers, SMEs and policymakers seeking to attract impact investments for private sector-driven development.

Bank size and capital: A trade-off between risk-taking incentives and diversification

This paper analyzes the importance of size and capital for risk-taking incentives of Jordanian banks using panel data of 13 commercial banks for the period 2007–2017. The results reveal that size and capital add to stability, consistent with the economies of scale and scope hypothesis. In developing countries, banks are more conservative and less involved in market-based activities; however, they are interconnected just as in developed countries. The results of the first model and second model reveal that as size increases by 1 percent, risk decreases by 0.11 percent and 0.03 percent, respectively, implying that too-big-to-fail is not present and that moral hazard is not a serious issue. In both models, large size is driven by diversification not by risk-taking incentives. In terms of capital, the results of the first model and second model reveal that as capital increases by 1 percent, risk decreases by 0.48 and 0.12 percent, respectively. The fact that Jordanian banks are overcapitalized indicates that the central bank regulation is not binding. Banks increase their capital adequacy ratios to reduce risk. It is clear that there is economic benefit from increased size. However, the failures of large banks are systemic due to their interconnectedness. Therefore, regulators need to pay special attention to them in accordance with Basel III Accord.

Regulatory arbitrage, shadow banking and monetary policy in China

Regulatory arbitrage is a persuasive explanation for the rapid growth in shadow bank credit. In China, the distortions caused by government support to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and preferential lending by state-owned banks have created an environment for the development of shadow banks that lend to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The imposition of a loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) cap of 75% in 2009–2015 gave an additional boost to the growth of shadow bank credit by providing an incentive for conventional banks to bypass regulation and lend to SMEs via the shadow banks. The result is that shadow bank credit varied contra-cyclically to regular commercial bank credit in response to monetary policy shocks, dampening the effectiveness of monetary policy during the period of the LDR cap. This paper presents a model of the Chinese economy using a DSGE framework that accommodates a banking sector which isolates the effects of lending to SMEs by shadow banks. The model which is estimated by the method of indirect inference, allows for bank and shadow bank lending to affect the credit premium on private investment. We show that in general regular bank credit and shadow bank credit varies pro-cyclically with monetary policy but varies contra-cyclically when a LDR cap is imposed. The findings have implications for the policy of de-leveraging followed by China.

Nonbanks and Mortgage Securitization

This article reviews the dramatic growth of nonbank mortgage lending after the Global Financial Crisis, especially to borrowers with lower credit scores, and the related importance of mortgage-backed securitization. Our literature review suggests that the existing theoretical and empirical work on securitization is more relevant to bank than to nonbank lenders, thus leaving outstanding questions as to why nonbank market shares have increased to their current levels and how best to structure nonbank oversight. To highlight key differences in the mortgage-lending incentives of banks and nonbanks, we build a simple theoretical model of bank versus nonbank mortgage lending and use it to generate and test empirical hypotheses. We find, in particular, that loans issued by nonbanks are more likely to prepay early than loans issued by banks, the difference not explainable by nonbank borrowers prepaying more rationally. Using regulatory filings from nonbanks that are typically unavailable to academic researchers, we examine the balance sheets and liquidity and capital positions of large Ginnie Mae nonbank servicers, which face and pose more risk in the current mortgage system. We find that on average these servicers have reasonable liquidity and capital positions relative to standard regulatory thresholds, particularly in 2022:Q1 after a few quarters of elevated profits. However, some large Ginnie Mae servicers appear to have inadequate capital, as gauged by risk-based capital measures. If defaults rise on a large scale, the liquidity and capital positions of these servicers may amplify the disruption in the mortgage and housing markets.

Credit Default Swaps and Lender Incentives in Bank Debt Renegotiations

AbstractUsing a regression-discontinuity design and within lender–borrower variation, we analyze how credit default swaps (CDSs) affect bank incentives and borrower outcomes in renegotiations after covenant violations. While existing studies document an investment decline after covenant violations, we find that covenant-violating firms maintain their investment subsequent to the introduction of CDS trading. Moreover, after CDS introduction, covenant-violating firms are less likely to default. Our results suggest that in the private debt markets, CDSs discipline borrowers, while the empty creditor problem due to CDS is mitigated because of lenders’ reputation concerns and lower coordination frictions.

The Need for Reform of Financial Markets in Times of Crisis in Emerging Economies: The Case of Lebanon

While many countries were confronting immense financial crises, Lebanon was one of the few countries that were able to withstand the dramatic consequences of the crises despite suffering from decades of geopolitical and financial instability. However, the burdened capital structure of Lebanon was overstrained by the incrementing cost of borrowing. The actual beneficiary from the latter financial model was the domestic banking sector. This sponsored the process of attracting customer deposits to be reinvested in the government debt issued by different Lebanese governments for securing the funds needed in financing the process of the development and reconstruction following decades of continuous war and destruction. The Lebanese financial system was abridged by redirecting the investors in the financial sector towards placing their capitals in customer deposit schemes with the domestic banks rather than channeling the capitals towards other economic sectors. In fact, the incentive for the investors was designated in the high yields secured by the reinvestment opportunity in the government debt that has been rising every day to reach historic records while the incentive for the domestic banks remained the conventional scheme of premiums charged for intermediation between the lender and the borrower. The latter process led to increase the concentration risk of customer deposits as liabilities on the balance sheets of the local banks. This research study aims at demonstrating the feasibility of the implementation of a scientific reform by interpreting the recognition of modern investment alternatives for the investors in the Lebanese financial sector while securing the same funding level for the Lebanese government and governing the roles of the sponsoring banks. The study will adopt referenced fundamental and technical interpretation and arguments to emphasize the necessity of launching a new era of investment derived from stimulating the domestic financial market by activating and incentivizing the role of country’s stock exchange.

Lender financial reporting incentives and loan prioritization during the Paycheck Protection Program

PurposeThis study contributes to a growing body of literature on the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) by examining how lender incentives affected prioritization of large borrowers. In addition, this study separately examines incentives for commercial banks and credit unions during the program.Design/methodology/approachUsing 2020 PPP loan data, the authors create a proxy for lender loan prioritization by comparing the skewness statistics of large and small loan distributions. A regression model is used to examine lender reporting incentives and loan prioritization.FindingsResults show that larger borrowers were prioritized in receiving PPP loans earlier. Lenders with financial reporting concerns and commercial banks favored large borrowers to a greater extent.Practical implicationsThis study may inform social planners and regulators about the benefits and costs of delegating emergency funding loan decisions to financial institutions.Originality/valueThe authors believe this paper is the first to examine financial institution reporting incentives in relationship to PPP lending practices. It adds novelty by examining lender incentives, while prior research has focused heavily on the economic consequences of the program and how borrower–lender relationships affected loan practices during the program.