Incentive Model Research Articles

An Examination of Management Tone in the MD&A in the Context of Fraud Pentagon

ABSTRACT We examine the association between management tone in management discussion and analysis (MD&A) and five elements of the fraud pentagon model of incentives, opportunity, rationalization, capability, and arrogance. Management tone is measured using a biased tone, and several proxies for fraud are constructed. Using a sample of 586 public companies listed on the Teheran Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2022, we find (1) auditor’s opinion, current ratio, capital expenditure, earnings management, and tax evasion as proxies for fraud incentives; (2) internal control weakness as a proxy for fraud opportunity; (3) CEO tenure and ability as proxies for fraud capability; (4) competition in the product market, industry tax evasion, and lack of political communication as proxies for fraud rationalization; and (5) narcissism and overconfidence as proxies for fraud arrogance are associated with management abnormal tone. We contribute to literature by examining relationships between fraud elements and the abnormal tone in MD&A. Data Availability: Data used in this paper are available from the public sources identified in the text and upon request from authors. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48.

지속가능한 프로젝트 관리를 위한 프로젝트 제어 방안: 도로 침수 예방 사례 프로젝트를 중심으로

As environmental pollution, energy depletion, and maintenance difficulties due to changes in social requirements arise during project progress, interest in the sustainability of project management has increased. Accordingly, sustainable project management theories have been proposed to complement the short-term goal-focused approach and performance evaluation methods that existing project management methods have adhered to. However, the sustainable project management theories have not been extended to empirical research. In this paper, we provides a case study of a sustainable project management framework and control mechanisms such as a collaboration model and incentive model using a road flood prevention project as an example. The case project was a project for improving urban infrastructure and was carried out with consideration for environmental, social, and economic sustainability. Through sustainable project management, the case project was able to achieve its sustainability goals and shows the results of the application of the control mechanisms.

Resources Price Adjustment in Cloud Computing for Load Balancing and Fairness Between Users and Suppliers

Resource price adjustment is a challenging issue when building a cloud computing system. For this purpose, we present an approach that adopts a market-driven price adjustment model as an economic incentive model and ensures the balance between supply and demand. We show how this model may be adapted and applied to an infrastructure as a service (IaaS) in cloud computing. We place ourselves in the context of the virtual machines market. To achieve competitive equilibrium, prices are adjusted according to a tâtonnement-like process. The prices are computed by a third party, the auctioneer. However, this process requires several assumptions to ensure the existence and stability of competitive equilibrium, not all of which are verified by cloud computing systems. The atomicity and convexity of preferences are not guaranteed by cloud computing systems. These questions will be the subject of our empirical study. We find empirically that the change in the sign of excess demand, indicating the existence of equilibrium, occurs between two similar prices. The experimental results show that the proposed dynamic price adjustment approach is more profitable than fixed-price pricing, allowing dynamic suppliers to become important market agents.

Dynamic Incentive Mechanism of Collaboration in Prefabricated Building Supply Chain Based on Differential Game

Supply chain collaboration is an important guarantee for improving the performance of prefabricated construction projects and exerting its advantages. The aim of this study was to explore the level and effect of supply chain collaboration under a no-cost-sharing contract, a cost-sharing contract, and a centralized decision-making contract. A dynamic incentive model of prefabricated building supply chain collaboration based on the differential game model was proposed. Considering the impact of BIM on collaboration, the BIM application level was also introduced into the incentive model. Through the comparative analysis of model solution results and numerical simulation, it was found that, in the centralized decision-making contract, the optimal collaborative effort and the optimal total revenue of enterprises in the prefabricated building supply chain were the largest; the optimal collaborative effort of enterprise in the prefabricated building supply chain reduced first and then tended to be stable; and the improvement of the BIM application level could promote collaboration in the prefabricated building supply chain. The results of this study are helpful for managers to select and formulate a reasonable collaboration incentive contract in the prefabricated building supply chain.

Opportunities and Challenges of California’s Fruit and Vegetable Electronic Benefit Transfer Pilot Project at Farmers’ Markets: A Qualitative Study with Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Shoppers and Farmers’ Market Staff

Background/Objectives: Nutrition incentive programs can increase access to fresh fruits and vegetables and improve food security among Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) participants and others in the United States. This qualitative study explored SNAP participants’ and farmers’ market staff’s perceptions of and experiences with a pilot supplemental benefit program offered at seven farmers’ markets in 2023 as part of the California Fruit and Vegetable Electronic Benefit Transfer Pilot Project. The pilot introduced specific characteristics that differ from more traditional nutrition incentive program dollar-for-dollar match incentive models, particularly the traditional model operating in California. Specific differences included the following: (1) offering a monthly USD 60 supplemental benefit that could be redeemed in a single shopping trip; (2) providing the supplemental benefit as a match that could be spent on any SNAP-eligible item in any retail location (rather than solely on fruits and vegetables at the farmers’ market). Methods: We conducted a qualitative, cross-sectional study including seven focus groups with 40 SNAP shoppers and six focus groups with 14 farmers’ market staff at six pilot-participating farmers’ markets in California. All focus groups were conducted by trained research staff and were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed using the immersion crystallization method. Results: Our findings include that shoppers appreciated several features of the pilot, particularly the ability to obtain an entire month’s supplemental benefit during one shopping trip and the ability to spend the benefit earned on any SNAP-eligible item at any SNAP retailer. Farmers’ market staff appreciated that the pilot benefited shoppers but found it difficult to manage due to staff and shopper confusion about the program, increased program utilization, subsequent long lines, and the spending of the earned incentives at other SNAP retailers. Both shoppers and staff reported that the program was difficult to understand. Conclusions: These findings can inform future nutrition incentive program designs to benefit SNAP participants while offering sustainable models for farmers’ markets.

<b>The Crossroad between Intellectual Property and Clinical Trials: Balancing Incentives for Innovation w</b>ith Access to Healthcare

The interplay between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and clinical trials presents a complex challenge in the realm of healthcare innovation. This paper examines the critical role of IPRs, particularly patents, in incentivizing pharmaceutical research and development while simultaneously addressing their implications for access to essential medicines, especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). We explore the phases of clinical trials that underpin medical advancements and highlight the significant financial and temporal investments required for drug development. The discussion also delves into the tensions created by monopolistic pricing, data exclusivity, and evergreening practices that hinder equitable access to healthcare. Through a review of international agreements like the TRIPS Agreement and case studies on HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C treatments, and COVID-19 vaccines, we illustrate the urgent need for policy reforms and alternative incentive models, including prize funds, patent pools, and tiered pricing strategies. Our findings underscore the necessity for a balanced approach that fosters innovation while ensuring that life-saving medications are accessible to all populations. Ultimately, this paper calls for collaborative efforts among governments, international organizations, and the private sector to create an equitable healthcare landscape that prioritizes public health needs without stifling innovation.

Innovating Civil Engineering: Strategies for Fostering Stakeholder Engagement in the Circular Economy

Sustainability and circular economy principles are increasingly important in civil engineering, as highlighted by the United Nations Environmental Programme in 2023 the construction activities represented 36% of global energy use in 2020. However, the sector's focus on reducing operational carbon overshadows the need for addressing embodied carbon from materials like cement, steel, and aluminium. To address this, a shift towards incentivizing all supply chain stakeholders and cultivating collaborative models is necessary. This research provides an initial scoping for the development of the Lithuanian Construction Materials Reuse Optimization (LSEPO) platform, a pioneering regional initiative fostering a marketplace for reused building materials. Such platforms are recognized for their potential to overcome sustainability barriers by utilizing digital technologies for efficient data management and stakeholder collaboration. Our research identifies a significant gap in the existing literature concerning effective stakeholder engagement strategies critical for the success of such platforms. To bridge this gap, we employed a three-tiered methodological approach: firstly, a semi-structured literature analysis delved into existing stakeholder engagement strategies within the circular economy. This review highlighted a fragmented understanding of incentives and collaboration dynamics across different sectors. Secondly, a content analysis of global material exchange and circular construction platforms provided insights into best practices, showcasing successful communication methods, innovative incentive models, and robust collaboration frameworks. Lastly, integrating these findings, our study proposes a conceptual stakeholder engagement framework tailored for social innovation in civil engineering, more specifically Lithuanian Construction Materials Reuse Optimization (LSEPO). Practical implications of our findings underscore the necessity for platforms like LSEPO to incorporate adaptive engagement strategies that are context-sensitive and inclusive, facilitating a broad spectrum of stakeholder inputs. The study demonstrates that effective stakeholder engagement goes beyond traditional communication methods; it requires a systemic integration of technological innovation and incentive alignment to promote sustained participation and collaboration. By providing a comprehensive foundation for the development of the LSEPO platform, this research not only aims to advance it as a beacon of social innovation and environmental stewardship within the civil engineering sector but also sets a benchmark for future initiatives aiming to embed circular economy principles effectively.

Incentive and Supervision Mechanism for Operation and Maintenance of Mega Railway Infrastructure Based on Principal-Agent Theory

This study incorporates fairness preference theory into the principal-agent model to address the challenges arising from information asymmetry between the government and railway infrastructure operation and maintenance (O&M) companies. It develops an incentive and supervision model for the management of mega railway infrastructure operations and maintenance, considering two perspectives: full rationality and fairness preference. The models are compared and analyzed, exploring the costs of government supervision and the changes in expected benefits when equity preference is taken into account. The conclusions are supported by numerical examples and visual analysis, illustrating the impact of different variable parameters on the behavioral strategies of the government and O&M companies. The findings demonstrate that a well-designed incentive and supervision mechanism can effectively regulate the behavior of railway infrastructure O&M companies. The effort level of O&M companies is positively correlated with the intensity of government incentives and supervision. Moreover, from the perspective of fairness preference, transferring some financial benefits from the government to O&M companies not only increases their extra effort but also reduces government’s supervision costs, while the government’s expected utility gain depends on the strength of “reciprocity” exhibited by O&M companies.

Data-driven contract design

We propose a prior-free model of incentive contracting in which the principal's beliefs about the agent's production technology are characterized by revealed preference data. The principal and the agent are each financially risk neutral and the agent's preferences are understood to be quasilinear in effort. Prior to contracting with the agent, the principal observes the output produced by a population of identical agents in best response to finitely many exogenously-specified contracts. She views any technology that rationalizes this data as plausible and evaluates contracts according to their guaranteed expected payoff against the set of all such technologies. This paper does four things. First, we characterize the set of technologies that are consistent with the revealed preference data. Second, we show that robustly optimal contracts are either empirical contracts or equity bonus contracts that supplement mixtures of contracts from the data with equity payments. Third, we provide conditions under which these optimal contracts append equity payments to only a single contract from the data. Fourth, and finally, we show that all of our results generalize without complication to a setting in which there might be arbitrary forms of unobserved heterogeneity within the population of agents.

Decentralized Incident Reporting: Mobilizing Urban Communities with Blockchain

This paper introduces an innovative response to the pressing challenge of rapid and effective incident detection and management in urban settings. The proposed solution is a decentralized incident reporting system (IRS) harnessing blockchain technology and decentralized data storage systems. By empowering residents to report incidents, the proposed IRS enables seamless real-time monitoring and intervention by relevant departments. Built on a blockchain foundation, the proposed solution ensures immutability, transparency, security, and auditability, enhancing data resilience and comprehensive applicability. The proposed system leverages the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) for the storage of incident proofs to manage the blockchain size effectively. Through the proposed IRS, transparency is upheld, enabling complete auditability of incident details and required interventions by citizens, societal bodies, and governmental bodies. Moreover, an incentive model is introduced to encourage active participation in incident reporting, thereby enhancing the system’s overall effectiveness and long-term sustainability. The proposed IRS integrates mobile technology to facilitate user engagement and data submission, essential for urban emergency management. Empirical validation using the Quorum–Raft blockchain demonstrates the feasibility of the proposed approach in terms of system throughput, incident reporting delay, blockchain size, and deployment cost. Specifically, the system maintains a latency of under 15 s even at high transaction rates, can handle up to 200 incidents per second, and is cost-effective, with deployment estimates for 16 organizations over five years being under 1.99 million USD. The method involves extensive testing with simulated incidents and user interactions to ensure robustness and scalability, showcasing the system’s potential for effective emergency management in urban environments.

Cost-sharing incentive for collaborative innovation between main manufacturer-core supplier based on risk factors

This paper considers the “main manufacturer-supplier” model in collaborative cooperation among firms which requires the leader to invest significant resources and bear huge risks. However, few scholars simultaneously consider innovation risks and incentive issues under the model. We construct a Stackelberg game incentive model with different cost-sharing ratios under the risk of technological innovation. We characterize the equilibrium of the model and highlight the key role played by the main manufacturer and supplier. The results are as follows: (a) Main manufacturer can implement the cost-sharing incentive strategy under certain conditions, which is, its profit coefficient is greater than 0.75 times that of supplier and the cost-sharing ratios expected coefficient is greater than the minimum threshold. (b) The optimal cost-sharing ratio is directly proportional to the profit coefficient of the main manufacturer, inversely proportional to that of the supplier, and shows an inverted U-shape function with the probability of successful technological innovation. (c)This strategy can motivate suppliers to invest more resources, reduce the investment of the main manufacturer, simultaneously increase the profits of the main manufacturer and supplier in the certain ranges of innovation success probability and profit coefficients, with significant incentive effects.

The application of comprehensive incentive model theory in debridement, plastic surgery and suturing of preschool children.

The application of comprehensive incentive model theory in debridement, plastic surgery and suturing of preschool children.

Dynamic incentive mechanisms in mega project-risk management considering the participation of the insurance company

PurposeThe construction of megaprojects often involves substantial risks. While insurance plays an important role as a traditional risk transfer means, owners and insurance companies may still suffer huge losses during the risk management process. Therefore, considering the strong motivation of insurance companies to participate in the on-site risk management of megaprojects, this study aims to propose a collaborative incentive mechanism involving insurance companies, to optimize the risk management effect and reduce the risk of accidents in megaprojects.Design/methodology/approachBased on principal-agent theory, the research develops the static and dynamic incentive models for risk management in megaprojects, involving both the owner and insurance company. The study examines the primary factors influencing incentive efficiency. The results are numerically simulated with a validation case. Finally, the impact of parameter changes on the stakeholders' benefits is analyzed.FindingsThe results indicate that the dynamic incentive model is available to the achievement of a flexible mechanism to ensure the benefits of contractors while protecting the benefits of the owner and insurance company. Adjusting the incentive coefficients for owners and insurance companies within a specified range promotes the growth of benefits for all parties involved. The management cost and economic benefit allocation coefficients have a positive effect on the adjustment range of the incentive coefficient, which helps implement a more flexible dynamic incentive mechanism to motivate contractors to carry out risk management to reduce risk losses.Originality/valueThis study makes up for the absence of important stakeholders in risk management. Different from traditional megaproject risk management, this model uses insurance companies as bridges to break the island effect of risk management among multiple megaprojects. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by designing appropriate dynamic incentive mechanisms in megaproject risk management through insurance company participation, and provides practical implications to both owner and insurance company on incentive contract making, thus achieving better risk governance of megaprojects.

Tax Incentive Mediates Foreign Direct Investment Determinants and Hotel Performance in Arusha Tanzania

This study seeks to explain the mediation effect of tax incentives on the relationship between ownership advantage (OWA), location advantage (LA), and internationalization (INT) factors determining Foreign direct investment (FDI) on hotel performance (HP). The study proposes the mediation model of tax incentives and FDI toward hotel performance in the Arusha region, of Tanzania. The proposed order of the model is that foreign direct investment depends on OWA, LA, and INT which may become applicable through tax incentives and tax incentives may further predict hotel performance. The measurement scale was borrowed from different studies and responded Includes hotel owners, managers, executive officers, and employees. Data were collected from August 2022 to February 2023; whereby 257 filled questionnaires were gathered and 236 were usable for further analysis. Final questionnaires were analyzed using SPSS and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The findings support that tax incentive fully mediates the relationship between ownership advantage and FDI toward hotel performance and partially mediates location advantage and internationalization on FDI investments toward hotel performance. The paper strengthens theoretical arguments by indicating the mediation effect of tax incentives on the relationship between the determinant of FDI, OWA, LA, INT, ICT, and hotel performance. Thus, this study adds to the literature as it has confirmed the eclectic paradigm theory.

Multi-stage incentive contract design of aviation complex product multi-task delivery strategy

The increasing demand for aviation complex products makes complex product manufacturers pay more attention to delivery efficiency, and the efficiency and effect of delivery problems are the key factors that restrict delivery efficiency. A series of delivery strategy combinations of delivery subjects will affect delivery output and delivery efficiency. This study aims to design a long-term effective incentive contract, which stimulates the subjective initiative of the subject and then investigates the effect of the incentive contract on delivery efficiency under different combinations of delivery strategies. We consider the behavioral characteristics of each technical business department to expand the benchmark incentive model, such as the degree of perceived revenue fairness, the variation of the three relationships (neutrality, competition, and cooperation), and the level of technological transformation capability. The multi-stage incentive mechanism which combines explicit incentives and implicit incentives is developed to explore the optimal delivery strategies based on a benchmark model. The results show that incentive contracts can improve delivery efficiency and benefit delivery centers and technical business departments. The delivery decisions of the department are influenced by the closeness of department relationships and the fairness of assignment, and the departments tend to pay more effort in tasks with high relative importance and low effort cost. When the relative importance of tasks is equal to the ratio of marginal cost, a weak incentive zone in the delivery incentive contract exists. The incentive effect of reputation effect is obvious except for the last stage. Based on the designed incentive contracts, the subjective initiative of the participants can be effectively stimulated to empower complex product delivery.

INCENTIVE MECHANISMS OF AN EXPERIMENTAL RESOURCE-SHARING PLATFORM CONSIDERING REPUTATION EFFECTS FOR MEGAPROJECTS

Participating in megaproject experimental tasks would significantly improve the laboratories’ industry influence and future competitiveness. Thus, this paper introduces the long-term reputation effects of the incentive model of an experimental resource-sharing platform for megaprojects, which could motivate them to consider future benefits and improve their current efforts. The aim is to incentivize laboratories’ resource-sharing behavior more effectively and to increase the amount of resources shared by these laboratories on the platform, thus guaranteeing the long-term sustainability of the platform. It constructs the incentive model by combining dual implicit and explicit incentive mechanisms. It analyses the incentive mechanism of a reputation effect on laboratories compared with the pure explicit mechanism so that the primary conditions for reputation incentives can be obtained to achieve Pareto improvement. Finally, the proposed method is validated in combination with data simulation. The results show that although dual implicit and explicit incentive mechanisms could reduce the information asymmetry between the two sides and increase the efforts of laboratories and the benefits of the platform, the platform should not blindly increase the intensity of these incentives and need to consider the influence of the subsidies of these laboratories’ upfront inputs, the degree of sharing and their informatization capabilities.

Antifungal pipeline: Is there light at the end of the tunnel?

The misuse and overuse of classic antifungals have accelerated the development of resistance mechanisms, diminishing the efficacy of established therapeutic pathways and necessitating a shift towards alternative targets. Despite this pressing need for new treatments, the antifungal drug pipeline has been largely stagnant for the past three decades, primarily due to the high risks and costs associated with antifungal drug development, compounded by uncertain market returns. Extensive research durations, special patient populations and rigorous regulatory demands pose significant barriers to bringing novel antifungal agents to market. In response, the “push-pull” incentive model has emerged as a vital strategy to invigorate the pipeline and encourage innovation. This editorial critically examines the current clinical landscape and spotlights emerging antifungal agents, such as Fosmanogepix, Ibrexafungerp, and Olorofim, while also unraveling the multifaceted challenges faced in new antifungal drug development. The generation of novel antifungals offers a beacon of hope in the battle against antimicrobial resistance, but it is premature to declare them as definitive solutions. Their future role hinges on thorough clinical validation, cost-effectiveness assessments, and continuous post-marketing surveillance. Only through strategic implementation and integration with market strategies we can transform the landscape of antifungal development, addressing both the resistance crisis and the treatment challenges.

Research on Competitive Compliance System based on Lawler-Porter Comprehensive Incentive Model

在竞争合规领域，普遍存在的“威慑陷阱”现象反映了我国传统简单威慑的固有缺陷，有鉴于此，一套能将外部法律规制等效转化为企业合规自觉的激励体系必不可少。在将Lawler-Porter综合激励模型引入到我国竞争合规制度领域的过程中，达成“工作绩效”是激励机制的基本目标，立法、执法、司法是法律上的三大主要推进路径。适用严格责任、将合规作为法定量刑情节等立法措施能从外在环境上激发企业的合规努力，合规风险提示、宽恕政策等执法手段在事后奖励方面推进企业合规体系建设，综合认定的司法理念则会进一步增强企业的公平感。通过以Lawler-Porter内在逻辑为核心，借鉴海外企业合规的先进经验构建的一套完整循环的竞争合规激励机制，能够从根源上提高企业合规参与度与积极性，从而为推动我国竞争合规制度的不断完善提供参考路径。 In the field of competitive compliance, the widespread phenomenon of “deterrence trap” reflects the inherent defects of China’s traditional simple deterrence. In view of this, a set of incentive mechanism that can equivalently change the external regulation into the compliance consciousness of enterprises is essential. In the process of introducing Lawler-Porter Comprehensive Incentive Model into the field of China’s competition compliance system, achieving “job performance” is the basic goal of the incentive mechanism, legislation, law enforcement and justice are the three main promotion paths in law. The application of legislative measures such as strict liability and taking compliance as a legal sentencing circumstance can stimulate the compliance efforts of enterprises from the external environment. Law enforcement means such as compliance risk prompt and leniency policy can promote the construction of enterprise compliance system in terms of afterwards reward, and the comprehensive judicial concept will further enhance the sense of fairness of enterprises. Through a complete cycle of competitive compliance incentive mechanism and with the help of advanced experience in compliance from overseas enterprises, we can improve the compliance participation and enthusiasm of enterprises from the root, thus offering a reference path for promoting the continuous improvement of China’s competitive compliance system.

The Dynamic Comprehensive Evaluation of the Importance of Cutting Parameters in the Side Milling TC4 Process Using an Integrated End Mill.

In the cutting process, there are many parameters that affect the cutting effect, and the same parameter has different degrees of influence on different performance indicators, which makes it difficult to select key parameters for parameter optimization and parameter combination evaluation while considering multiple performance indicators at the same time. The process of titanium alloy milling with an integrated end mill is studied herein. The values of cutting tool flank face wear and material removal rates are obtained with experimental and analytical methods. Numerical characteristics and causes of the cutting tool flank face wear at different stages are also analyzed. The dynamic, comprehensive evaluation method based on the double incentives model is used to evaluate the dynamic, comprehensive importance of cutting parameters in view of the problem of considering multiple performance indicators and the characteristics of the dynamic change in performance indicators in the cutting process. According to the result of a dynamic, comprehensive evaluation, the cutting parameters with the highest comprehensive importance are selected. Finally, the radar map is used to plot the comprehensive importance of the cutting parameters. The overall comprehensive importance of each cutting parameter is intuitively displayed as well. As a result of the research, the dynamic, comprehensive evaluation method based on the double incentives model has a good application value in the evaluation of tool performance in the cutting process and can quickly select the best tool performance parameter combination; it is established that the most comprehensive parameter is the cutting speed, and the cutting width is the second most important. In turn, the comprehensive importance of the cutting depth is the lowest.

An Incentive Mechanism-Based Minimum Adjustment Consensus Model Under Dynamic Trust Relationship.

In traditional group decision making, the inconsistent experts are usually forced to make compromises toward the group opinion to increase the group consensus level. However, the strategy of reaching group consensus via an incentive mechanism encouraging adjustment of preferences is more effective than forcing, which is the aim of this article. Specifically, this article establishes a novel incentive mechanism to support group consensus under dynamic trust relationship. First, the supremum and infimum incentives-based rule driven by trust relationship is defined. Based on the assumption that if incentive conditions are met, then experts will be willing to adjust their preferences, the incentive behavior-driven minimum adjustment consensus model is developed to generate optimal incentive-based recommendation preferences. Thus, the proposed incentive mechanism can effectively reduce the preference adjustment cost and promote group consensus reaching. Third, the updated trust relationships between experts are shown to be strengthen by the proposed incentive-driven preference revision. Consequently, the optimization model based on trust interaction relationship is constructed to obtain the final group preference matrix. Finally, a supplier selection case of high-end medical equipment is provided to illustrate the proposed method and show the rationality and advantages of the proposed methodology with both a sensitivity analysis and a comparison analysis.