Incentive Compatible Reputation Research Articles

An incentive compatible reputation mechanism for P2P systems

In peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, peers often must interact with unknown or unfamiliar peers without the benefit of trusted third parties or authorities to mediate the interactions. Trust management through reputation mechanism to facilitate such interactions is recognized as an important element of P2P systems. It is, however, faced by the problems of how to stimulate reputation information sharing and honest recommendation elicitation. This paper presents an incentive compatible reputation mechanism for P2P systems. It has two unique features: (1) a recommender's trustworthiness and level of confidence about the recommendation is considered for a more accurate calculation of reputations and fair evaluation of recommendations. (2) Incentive for participation and honest recommendation is implemented through a fair differential service mechanism. It relies on peer's level of participation and on the recommendation credibility. Theoretic analysis and simulation show that the reputation mechanism we propose can help peers effectively detect dishonest recommendations in a variety of scenarios where more complex malicious strategies are introduced. Moreover, it can also stimulate peers to send sufficiently honest recommendations. The latter is realized by ensuring that active and honest recommenders, compared to inactive or dishonest ones, can elicit the most honest (helpful) recommendations and thus suffer the least number of wrong trust decisions.

A Novel Service-orientated Incentive Compatible Reputation Model for MANETs

Mobile Ad Hoc networks have become increasingly popular in the recent years. Multi-devices cooperating and sharing services is critical to realizing various mobile business applications. However, because mobile nodes are usually constrained by limited resources such as energy, bandwidth, computational power, storage and so on, some nodes may be a unwilling to share the services. Under these conditions we present in this paper a novel trust and reputation model, called NSOICRep, based on an incentive compatible clustering global reputation model aiming at providing trust and reputation in MANETs. Simulations show that NSOICRep can resist the selfish behavior of nodes, and motivate nodes positively share trustworthy services effectively.

An incentive compatible and distributed reputation mechanism based on context similarity for service oriented systems

One major challenge in service oriented systems is how to establish a trusted relationship between different parties. A reputation mechanism is the best-known method to build trust and foster mutual cooperation. Reputation mechanisms require correct and honest feedback to function effectively. An incentive compatible reputation mechanism entices self-interested parties to report the truth by explicit rewards which can offset the potential profits that could be gained by lying. The existing incentive compatible mechanisms are centralized which gather feedback merely through a specific service offered by a service provider, while they ignore some useful information on other services that are offered by the same service provider. In this paper, we introduce a novel distributed reputation mechanism based on a number of special reputation centers (SRCs) for service oriented environments. Each SRC gathers reputation information for a predetermined service offered by different service providers. The proposed model is collusion resistant and offers incentives to SRCs for making an attempt at gathering reputation information thoroughly and report it honestly. We then also evaluate the integrity and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism by carrying out experiments under different settings of the electronic marketplace. Examination of the results confirms that the new approach outperforms other incentive compatible reputation solutions reported in the literature.

An Incentive Compatible Reputation Model for P2P Networks

An important challenge regarding peer’s trust assessment in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks is how to cope with such issues as the fraudulent behaviors and the dishonest feedback behaviors from malicious peers, and the issue of inactive recommendations to others. However, these issues cannot be effectively addressed by the existing solutions. Thus, an incentive compatible reputation management model for P2P networks, named ICRM, is proposed to solve them. In ICRM, the metric of time zone is used to describe the time property of the transaction experience and the recommendation. Three other metrics such as the direct trust value, the recommendation trust value and the recommendation credibility, based on the metric of time zone are applied to express accurately the final trust level of a peer. Furthermore, the participating level is introduced as the metric to identify a peer’s activeness degree. Theoretical analysis and simulation experiments demonstrate that, ICRM can effectively suppress the malicious behaviors such as providing unreliable services, or giving dishonest feedbacks to others in the P2P networks. What’s more, it also can incent peers to offer recommendations to others more actively.

An incentive compatible reputation mechanism for ubiquitous computing environments

The vision of ubiquitous computing is becoming a reality thanks to the advent of portable devices and the advances in wireless networking technologies. It aims to facilitate user tasks through seamless utilization of services available in the surrounding environments. In such distributed environments featuring openness, interactions such as service provision and consumption between entities that are unknown or barely known to each other, are commonplace. Trust management through reputation mechanism for facilitating such interactions is recognized as an important element of ubiquitous computing. It is, however, faced by the problems of how to stimulate reputation information sharing and enforce honest recommendation elicitation. We present in this paper an incentive compatible reputation mechanism to facilitate the trustworthiness evaluation of entities in ubiquitous computing environments. It is based on probability theory and supports reputation evolution and propagation. Our reputation mechanism not only shows robustness against lies, but also stimulates honest and active recommendations. The latter is realized by ensuring that active and honest recommenders, compared to inactive or dishonest ones, can obtain the most number of honest (helpful) recommendations and thus suffer the least number of wrong trust decisions, as validated by simulation based evaluation. The proposed reputation mechanism is also implemented as part of a QoS-aware Web service discovery middleware and evaluated regarding its overhead on service discovery latency.