Inadequate Notion Research Articles

From “Natural Institution” to Poetic Genre: Literary Testimony and the Issues of Witnessing in Verse

Abstract This article examines the relationship between poetry and testimony in order to outline a viable framework for interpreting testimonial poetry (or “poetry of witness,” in Carolyn Forché’s terms) as a literary genre in its own right. Neglected in favor of other, mimetically oriented modes of witnessing, especially those in narrative fiction and documentary prose, testimonial poetry has not been extensively studied, and when it has, the studies were often based on inadequate notions of testimony that fail to recognize witnessing as a broader social and linguistic practice. Relying on the sociological approach to eyewitness testimony developed by Renaud Dulong (notably in Le témoin oculaire [1998]), this article proposes a new understanding of poetic testimony, based neither on an overly broad notion of witnessing as living through an event or era, nor on a narrow understanding of witnessing as providing a faithful documentary account of a personal experience. Much like its prose counterpart, poetic testimony enacts a quasi-contractual relationship between authors and readers, whereby the former are committed to telling the truth about a directly experienced event of public importance and the latter, in return, are committed to considering seriously their words, approaching them in good faith. This relationship is driven by an underlying ethical imperative whereby the author acts as a moral witness in Avishai Margalit's sense of the term, and the readers assume the role of a moral community sympathetic to their plight. By referencing examples from American, Hungarian, Russian, French, Polish, and South Slavic twentieth-century poetry, the article shows how a “testimonial” reading of a poem, often very strongly favored on intuitive grounds, modifies generic expectations based on traditional poetic genres and explores its interpretative and ethical implications.

Causal Power and Perfection: Descartes's Second a Posteriori Argument for the Existence of God

Abstract: The third Meditation is typically understood to contain two a posteriori arguments for the existence of God. The author focuses on the second argument, where Descartes proves the existence of God partly in virtue of proving that Descartes cannot be the cause of himself. To establish this, Descartes argues that if he were the cause of himself, then he would endow himself with any conceivable perfection. The justification for this claim is that bringing about a substance is more difficult than creating an attribute, so anything that can do the former can do the latter. While current explanations of this justification are either implausible or inadequate, the author argues that this principle derives support from a scholastic distinction between being-as-such and determinate being. With this distinction in view, we can make sense of Descartes's argument without appealing to ambiguous or inadequate notions.

Communication and the principle of intersubjectivity: :Towards an integrational account of communication, part 1

Do new perspectives on language as first order interaction involve an original standpoint on human communication? I show that leading research is currently rather ‘stretching’ traditional ideas of communication. I argue that “the principle of intersubjectivity” (Taylor and Cameron 1987), according to which communication results in shared understanding, will not only reproduce the same accounts of communication over and over, but force us to keep working with inadequate notions of human cognition. Following a Darwinian perspective on cognition, I argue that perception can better be understood as sign-making in accordance with the tenets of integrational semiology. In a subsequent article I will present a general description of how we engage the suggested semiotic perception when we communicate through language.

Can God Be Perceived? A Phenomenological Critique of the Perceptual Model of Mystical Experience

In the perceptual model of mystical experience, the mystics are said to “perceive” God much like ordinary people perceive physical objects. The model has been used to defend the epistemic value of mysticism, and it has been championed most vigorously by William Alston in his work Perceiving God. This paper is a critique of the model from a phenomenological perspective. Utilizing insights from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I show that models like Alston’s are based on an inadequate notion of perception, which fails to distinguish perception from other modes of intentionality; the result is that even if we assume the mystics have directly experienced God, it is not clear why we should say they have “perceived” God. Then, using a better and richer concept of perception, I show that the mystical experiences under discussion cannot be truly perceptual, because they lack some salient features of perception. The conclusion is that talks of “perceiving God” can only be analogical or metaphorical, but not literal.

Cosmopolítica indígena en los Andes: reflexiones conceptuales más allá de la «política»

In Latin America indigenous politics has been branded as “ethnic politics.” Its activism is interpreted as a quest to make cultural rights prevail. Yet, what if “culture” is insufficient, even an inadequate notion, to think the challenge that indigenous politics represents? Drawing inspiration from recent political events in Peru—and to a lesser extent in Ecuador and Bolivia—where the indigenous–popular movement has conjured sentient entities (mountains, water, and soil—what we call “nature”) into the public political arena, the argument in this essay is threefold. First, indigeneity, as a historical formation, exceeds the notion of politics as usual, that is, an arena populated by rational human beings disputing the power to represent others vis-a-vis the state. Second, indigeneity's current political emergence—in oppositional antimining movements in Peru and Ecuador, but also in celebratory events in Bolivia—challenges the separation of nature and culture that underpins the prevalent notion of politics and its according social contract. Third, beyond “ethnic politics” current indigenous movements, propose a different political practice, plural not because of its enactment by bodies marked by gender, race, ethnicity or sexuality (as multiculturalism would have it), but because they conjure nonhumans as actors in the political arena.

What is home? An art-based workshop to explore the physical, relational and wellbeing properties of Home

Abstract This feasibility study was framed under the notion of creative practices as mutual recovery – the idea that shared creativity, collective experience and mutual benefit can promote resilience in mental health and well-being. The study evaluated the impact of an art-based workshop designed to examine participant’s notions of home. Thematic analysis was used to evaluate the textual data derived from three focus groups. The findings indicate that art-based workshops that incorporate principles of mindfulness can be used to raise awareness of mental health and well-being issues associated with challenging or inadequate notions of home. These workshops provide a forum for reflection and community in which these problematic notions can be meaningfully articulated and communicated and solutions discussed. This type of creative practice supports the notion of mutual recovery health, helps build resilience among residential workforce and thus helps them to better deal with existing problems.

On the inheritance of orbifold substructures

In a previous article, we defined a very flexible notion of suborbifold and characterized those suborbifolds which can arise as the images of orbifold embeddings. In particular, suborbifolds are images of orbifold embeddings precisely when they are saturated and split. This article addresses the problem of orbifold structure inheritance for three orbifolds Q⊂P⊂O. We identify an appealing but ultimately inadequate notion of an inherited canonical orbifold substructure. In particular, we give a concrete example where the orbifold structure of Q is canonically inherited from P, and the orbifold structure of P is canonically inherited from O, but the orbifold structure of Q is not canonically inherited from O. On the other hand, it is easy to see that when Q is embedded in P, and P is embedded in O, all of the canonical inherited orbifold substructures will agree. We also investigate the property of saturation in this context, and give an example of a suborbifold with the canonical orbifold substructure that is not saturated.

In Defense of Levels: Layer Cakes and Guilt by Association

Despite the ubiquity of “levels of organization” in the scientific literature, a nascent “levels skepticism” now claims that the concept of levels is an inherently flawed, misleading, or otherwise inadequate notion for understanding how life scientists produce knowledge about the natural world. However, levels skeptics rely on the maligned “layer-cake” account of levels stemming from Oppenheim and Putnam’s defense of the unity of science for their critical commentary. Recourse to layer-cake levels is understandable, as it is arguably the default conception of levels in philosophy. However, relying on this conception of levels undermines the initial plausibility of general dismissals of the concept, because the problems skeptics identify within the “basic idea” of the concept “levels” are merely ones already widely acknowledged in this conception. I illustrate this “guilt by association” by looking at the embedded role of “levels” in articulating intertheoretical reductionism during the latter part of the 20th century. I conclude by suggesting a methodological framework focusing on local usage patterns as a promising means for future analysis of the levels concept.

The Political and Institutional History of Colonial Spanish America

AbstractThis essay argues for a need to develop a new political history of colonial Spanish America in order to bring up to date the old institutional history of the Spanish empire. In recent decades, historians of colonial Spanish America have not shown much interest in the study of political and institutional history. Originally, this constituted a welcome reaction against the previous emphasis on the institutional and legal aspects of the Spanish empire. But one effect of this historiographical development has been that, while our knowledge of the social history of colonial Spanish America has progressed in an impressive way, our knowledge of the mechanisms of imperial rule has made very little progress in the last 50 years. As a result, colonial historians have to rely on antiquated or inadequate notions regarding the political and institutional nature of Spanish colonialism. However, the new political history of colonial Spanish America should not focus on the study of the colonial state, but rather on the political culture of the Spanish empire.

INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITICS IN THE ANDES: Conceptual Reflections beyond “Politics”

In Latin America indigenous politics has been branded as “ethnic politics.” Its activism is interpreted as a quest to make cultural rights prevail. Yet, what if “culture” is insufficient, even an inadequate notion, to think the challenge that indigenous politics represents? Drawing inspiration from recent political events in Peru—and to a lesser extent in Ecuador and Bolivia—where the indigenous–popular movement has conjured sentient entities (mountains, water, and soil—what we call “nature”) into the public political arena, the argument in this essay is threefold. First, indigeneity, as a historical formation, exceeds the notion of politics as usual, that is, an arena populated by rational human beings disputing the power to represent others vis-a-vis the state. Second, indigeneity's current political emergence—in oppositional antimining movements in Peru and Ecuador, but also in celebratory events in Bolivia—challenges the separation of nature and culture that underpins the prevalent notion of politics and its according social contract. Third, beyond “ethnic politics” current indigenous movements, propose a different political practice, plural not because of its enactment by bodies marked by gender, race, ethnicity or sexuality (as multiculturalism would have it), but because they conjure nonhumans as actors in the political arena.

‘Developing’ the Self in the Knowledge Economy

The term ‘knowledge economy’, like the term ‘globalisation’, has become a catchword in political and educational debate over the last decade or so, especially in debates upon educational policy where the role of education in preparing young people to take their part in the Knowledge Economy is often seen as paramount over other traditional schooling activities. It is said in such debates that the production of knowledge, information and skills, will become more valuable than traditional primary and secondary production. A lot is said about the knowledge required in the Knowledge Economy, and about how institutions, businesses, activities and human beings are to be ordered or structured in accordance with views of knowledge and new Management theories. But little is said of the young people expected to take their part in the knowledge economy. Do they have a choice? Is lying on a surfboard excluded from their life options? How will they be developed, trained or educated to take their part? Will they be committed to developing their selves in accordance with the model of the IT Knowledge Entrepreneur (hereinafter TIKE) presented as a model for education by policy makers in the Knowledge Economy? This article will argue against this latter notion of the development of the self, arguing that because knowledge is prioritised over ethics, there is both an inadequate notion of the self and the educational development of the self and, because of its implicit view only of ethics, an inadequate ethical and moral view of education [246 words].

John Berger's "Why Look at Animals?": A Close Reading

AbstractThis article is a close reading of John Berger's highly influential essay "Why look at animals?" and its implications for thinking about animals in modernity. Berger analyses the alienation of human and animal as a consequence of nineteenth-century capitalism, and contrasts it with an earlier period when human-animal relations were more integrated. Despite the power and simplicity of Berger's argument, which has been taken up uncritically by a number of writers, both his historical analysis and his conception of human-animal relations in modernity are highly problematic and need substantial revision. Furthermore, the consequences of his thesis paradoxically reinforce the very processes he is criticising. Inadequate notions of the place of animals in public visual culture, and a more general bias against visual imagery in favour of text-based notions of the animal, create obstacles to theorising human-animal relations and welfare related issues in the contemporary world. The article suggests other perspectives for understanding what it means to look at animals.

Zafer Çenocak ed. by Tom Cheesman, Karin E. Yeçilada (review)

1112 Reviews Romantics and Modernist aesthetics. This not only brings out the musicality of Duden 's writing, a theme which, like that ofvisual art, runs throughout the contributions here, but also furtherwidens the appeal and the impact of Duden's work. University College of Swansea Beth Linklater Zafer $enocak. Ed. by Tom Cheesman and Karin E. Yesjlada. (Contemporary German Writers) Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 2003. x+187 pp. ?15 (pbk ?7.99). ISBN 0-7083-1811-8 (pbk 0-7083-1810-x). The Turkish-German Zafer ?enocak (born in 1961) is rapidly coming to prominence as a lyric poet and essayist, and also as the author of a tetralogy of novels. This latest volume in the Cardiff Contemporary German Writers series (it is in fact the eleventh, though oddly they are not numbered) is the firstscholarly attempt at a comprehensive evaluation and presentation of his work. As primary sources it offersfifteenpages of new poetry and the transcript of a literary interview with the poet. A cursory bio? graphical overview and an exceptionally thorough bibliography are also useful assets, particularly as the books in this series seek to sell themselves as reference works. The bulk of the volume consists of short articles by academies. Identity has always been a key theme in the works of migrant writers, and this applies also to ?enocak, whose novels play constantly with uncertainties about what we are and who's who. This is explored in a finediscussion by Monika Carbe of ?enocak's Errotomane {1999), in which she shows how this psychological meandering is in part a working out of the author's personal 'interkultureller Riss'. It would have been good if Carbe had drawn the comparison with Aras Oren, for example, with his Berlin Savignyplatz (1995), for much of what she presents as original in ?enocak's novel is in fact highly deriyative, and there would have been scope for interesting intertextual discussions here. Oren likewise allows existential questions of personal identity to merge with political questions of cultural identity, leading to a bewildering quest from which the protagonist can emerge with new insights but with no easy answers. ?enocak rejects the cliche-ridden Turkish 'identity' of German perception, which inevitably means that Said and Orientalism feature largely in some ofthe discussions. Ulrich Beil's article 'Wider den Exotismus' documents this, showing how some mig? rant writers have cashed in on Western perceptions ('Selbstexotisierung'), to which ?enocak's anti-exotic tendency must be seen as a conscious reaction. Here ?enocak? and Beil?are particularly critical of Emine Sevgi Ozdamar, and ironically the same politically correct zeal which elevated her in the scholarship of the 1990s now ap? pears to damn her. ?enocak's rejection of the exotic is entirely understandable in a generation that seeks to belong in Germany and still make sense of its roots, but the priorities of the firstgeneration were different,and it might have been more useful here to have explored the ways in which conflicting strategies may be equally legi? timate. It would have been interesting, for example, to have worked out a discourse between ?enocak and the Syrian-German Rafik Schami, whose use ofthe techniques of traditional oriental storytelling is noteworthy precisely for the way in which he successfully harnesses the exotic to communicate on intercultural questions. The debate on the catchphrase 'between two cultures', taken up by Leslie Adelson in 'Against Between', is also of some importance. As a well-balanced bicultural, ?enocak experiences his cultures as two intersecting circles, the area between the culturally distinct elements being not a gap, but rather the common ground. This optimistic attitude to the richness of biculturality is useful in challenging inadequate notions of cultural boundaries. But here again, a recognition of the diversity of mig? rant experience could have provided a necessary counterpoint; other authors (Alev MLR, 99.4, 2004 1113 Tekinay, Sadik Yemni) portray the experience of less fortunate migrants who find themselves excluded from both of their communities, and in terms of group dynamics , 'between' is precisely where they find themselves. Other excellent essays are Karin Yesilada's plea forthe priority of ?enocak's lyrics, and Tom Cheesman's reflections on cultural clashes. University of Regensburg...

Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants

In certain contemporary theories of the politics of shame, shame is considered a pernicious emotion that we need to avoid in, or a salutary emotion that serves as an infallible guide to, democratic deliberation. The author argues that both positions arise out of an inadequate notion of the structure of shame and an oversimplistic opposition between shame and shamelessness. Plato’s dialogue, the Gorgias, actually helps to address these problems because it supplies a deeper understanding of the place of shame in democratic politics in ways that address our contemporary dilemmas. It does this first, by avoiding the simple opposition between shame and shamelessness and secondly, by articulating three different kinds of “politics of shame” that can characterize democratic deliberations. Finally, Plato’s treatment of shame extends upon contemporary ethical and psychoanalytic notions of shame in ways that are directly relevant to the our contemporary political situation.

Omniscience and radical particularity: a reply to Simoni

This paper is a brief reply to Henry Simoni's ‘Divine passibility and the problem of radical particularity: does God feel your pain?’ in Religious Studies, 33 (1997). I treat his discussion of my paper entitled ‘Hartshorne and Creel on impassibility’, Process Studies, 21 (1992). I argue that Simoni's examples used to illustrate the purportedly contradictory nature of the experiences of a God who universally feels creaturely states fail. For Simoni tacitly employs an inadequate notion of the law of non-contradiction, and thereby misses the relevant phenomenological fact that it is possible for human beings to have integrated mental states that contain spatially distinctive but conflicting hedonic properties. Thus, it is possible for God (at least under Hartshornean descriptions) to have such experiences. I also argue that I have not ‘exploited an isolated passage’ in Hartshorne to make his views seem more palatable. The point of the passage in question is in fact repeated by Hartshorne and is systematically connected with his doctrine of the ‘objective and subjective form of feeling’.

Care, Freedom, and Reciprocity in the Ethics of Simone de Beauvoir

To get to a place where you could love anything you chose-not to need permission for desire-well now, that was freedom.. An important aspect of contemporary ethics is questioning the nature of subjectivity. The agent is being redefined as connected rather than as solipsistically independent. In this essay, I look at the problem of envisioning a agent that accounts both for relationships with others and for liberatory independence. I argue that one's ability to love and give care is bound to one's ability to act on one's freedom. My aim is to consider vulnerability and an empowered freedom in feminist agency, and to propose an ethics that values both freedom and responsiveness to needs. In this essay I focus on the ideas of freedom, reciprocity, and ambiguity in the work of Simone de Beauvoir and use these ideas to augment the ethical notion of care. Beauvoir develops a relational subjectivity in The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex and this description of subj ectivity profoundly affects her discussions of freedom and reciprocity, making these concepts speak to women's oppression. Care ethics has been criticized for lacking reciprocity and for failing to promote freedom. I argue, however, that recognition of others' freedom is a response to the ethical needs of those others as well as one's own ethical needs, and thus is a form of care. This mutual recognition and response must be reciprocal, at least between those who can reciprocate, in order for persons to have political and ethical freedom. The ambiguity of the human condition in which we are both powerful and needy reflects the ambiguity of power in reciprocal relationships, in which each recognizes and helps the other. Mutual recognition of freedom is the attitude of the ethic of freedom and care that I want to develop. Care ethics as it has been construed thus far has been criticized for having inadequate notions of reciprocity. Descriptions of care as a value often portray a agent who always is ready to give to the other, who always is open to the other's needs, regardless of the harm that care might cause to the agent or to others. Such descriptions risk reinscribing patriarchal femininity, in which the is the one who gives on command and consequently cannot be autonomous in her decision-making. The moral woman of patriarchal femininity therefore is contradictory, since acting on command, that is, acting heteronomously, is not usually considered by philosophers to be a possible description of action. If care ethics is to be an ethic at all it must value the kind of action and response to needs which guarantee that care givers will define their own actions. Taking care in understanding another's demands certainly entails noticing when a person may be asking for care that is morally suspect or dangerous. Beauvoir's theory is consistent with many aspects of care ethics although her emphasis on political freedom might mask these similarities. Both value subjectivity rather than obj ectivity, and both regard generosity as better grounded and therefore more valid if less distinction between persons and more self-fulfillment are found in taking the other as an end. Beauvoir suggests principles that she wants everyone to hold, but we develop those principles through collective action rather than through some process of abstraction. For Beauvoir, ethics proposes methods, not recipes for right action. Ordinary situations are so complex that one must make an involved analysis before coming to a decision. This is where a strong notion of reciprocity and Beauvoir's notion of freedom can aid in developing the empowered action I am seeking. Reminiscent of Hegel, Beauvoir points out that in order to be free one needs others to recognize her freedom. Beauvoir, however, does not see a necessary struggle between two subjects or a need to destroy the other to establish one's own subjectivity. …

Noxious and algogenic stimuli are only part of the topic

T he point of the Focus article seems to have been well taken by all the commentators, and . their remarks provide us with an opportunity to develop the discussion further rather than a need to spend much time on our choice of the word algogenic. We are glad, therefore, to spend more time upon the first matter than the second. The real aim of our article was not to suggest that we should abandon existing nomenclature, or that we should incorporate new terms, but to draw attention to the potential problems in pain research of using incomplete or inadequate notions when referring to experimentally applied stimuli. This is important in both basic and clinical studies, as confusion about the nature and potential effects of the controlled variable (i.e., the stimulus) will generate results that are difficult to explain or that can be interpreted in many different ways. A good example of this problem is provided in Gebhart's discussion about visceral nociceptors; the existence of this category of sensory neuron being determined by whether or not the stimuli used to activate them are noxious, non-noxious, algogenic, or whatever.

Indian conceptions of human personality

Abstract Western philosophical and psychological thinking lacks an accepted theory of human personality; it has produced conflicting and inadequate notions, such as the religious one of a soul, the vague concept of the ‘mind’ and biological theories basing their understanding of man on the functions of the nervous system, particularly the brain, or dealing with his mental dimension only in terms of behavioural patterns. This paper explores the notions of personality in Indian systems and finds that virtually all of them understand it, despite differing terminology, as a fluid complex of functions or living forces characterised by intrinsic intelligence and coordinated by a dynamic structural principle, operating on three levels of reality: phenomenal material, phenomenal immaterial and noumenal or absolute. One can say that the Indian tradition fully appreciated the complexity of the problem and produced theories of personality which are more comprehensive than western ones and merit study as well as atte...

Absorptive capacity: On the creation and acquisition of technology in development

Recent studies on technological transformation in developing countries emphasize that successful industrialization requires both technological information and a good understanding of its implementation. In an open economy context it is shown that the sustained gains in growth derived from a move towards an open trade regime evaporate as soon as one gives up the arguably inadequate notion of ‘technology’ as being all-inclusive. In this paper, technology is only implementable as the labor force has built up the corresponding skills. Trade liberalization disseminates new technologies and goods to the domestic economy, and has beneficial effects on the level of final output and consumption. But sustained growth gains are only forthcoming if in addition to the arrival of new technologies also skills are accumulated at a higher rate than before the regime change. I argue that this explains part of the variation in the long-run growth effects of trade liberalization in newly industrializing countries.

Progress and rationality: Laudan's attempt to divorce a happy couple

The article raises objections to some fundamental assumptions of ‘normative naturalism’ as put forth by Larry Laudan. It contests the view that matters of rationality are strictly to be separated from matters of (normative) methodology and progress of knowledge. Thus a modified version of what Laudan calls the ‘historicist's meta‐methodology thesis’ is suggested. In particular, it is argued that methodological rules should not initially be taken as elliptical for hypothetical means‐end relations. Assuming that they are taken as such, it is argued that naturalized methodology becomes untestable, since methodological rules (norms) turn out to be either vacuous or not lawlike. It is suggested that methodological norms have a status which has much in common with social norms. Instead of starting with methodological instrumentalities, a view of methodology is sketched in which the traditional idea of rational reconstruction is utilized. Yet the history of science may still serve as a major warrant for normative methodological claims. This becomes possible once we accept John Rawls's justificationary strategy of a ‘reflective equilibrium’. Finally, it is claimed that Laudan's misconception of methodology is in part due to an inadequate notion of (scientific) progress.