Import-competing Producers Research Articles

The political economy of protection in GVCs: Evidence from Chinese micro data

This paper explores the political economy of import protection in a setting where imports may contain a country's own domestic value added (DVA) via domestically-produced inputs that get exported and used in foreign downstream production. We show that import-competing producers and their domestic input suppliers are generally allies in favor of protection, but this alliance weakens as DVA increases, because a home tariff on finished goods decreases foreign demand for home inputs. Empirically, we examine detailed discriminatory trade policies of 23 countries toward China and use Chinese transaction-level processing trade data to construct a measure of DVA. We also measure input customization. We find that both upstream and downstream political organization increase downstream protection, but the effect of the former is smaller when DVA as a share of final imports from China is larger. Tariffs on products containing inputs that are neither customized nor politically organized appear to be unaffected by the DVA share.

Economic Sanctions and Demand for Protection

How do the distributional consequences of economic sanctions impact future trade policy? Regardless of whether sanctions are effective in achieving concessions, sanctions restrict international trade flows, creating rents for import-competing producers, who are protected from international competition. These rents can then be used to pressure the government to implement protectionist policies. Thus, while the lifting of sanctions directly facilitates some international transactions, sanctions also have an indirect effect. They create powerful domestic interest groups in the sanctioned country who seek market protection. I use multiple estimators to evaluate the effect of trade sanctions on tariff rates. The evidence is consistent with the argument that sanctions increase market protection in both the short and long run.

Food Miles: Starving the Poor?

Food miles measure the distance food travels to reach consumers’ plates. Although substituting local food for imported produce will not necessarily reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the food miles movement is widely supported by consumers and import-competing producers, especially in some parts of Western Europe. We investigate the economic implications of food miles preference changes in the UK, France and Germany on other nations using an economy-wide model. Among the regions we consider, New Zealand is the most distant from Western Europe and Madagascar and Malawi export the most agro-food products relative to GDP, so food miles movements have the largest impacts on these regions. When there is a linear relationship between distance and preference changes, food miles campaigns decrease welfare in New Zealand, Madagascar and Malawi by 0.30, 0.12 and 0.28 per cent, respectively. When there is a preference shift away from imported food unrelated to distance, proportional welfare losses in the three countries are, respectively, 0.11, 0.08 and 0.24 per cent. With the exception of New Zealand, these findings indicate that some of the world’s poorest nations will suffer the most from European food miles lobbying. We conclude that food miles campaigns will increase global inequality without necessarily improving environmental outcomes.

Tariff Incidence in America's Gilded Age

In the late nineteenth century, the United States imposed high tariffs to protect domestic manufacturers from foreign competition. This article examines the magnitude of protection given to import-competing producers and the costs imposed on export-oriented producers by focusing on changes in the domestic prices of traded goods relative to nontraded goods. The results suggest that the 30 percent average import tariff gave about a 17 percent implicit subsidy to import-competing producers and effectively taxed exporters at about 10 percent. Tariffs redistributed large amounts of income (about 8 percent of GDP), but the effect on consumers was roughly neutral.

The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Tying One's Hand through the WTO

Why would governments agree to restrict their own discretion in setting domestic policies as part of a trade agreement? This paper examines the welfare consequences of the GATT's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). If countries which join a trade agreement are given free reign over the use of domestic production subsidies, then after negotiating tariff reductions, governments could undermine the agreement by introducing production subsidies to import-competing producers that effectively act as trade barriers. The SCM restricts the use of domestic subsidies by countries which have joined the WTO. Specifically, governments may not use sector-specific subsidies (agriculture is an exception) but they may subsidize their producers if they offer the same subsidy to all producers in their economies. I show that through an agreement like the SCM, governments can better achieve their goals of maximizing domestic welfare. This occurs because terms-of-trade concerns lead to subsidies in import-competing sectors that are higher than globally optimal and in export sectors that are lower than globally optimal. Therefore, a rule to require that subsidies be the same in all sectors forces a country to partially internalize these terms of trade externalities (by reducing subsidies to import-competing sectors and increasing subsidies to export sectors).

A theory of trade policy leadership

This paper constructs a two-country model of bilateral trade negotiations in the presence of political uncertainty to demonstrate that unilateral trade liberalization may be an optimal policy for a large country. The political uncertainty is due to producer opposition to trade-agreement ratification in the foreign country. Unilateral liberalization by the home country has a salutary effect on negotiations, because it mitigates the pain of potential ratification failure on the foreign country. It also promotes foreign ratification, because it effectively punishes foreign import-competing producers for lobbying against an agreement. These benefits are shown to outweigh (up to a point) the terms-of-trade cost that the home country must suffer when it actually liberalizes unilaterally. In equilibrium, therefore, we see a pattern in which the home country unilaterally liberalizes for several periods, until ratification in the foreign country succeeds, at which point foreign country finally reciprocates. We also demonstrate that, contrary to the standard optimal tariff result, there may be an inverse relationship between the home country's monopoly power and its optimal unilateral tariff.

On the Need for More Economic Assessment of Quarantine/SPS Policies

Quarantine policy reviews are becoming more sophisticated following the Uruguay Round's Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and, in Australia's case, following also the 1996 Nairn Report. Yet they still focus primarily on the effects of restrictions just on import-competing producers. A fuller analysis that includes the consumers demonstrates that even if imported diseases were to wipe out a local industry, the gains to consumers may outweigh the losses to import-competing producers from removing a ban on imports. This paper provides the simplest partial-equilibrium framework for thinking more about the economics of quarantine policy measures. An empirical analysis of Australia's ban on imports of bananas, used to illustrate the methodology, suggests a move to free trade may well cause a major contraction of banana growing in Australia but the economic welfare gains to consumers are almost certain to outweigh the losses to producers. The paper concludes by arguing that there is a need for a comprehensive economic review of Australia's myriad quarantine restrictions.

Protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry

The political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import-competing producers. The regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving (or instigating) international collusion. Hence, voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import-competing producers and a de-emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement. Similarly, trigger-price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti-dumping measures to preserve ‘fair’ competition. Likewise, the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated (but, as demonstrated by Kalt's econometric analysis, contentious) complaint of ‘unfair’ foreign competition. Voluntary export restraints, trigger-price mechanisms, and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices, the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions, and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors.

Microeconomic adjustments in Uruguay during 1973–1981: The interplay of real and financial shocks

This paper uses the financial statements of industrial firms to develop an integrated firm's eye view of the changes in the Uruguayan economy during 1973–1981. In the first of three subperiods, 1973–1975, real financial costs were very negative and tended to offset low returns on operating assets. During 1976–1978, the dismantling of interest rate controls increased real financial costs, but other factors increased the returns on operating assets more rapidly. During 1979–1981, financial costs jumped enough to more than absorb increases in gross earnings, which were probably due to Argentine demand. The rates of earning and capital formation were highest among exporters in the second subperiod, when a major export promotion program was in place. This pattern was reversed in the third subperiod, as the promotion programs were dismantled and real currency appreciation seemed to squeeze gross earnings of exportables relatively more. This unequal squeezing was probably due to redundant tariff and other protection for import-competing producers.

Full Employment, Trade Expansion, and Adjustment Assistance: Reply

inefficient import-competing industries to more efficient lines of production. In cases where resources are relatively immobile, injury may occur. Under an escape clause contained in recent extensions of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, industries could apply for relief and, if successful, be granted increased protection. This escape clause, in modified form, was continued in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.1 However, Congress provided an alternative to increased protection in the form of adjustment assistance. This provision is designed to help injured parties move to other lines of production or adjust to increased foreign competition. In essence, the escape clause attempts to reconcile the conflict between increased imports (and a more efficient allocation of world resources) and full employment. The conflict arises when increased imports cause injury to domestic import-competing producers resulting in curtailment of domestic production and unemployment or under-