Implementation Of Process Safety Management Research Articles

The New Three-Dimensional Safety Approach for the Implementation of Process Safety Management (PSM) and Improving Safety Aspects for the Pharmaceutical Industry in India – An Overview

Implementation of the fourteen elements of process safety management (PSM) helps to build a good safety culture in the organization. The new three-dimensional approach, which consists of good safety practices, safety precautions, and frequent checking of the process equipment and its devices has been applied to the various elements of the process safety management. The elements of process safety management are six, four, and three are good safety practices, safety precautions, and frequent checking of process equipment and its devices but one of the elements is the combination of all the three-dimensional approach, which is a trade secret, which insists that all the people in the organization should follow all the documented procedures from two to thirteen elements of the process safety management, the controlled copy should only be used inside the company premises. We have taken secondary published data for assessing the deviations of the three-dimensional safety approach for the human failures in the pharmaceutical industry, which has led to various incidents/accidents from October 2017 to September 2021. The deviation, which we have observed for the good safety practices, safety precautions, and frequent checking of process equipment and its devices was ten, nine, and one numbers before implementation of the process safety management. After the implantation of the process safety management, the incidents were reduced to three numbers from January 2022 to August 2023, in which deviation has been found in the two and one for the good safety practices and safety precautions.

Implementation guide for process safety management

AbstractA general guide how to implement process safety management (PSM) is missing in the literature. This article provides general procedure to implement PSM which any industry in underdeveloped, developing and developed countries can adopt to start PSM implementation. PSM implementation can be initiated through the proposed framework consisting of four steps: (1) PSM introduction, (2) Assigning departmental wise PSM duties, (3) Trainings and (4) Audits and improvements. Trainings include process hazard analysis (PHA) using Integrated What‐If/HAZOP analysis, quantitative risk assessments using ALOHA or equivalent software, PSM forms developments and other trainings. In a case study, ammonia release is estimated and quantified using ALOHA. Nine various forms for PSM are required to be developed for industry implementing PSM. Various trainings should be arranged including specific learning outcomes and few examples are discussed in this article. An audit scheme is proposed for any new industry implementing PSM. PSM elements implementation sequence is discussed. New established industries can adopt this procedure to implement PSM following suggested forms and sequences, which can help engineers in understanding PSM implementation. This PSM implementation proposed framework is being implemented in the fertilizer industry and caustic industry.

Methodology for Implementation of Process Safety Management into Experiment Life Cycle

The presented work deals with experiments in laboratories that solve practical problems. Each experi-ment is a process that takes place under certain conditions, which significantly influence its results. Re-sults of experiment are further influenced by the quality of: inputs; technical and cyber equipment; con-trol; and the knowledge, experience and skills of personnel. Therefore, experiments supporting the prac-tice must be carried out using a methodology that ensures that the results always are of required quality. Process safety management, which is based on management of risks connected with process, has proven itself in practice. Therefore, we apply its principles into experiment life cycle. Paper shows methodology of process safety managements in experiments and its main part, i.e. prototypal checklist for evaluation of both, the partial risks and the integrated risk of experiment.

Improving process safety culture through developing and maintaining the sense of vulnerability at all levels in the organization

AbstractIn Chola MS Risk Services, we differentiate between safety culture and process safety culture to improve the sense of vulnerability toward anticipating incidents with high severity, called process incidents. Culture is termed how employees are following safety even when no one is watching. In building a risk‐conscious organization, the attribute of maintaining a sense of vulnerability plays a major role. This article will share the experience of the Chola MS Risk Services gained through the implementation of process safety management (PSM) in various sectors across the country to the level of sense of vulnerability that exists in the organization with field‐related examples and challenges faced by the Indian industries in improving the same. This article will also highlight that the sense of vulnerability also brings in the sense of vigilance over various parameters even in apparently steady‐state, smooth operations. Even slight changes in critical parameters will “ring a cautionary bell” where there is a sense of vulnerability.

Process safety management lessons learned from a fire and explosion accident caused by a liquefied petroleum gas leak in an aromatics reforming unit in Taiwan

A severe fire and explosion accident was caused by a liquefied petroleum gas leak in Taiwan in 2019. This accident resulted in the loss of approximately US$3.5 billion in output value due to a one-and-a-half-year shutdown after the accident; however, no casualties were recorded at the accident scene. An analysis of the accident pipelines demonstrated that the pipeline leak had been caused by hydrochloric acid corrosion. Cause analysis based on the accident timeline, fault tree analysis, and causal factor charting indicated inadequacies in five elements of process safety management (PSM) namely mechanical integrity (MI), management of change, emergency planning and response, process hazard analysis (PHA), and process safety information (PSI) as the root causes of the accident. Furthermore, insufficient PSI (i.e., a lack of comprehensive understanding regarding corrosion mechanisms) was deemed to have been the core problem leading to the accident. This accident revealed common shortcomings that are often overlooked in PSM implementation in Taiwan; thus, the present research can serve as a vital reference for improving PSM programs in Taiwan.

Process safety management and process hazard analysis implementation progress in Pakistan chemical process industries

AbstractPakistan is a developing country and has various chemical process industries to fulfill the local demands of numerous chemical products. In order to maintain the uninterrupted production from these industries, safety protocols need to be implemented. Safety progress must be studied with passage of time to identify the gaps and to decide the future actions. In this article, process safety in various chemical process industries (CPIs) of Pakistan is investigated regarding process safety management (PSM) and process hazard analysis (PHA). The covered industries include mainly fertilizer complexes, food processing plants, gas and oil processing plants, oil refineries, petrochemical plants, polymer processing plants, paper industries, tire industries, and sugar industries. This research will help in addressing the weaknesses. A comparative analysis of all considered CPIs is provided graphically. Overall analysis of all industries depicts that more emphasis on three categories is required, namely (1) documents upgradation and staff communication, (2) PHA revision and auditing, (3) PHA recommendations documentation and implementation. Provided suggestions, the implementation of PSM and PHA in Pakistan CPIs is expected to enhance, which may lead to a substantial increase in productivity of these industries without accidents.

Assessment on process safety management implementation maturity among major hazard installations in Malaysia

Despite the widespread process safety management (PSM) implementation among major hazard installations (MHI) in Malaysia, an assessment on current PSM implementation maturity had never been conducted. This study aims to provide such assessment, through the utilisation of PSM elements under the OSHA PSM standard. The study first involved the measurement of PSM implementation achievement grades as well as, the development of PSM implementation related process safety maturity model and process safety assessment rubrics. Both the achievement grades and maturity model were then utilised for the assessment on PSM implementation maturity among MHI in Malaysia. Suitable recommendations for improvements in effectiveness of PSM implementation were finally proposed with reference to the assessment rubrics. From the individual PSM elements implementation assessment results, the Pre-Startup Safety Review element registered the highest representative percentage of 24 %, of MHI in Malaysia having PSM implementation maturity below the predefined acceptable maturity levels. From the overall PSM implementation assessment results, it was found that a representative percentage of 40 % of MHI in Malaysia displayed PSM implementation maturity below the similar predefined acceptable maturity levels. However, the study emphasised that future improvements to the PSM implementation maturity could be achieved through the implementation of the proposed recommendations.

Operational discipline in practice

AbstractA general guideline to improve operational discipline is required. Operational discipline can be improved with simple things such as floor level meeting (FLM), job cycle check (JCC), risk assessment (RA), daily safety audit (DSA), consequence analysis (CA), mechanical integrity (MI), incident investigation (II), management of change (MOC), behavior observation (BO), pre‐start up safety reviews (PSSR), process hazard analysis (PHA), job risk assessment (JRA), quantitative risk assessment (QRA), and process safety management (PSM) implementation. This article presents risks identified from floor level meetings, steps for job cycle check and risk sensitivity and procedure for daily safety audit and behavior observation audit. Consequence analysis, pre‐start up safety review and why tree analysis are discussed for improving operational discipline. Inclusion of consequence analysis in work instructions is discussed. Procedure for accident investigation is elaborated by investigating trainee unit shift engineer (USE) burning injury accident and why tree diagram is constructed and findings and recommendations are provided. PHA techniques (HAZOP, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) methodology is presented to enhance operational discipline. This article is especially for those industries which are located in countries where PSM implementation is not mandatory and they are lacking in operational discipline.

Appraisal of process safety management practices in refining sector of Pakistan

Globally industries have successfully implemented Process Safety Management (PSM) systems which have enormously reduced incident magnitude, their dreadful repercussions, and have proven organisational stability thereby maximizing profit margins. Due to limited data access, lack of incident and near-miss reporting & recording trend, lack of understanding and implementation of process safety management, petroleum refining sector as one of the most prone-to-incident industries globally was selected as a base case to evaluate process safety management practices in Pakistan. Various process and safety veterans were interviewed to figure out the present status of PSM systems in downstream (refining) sector and identify the gaps. Local regulations were reviewed to gauge their extent for process safety coverage in comparison to international process safety management regulations. Pertinent international publications and Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) books were also reviewed to gain valuable insights of PSM in highly hazardous processes. Interviewing process and safety veterans and reviewing local regulations surfaced several gaps and provided areas of improvement in order to setup a healthy process safety management framework for hazardous petroleum refineries. This includes, absence of local PSM regulations, lack of PSM awareness, inadequate leadership commitment, lack of implementation of a dedicated PSM system, ineffective near-miss and incident reporting and database maintaining policy. Outcomes of this study are not merely limited to the refining sector of Pakistan but provide an opportunity for other sectors as well to implement PSM in an effective manner.

Implementation of Safety Performance Framework (SPF) In Process Industries to Avoid Disasters

The reports of past major process disasters reveal that catastrophes are preventable and many of the problems are recognized prior to the accidents through the near-misses. The key element to improve safety performance is analyzing the performance indicators i.e. leading and lagging metrics in order to avoid process disasters. In past, the focus has only been given to the implementation of fourteen elements of process safety management (PSM) system, legislated under occupational safety and health administration (OSHA), for the effective safety system. However, it ignored the insight behaviour and performance of indicators along with its associated metrics for its every element. Therefore, to cater all these needs, a structured technique known as safety performance framework (SPF) has been suggested. It encompasses four major steps including a developed mathematical model i.e. safety performance index (SPI) to ensure the proper implementation of PSM in process industries. In addition to this, the identification of leading and lagging indicators for each PSM element is an integral part of this structure and is the real key to success. Moreover, this technique has been applied to the case studies of current process plant and the past disaster, where it has disclosed the insights of safety performance failure. Thus, SPF has been shown as a helpful tool to implement PSM in process industries to avoid disasters. © Universiti Malaysia Pahang, Malaysia.

Analysis of Main Accident Contributor According to Process Safety Management Elements Failure

Process safety management (PSM) covers the aspect of process hazard identification, understanding the level of risk and hazard reduction to prevent process-related failures. The need for understanding on how the process safety elements fail is essential in improving the quality of the accidents prevention effort. In this paper, the contributions of PSM element to chemical process accident are studied using major process failures in the chemical process industry (CPI). Around 770 major accident cases were collected and analysed from several accident data base such as Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB-US), European Major Accident Reporting System (EMARS), Failure Knowledge Database (FKD-Japan) and Accident Reporting Information Analysis (ARIA). The PSM element failures were ranked in accordance to their frequency and importance in accident prevention. Based on the result, majority of the element failure is classified as design and technical reasons (53 % of total process failures) and the rest is related to management related causes (47 %). The most common accident contributors were identified to be the process hazards analysis (19 % of total process failures), operating procedures (17 %), employee participation (12 %), training (11 %), management of change (9 %), mechanical integrity (9 %), and permit to work (9 %). In depth, analysis on individual PSM elements were made for better understanding on their readiness and its implementation issues in the CPI. Appropriate suggestion for continuous improvement of PSM implementation will also be suggested.

Korean experience of process safety management (PSM) regulation for chemical industry

From the 1960s, Korean industries have been encouraged by the government to nurture heavy and chemical industry and to modernize the economics and industrial structures. The development of chemical industry particularly became the turning point in industrial development, and played a major role in the construction of a new industrialized country. However, the process systems in the chemical industry have become more complex and larger, and the inventories of dangerous chemicals that are produced or consumed have continuously increased. Therefore, the hazards from potential accidents such as fire and explosion or release of toxic chemicals have also increased. In fact, from the end of 1980s to the beginning of 1990s in Korea, a number of major industrial accidents such as ABS extruder explosion, TDI release and dryer explosion, etc. Occurred and caused many fatalities. As the chemical companies recognized the importance of preventing major hazards, PSM system, the prevention of major industrial accidents, was introduced in January 1995 by amending Industrial Safety and Health Act, and it has been enforced from January 1, 1996. According to the law, the business owner of a workplace with hazardous or dangerous equipment shall submit a process safety report to the Government to prevent any accidents, which could inflict an immediate damage on workers or on areas in the vicinity of the workplaces. As a result of PSM implementation for 19 years, chemical accident prevention system has been stabilized and various kinds of effectiveness and desirable customer satisfaction have been made.

Promoting commitment to process safety

Successful implementation of process safety management (PSM) typically requires the use of a combination of physical and procedural safeguards. Ideally, these safeguards must be maintained in a constant state of readiness throughout the life of the process facility. The management system provides the framework for maintaining and sustaining these safeguards, but the critical ingredient that ensures that the work gets done is the individual employee's commitment to PSM. Game theory provides a useful framework for understanding how an organization can foster cooperation between management and its employees toward the common goal of safety. Using a specific game‐theoretical model known as the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, it is shown how cooperative behavior is the natural consequence of a balanced system of rewards and penalties. Here, the term “balanced” means that both employees and their managers are subject to this system of rewards and penalties. By implementing a balanced framework for feedback, an organization can promote a commitment to process safety by fostering cooperation between both the employees and the managers. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 319–321, 2013

Technical Aspects of Storage Tank Loss Prevention

Storage tanks are the most common chemical containing vessels within the process industries. There have been many accidents associated within storage tank (material deficiency, structure design failures, operation error etc.) or among storage areas throughout the history. Both human error and natural disasters can result in devastating incidents for tanks that are usually kept outdoors under weather influences, as well as the tank bodies and accessories are poorly designed, abused, or are not effectively inspected and maintained. There are potential hazards which must be assessed carefully before construction, during operation, and after shutdown of any storage areas including hazardous or flammable chemicals. This article offers an overview of the tank and tank farm with significant incident causes about aboveground tank design failures, operation problems, and maintenance issues, with the relating discussion about the implementation of process safety management and regulations. Also, some innovative storage unit technologies including groundings, roof design, safer filling procedures, and tank fire mitigation systems are introduced to give a proper information session to help industry understand the tank hazards and implement adequate actions to prevent incidents and losses. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 28–36, 2013

Implementation Issues of PSM in a Fertilizer Plant: An Operations Engineer's Point of View

In this article, guidelines are provided for implementation of the elements of process safety management (PSM) such as management of change (MOC), process hazard analysis (PHA), incident investigation, emergency planning, and response. The role of mechanical integrity, operating procedures, compliance audits, pre‐start‐up safety review, contractors, training, work permits, and process safety information for implementation of the PSM in a fertilizer plant are discussed. Implementation of MOC is an important step for the adoption of PSM standards and a necessary condition for internal and external audits of the plant. There are many issues linked with implementation of PHA like plant modifications, shut downs, and production losses as well as the behaviour of the design engineer whenever modifications are required. Consequence analysis, an evaluation of an incident in terms of its effects on environment, equipment, and people is of great help. Incident reporting for a company can be improved by ensuring confidentiality and not exposing the reporting person. Improvement in the operating procedures and preserving mechanical integrity of the process plant are necessary conditions for the implementation of the standards. Internal and external audits of the company are the most important part of the PSM implementation. In general, the PSM implementation requires much effort and time but pays off well if implemented fully. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 59–65, 2013

Has process safety management missed the boat?

AbstractThe US Nuclear Navy has an exceptional record of reactor process safety. In over 50 years of nuclear plant operations with as many as 100 operational reactors, the Nuclear Navy has not had a single loss of life or major environmental accident because of process safety. Compare this to the record of all too frequent serious process safety accidents in industries covered by OSHA's process safety management (PSM) regulation and one may wonder, “What's caused the difference?”Although some may say that comparing a military organization and civilian industrial facilities is impossible, this article compares Rickover's reactor process safety philosophy to the regulations and guidelines applied to industrial PSM to provide readers with potential ideas for improving the implementation of PSM. © 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2011

The effectiveness of U.S. OSHA process safety management inspection – A preliminary quantitative evaluation

This study attempted to evaluate the inspection effectiveness of the U.S. OSHA process safety management (PSM) standard using statistical correlation test. A total of 6578 citations of past 1277 OSHA PSM inspections from 1992 to 2006 were quantitatively compared with the findings of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigations on root and contributing causes of 19 major chemical accidents. Nonparametric Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation tests showed a moderately strong agreement between OSHA PSM inspection citations and CSB findings at p < .01 significant level, and the degree of agreement increased with time. These results suggested that past OSHA PSM inspections had cited the problems that were the accident root causes, and the effectiveness of PSM citations has been improved as more inspections were conducted since the standard promulgation. However, factors such as standard coverage, inspection frequency, inspection resources allocation, and inspection strategy, were critical for effective PSM standard enforcement and implementation. Future studies should include more aspects of PSM citations and CSB accident investigation data for better evaluation of inspection effectiveness. The results may be valuable to the PSM enforcement policy makers.

Improving the effectiveness of process safety management in small companies

AbstractMajor accidents are continuing to injure people, and damage facilities and the environment. About 50% of these accidents are in plants that are covered by process safety management (PSM) and 50% are in smaller plants that are not covered. However, the damage is the same. Clearly the OSHA PSM regulation and recommendations by CSB, CCPS, PSP, etc. are not being used as specified. The objective of this paper is to express an enthusiastic support for these major excellent recommendations and to make a few additional recommendations that should enhance those previously listed. This article describes (a) specifically designed methods to improve the implementation of PSM and the above‐mentioned recommendations and (b) additional plant practices for preventing accidents. The methods and practices presented in this article are especially important for smaller plants; most of the larger companies already have good systems to prevent accidents. However, since many of the large accidents are in PSM‐covered plants, some of these larger plants may also benefit from these additional recommendations.One recommendation is that small companies, although not covered by PSM, should practice the intent of the regulation. At a minimum, companies should develop a document that is at least similar to the PSM documentation. However, this article emphasizes that this documentation is not enough because the management of the requirements is extremely difficult. Companies need to have a system that includes the PSM documents, communication, delegation, and follow‐up to insure that the requirements are practiced as intended.Based on the author's experience, the use of additional plant practices such as an effective management system, internal audits, walk‐the‐line, and checklists will enhance the utilization of PSM. These practices are easy to use and will prevent accidents. More of these methods and practices are needed and should be shared between companies. © 2008 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2008

The effectiveness of process safety management (PSM) regulation for chemical industry in Korea

From the 1960s, Korean industries have been encouraged by the government to nurture heavy and chemical industry and to modernize the economics and industrial structures. The development of chemical industry particularly became the turning point in industrial development, and played a major role in the construction of a new industrialized country. However, the process systems in the chemical industry have become more complex and larger, and the inventories of dangerous chemicals that are produced or consumed have continuously increased. Therefore, the hazards from potential accidents such as fire and explosion or release of toxic chemicals have also increased. In fact, from the end of 1980s to the beginning of 1990s in Korea, a number of major industrial accidents such as ABS extruder explosion, TDI release and dryer explosion, etc. occurred and caused many fatalities. As the chemical companies recognized the importance of preventing major hazards, PSM system, the prevention of major industrial accidents, was introduced in January 1995 by amending Industrial Safety and Health Act, and it has been enforced from January 1, 1996. According to the law, the business owner of a workplace with hazardous or dangerous equipment shall submit a process safety report to the Government to prevent any accidents, which could inflict an immediate damage on workers or on areas in the vicinity of the workplaces. As a result of PSM implementation for 7 years, various kinds of effectiveness have been made. Accident rate including number of fatalities has been decreased, and productivity has been increased as well as product quality.