Impact Of Judicial Review Research Articles

Ensuring Administrative Legality and Justice Through Judicial Review In Indonesia

Within the context of the Indonesian legal system, this study investigates the crucial function that judicial review plays in ensuring that administrative procedures are lawful and that justice is served. This study sheds light on the techniques, processes, and issues that are involved with judicial review in relation to administrative acts. It does so by conducting a comprehensive analysis of judicial decisions, legal precedents, and legislative frameworks. The paper provides an in-depth analysis of the development of judicial review in Indonesia, following its historical progression and analysing the current state of affairs. Through an in-depth analysis of administrative decisions, it examines the role that the court plays in ensuring that administrative procedures are valid, preserving a system of checks and balances, and protecting fundamental rights. The impact of judicial review on administrative institutions and the legal landscape is also investigated in this study. Particular attention is paid to the role that judicial review plays in promoting openness, accountability, and adherence to the rule of law for administrations. The purpose of this research is to give useful insights into the efficient operation of Indonesia's administrative governance and the improvement of justice in administrative procedures. This is accomplished by casting light on the junction between judicial review and administrative law.

A Methodological Critique on Constitutional Amendment Theory

This paper is a methodological critique on constitutional amendment theory, aimed at producing an overal theory of constitutional amendment. The methodological critique is centered at the concept of constitutional rigidity, as well as the current atempts to quantify it as a variable capable of explaining constitutional amendment. It also produces an overall theory on constitutional amendment, centered on three main dimensions: 1) the interaction between constitutional legacies, as well as the incentives for current majorities to control future ones, through the constitutionalization of public policies; 2) the impact of federalismo on constitutional amendment; 3) the impact of judicial review on constitutional amendment.

Using equality legislation as a sword

This article argues that there is potential for equality legislation to be used proactively to contest attempts by public authorities to remove funding from groups who share protected characteristics. This follows on from the first empirical study of the impact of the Equality Act 2010 on charities in the United Kingdom, conducted by the Charity Law and Policy Unit, University of Liverpool (the study). One finding of the study was that charities in the United Kingdom are using the Act to challenge local government funding cuts. Strict austerity measures have led to widespread funding cuts for service provision. As many charities are commissioned by local governments to provide social services, this has had a direct impact on the charities’ funding. However, some charities and service users found a useful sword in the Equality Act and predecessor legislation. They used judicial reviews to challenge whether local governments have properly fulfilled their Public Sector Equality Duty when making the funding cuts. In some cases successful challenges prevented or restored funding cuts, while others simply resulted in the same cuts after a better process. However, cuts to legal aid and judicial review reforms may well blunt this sword. Charities’ motivations and successes, the impact of judicial review and the uncertain future for the strategy are discussed.

Judicial Review and Democratic Failure

We use an agency model to analyze the impact of judicial review on democratic performance. We find that judicial review may increase democratic failure by rescuing elected officials from the consequences of ill-advised policies, but may also decrease democratic failure by alerting voters to unjustified government action. We further find that judges will defer to the decision of elected leaders unless the level of democratic failure is sufficiently high. We then show how judicial review affects voter welfare both through its effect on policy choice and through its effect on the efficacy of the electoral process in selecting leaders. We also analyze how the desirability of judicial review is affected by characteristics of the leaders and the judges. Our welfare analysis establishes general conditions under which judicial review serves majoritarian interests - and thereby arguably increases the “democratic” character of political outcomes, despite the non-democratic nature of judicial review itself.

Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated System

Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated System. By J. Mitchell Pickerill. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. 208p. 21.95 paper.J. Mitchell Pickerill's richly layered book shows the possibilities and limits of “constitutional deliberation” in Congress, defined as “reflection and debate over the scope of federal powers under the Constitution in the context of legislation” (p. 11). Pickerill says that such institutional introspection is rare until Congress is confronted with activist majorities on the Supreme Court, as witnessed in the beginning and end of the twentieth century. But even when using constitutional deliberation to rescue stricken laws and protect future ones, Congress incorporates, rather than “overrides,” the latest judicial doctrine on the proper balance of power between the federal government and the states. He compares the use and specter of judicial review to a presidential veto and concludes that such Congress–Court dynamics show bargaining and compromise. However, interpretive equality is not necessary in this view of a healthy separation-of-powers system.

Constitutional deliberation in Congress: the impact of judicial review in a separated system

In Constitutional Deliberation in Congress J. Mitchell Pickerill analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions on Congressional debates and statutory language. Based on a thorough examination of how Congress responds to key Court rulings and strategizes in anticipation of them, Pickerill argues that judicial review—or the possibility of it—encourages Congressional attention to constitutional issues. Revealing critical aspects of how laws are made, revised, and refined within the separated system of government of the United States, he makes an important contribution to “constitutionalism outside the courts” debates. Pickerill combines legislative histories, extensive empirical findings, and interviews with current and former members of Congress, congressional staff, and others. He examines data related to all of the federal legislation struck down by the Supreme Court from the beginning of the Warren Court in 1953 through the 1996–97 term of the Rehnquist Court. By looking at the legislative histories of Congressional acts that invoked the Commerce Clause and presented Tenth Amendment conflicts—such as the Child Labor Act (1916), the Civil Rights Act (1965), the Gun-Free School Zones Act (1990), and the Brady Bill (1994)—Pickerill illuminates how Congressional deliberation over newly proposed legislation is shaped by the possibility of judicial review. The Court’s invalidation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act in its 1995 ruling United States v. Lopez signaled an increased judicial activism regarding issues of federalism. Pickerill examines that case and compares congressional debate over constitutional issues in key pieces of legislation that preceded and followed it: the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1997. He shows that Congressional attention to federalism increased in the 1990s along with the Court’s greater scrutiny.

Book Notes: Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated System, by J. Mitchell Pickerill

Book Notes: Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated System, by J. Mitchell Pickerill

Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking

Those who have recently written about the impact of judicial review on agency decisionmaking have not treated the practice kindly. Many express concern about the burdens that review places on agencies, and some even conclude that judicial review hurts the quality of the decisions the agency makes when adopting a new rule. These critics, however, treat the agency and the particular decisionmakers within it as if they react as rational maximizers of utility towards the incentives created by judicial review. At most they give some passing reference to psychological constructs of how individuals and groups make decisions. This paper takes as a major premise that psychology has much to tell us about the ways in which decisions deviate from the assumptions that public choice theorists and others who rely on economic rationality use in evaluating the workings of our governmental institutions. Individuals do not tend to optimize every decision, but instead rely on personal decision rules whose use becomes habit as well as more generally shared rules of thumb as shortcuts to making decisions. In certain situations, these shortcuts can lead to avoidable bad decisions. One mechanism for avoiding careless or improper reliance on such shortcuts is to hold the decisionmaker accountable for her choice. If structured properly, accountability can attenuate many of the systematic biases that flow from improper use of decisionmaking shortcuts. The structure of beneficial accountability corresponds closely to the nature of judicial review of agency rulemaking under current standards of arbitrary and capricious review. There is also reason to believe that agency staff members react to judicial review of a rule as they do to direct accountability for an individual decision. In addition, arbitrary and capricious review is likely to reduce any magnification of individual biases that result from the group nature of agency decisionmaking. Hence, arbitrary and capricious review provides incentives for agency staff to take appropriate care and to avoid many systematic biases when formulating rules and ushering them through the rulemaking process. This does not mean that judicial review will eliminate all decisionmaking biases. There is at least one bias ? the propensity of individuals to avoid extreme choices even when logic dictate otherwise ? that judicial review might even exacerbate. In addition, review will never prevent all biased decisionmaking; it can only encourage decisionmaking processes that reduce the probability of bias. Finally, the psychological results which I discuss come predominately from laboratory experiments, some of which involve different individuals performing different tasks than those involved in writing agency rules. Hence, the suggestion that judicial review improves the quality of agency rulemaking must be seen as just that ? a suggestion. Nonetheless, I believe there is enough evidence to warrant further consideration of the likely impact of review on the performance on agency staff, and more particularly to refute critics who, without considering this evidence, conclude that judicial review has a deleterious impact on the quality of rulemaking.

Reputation, Power and Fairness: A Review of the Impact of Judicial Review upon Investigative Tribunals

Reputation, Power and Fairness: A Review of the Impact of Judicial Review upon Investigative Tribunals

Reputation, Power and Fairness: A Review of the Impact of Judicial Review upon Investigative Tribunals

Reputation, Power and Fairness: A Review of the Impact of Judicial Review upon Investigative Tribunals

Administrative Law Symposium: Question & Answer with Professors Elliott, Strauss, and Sunstein

DP: Before you get your chance at questions, Peter said enough to provoke a request from Cass Sunstein for three minutes of rebuttal time, which I have granted. CS: I was uncharacteristically cautious, wasn't I? The three major cases that divide contemporary ideas about administrative law have to be Chevron, I State Farm,2 and Heckler v. Chaney, 3 right? Chevron on deference to agency determinations of law, State Farm on the hard look doctrine, Heckler v. Chaney against agency inaction. I think Chevron's analysis was badly off, State Farm was basically right, and I think Heckler v. Chaney points in the wrong direction in drawing this sharp distinction between action and inaction. In understanding why I think that, I think Peter is exactly right in pointing to the systemic ex ante effects of judicial review. Most of the real world is affected by these three cases not because of bubbles and passive restraints and drugs being injected and people are going to be executed as a result-those are important, yes, but administrative law now is done day to day in the shadow of these three cases. That's the systemic ex ante effect and that is huge. Now, Don's data are extremely interesting and important. When thinking about the impact of judicial review, one wants to think also about the systemic ex ante effect.

Federalism, Ideology, and Charter Review: Alberta's Response to Morgentaler.

In the inaugural volume of this journal Peter Russell of the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto noted that the political science community, after nearly fifty years of blindness to judicial power, had begun to regain an appreciation of the courts' political significance. Despite this reawakening, certain legal subjects very germane to political science still tend to be the preserve of legal academics. One such subject is judicial review, more specifically the impact of judicial review upon policy outcomes. To date, arguably the most detailed and valuable commentary on this topic is offered by a legal scholar, Patrick Monahan. InPolitics and the Constitution, Monahan suggests that judicial review is not as universally consequential as we might expect. For him, the instrumental impact of judicial review varies according to whether it is based on the law of federalism or on theCharter of Rights. He believes that, for reasons to be outlined shortly,Charterreview is likely to have a greater substantive impact than federalism review. In this article, I use a discussion of Alberta's reaction to the 1988 decision inMorgentaler, Smoling, and Scott v. The Queento question this conclusion. This decision on abortion provides an excellent example of how federalism may temper the substantive impact ofCharterreview. The reaction of Alberta to the Court's judgement demonstrates how the intergovernmental interdependence typical of Canadian federalism may dilute or at the very least delay the consequences ofCharterreview for policy outcomes.

An Airing of the Clean Air Act

In recent years criticism of excessive and inefficient regulation has frequently been voiced. Environmental regulations in particular have been a target. Some critics charge that environmental benefits have been pursued too aggressively without sufficient regard to the cost of controls. Others, without attacking the desirability of the benefits, argue that pollution reduction has been unnecessarily costly. Yet there are also those who claim that antipollution legislation has not been implemented sufficiently and effectively and that progress toward air and water quality goals has been disappointingly slow. Causes of these problems, depending on the source of the criticism, include failure to incorporate economic rationality and economic incentives into regulations, overzealous regulators, weak enforcement efforts, and insufficient funding to support timely and effective implementation of complex statutes. These conflicting viewpoints are part of the debate currently surrounding the Clean Air Act whose reauthorization by Congress is considerably behind schedule. Reauthorization of the act has been held up by conflict over proposals to add acid rain control measures and proposals to change existing provisions. Each of the books under review offers a timely opportunity for an increased understanding of the crucial issues in the debate over the Clean Air Act. Each provides insight on important components of the act and its implementation. Among the subjects addressed by the authors are the administrative burden created by the numerous and complex requirements of the Clean Air Act, the impact of judicial review and public input on administrative decision making and air quality policy, and the application of principles of economic efficiency to air quality policy. The conclusions reached by the authors are sobering, provocative, and instructive.