Impact Of Incomplete Information Research Articles

Blessing or curse? Impact of incomplete information in a networked cournot competition

Networked markets are prevalently seen in different industries. Current research mainly focuses on settings with a transparent network. However, in many applications, firms choose their actions without fully knowing their competitors’ information. This study examines oligopolies in networked markets when firms’ production costs are incomplete information. We characterize the unique Bayesian equilibrium supply quantities for any given network under incomplete information. Our results connect the equilibrium outcome with the underlying competition and information structures. We find that when the production cost of a firm is high, incomplete information helps increase its total production quantity. In contrast, the impact is the opposite in the presence of low production costs. However, the impact of incomplete information on a firm’s supply allocation on each edge depends not only on its production cost but also on the network position of the edge. We also find that, unlike the case in single-market, the low-cost firm always suffers from incomplete information, while the high-cost firm benefits from incomplete information only under certain conditions. Moreover, we show that changes in global network structure that do not directly relate to a firm may alter its information preference. We study several extensions and find that not only do firms with cost advantage prefer complete information, but those high-cost firms with smaller cost disadvantages are also more likely to prefer a transparent competition environment. The case of heterogeneous logistic costs is also considered, and we show that for firms of high-cost type, the logistic cost advantage may hedge its benefit from incomplete information. Our findings imply that a firm has to consider not only its own cost type and local competition but also the global network structure to determine its preference for information structure. Moreover, our results may be helpful to the market regulator that, when promoting information transparency, firms with better production technology are more likely to support the movement.

A One-Leader Multi-Follower Bayesian-Stackelberg Game for Anti-Jamming Transmission in UAV Communication Networks

This paper focuses on the anti-jamming transmission problem in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication networks. Considering the incomplete information constraint and the co-channel mutual interference, a Bayesian Stackelberg game is proposed to formulate the competitive relations between UAVs (users) and the jammer. Specifically, the jammer acts as the leader, whereas users act as followers of the proposed game. Based on their utility functions, the jammer and users select their optimal power control strategies respectively. In addition, the observation error is also investigated in this paper. Due to the incomplete information constraint and the existence of co-channel mutual interference, it is challenging to obtain Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed game. Thus, a sub-gradient based Bayesian Stackelberg iterative algorithm is proposed to obtain SE. Finally, simulations are conducted to demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithm, and the impact of incomplete information and observation error on users’ utilities are also presented.

Влияние неполноты информации об агрегате на выбор периода диагностирования и эффективность эксплуатации по состоянию

Влияние неполноты информации об агрегате на выбор периода диагностирования и эффективность эксплуатации по состоянию

The Impact of Incomplete Information on Games in Parallel Relay Networks

This paper considers the impact of incomplete information on incentives for node cooperation in parallel relay networks with one source node, one destination node, and multiple relay nodes. All nodes are selfish and strategic, interested in maximizing their own profit instead of the social welfare. The paper considers the practical situation where the channel state on any given relay path is not observable to the source or to the other relays. Different bargaining relationships between the source and the relays are considered, and a framework for studying the efficiency loss induced by incomplete information is proposed. The source of the efficiency loss is analyzed, and the amount of inefficiency which results is quantified.

Incomplete Information in Rent-seeking Contests

We consider a variant of the Tullock lottery contest. Each player’s constant marginal cost of effort is drawn from a potentially different continuous distribution. In order to study the impact of incomplete information we compare three informational settings to each other: players are either completely informed, privately informed about their own costs, or ignorant of all cost realizations. For the first and the third setting we determine the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Under private information we prove existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and identify a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Assuming that unit cost distributions all have the same mean, we show that under ignorance of all cost realizations ex ante expected aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Ex ante expected rent dissipation, however, is higher than in the latter settings if we focus on the standard lottery contest and assume costs are all drawn from the same distribution. Between complete and private information there is neither a general ranking in terms of effort nor in terms of rent dissipation.

Interest rate options valuation under incomplete information

This paper aims at examining the term structure of interest rates and European-type interest rate option prices in a partially observable economy. It extends the existing literature on incomplete information by developing a one-factor model which is consistent with the initial yield curve and by providing closed-form solutions for discount bonds and different kinds of options. The model of this paper encompasses Hull and White’s (1990). Moreover, through a numerical example, these two models are compared and the impact of incomplete information on option prices is analysed.

The Impact of Incomplete Information on the Use of Marketing Research Intelligence in International Service Settings

Unfamiliarity with foreign business environments and cultures will result in higher levels of uncertainty, especially for international service organizations. To effectively deal with international uncertainty, it seems crucial to have access to information that is as complete as possible. In practice, however, information is hardly ever complete. To date, little is known about the impact of incomplete information on the decision-making processes in international service firms. This article examines the effects of incomplete information on the evaluation and use of marketing research intelligence. The results of an experimental study suggest that decision makers in international service firms are unlikely to ignore missing information. Instead, they tend to adopt a strategy of inferential, assumption-based reasoning. Furthermore, the absence of information relevant to decision making in international services marketing has distinct evaluative consequences in terms of satisfaction, trust, and intention to use information.