Classic and contemporary research assumes legislators subjectively adopt a role orientation. This role indicates the degree to which they attempt to provide delegate representation for their constituents with the policies they support. Existing research, however, is divided on the causes that influence the choice between a relatively delegate or trustee role. I hypothesize that district heterogeneity affects this choice. Using data from the American Representation Study in the 1950s, I assess how a U.S. representative’s selection of a delegate or trustee role is affected by district heterogeneity. The findings indicate that greater ideological heterogeneity generally increases the likelihood of delegate representation, depending on a legislator’s electoral marginality. Greater partisan heterogeneity usually decreases the likelihood of delegate representation, except among electorally marginal legislators. I also find that marginality, seniority, and party affect legislators’ role choices, providing evidence that in some ways Congress has remained the same over time.
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