Identity-based Authenticated Key Exchange Research Articles

Strongly Secure Identity-Based Key Exchange with Single Pairing Operation

This paper proposes an id-eCK secure identity-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) scheme, where the id-eCK security implies that a scheme resists against leakage of all combinations of master, static, and ephemeral secret keys except ones trivially break the security. Most existing id-eCK secure ID-AKE schemes require two symmetric pairing operations or a greater number of asymmetric pairing, which is faster than symmetric one, operations to establish a session key. However, our scheme is realized with a single asymmetric pairing operation for each party, and this is an advantage in efficiency. The proposed scheme is based on the ID-AKE scheme by McCullagh and Barreto, which is vulnerable to an active attack. To achieve id-eCK security, we apply the HMQV construction and the NAXOS technique to the McCullagh-Barreto scheme. The id-eCK security is proved under the external Diffie-Hellman for target group assumption and the q-gap-bilinear collision attack assumption.

An Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Resilient to Continuous Key Leakage

Identity-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) protocol is an important cryptographic primitive, which is used to establish a session key between two communication participants while authenticating each other. Indeed, most of the existing ID-AKE protocols do not concern with side-channel attacks in the sense that adversaries could obtain partial information of ephemeral/permanent secret keys of users. Recently, several leakage-resilient ID-AKE (LR-ID-AKE) protocols have been proposed to address such attacks. However, these LR-ID-AKE protocols have a restriction that the total leakage information during the life time of the LR-ID-AKE protocol must be bounded to some ratio of ephemeral/permanent secret keys. In this paper, the authors define a new adversary model, termed as identity-based continuous-leakage extended Canetti–Krawczyk (ID-CL-eCK) model. Using the key refreshing procedure (i.e., the multiplicative blinding technique) of permanent secret keys, the first LR-ID-AKE protocol resilient to continuous key leakage is proposed, and it possesses overall unbounded leakage property. Comparisons are given to demonstrate that the proposed protocol is better than the previously proposed ID-AKE protocols in terms of security models and leakage properties. Under the generic bilinear group model, security analysis is made to show that the proposed LR-ID-AKE protocol is secure against adversaries in the new ID-CL-eCK model.

Unbalancing Pairing-Free Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols for Disaster Scenarios

In disaster scenarios, such as an area after a terrorist attack, security is a significant problem since communications involve information for the rescue officers, such as polices, militaries, emergency medical technicians, and the survivors. Such information is critically important for the rescue organizations; and protecting the privacy of the survivors is required. Normally, authenticated key exchange (AKE) is an underlying approach for security. However, available AKE protocols are either inconvenient or infeasible in disaster areas due to the very nature of disasters. To address the security problem in disaster scenarios, we propose two pairing-free identity-based AKE (ID-AKE) protocols that have unbalanced computational requirements on the two parties. Compared with existing AKE protocols, the proposed protocols have a number of advantages in disaster scenarios: 1) they are more convenient than symmetric cryptography-based AKE protocols since they do not require any preshared secret between the parties; 2) they are more feasible than asymmetric cryptography-based AKE protocols since they do not require any online server; and 3) they are more friendly to battery-powered and computationally limited devices than pairing-based and pairing-free ID-AKE protocols since they do not involve any bilinear pairing (a time-consuming operation), and have lower computational requirement on the limited party. Security of the proposed protocols are analyzed in detail; and prototypes of them are implemented to evaluate the performance. We also illustrate the application of the protocols through a vivid use case in a terrorist attack scenario.

Cryptanalysis of an identity‐based authenticated key exchange protocol

SummaryAuthenticated key exchange protocols represent an important cryptographic mechanism that enables several parties to communicate securely over an open network. Elashry, Mu, and Susilo proposed an identity‐based authenticated key exchange (IBAKE) protocol where different parties establish secure communication by means of their public identities.The authors also introduced a new security notion for IBAKE protocols called resiliency, that is, if the secret shared key is compromised, the entities can generate another shared secret key without establishing a new session between them. They then claimed that their IBAKE protocol satisfies this security notion.We analyze the security of their protocol and prove that it has a major security flaw, which renders it insecure against an impersonation attack. We also disprove the resiliency property of their scheme by proposing an attack where an adversary can compute any shared secret key if just one secret bit is leaked.

Strongly secure authenticated key exchange from factoring, codes, and lattices

An unresolved problem in research on authenticated key exchange (AKE) in the public-key setting is to construct a secure protocol against advanced attacks such as key compromise impersonation and maximal exposure attacks without relying on random oracles. HMQV, a state of the art AKE protocol, achieves both efficiency and the strong security proposed by Krawczyk (we call it the $${\mathrm {CK}}^+$$CK+ model), which includes resistance to advanced attacks. However, the security proof is given under the random oracle model. We propose a generic construction of AKE from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). The construction is based on a chosen-ciphertext secure KEM, and the resultant AKE protocol is $${\mathrm {CK}}^+$$CK+ secure in the standard model. The construction gives the first $${\mathrm {CK}}^+$$CK+ secure AKE protocols based on the hardness of integer factorization problem, code-based problems, or learning problems with errors. In addition, instantiations under the Diffie---Hellman assumption or its variant can be proved to have strong security without non-standard assumptions such as $$\pi $$?PRF and KEA1. Furthermore, we extend the $${\mathrm {CK}}^+$$CK+ model to identity-based (called the $${\hbox {id-CK}^+}$$id-CK+ model), and propose a generic construction of identity-based AKE (ID-AKE) based on identity-based KEM, which satisfies $${\hbox {id-CK}^+}$$id-CK+ security. The construction leads first strongly secure ID-AKE protocols under the hardness of integer factorization problem, or learning problems with errors.

Secure Enablement of Real Time Applications: A Novel End-to-End Approach

The Internet has evolved into a multi-service Internet Protocol (IP) network with support for various types of traffic, including multimedia. Given the relatively open nature of IP networks, securely enabling multimedia services is increasingly important. While protocols such as Secure Real Time Protocol (SRTP) provide container formats for various applications, the supporting security solutions lack end-to-end secure key management. In this paper, we propose a novel secure key management framework targeted for real time applications in multi-operator environments. In particular, by leveraging an Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange (IBAKE) protocol, we develop secure key management solutions to support two-party communications, conferencing applications, call forking, call redirect, and deferred delivery. Our framework eliminates the need for costly public key infrastructure (PKI) or other online solutions, overcomes the problem of key escrow while providing perfect forward and backwards secrecy, and works across applications and media types. Overall, our solution opens-up new lines of research and business opportunities in secure application enablement. © 2012 Alcatel-Lucent.

One-round identity-based key exchange with Perfect Forward Security

Identity-based authenticated key exchange (IBAKE) protocol is one of the most important cryptographic primitives that enables two parties using their identities to establish their common secret keys without sending and verifying public key certificates. Recently, many works have been dedicated to design efficient and secure IBAKE protocols without bilinear pairings which need the heavy computational cost. Unfortunately, most of the proposed protocols cannot provide Perfect Forward Security (PFS) which is a major security goal of authenticated key exchange protocols. In this paper we present an efficient and provably secure IBAKE protocol with PFS. Our protocol relies on the technique known as the concatenated Schnorr signature and it could be viewed as a variant of the protocol proposed by Fiore et al. in 2010. By using the Canetti–Krawczyk security model, we prove that the protocol is secure with PFS under the Computational Diffie–Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. The protocol is of interest since it offers a remarkable combination of advanced security properties and efficiency and its security proof is succinct and intelligible.

Secure remittance transaction to bankless consumers in a fragmented applications market

This paper proposes a novel electronic monetary transaction scheme that provides secure access to a set of mobile payment services for “unbanked” consumers equipped with mobile handsets. It considers a realistic scenario of a remittance service, i.e., a user-to-user transfer of funds, in which users do not necessarily trust intermediate parties (called agents) or their infrastructures and therefore require end-to-end security and privacy protection. Since the payment solutions market is very fragmented, we also assume that users and agents are subscribed to different payment solution providers. The paper proposes a holistic approach to securing payment services by focusing on securing the transaction rather than requiring users to authenticate with unknown agent infrastructures and by using a mechanism of delegation of trust. It also proposes a novel security approach for securing payment transactions over insecure communication channels based on the Identity Based Authenticated Key Exchange (IBAKE).

A novel two party identity-based authenticated key exchange

A novel two party identity-based authenticated key exchange