Identity Of Indiscernibles Research Articles

Why I am not an Anti-Haecceitist

In this paper I argue that if the Identity of Indiscernibles is not necessarily true, then Haecceitism ensues—where Haecceitism is the view that there are maximal possibilities that include all the same qualitative possibilities, and yet differ with respect to the non-qualitative possibilities they include. This goes against the common intuition that Anti-Haecceitism is compatible with the Identity of Indiscernibles being only contingently true. My argument is interesting in many respects. First, it shows that in any modal framework there is a connection between the number of worldbound ordinary spatio-temporal objects, and the number of overall possibilities. Second, it has repercussions for the tenability of some philosophical positions, like Generalism, which is usually interpreted as entailing Anti-Haecceitism while at the same time being compatible with the claim that the Identity of Indiscernibles is not necessarily true. If I am correct, Generalism and similar philosophical accounts turn out to be inconsistent. Finally, it provides a strong argument for Haecceitism, given that the majority of authors today find counterexamples to the Identity of Indiscernibles extremely convincing, and many philosophical positions have been and continue being criticised on the basis of their commitment to the Identity of Indiscernibles. The paper is structured as follows: I introduce Haecceitism and the Identity of Indiscernibles in Sects. 1 and 2 respectively. Drawing on a result from the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, which I survey in Sect. 3, I give my main argument in Sect. 4. Finally, I discuss some implications in Sect. 5.

Beyond "Traditional" Substance Dualism: A Hindu Soul

This article presents an argument for a Hindu substance-dualist position that has remained largely overlooked by Western analytic philosophers, a position that diff erentiates (ontologically) the body and the mind from the soul. A thought experiment is put forth concerning Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles that foregrounds intuitions which, it is argued, comport more with a Hindu soul than the soul of emergent dualism, currently one of the most attractive forms of substance dualism.

On making a difference: towards a minimally non-trivial version of the identity of indiscernibles

The identity of indiscernibles (PII) states that indiscernible objects must be identical. Many philosophers have held that the PII turns out to be either true but trivial, or non-trivial but false, depending on how the notion of (in)discernibility is spelled out. In this paper, I propose and defend an account of this notion which aims to yield a minimally non-trivial and yet plausible version of the PII. I argue moreover that this version of the principle is immune to a number of well-known and recent objections to the PII.

Descartes on Numerical Identity and Time

ABSTRACT According to most contemporary philosophers, the Indiscernibility of Identicals is obviously true. We might therefore expect earlier philosophers to endorse it. But I will use a puzzle about identity over time to argue that Descartes would reject it.

Identical head and neck cancer surgery in identical twins with identical oral cavity squamous cell carcinoma – a case of indiscernibility of identicals?

Identical head and neck cancer surgery in identical twins with identical oral cavity squamous cell carcinoma – a case of indiscernibility of identicals?

Quantum prescriptions are more ontologically distinct than they are operationally distinguishable

Based on an intuitive generalization of the Leibniz principle of `the identity of indiscernibles', we introduce a novel ontological notion of classicality, called bounded ontological distinctness. Formulated as a principle, bounded ontological distinctness equates the distinguishability of a set of operational physical entities to the distinctness of their ontological counterparts. Employing three instances of two-dimensional quantum preparations, we demonstrate the violation of bounded ontological distinctness or excess ontological distinctness of quantum preparations, without invoking any additional assumptions. Moreover, our methodology enables the inference of tight lower bounds on the extent of excess ontological distinctness of quantum preparations. Similarly, we demonstrate excess ontological distinctness of quantum transformations, using three two-dimensional unitary transformations. However, to demonstrate excess ontological distinctness of quantum measurements, an additional assumption such as outcome determinism or bounded ontological distinctness of preparations is required. Moreover, we show that quantum violations of other well-known ontological principles implicate quantum excess ontological distinctness. Finally, to showcase the operational vitality of excess ontological distinctness, we introduce two distinct classes of communication tasks powered by excess ontological distinctness.

The Anomaly of Anomaly of Anomaly

The Anomaly of Anomaly of Anomaly

Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles

A and B continue their conversation concerning the Identity of Indiscernibles. Both are aware of recent critiques of the principle that haven’t received replies; B summarizes those critiques, and A offers the replies that are due. B then raises a new worry.

The Priority of Natures against The Identity of Indiscernibles: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Yaḥyā b. 'Adī, and Avicenna on Genus as Matter

The Priority of Natures against The Identity of Indiscernibles: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Yaḥyā b. 'Adī, and Avicenna on Genus as Matter

A Fractal Universe and the Identity of Indescernibles

The principle of Identity of Indiscernibles has been challenged with various thought experiments involving symmetric universes. In this paper, I describe a fractal universe and argue that, while it is not a symmetric universe in the classical sense, under the assumption of a relational theory of space it nonetheless contains a set of objects indiscernible by pure properties alone. I then argue that the argument against the principle from this new thought experiment resists better than those from classical symmetric universes three main objections put forth against this kind of arguments.

Leibniz on Diplomacy and Discernible Art

This article discusses Leibniz’s unique blend of aesthetics and diplomacy. While his art extended diplomacy beyond the bounds of political realism, his diplomacy gave occasion to his art. His identity of indiscernibles (objects with the same properties are identical) inspired philosopher Arthur Danto to define contemporary art in terms of a qualitative perceptual division between the world and the Artworld (objects with the same properties may or may not be art). Although Leibniz would have disputed Danto’s bifurcated artistic perspective, Danto vindicates Leibniz’s major contribution to contemporary aesthetic philosophy by defending his belief in the moral foundation of art. Leibniz was not only one of the pre-eminent men of German letters of his time, he also excelled in diplomacy on behalf of the Hanoverian court. His international relations (IR) theory of peace through grand global alliances is only just beginning to be understood, though his aesthetics and correct diplomacy continue to validate individual creativity, liberal freedoms, and universal enlightenment up to this very day.

On a Misguided Argument for the Necessity of Identity

There is a certain popular argument, deriving from Ruth Barcan and Saul Kripke, from the conjunction of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (PInI, for short) and the Principle of the Necessity of Self-Identity to the Thesis of the Necessity of Identity. My purpose is to show that this argument does not work, at least not in the form it is often presented. I also give a correct formulation of the argument and point out that PInI is not even needed in the argument for the necessity of identity.

On Identity and Simultaneity

While we often talk about different types of identity, logical, ontological, or Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles, we often tend to overlook that any question regarding “What is identical?” or “How is it identical?” depends upon “When is it identical?” or “Where is it identical?” Therefore, identity cannot be understood without spacio-temporal reference. Also, as any object can be described as an event or to make it stricter – any object is an event, thus anything considered to be simultaneous also must be considered as identical in time. However, while simultaneous objects (events) are considered to be identical in time, not all identical objects (events) are considered to be simultaneous. Following this consideration, four possible types of spacio-temporal identity are analysed. Any object (event) can be identical: A) In Time and Space; B) In Time but not in Space; Γ) In Space but not in Time; Δ) Neither in Space nor in Time. Therefore, all objects (events) that are considered as being identical fall into one of these four spatio-temporal types. This is true whether we have properties, features, qualities or any other factors which let us consider objects (events) as identical. As we can see, only cases A and B apply to the notion of simultaneity, where objects (events) are considered to be identical in time. We also know that simultaneity is relative and depends upon a system of reference. Therefore, we may expect that the same applies to identity thus forming an idea of relativity of identity in those types that depend on time.

The Repeatability Argument and the Non-Extensional Bundle Theory

ABSTRACTI present a new objection to Bundle Theory. The objection rests on the repeatability of universals, and targets every version of Bundle Theory that assumes that concrete particulars constituted by the same universals are numerically identical. The only way that bundle theorists can elude this objection is to admit the possibility of distinct bundles constituted by the same universals. If even this view is untenable, then Bundle Theory as such is hopeless. Finally, I show how the present inquiry reshapes the dialectical relationship between Bundle Theory and the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles.

The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals requires no restrictions

There is a certain argument against the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (PInI), or the thesis that whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing. In this argument, PInI is used together with the self-evident principle of the necessity of self-identity (“necessarily, a thing is identical with itself”) to reach the conclusion , which is held to be paradoxical and, thus, fatal to PInI (in its universal, unrestricted form). My purpose is to show that the argument in question does not have this consequence. Further, I argue that PInI is a universally valid principle which can be used to prove the necessity of identity (which in fact is how the argument in question is usually employed).

Mereological monism and Humean supervenience

According to Lewis, mereology is the general and exhaustive theory of ontological composition (mereological monism), and every contingent feature of the world supervenes upon some fundamental properties instantiated by minimal entities (Humean supervenience). A profound analogy can be drawn between these two basic contentions of his metaphysics, namely that both can be intended as a denial of emergentism. In this essay, we study the relationships between Humean supervenience and two philosophical spin-offs of mereological monism: the possibility of gunk and the thesis of composition as identity. In a gunky scenario, there are no atoms and, thus, some criteria alternative to mereological atomicity must be introduced in order to identify the bearers of fundamental properties; this introduction creates a precedent, which renders the restriction of the additional criteria to gunky scenarios arbitrary. On the other hand, composition as identity either extends the principle of indiscernibility of identicals to composition or is forced to replace indiscernibility with a surrogate; both alternatives lead to the postulation of a symmetric kind of supervenience which, in contrast to Humean supervenience, does not countenance a privileged level. Both gunk and composition as identity, thus, display a tension with Humean supervenience.

Signs and reality

Signs and reality are the two fundamental topics of ontology. Reality is whatever exists independently of how we think about it. Signs are those aspects of reality that living things use to interpret, act upon, and communicate about reality. Every signal in a neuron, every thought in a brain, every bit in a computer, and every symbol in any language, natural or artificial, is a sign. Since signs are also part of reality, signs of signs are the part of reality that includes every branch of science including ontology itself. For applied ontology, that distinction is embodied in digital computers: everything in a computer is a sign, either of the outside world or of other signs inside. Aristotle introduced a theory of signs, which he related to language and logic, the medieval Scholastics extended it, and Peirce developed it as the foundation for ontology. His semiotic addresses important issues that have been neglected by the mainstream of 20th century analytic philosophy. The index of that book is a warning of the terminology to come: abstract particulars; argument from almost indiscernible cycles; blob theories; bundle theories; iden- tity of indiscernibles; indiscernibility of identicals; particulars (bare, perfect, thick, thin); tropes (a posteriori, bundles, causality, co-extensive, higher-order, independent existence of, natural classes of, nontransferable, sparse); universalia (ante res, in res, inter res).

Weak Discernibility and Relations between Quanta

Some authors (Muller and Saunders, Huggett and Norton) have attempted to defend Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles through weak discernibility. The idea is that if there is a symmetric, nonreflexive physical relation that holds between two particles, then those particles cannot be identical. In this article I focus only on Muller and Saunders’s account and argue that the means by which they achieve weak discernibility is not through a quantum mechanical observable but an alternate mathematical construction that is both unorthodox and incomplete.

Leibnizian Rejection of Standard Thought Experiments against Identity of Indiscernibles

Abstract It is argued that from a genuine Leibnizian point of view the well-known thought experiment, call it BTE, involving a possible world with only two exactly similar objects, cannot be used to refute Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles (LIdI). If the claim that there are two objects in BTE is based on primitive thisnesses, the Leibnizian objection is that there are no such things; and even if there were, then, quite generally, something true of one object – that it has its primitive thisness – would not be true of the other. Secondly, if the duality claim is based on a primitive, irreducible relation of distinctness, the Leibnizian objection is that there are no irreducible relations. Finally, if it is said that the (putatively) two objects in BTE cannot be separately individuated, then BTE is not a counter-example to LIdI, because if there is no individuation, there are no individuals either, while LIdI presupposes that there are individuals.

Concrete Individuals and the Failure of the Trope Bundle Solution

What account can we give of the nature of the individuality of concrete particulars that allows many properties to inhere in them? Campbell argues that concrete particulars are bundles of tropes, or of instances of qualities. It is argued that we should individuate tropes spatiotemporally, as Schaffer suggests we should, and that such a spatiotemporal individuation principle makes Campbell’s model require that the Identity of Indiscernibles be a necessary truth, which he rejects. The problem of concrete individuals is the problem of how many distinct properties inhere in one, single individual. What account can we give of the nature of the individuality of concrete particulars that allows many properties to inhere in them? Before putting forward his own solution to this problem, Campbell speaks of a proposed solution, the universal bundle theory. This solution states that for some concrete particular, a, if we list all the universals which a instantiates—say F, G, and H—then the bundle of F, G, and H will be a itself. However, says Campbell, there could be some concrete particular, b, which also instantiates all and only F, G, and H. Thus, on this view, b would be identical by definition with the very same bundle with which a is identical, merely on the basis that a and b instantiate the very same universals—in other words, on the basis of the indiscernibility of a and b. But, as Campbell points out, this solution makes the Identity of Indiscernibles a necessary truth, while in reality it is no such thing. Campbell’s own solution is that concrete individuals are bundles, not of universals, but of tropes—more specifically, bundles of all and only compresent tropes. While the Res Cogitans (2015) 6 Fishman | 8