ObjectivesWho have we become, as citizens, patients, practitioners? How do the means of communication and the computerization of our society, its digitization, modify and integrate our identities? Can we assume that artificial intelligence will soon have a more accurate understanding of the human being from whom it will have emancipated itself? Materials and methodsWe move from lexicology to try to grasp, from the point of view of philosophy, a contemporary identity that is moving towards the notion of a “digital identity” whose normal or pathological psychological incidents lead to what we define as “the digital personality.” Then, laying the foundations for a contemporary psychology of identity, we consider how current “psychology” and “psychiatry” view the patient's “personality” and, in turn, how they define themselves from the point of view of “the patient,” or, inversely, from the point of view of the “online practitioner” or “connected researcher.” ResultsIn exchange for its “free” use, the Internet user's action on Web 2.0 produces content and feeds databases, whether this is declared or not. Users’ privacy is lost, as “their” data no longer belongs to them; and citizens’ identity is broken down into digital media functions: a site for meeting friends, a dating platform, a blog about hobbies or travel, etc. At the same time, digital identity is made up of an other-self, including a part of artificial intelligence that provides capacity for its own existence. Rather than two parallel, differentiable entities, real or augmented, a “realistic-virtual” hybrid identity is born. What are the normal or pathological consequences for humans? Postmodern societal trends emerging from or finding expression in the digital can lead to an exacerbation of previously existing personality traits, or even symptoms, in a given individual. At the same time, it happens that the modern means of communication become an aid to experience the world, to increase self-esteem, to dream favorably about one's fantasies, to confide more easily in “strangers,” etc. But in all cases, in the subject suffering, or not suffering, prior to his overexposure, from a neuropsychiatric disease or a psychopathological disorder, it now turns out to be scientifically documented that the increased numerical confrontation induces massive neuropsychic damage (weakening working memory, attention and concentration skills, skills in constructing sophisticated cognitive operations, etc.). On the psychopathological level, rather than the terminology of “identity disorder” or a notion of “co-identities,” the term “identity elusive" seems to us to best account for this mutation of the “me” where the border between reality and virtualities is shrinking: dissociation prevails. The postmodern human and its connected objects become one, but this “uniformity” appears to be made up of a patchwork of identifying confetti more or less joined together, without a real overall harmonization. The common personality is marked by hyperexpressiveness and hyperemotivity, to the detriment of the possibility of controlling affects and the development of introspective capacities. Against the risk of a vacuum, a contra-phobia tends to develop through the smartphone, by the object itself, by the possibility of constantly contacting relatives if necessary, and in return always remaining “available,” which fuels a form of addicting self-centeredness. The result of these developments, for society in general, is a weakening of language skills, and thus of reflection, including in the clinical and scientific space. DiscussionFor the areas of psychology and psychiatry, two developments are currently associated: a desire for “objectivity-scientificity” and a digitization of the patient–caregiver relationship. On the side of “science,” objective “factual” medicine is increasingly interested in pathology at the expense of the suffering subject, confusing sign and symptom, sliding down to a molecular level, far below the patient, towards psychiatry or postclinical psychology. Whether we want to promote it or destroy it, on the side of the clinician or the researcher, “subjectivity” has become a fashionable signifier in the field of mental health. This current return of the “subjective” thrives on a kind of fear of subjectivity present since the end of World War II, which had led American nosography towards the “objectives” of the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952). But rather than a verifiable and/or invariable knowledge concerning a particular psychic disorder, the changes and the relativity of nosographic entities from one version of the manual to another provides us with a mirror image of the subjectivity of an era, which we propose to call “societal subjectivity.” As much as it is a product of our time, the bio-digital revolution will probably impose itself in a future edition of nosography: the diagnostic validity should be increased by the precise definition of biological and/or neuroradiological markers, if these participate in building an etiopathogenic theory of observed psychic phenomena. This orientation remains in its infancy, however: in addition to the tiny number of identified biomarkers, and above all, those that are usable in daily practice, their causal or consequential links with symptoms or with the morbid process remain most often uncertain, inasmuch as they are diverse and interrelated. The neuroscience researcher aims to measure and analyze a multitude of data, integrating, in particular, mimicry and emotions authenticated by thermal camera; movements of body segments and gaze dynamics recorded by sensors; the standardization of voices and speeches for computer software analysis of prosody, used signifiers, syntax… all of which is integrated into a digital phenotyping of suffering. Will we soon be able to speak, replacing the psychologist or the psychiatrist, of an “augmented diagnostician?”. ConclusionDoes it currently appear risky to trust an entirely virtual therapist… an experiment already launched more than 50 years ago! The human being is a “being of meaning,” yet, according to the model of trauma, the emergence of the all-digital can lead to a “collapse of meaning,” generating a tendency to personality dissociation. Granting the reestablishment of the links between emotions, affects, behaviors, and cognitions, spoken language attenuates dissociation, then makes it disappear. Guided by the practitioner, this therapeutic word is sometimes qualified as “maieutics,” from the name of the science of childbirth: it builds thought synchronously to its essence, and an awareness of it, rather than nondisclosure, would account for it secondarily. It is a causal reinterpretation of a meaning understood or rather “attributed” singularly by the subject, after the fact: the past revisited in the present moment creates a synthesis, and chance is transformed into fate. The speaking subject re-elaborates her/his story towards a semantic reconstruction, a densification of her/his networks of signification. Reclaiming one's being by the creation of a discourse, of veridical as well as fictional meanders, narration, even poetization, offers the punctual illusion of a better coherence, always relative, illusory… Therapeutic speech and discourse about such speech–these are still being made, unfinished, uncertain, and alive. These are the characteristics of what we could a “post-psychotherapy,” that is, a psychotherapy and not a re-educational technique whose objectives would be fixed and known in advance. The notions of facts and reality are secondary here, not in the sense of the objective, nor even of the subjective, but of the second degree, then of other successive or overlapping degrees that require intellectual effort. Moving towards appeasement, if we wanted to bring the reflection to its paroxysm, we could advance that it would be enough to give “any meaning,” whatever it may be. This would apply both to the patient and to the practitioner, without each party's meaning necessarily being the same: a testimony to a formally invalid intersubjective construction.