Idealist Logic Research Articles

Naturalism as a Theological Problem: Kant, Idealism, the Chicago School, and Corrington

Research Article| January 01 2017 Naturalism as a Theological Problem: Kant, Idealism, the Chicago School, and Corrington Gary Dorrien Gary Dorrien Union Theological Seminary Gary Dorrien teaches at Union Theological Seminary and Columbia University. His book Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015) won the Association of American Publishers’ PROSE Award, and he recently published The New Abolition: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Black Social Gospel (Yale University Press, 2015). Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google American Journal of Theology & Philosophy (2017) 38 (1): 49–69. https://doi.org/10.5406/amerjtheophil.38.1.0049 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Gary Dorrien; Naturalism as a Theological Problem: Kant, Idealism, the Chicago School, and Corrington. American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 1 January 2017; 38 (1): 49–69. doi: https://doi.org/10.5406/amerjtheophil.38.1.0049 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectiveUniversity of Illinois PressAmerican Journal of Theology & Philosophy Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright 2017 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois2017 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Contextualizing Individual Competencies for Managing the Corporate Social Responsibility Adaptation Process: The Apparent Influence of the Business Case Logic

Companies committed to corporate social responsibility (CSR) should ensure that their managers possess the appropriate competencies to effectively manage the CSR adaptation process. The literature provides insights into the individual competencies these managers need but fails to prioritize them and adequately contextualize them in a manner that makes them meaningful in practice. In this study, we contextualized the competencies within the different job roles CSR managers have in the CSR adaptation process. We interviewed 28 CSR managers, followed by a survey to explore the relative importance of the competencies within each job role. Based on our analysis, we identified six distinct managerial roles, including strategic, coordinating, and stimulating roles. Next, we identified per role key individual CSR-related competencies as prioritized by the respondents. Our results show that the context, as indicated in this study by CSR managers’ job roles, indeed influenced the importance of particular CSR-related competencies, because each role seems to require a different combination and prioritization of these competencies. Moreover, the results suggest that the relative importance of these competencies within each role may be driven by business logic rather than an idealistic logic. The results are presented as a competence profile which can serve as a reflection tool and as a frame of reference to further develop the competence profile for CSR managers.

Political innovation as ideal and strategy: the case of aleatoric democracy in the City of Utrecht

ABSTRACTPolitical innovations aim to strengthen democracy but few connect well to the institutionalized democratic context. This paper explores how political innovations can be successfully embedded in existing democratic systems. It builds upon both the literature on political innovation and on new democratic arrangements and studies a practice of aleatoric democracy – using the lottery instead of elections to select representatives – in the Dutch City of Utrecht. The case study shows how the idealist logic of improving democracy and the realist logic of realizing specific political goals intertwine to get the political innovation accepted by the institutionalized democratic system.

Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology. By GaryDorrien. Oxford: Wiley‐Blackwell, 2013. Pp. x + 605. $174.95.

Religious Studies ReviewVolume 40, Issue 1 p. 22-22 Theology Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology. By Dorrien, Gary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Pp. x + 605. $174.95. Nathan R. Strunk, Nathan R. Strunk McGill UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Nathan R. Strunk, Nathan R. Strunk McGill UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 27 February 2014 https://doi.org/10.1111/rsr.12102_5Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume40, Issue1March 2014Pages 22-22 RelatedInformation

Kantian reason and Hegelian spirit: the idealistic logic of modern theology

Preface and Acknowledgments ix 1 Introduction: Kantian Concepts, Liberal Theology, and Post-Kantian Idealism 1 2 Subjectivity in Question: Immanuel Kant, Johann G. Fichte, and Critical Idealism 23 3 Making Sense of Religion: Friedrich Schleiermacher, John Locke, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Liberal Theology 84 4 Dialectics of Spirit: F. W. J. Schelling, G. W. F. Hegel, and Absolute Idealism 159 5 Hegelian Spirit in Question: David Friedrich Strauss, Soren Kierkegaard, and Mediating Theology 243 6 Neo-Kantian Historicism: Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf von Harnack, Wilhelm Herrmann, Ernst Troeltsch, and the Ritschlian School 315 7 Idealistic Ordering: Lux Mundi, Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, Hastings Rashdall, Alfred E. Garvie, Alfred North Whitehead, William Temple, and British Idealism 378 8 The Barthian Revolt: Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and the Legacy of Liberal Theology 454 9 Idealistic Ironies: From Kant and Hegel to Tillich and Barth 530 Index 574

British idealism: a history

Preface 1. Introduction 2. Beginnings and Influences 3. The History of Philosophy 4. The Metaphysics of the Absolute 5. Idealist Philosophy of Religion 6. The Idealist Ethic of Social Self-Realisation 7. Idealist Political and Social Philosophy 8. Idealist Logic 9. Aesthetics and Literature 10. Developments in Idealist Metaphysics 11. Developments in Idealist Philosophy of Religion 12. Developments in Idealist Logic 13. Developments in Idealist Ethics 14. Developments in Idealist Political and Social Philosophy 15. The After-Life of Idealism Bibliography Index

Hegel's Hyperbolic Formalism

The Science of Logic is perhaps Hegel's most notoriously impenetrable work. Despite well over a century of commentaries as well as the recent proliferation of scholarship, there exists little agreement concerning the text, whether with regard to particular details or the project of speculative logic in general. Nonetheless, the Logic has often been regarded as exemplifying totalizing metaphysics at its worst. Contemporary philosophers concerned with overcoming metaphysics have thus sought to show not only the incoherence of speculative logic but also the perils of Hegel's supposedly totalizing philosophy.In contrast, showing the continuity between Kant and Hegel has been the strategy for establishing a ‘non-metaphysical’ view of Hegel's speculative logic. Against readings of Hegel as a metaphysical monist who defends the reality of the Absolute Idea developing in nature and spirit, speculative logic is presented as the absolute-idealist successor to Kantian transcendental logic. Hegel's speculative logic is an ‘idealist logic’, since it aims at expounding the conditions necessary for the determinacy of any possible object of thought. Speculative logic thus clarities that experience is dependent on non-empirical concepts and, ultimately, on selfconsciousness. Along this interpretative line, Hegel's Science of Logic offers an account of thinking as a norm-based activity, and of concepts as rules for fixing determinacy. The great insight of Hegel's Logic is, on this view, twofold. First, Hegel's notion of the concept [der Begriff] is understood as a holistic-inferential system of logical concepts, since it provides an account of conceptual content as determined by every other possible content. Second, Hegel's analysis of the actualization of the concept — of the concept that has ‘made itself the foundation’, in Hegel's obscure phrasing — provides an account of the fundamental role of authority involved in the process of fixing determinacy. To be bound to a rule is to acknowledge it as having authority over us and at the same time to institute it as authoritative over the states of affairs that we seek to determine. That Hegel spoke of the freedom of the concept is, therefore, crucial. It suggests that determinacy is ultimately a matter of the authorization of reason, of establishing one way of fixing intelligibility over against others.

The Politics of Disjunction

At the center of the rise of modern logic in the twentieth century was an unquestioned commitment to the idea that inclusive disjunction and negation were the fundamental logical operations. Lost in the development of this logic was an alternative starting point proposed by earlier idealist logicians taking exclusive disjunction and negation as fundamental. This paper considers the logical system of Josiah Royce as a development of the idealist version and argues that it has the potential to account both for modern logical systems and for the place of agency and purpose in logic. I will briefly present the late twentieth century effort to settle on a single concept of disjunction in logic in order to reveal the issues at work. This late debate over the nature of disjunction follows an earlier one in which the leading British idealists were challenged by a variety of philosophers who sought to separate formal systems from conscious agency. Once I have set out the debate, I present a reformulation of Royce’s System ∑ that shows how it takes up the conception of disjunction as it developed in idealist logic and uses it to reconnect agency and formal logic.

Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge (review)

~44 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29; 1 JANUARY ~99~ Patrick Murray. Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1988. Pp. xx + 279. Cloth, $49.95. The title of Murray's book might suggest that it falls within the "analytic" genre of Marx studies ~ la G. A. Cohen. However, in his very first endnote Murray indicates that he takes the term "scientific knowledge" in the sense of the German Wissenschaft, which in comparison to the natural sciences has the less technical meaning of "reflective , methodically disciplined knowledge." Indeed, in his introduction the author claims Marx worked out a view of science that rejected positivism in incorporating reflection on the relationship between theory and practice, in recognizing a dialectic of concept and fact, and in thematizing the historicity of theory. Moreover, Marx's science and his humanism are not external to each other, but rather are interrelated as they must be if this science is to have practical revolutionary significance. Another feature of the book not suggested in the title is the author's construction of an ongoing dialogue between Marx and Hegel. Hegel is viewed as important both for his methodological influence upon Marx, especially with the idea of immanent criticism , and as a foil by which Marx, in opposition to Hegel's idealist logic, develops his own non-aprioristic critique of philosophy and political economy. Murray meticulously organizes his text into two parts, each containing several divisions with further subdivisions that comprise a total of nineteen very concise and tightly argued chapters. The first part, entitled "Marx's Critique of Philosophy," treats Hegel's influence on Marx's doctoral dissertation, the break with Hegel that occurs in Marx's writings in 1843-44, Marx's critique of the Young Hegelians, the development of Marx's materialist perspective in opposition to idealism, and Marx's critique of Proudhon's confused Hegelianism. The main theme running through these discussions is that despite Marx's learning from Hegel of the "immanent approach" and the need for a rational mediation of form and content, 'is' and 'ought', and subject and object, nonetheless there are vicious dualisms in Hegel that vitiate the system of reconciliations worked out in his speculative philosophy and applied to politics and political economy. In particular, there is the gap between logic and reality due to the apriorism and abstractness of Hegel's logic, as witnessed in the inversion of subject and predicate and in the speculative syllogism. Hegel's "prefabricated logic" leads to failed mediations between unreconcilable opposites and thus, in simply fitting empirical facts into a logical schema, to uncritical social and political accomodations. Moreover, the appropriation of Hegel's speculative idealism by the Young Hegelians leads to an anthropology based on abstraction and uncritical acceptance of the egoistic individualism of civil society. Marx's historical materialism provides an alternative to the speculative philosophy of self-constituting Spirit by rethinking the relation of consciousness to being, and in particular by attending to the "logics of practical material life" and reconnecting the "co-constituting relation of nature and history" (69-75). Finally, with Marx's critique of Proudhon we have an important intersection between Marx's critique of philosophy and his critique of political economy. In both critiques, the theological and dualistic character of speculative reason is exposed. In Part Two, "Marx's Critique of Political Economy," Murray examines Marx's BOOK REVIEWS 145 methodological writings, especially in the Grundrisse, and his scientific practice as it is displayed in the first four chapters of Capital. Here we find that, despite his debt to Hegel regarding the method of immanent dialectical critique, Marx moves well beyond Hegel with an "empiricism of second intension," i.e., a dialectical approach that develops the logical categories of political economy a posteriori out of the subject matter at hand. Moreover, we discover that in contrast to Hegel's attempt to make the science of knowledge presuppositionless, which results in a formalism that reduces concrete categories to abstract ones, Marx "returns to epistemology" in taking the distinction between subject and object of knowledge seriously, and thereby gets back to the logic of the things themselves. Also, in contrast...

(1) A System of Logistic (2) The Nature of Mathematics: a Critical Survey (3) Idealistic Logic: a Study of its Aim, Method and Achievement

THE number of those who still believe in a perfect continuity between logic and mathematics does not appear to increase to any appreciable extent. Gone are the heroic days when Russell's aphorism to the effect that “Logic is the youth of Mathematics, and Mathematics is the manhood of Logic“was reverently admitted to be a proved belief. The dazzling complexity and austere beauty of the “Principia Mathematica”, a perennial masterpiece of which British thought has every right to be proud, caused people to hesitate taking up Russell's challenge “to indicate at what point in the successive definitions and deductions of Principia Mathematica they consider that Logic ends and Mathematics begins”. A casual visit to any public or college library would show conclusively that persistent thumb-marks can scarcely be found beyond Part 1 of the first volume of the “Principia”: faith leaves the “Prolegomena to Cardinal Arithmetic“and the last two volumes of that monumental work shrouded in their virginal brilliance. What is more, authors of textbooks of logic have asserted that negation and disjunction are the basic operations proposed in the second edition of the “Principia”: they had failed to realise that there is an “Introduction to the Second Edition“in which Russell and Whitehead adopt as primitive in the prepositional calculus the single notion of ‘incompatibility’, and direct the reader to replace their original theory of generalised deduction by an important chapter given in an appendix at the end of the volume and based entirely on the stroke notation. (1) A System of Logistic. By Dr. Willard Van Orman Quine. Pp. xi + 204. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1934.) 20s. net. (2) The Nature of Mathematics: a Critical Survey. By Max Black. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.) Pp. xiv + 219. (London: Kegan Paul and Co., Ltd.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1933.) 10s. 6d. net. (3) Idealistic Logic: a Study of its Aim, Method and Achievement. By C. R. Morris. Pp. ix + 338. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1933.) 12s. 6d. net.

Idealistic Logic.

Idealistic Logic.

Idealistic Logic: A Study of its Aim, Method, and Achievement. By C. R. Morris, M.A., (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.1933. Pp. x + 338. Price 12s. 6d.)

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Idealistic Logic. A Study of its Aim, Method, and Achievement.

Idealistic Logic. A Study of its Aim, Method, and Achievement.

Idealistic Logic and Philosophical Construction

Idealistic Logic and Philosophical Construction

Royce on the Problem of Evil

THE treatment of the problem of evil by the absolute idealists has been particularly unsatisfactory to their opponents. The arguments which they use to defend the presence of evil in a universe which, according to idealistic logic, is perfect, are similar to those employed by the Stoics many years ago. These arguments received brilliant criticism at an early date and yet have reappeared at various intervals throughout the history of philosophy. At the present time it seems that the theist is unable to swerve very far from the general approach of monistic idealism to the problem of evil even though he may not agree with the whole metaphysical system. The problem is still that of the Stoics: If the whole is perfect, why are the parts imperfect? Perhaps no member of the group of absolute idealists has faced this question more frankly than Josiah Royce, and it is to him I feel inclined to turn for a satisfactory answer if one is to be found. Royce insists that the real key to the solution of the problem of evil is to be found in the central thesis of idealism.